Migration from Latin America to Europe: Trends and Policy Challenges
Migration from Latin America to Europe: Trends and Policy Challenges

Prepared for IOM by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Migration to Europe from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has grown rapidly over the last decade. Most of the flows are directed towards southern European countries, although other European countries have also seen significant increases. Widespread poverty and economic hardship caused by the recession in LAC, together with the tightening of visa regimes in the United States, have been a major contributing cause of increased flows. The most recent data in major destination countries, such as Spain, show that the largest increases occurred over the past two to three years. The existence of what is now a significant LAC diaspora in Europe may itself be a driving force for further migration, and flows are likely to continue to increase in the future. The demographic profile of LAC migrants in Europe shows a young population with high rates of labour force participation, relatively high levels of education and strong remitting behaviour. Over US$ 1 billion are remitted annually from Spain to LAC, and 1 billion from the rest of Europe. These figures are expected to rise further as remittance services improve for a growing LAC diaspora.

LAC migration is highly feminized, with women constituting over half of all LAC migrants. Irregular LAC migration including human trafficking, is substantial. As Europe seeks to recruit increasing numbers of highly-skilled migrants, including from the LAC region, concern over brain drain from those regions is also rising. Within the context of strengthened LAC-EU cooperation, rising migrant flows represent both opportunities and challenges for policy makers. In particular, given the EU Commission’s proposal in November 2000 to enhance cooperation and partnerships with third countries, a strengthened dialogue on migration between EU and LAC is warranted. In this connection, the effective integration of migration concerns into the ongoing development cooperation activities will be critical ensuring successful outcomes.
1. INTRODUCTION

The history of European and Latin American migration shows how quickly countries and regions can change from being countries of immigration to countries of emigration. It is not so long ago that Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) constituted a major destination area for European migrants. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many millions of Europeans, mostly from southern Europe, migrated there. This trend had all but abated by the 1950s and 60s, and in the 1980s and 90s, the flows were reversed. Today, the numbers of LAC migrants in countries such as Spain and Italy, countries with strong historical and cultural ties to Latin America, have increased dramatically. By way of illustration, between 1995 and 2003 the LAC population in Spain increased from 92,642 to 514,485.1 A significant portion of that increase occurred in just the last three years and the actual figure is likely to be much higher if dual nationals and irregular migrants are also counted. LAC migrants have also moved in large numbers to other countries of the European Union, especially Italy and Portugal. The UK has also seen its Caribbean migrant population increase. Several factors spurred these recent flows, including the economic crisis in Latin America and the tightening of immigration controls and visa regimes in the United States after 11 September 2001, which had the effect of making Europe a more attractive destination. Available information indicates that migration from LAC to Europe will continue to grow for the coming years.

As this study will show, the demographic profile of LAC migrants in Europe reveals a young population with high rates of labour force participation and strong remitting behaviour. Over US$ 1 billion are remitted annually from Spain and one billion from the rest of the Europe. These flows are expected to grow further with recent improvements to remittance systems and a growing LAC diaspora. Indeed, the average size of individual remittances from EU to LAC exceeds those originating in the US, although the total volume is, of course, much smaller considering the much larger LAC migrant community in the US. LAC migrants show relatively high levels of education and significant feminization; indeed, more than half of all LAC migrants are women. Overall, the cultural and linguistic affinities between the EU and LAC countries appear to facilitate the integration of LAC migrants. However, with the growing migratory flows, the number of irregular migrants has also increased and human trafficking between LAC and the EU has become a serious problem. The trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation is a particularly serious and growing concern. Also, the migration of skilled persons from LAC poses the risk of human capital flight with potentially negative consequences for economic growth in the LAC region.
It is becoming increasingly clear that migration from LAC to Europe presents important challenges to policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic. The issues raised are wide-ranging and include, in particular, irregular migration, human trafficking, brain drain, return migration and remittances. These issues are beginning to figure more prominently in the political dialogue between the EU and LAC, as well as in the ongoing development cooperation activities between the two regions.

Despite its growing importance, little effort has been made in the existing literature to examine the causes and consequences of LAC migration to Europe, or to discuss its policy implications for the EU and LAC. Similarly, the sources of data on LAC migration to Europe remain relatively underdeveloped, as until recently the LAC migrant communities have been quite small. Nevertheless, with the growth of LAC migrant communities in Europe, the need to better understand the dynamics of such flows, the forces driving them and future trends has also grown.

