Digital Library

The possibility of ending the armed conflict in Colombia will depend, to a large extent, on the state’s ability to prevent multiple criminal economies, and inhibit the actors who participate in them from damaging the implementation of the final peace agreements. This article analyzes criminal economies’ ability to destabilize and thereby damage the post-conflict phase, and identifies dilemmas the state must confront in responding to this situation. The article’s objective is to provide an analytical model to understand the complex relationship between actors involved in the peace process and criminal economies, and to thereby identify risks and possible models for intervention. The theoretical referent of this work is the discussion about peacebuilding in fragile states and literature that identifies organized crime as a spoiler. This is the first attempt to apply this perspective to Colombia, and to take the particular characteristics of the country into account while making comparisons with other countries that exhibit similar features in their own post-conflict and transitional phases. The article comes to the conclusion that in Colombia it is necessary to consider Interim Stabilization Measures, which allow the state to provide an effective response that takes advantage of
available resources without losing sight of the need to strengthen local institutions in the mid-term.

The constant decline of Bogota's rate of homicides and violent deaths during the late 90's and the beginning of the new millennium has its roots in an unconventional practice: mimes, soccer cards, balloons and an unorthodox Mayor wearing a super-hero costume. An innovative experiment on governance shows the effectiveness of approaching the citizens in a pedagogic, familiar and enjoyable way, improving the lives of the citizens regardless of their economic capacities. Rather than approaching the problem of violence with a zero-tolerance style of policies, Bogota invented a new sort of Community policing without the need for the police. By teaching tolerance, respect of law, empathy and patience to the citizens, Bogota created an atmosphere of trust and rejection of incivilities, which led then to a reduction of violence and crime. This case sheds light and guidance to another way of approaching the problem of violence in the Americas that truly deserves to be revisited.

Esta sesión fue moderada por el Embajador de México ante la OEA, el Señor Luis Alfonso de Alba, y contó con las experiencias de Colombia y Brasil. Para el caso colombiano, el Viceministro de Política Criminal y Justicia Restaurativa, Carlos Medina Ramírez, hizo referencia al tema de drogas. Por su parte, Iván Márques, del Instituto Sou da Paz, presentó la experiencia de Brasil en materia de control de armas. Los  comentarios a las dos intervenciones estuvieron a cargo de Eric Olson, Director Adjunto del Programa de América Latina y Asesor Senior del Instituto de México del Woodrow Wilson Center. 

En junio de 2016, durante la elaboración de este informe y dos años después de haber sido elaborada, se aprueba la Estrategia Nacional para la lucha contra la Trata en Colombia en la cual se introduce específicamente el tema de generación de estrategias para la prevención de la trata en el marco del conflicto armado.