The aim of this study is to arrive at a better understanding of the phenomenon under review. It begins by setting out the policy context in which it is unfolding. This is followed by a review and discussion of existing data on LAC migration and an analysis of the LAC presence in selected European countries, where the largest communities are found in Spain, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Sweden. The causes of migration and the effects on countries of emigration are analysed and discussed, including the issues of remittances, skilled migration or brain drain, human trafficking and future migration trends. The study concludes with a discussion of a framework for future cooperation in these areas.
2. THE POLICY CONTEXT

European heads of state opened a new chapter in the history of EU migration policy with the decision at the European Council in Tampere, 1999, to develop a common EU migration and asylum policy. This development reflected the growing consensus among European policy makers that the realities of labour market demand for immigrant workers, continuing migration pressures from the developing world and demographic trends in European countries, particularly declining birth rates and ageing populations, all called for innovative policy approaches. In its communication on a Community Immigration Policy (COM (2000) 757) of November 2000, the European Commission explicitly proposed abandoning the zero immigration policies of the past 30 years. Instead, new immigration policies would be devised with which to better regulate migration through orderly and regular channels that were themselves responsive to labour market needs, as well as to undercut migrant smuggling and human trafficking. As one observer put it “[t]he new millennium is distinguished by the emergence in the European Union of a debate on the ‘conditioned reopening’ of the borders and by the definition of a new calculated hospitality” (Bribosia et al., 2002).

A key element of the common European migration and asylum policy is its emphasis on partnership with countries of origin, including more comprehensive co-development policies which take into account migration management issues such as tackling the root causes of irregular flows and promoting the development-related aspects of migration. Also, migration issues are to be given higher priority in bi-regional political dialogues. In this context, the European Commission created a new budget line, B7-667, to facilitate migration cooperation with third countries, worth 10 million euros in 2001, and rising to 13 million euros in 2003.

Historically speaking, the predicament of migrants, refugees and displaced persons was already a subject of cooperation between the EU and LAC in the second half of the 1970s. However, until the EU’s recent policy reorientation on migration, brought about by the European Council decision at Tampere, concerns relating to LAC migrant populations were regarded as essentially a humanitarian and social problem of the Latin American countries themselves. Given the close historical and cultural links with Latin America, the EU saw itself under a certain obligation to help the countries concerned to resolve, or at least mitigate, this problem, but the fate of Latin American migrants and refugees was not considered a problem which might substantially affect the EU’s own interests.
A change of emphasis can be detected in the conclusions of the Rio Summit, the first summit between the EU and Latin American and Caribbean countries, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1999. The Declaration of the summit (Point 13) states the commitment of the participating heads of state and government: “to promote and protect the rights of the most vulnerable groups of society, particularly displaced persons and migrant workers and their families”. While the reference to the most vulnerable groups of society reflects the traditional humanitarian concern, the Declaration (Point 26) also includes the commitment of the participants to “join efforts to combat all forms of organized transnational crime such as trafficking of women, children, and migrants”. This aspect of the problem obviously concerns the interests not only of the Latin American migrants, or of victims of trafficking and their countries of origin, but also those of the EU countries where these individuals might end up.

The three years between the 1999 Rio de Janeiro summit and the second EU-Latin America-Caribbean summit held in Madrid, 17-18 May 2002, were marked by an intensification of the general debate in the EU concerning immigration as well as a dramatic deterioration of the economic and social situation in several Latin American countries. The crisis in Argentina with its spill-over effects in Uruguay and other neighbouring countries, the fragility of the Brazilian economy, the political and social instability in Venezuela and the intensification of the civil war in Colombia had already resulted in a rising stream of legal and illegal immigrants and returnees to EU countries, especially to Spain and Italy. These factors clearly influenced both the preparations and the outcome of the second summit.

Thus, a resolution of the European Parliament adopted in November 2001 in the run-up to the second EU-Latin America-Caribbean summit clearly dealt with questions of immigration from the perspective of genuine European interests. Among the aims of a new common strategy for EU-Latin American relations it enumerates “a firm and ambitious development cooperation policy covering immigration, justice and home affairs” and calls for a common strategy “to provide for a broader agenda for bi-regional political dialogue at the ministerial and parliamentary levels alike that also embraces in particular immigration and justice”. More specifically, the resolution states that “the new common strategy must present innovative immigration policies founded on the respect for, and dignity of, the individual and on the sovereignty of the countries concerned”. It also suggested that “an immigration observatory be set up with responsibility for ongoing and thorough monitoring of all issues related to migratory flows between Europe and Latin America”.

The growing importance of the issues generated in the relations between the EU and Latin America by migrants is being referred to more frequently in the regular
institutionalized political dialogues between the two regions. These dialogues take place yearly at ministerial level with the member countries of the Rio Group, comprising all Latin American as well as the Central American countries (the San Jose dialogue), the Andean Community and the MERCOSUR countries.

As a result of these developments, the Declaration on Common Values and Positions adopted by the second EU-LAC summit in Madrid states that the participants “commit (themselves) to further develop policies aimed at promoting the respect for the dignity and well being of migrants, and to ensuring protection of their rights and those of their families” (Point 7). In addition, the participants emphasized “the need to protect the rights of all members of vulnerable groups of our society: children, young people, senior citizens, persons with disabilities, displaced persons, indigenous people, and ethnic and religious minorities”. The declaration also underlines the need “to join forces to fight all forms of organized transnational crime, such as the trade in persons, particularly women and children, infant trade…” (Point 14).

Even more important, the Political Declaration adopted by the heads of state and government of the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean in Madrid includes the commitment of the participants (Point 31) “to carry out an integrated analysis of the different issues of migration between our regions, which has brought and continues to bring great benefits to both, to implement solutions and to guarantee the full respect of the fundamental rights of migrant workers and their families, in accordance with international law and national legislation”. The third EU-LAC Summit took place in Guadalajara, Mexico in May 2004. Although the main themes identified for this summit revolve around the issue of social inclusion and social equity, one of the aims of the Summit is nevertheless to assess “the progress made by the partnership since the Madrid Summit of 2002”. This will certainly include an assessment of the progress made on issues mentioned in Point 31 of the Political Declaration quoted above. Indeed, one of the preparatory events in the run-up to the Summit occurred on 4-5 March, in Quito, Ecuador, where a meeting of government experts was held to discuss the issue of migratory flows within and between the regions in preparation for the EU-Guadalajara Summit. Government experts identified certain “key themes” to be raised at the Guadalajara Summit, including: (1) the necessity of a comprehensive approach to migration which takes into consideration its dimensions, historical ties, root causes and its social, economic and cultural consequences in countries of origin and destination; (2) the necessity to guarantee full respect for the human rights of all migrants without regard to immigration status, including the rights of migrant workers and their families; (3) the necessity to continue to combat irregular migration and migrant smuggling and human trafficking; (4) the necessity to analyse the forms and means of managing migratory flows, including irregular migration; (5) the importance of remittances as a significant source
of income for many countries, emphasizing that all efforts should be made to facilitate transfers; (6) recognition of the contribution of migrants to the economic development and social and cultural life of countries of origin and of destination.

The EU and LAC have also entered into political dialogue and cooperation agreements at the interregional level. For instance, the EU concluded such agreements with the six Central American countries in the context of their specialized dialogue in this region, which includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Article 49 of this Cooperation on Migration agreement reaffirms the importance of joint management of migration flows and provides that migration concerns should be included in the national strategies for economic and social development of the countries of origin, transit and destination of migrants. Particular emphasis is placed on combating illegal migration, smuggling and human trafficking and the management of refugee flows. Specialized dialogues are ongoing between the EU and other LAC regions, including MERCOSUR and the Andean community. EU support for regional economic integration processes within these regions is a high priority.

Association agreements between the EU and individual LAC countries have also been used to pursue cooperation on migration issues including provisions relating to the return of illegal migrants. Concerning bilateral agreements between individual LAC and EU countries, three agreements were recently concluded between Spain and Latin American countries, Colombia, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. The aim of these agreements is to enhance cooperation on migration management, including the opening of channels for regular labour migration and efforts to prevent irregular migration and the exploitation of migrants (Izquierdo, 2002). In 2003, Brazil and Portugal also signed an agreement with similar objectives.
3. EUROPE AS A DESTINATION FOR LATIN AMERICAN MIGRANTS

Europe has always exercised a strong political and cultural influence over the Latin American countries and, as a result, the presence of members of the Latin American elite in European countries has been a reality since the Independence era. For example, there are the students who completed their education in Europe, there are intellectuals, artists and political exiles who have sought refuge from the innumerable wars and conflicts that have shaken the Latin American subcontinent throughout its history. However, Europe has begun to be seen as a destination of migration flows from Latin America only relatively recently.

The transformation of Europe from a region of emigration to one of immigration took place in the context of major economic and demographic changes. In the years following World War II, after a period in which the exodus from the continent predominated as a consequence of the war and the relocation of refugees, northern Europe entered a phase of economic growth that also brought about labour shortages. As a result of the growing demand for labour immigration, guest worker programmes were introduced. Labour migrants arrived from different regions, predominantly from the countries of southern Europe, characterized by stronger demographic growth and weaker economies.

This was also the period of decolonization in Asia, Africa and the European colonies of the Caribbean. This phenomenon was accompanied by migration flows to the former metropolitan countries.

In the 1970s and particularly as of 1974, the oil crises and accompanying oil price hikes seriously affected European economies and ended a phase of strong economic growth. The measures that previously aimed at attracting workers were replaced with “closed door” policies. However, it should be noted that Europe, and some countries in particular, remained especially sensitive to the reception of political refugees and exiles from the dictatorships of the Southern Cone of Latin America throughout that period.

The 1970s and 1980s meant political and social violence in South and Central America. The resulting exiles and emigration pressure due to economic causes which, in many cases, were difficult to separate from the context of crisis and political violence, involved a diversification in destinations, including countries that previously had not been considered as recipients. It should be borne in mind that exile implied forced migration that would in turn provide the core for future networks, thus con-
tributing to increased migration flows to the countries involved. It is well known that the existence of diaspora communities is itself a contributing factor, although the exact extent of immigration through these channels is not known.

Labour emigration in the most traditional sense to European countries, principally Spain, began in the 1980s and intensified in the late 1990s to continue up to the present time.
4. AN ATTEMPT TO QUANTIFY THE PHENOMENON

4.1 Difficulties Related to Information Sources

Information about Latin American immigration to Europe is limited, with the notable exception of Spain where research efforts in this area have been greatest. In the case of other countries, the presence of Latin Americans is small relative to other immigrant groups and quantitative data about these groups are rarely broken down from the general figures.

In addition to this situation which suggests significant difficulties in estimating the total volume of Latin Americans in Europe, there are the shortcomings associated with the sources of information themselves.

Latin American countries have available the ECLAC database *Investigación sobre Migración Internacional en Latinoamérica* (IMILA, Research on International Migration in Latin America) of the Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE, Latin American and Caribbean Demographics Centre). This database contains the census data available on Latin American and Caribbean migrants in all countries of the region (where censuses have been conducted) as well as the United States and Canada, from 1960 to the present. CELADE publishes reports on the state of migration for each decade, and Demographic Bulletins providing data on volume as well as the demographic and socio-economic profiles of these populations. Except for some European countries where the numbers of Latin Americans are available, it has not been possible to complete this information in a manner that would allow a comparison between migration flows within the Americas and those directed at the European continent. This database has been very influential in the studies of Latin American migration, many of which are largely based on that collection of information.

More recently IOM created and promoted the observatories for migration processes in response to the growing need for information, research and analysis related to migration in the region. The bibliographic base of CIMAL and its willingness to collaborate with the databases and libraries of other research centres is an important factor in the dissemination of information on the issue. There is a great lack of primary data on the effects of migration on the countries of origin, particularly in South America, the region that currently experiences the largest migration flow to Europe. A recently published study on Colombian immigration in Spain (Universidad de
Comillas, Universidad Autónoma, IOM and UN, 2003) makes an important contribution to the knowledge about one of the major immigrant groups in that country.

Data comparison poses serious difficulties. The European censuses usually publish information on immigrants classified by “citizenship”, while the Latin American countries and the United States categorize immigrants based on country of birth. In the case of Latin American immigrants in Europe, classification by citizenship prevents identification of those who reclaimed the nationality of their ancestors. However, the results of the Spanish census of 2001 permit the categorization of immigrants both according to country of birth and citizenship.

Furthermore, statistical information on immigrants comes from different types of sources. The countries of northern Europe have population registers; elsewhere the information is based on registers of residence and, in the case of workers, on work permits or social security (OECD, 2003). Using these different population registers, the Système d’Observation Permanente des Migrations (SOPEMI) publishes its annual reports on international migration.

To these difficulties we must add that the statistical data in general do not cover irregular migration, although in some cases the sources of data used may include at least some information on irregular immigration.

4.2 Data Sources on LAC Migration to Europe

With the information available in the SOPEMI database of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Latin American population in Europe is only quantifiable in some countries in which their presence exceeds a certain minimum level.

Table 1 shows data on LAC migrant stock by nationality in selected European countries taken from the SOPEMI report for 2003. Given that the information is presented only when a certain group attains some quantitative weight in a country, very few European countries publish such information regarding Latin American migrants. Table 2 contains the data available about South America from the Eurostat database. The differences between the sources are important and it should be noted that they are based on information coming from different sources and, in certain cases, are based on different definitions, as explained above.
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
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<td>12.4</td>
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<tr>
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## TABLE 2
FOREIGN CITIZENS FROM SOUTH AMERICA IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
1998-2000

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<td>2,646</td>
<td>58,873</td>
<td>2,108</td>
<td>84,678</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>4,766</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>17,007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,496</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>1,681</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>975</td>
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<td>870</td>
<td>22,390</td>
<td>719</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>6,408</td>
<td>323</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>334</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>148</td>
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### TABLE 2 (cont.)
**FOREIGN CITIZENS FROM SOUTH AMERICA IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES**
*(1998-2000)*

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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other South America</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Newcronos. EUROSTAT.
SOPEMI 2003 also contains data on the amnesty programmes in Spain and Portugal that allowed many undocumented LAC migrants to regularize their status (cf. Tables 5 and 6).

The SOPEMI data referred to above illustrates that the volume of immigrants, in any of the variations considered, is considerably smaller than other immigrant groups in European countries. At the same time, it should be mentioned that the Latin American population in Europe has grown significantly in recent years. The settlement of these migrants in Europe began to take shape in the 1970s and 1980s, initially with small core groups, which, to a great extent, comprised exiles from the dictatorships of South America. It is in the mid-1990s, and then particularly from 2000 to 2003, that the phenomenon takes on an unprecedented magnitude and Latin American immigration in Europe begins to attract attention, especially in Spain. Keeping in mind the recent increase, these are still small communities when compared with those in the United States.

It is clear that historic ties, such as former colonial dependence, linguistic identity or the presence of immigrants of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the various Latin American countries, influence the size of the current immigrant communities in each European country. For example, there is a notable presence of Brazilians in Portugal, although there are also Brazilians in Italy, which was the origin of many immigrants to Brazil in the late nineteenth century. A similar phenomenon occurred in respect of Jamaicans in the United Kingdom. These are reasons that explain, at least in general terms, the attraction that Spain holds for Latin American emigrants.

However, it is also evident that in the past decade Latin American labour migration developed with an intensity that seems to transcend the “return immigration” movements and historical ties and is completely in response to recent causes that are identified as the traditional motivations for labour migration in the contemporary period.

4.3 The Latin American Presence in Spain

Spain is particularly relevant in that, in recent years, it has become the main destination of Latin American emigration to Europe. According to figures from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, at the end of 2003, the total Latin American population in that country stood at 514,485, representing 31 per cent of all immigrants with residence permits. After Morocco, Ecuador and Colombia are second and third, with 174,289 and 107,459 immigrants, respectively, surpassing UK nationals, which were
long the second-largest foreign group in Spain. The growth between 1996 and 2003 was particularly significant for Ecuador and Colombia, whose presence had previously been very limited. The crisis in Argentina is evident in the doubling of its emigrants to Spain between 2001 and 2003 (Table 3).

The case of Uruguay is not included in this information because its total migration volume is very small in comparison to the other national groups mentioned. However, the impact of recent emigration on the country’s population of just 3.3 million is striking. An estimated 13 per cent of the population born in Uruguay now lives abroad. Beginning in 2000, emigration increased significantly, achieving a negative migration balance as it surpassed the natural population growth. Emigration in that period was directed mainly at the United States and Spain, with the latter being home to more than 0.8 per cent of the Uruguayan population according to the 2001 census (Pellegrino, 2003).

Martínez Buján (2003) states that migrants’ origins varied dramatically during that period. While in 1995 the portion of Argentines, Chileans, Uruguayans and Venezuelans was important, their relative participation in the immigrant community in Spain declined between 1995 and 2001, not because the flow decreased, but because there was a great increase in the number of Colombian and Ecuadorian immigrants.

According to Merino Hernando, until 1997 the Peruvians constituted the second-largest group of immigrants. This flow, which was already evident in the 1960s, remained stable with slight increases until 1990, when it began to grow significantly. It is of note that Peruvian emigration in the 1980s increased towards all countries it traditionally targeted (Venezuela, United States) but also shifted to new destinations such as Spain, Brazil, Argentina and Chile (Pellegrino, 2001).

Immigration from the Dominican Republic has maintained a strong presence in the United States since the mid-twentieth century and was also important in Venezuela in the 1970s and 1980s. The Venezuelan crisis prompted it to shift in other directions, with Spain being a leading destination. According to Romero Valiente (2003), approximately one out of every 200 Dominicans lives in Spain. Unlike the flows to the United States, which are primarily of urban origin, those who go to Spain are mostly from the rural environment.

Izquierdo et al. (2002) and Martínez Buján (2003) state that the increase in the Latin American population in Spain’s immigration registers is not necessarily due to a significant increase in inflows in recent years, but is rather the result of the legalization processes of 2000 and 2001, which affected a large portion of the Latin American community that had stayed in the country without registering with the authorities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>4,112</td>
<td>7,046</td>
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<td>30,878</td>
<td>84,699</td>
<td>115,301</td>
<td>174,289</td>
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<td>10,412</td>
<td>13,627</td>
<td>24,702</td>
<td>48,710</td>
<td>71,238</td>
<td>107,459</td>
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<td>18,023</td>
<td>21,233</td>
<td>24,879</td>
<td>27,263</td>
<td>27,888</td>
<td>33,758</td>
<td>39,013</td>
<td>57,593</td>
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<td>17,007</td>
<td>16,290</td>
<td>16,610</td>
<td>20,412</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>24,256</td>
<td>26,854</td>
<td>26,481</td>
<td>29,314</td>
<td>32,412</td>
<td>36,654</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10,507</td>
<td>13,214</td>
<td>16,556</td>
<td>19,165</td>
<td>21,467</td>
<td>24,226</td>
<td>27,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3,263</td>
<td>7,012</td>
<td>8,120</td>
<td>10,034</td>
<td>10,910</td>
<td>12,912</td>
<td>14,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6,911</td>
<td>7,323</td>
<td>7,986</td>
<td>9,067</td>
<td>10,634</td>
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<td>5,594</td>
<td>5,827</td>
<td>5,927</td>
<td>6,141</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>8,257</td>
<td>10,869</td>
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</table>

Of the immigrant groups, the Latin American population responded most to the legalization campaign, achieving, along with Poland, the highest acceptance rates.

The information provided by the Ministry of Interior refers to foreigners with residence permits and does not include those who live in Spain irregularly or who entered the country as Spaniards (returned descendants of Spanish emigrants), or who hold European Union documents. However, figures released by the National Institute of Statistics show a significant discrepancy between the foreign population captured in the Ministry of Interior’s count of foreigners legally residing in the country, and the figures on foreign populations produced by municipal registers known as the *Padrón Municipal*. The *Padrón Municipal* is a registry managed by the Spanish municipal authorities for planning purposes. All municipal residents, regardless of immigration status and including Spanish citizens, must register with the *Padrón* in order to be eligible for public services such as education, health and social assistance. The difference between the foreigners registered in the *Padrón* – 2,664,168 – on 1 January 2003 and the foreigners legally residing in Spain in December 2003 – 1,647,011 – suggests that more than 1 million foreigners are present in Spain without authorization.

Table 4 shows the figures for LAC nationalities according to the *Padrón* register for 2002 and 2003. The numbers are much higher compared to those of the regular LAC population of the Ministry of the Interior (Table 3). For instance, according to the *Padrón* there were 390,297 Ecuadorians in Spain in 2003 while the Ministry of the Interior reports 174,289 Ecuadorians legally residing in Spain the same year.

Data from the amnesty programmes also provide an indication of the scope of irregular migration from LAC. Tables 5 and 6 contains data from the amnesty programmes in Spain and Portugal. Amnesty or regularization programmes were used by a number of southern European countries specifically to regularize the status of irregular migrants who satisfied certain criteria. Spain has implemented a succession of regularization programmes, starting already in 1985. The amnesty programmes of 1996, 2000 and 2001 show a phenomenal rise in LAC representation among the migrants benefiting from regularization. In 1996, three LAC countries were among the top six nationalities included in the programme, totalling 4,000 nationals from Peru, Argentina and the Dominican Republic. In 2000, the total number of LAC migrants among the top countries rose to 33,000, with Ecuador and Colombia accounting for 20,200 and 12,500, respectively. In 2001, this figure rose to 92,300 LAC migrants, with Ecuador and Colombia accounting, respectively, for 52,300 and 40,800 migrants. That year, LAC migrants from these two countries separately out-numbered irregular migrants from Morocco for the first time in the history of Spanish amnesty programmes. These figures give an indication of the large proportion of
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<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<th>2002</th>
<th></th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.87</td>
<td>52,731</td>
<td>92.98</td>
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<td>191,018</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>53,666</td>
<td>28.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>38,332</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>31,832</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>20.42</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>390,297</td>
<td>14.65</td>
<td>259,522</td>
<td>13.12</td>
<td>130,775</td>
<td>50.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>44,752</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>11,163</td>
<td>24.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.91</td>
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<td>17.08</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.18</td>
<td>108,792</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>55,809</td>
<td>51.30</td>
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</table>

TABLE 5
REGULARIZATION PROGRAMMES OF IMMIGRANTS IN IRREGULAR STATUS, SPAIN, BY NATIONALITY
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>163.9</td>
<td>234.6</td>
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</table>

Source: OECD, 2004
### TABLE 6
REGULARIZATION PROGRAMMES OF IMMIGRANTS IN IRREGULAR STATUS, PORTUGAL, BY NATIONALITY
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LAC migrants who lived and worked illegally in Spain. The effects of the regularization programmes on the future of migration patterns from LAC are not clear; in particular, how they will influence family reunification migration from LAC and whether LAC migrants retained their jobs or were replaced by other irregular migrants (SOPEMI, 2003).

Table 7 shows the number of residence permits granted by the Ministry of Interior to persons of Latin American origin. There are two types of permits: those that fall under the general regime (Régimen General) and those that are part of the European Union regime (Régimen Comunitario). In both tables the relation is clear.

| TABLE 7 |
| RESIDENTS FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BY TYPE OF RESIDENCE PERMIT |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>General Regime</th>
<th>EU Regime</th>
<th>% EU Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>826,956</td>
<td>497,045</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
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<td>282,301</td>
<td>82,268</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>27,937</td>
<td>14,606</td>
<td>13,331</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>4,995</td>
<td>4,529</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>12,902</td>
<td>7,024</td>
<td>5,878</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>71,238</td>
<td>59,292</td>
<td>11,946</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>24,226</td>
<td>9,640</td>
<td>14,586</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>8,257</td>
<td>5,936</td>
<td>2,321</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>115,301</td>
<td>112,802</td>
<td>2,499</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1,649</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>5,894</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>2,984</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>39,013</td>
<td>33,289</td>
<td>5,724</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>32,412</td>
<td>21,423</td>
<td>10,989</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>3,232</td>
<td>2,763</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>10,634</td>
<td>3,925</td>
<td>6,709</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Latin America</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

between possessing citizenship and belonging to the EU among migrants from countries that, in the past, received Spanish immigrants. Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina have the highest share of people with Spanish or other European nationality that grant access to the EU common immigration policy.

It should be noted that, although they are the largest communities among the Latin American immigrants, a significantly smaller portion of Ecuadorians and Colombians obtain Spanish citizenship. Citizenship can be acquired based on Spanish ancestry or by maintaining residence in that country for a specified period and meeting certain conditions. The fact that a high percentage of these immigrants are recent arrivals would partly explain why fewer hold Spanish citizenship. Nevertheless, according to SOPEMI (2003), the largest portion of immigrants naturalized in 2001 came from LAC countries, including Peru, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Argentina and Colombia.

4.4 The Demographic Profile of Latin American Migrants in Spain

Generally speaking, migrants motivated by economic reasons are young. Even within the labour flow there are some small differences: migrants with higher education levels tend to be older than lower skilled migrants, among whom an early end to education also means earlier parental emancipation, and migration tends to form part of that process. The age profile of immigrants also depends on the time that has passed since migration, as well as on the opportunities for family reunification they have had.

The age of Latin American immigrants in Spain is highly concentrated among those who are engaged in an economic activity, with a low presence of children and the elderly, an indication of recent migration. In the case of children, their low representation in census data could also be the result of differences in how children born to immigrants in the receiving country are classified.

The presence of adults aged above 64 in the immigrant communities tends to reflect either non-economic factors of migration (political migration usually includes people of all ages) or a prolonged presence in the recipient country. Naturally, the age structure in the countries of origin influences the age profile of the emigrants: in the case considered here, the countries with an older age structure in their populations in Spain are also those with a higher proportion of people older than 64: Argentina, Cuba and Uruguay. Even so, the profile of emigrants from those countries is notably
younger than that of their non-emigrant fellow citizens, demonstrating selectivity towards the younger population and the incidence of recent migrations (Table 8).

The majority of Latin American immigrants in Spain are women (Table 9). The literature on migration has emphasized the increased feminization occurring in most migration flows today. This applies to Latin American emigration to Spain, although with some exceptions: there is a gender balance among Argentines, Chileans and Uruguayans. This corresponds to the characteristics of emigration from those countries to other destinations as well. These are flows which, to a great extent, comprise complete families and as a result have a greater tendency to equal proportions of the sexes (Pellegrino, 1989 and 2001a).

### Table 8

**FOREIGNERS BY COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP BY AGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>&lt; 16 years (%)</th>
<th>16-64 (%)</th>
<th>65 or more (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>47,656</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>11,311</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>18,305</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>14,126</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>160,096</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>25,788</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>216,465</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2,407</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>8,892</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>38,532</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>31,579</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>9,745</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>18,370</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Central America</td>
<td>3,702</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other South America</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, the selectivity towards one gender or the other is closely associated with the labour profile. Colombian migration to the United States and to the urban areas of Venezuela has been predominantly composed of women, while in Colombian migration to rural Venezuela men are by far the majority (Pellegrino, 1989). Feminization was also important in Dominican migration to Venezuela in the 1970s and to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. In Spain, with the exception of the Southern Cone countries already mentioned, as well as Ecuador (which also has a gender balance among emigrants), the rest of the flows involve mostly women (Table 9). This reflects insertion into a labour market in which women are in higher demand than men, notoriously in domestic service. The role of migrant trafficking must not be ignored, as it is particularly active in recruiting women for domestic work and for the sex trade.

TABLE 9
FOREIGNERS FROM LATIN AMERICA BY CITIZENSHIP AND SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>% Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North and South America</td>
<td>626,646</td>
<td>278,818</td>
<td>347,828</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>25,798</td>
<td>12,031</td>
<td>13,767</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>535,788</td>
<td>243,010</td>
<td>292,778</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>47,656</td>
<td>23,646</td>
<td>24,010</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>11,311</td>
<td>5,084</td>
<td>6,227</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>18,305</td>
<td>5,575</td>
<td>12,730</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>14,126</td>
<td>6,772</td>
<td>7,354</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>160,096</td>
<td>67,320</td>
<td>92,776</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>25,788</td>
<td>11,188</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>216,465</td>
<td>105,889</td>
<td>110,576</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2,407</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>8,892</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>5,325</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>38,532</td>
<td>15,683</td>
<td>22,849</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>31,579</td>
<td>9,845</td>
<td>21,734</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>9,745</td>
<td>4,809</td>
<td>4,936</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>18,370</td>
<td>7,796</td>
<td>10,574</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other South America</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Central America</td>
<td>3,702</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Martínez Buján (2003), the recent evolution of Latin American immigration in Spain tends towards an increase in the proportion of men. The author attributes this fact to the effects of settlement: once the women immigrants are established, they send for their families (in this case, the male spouse) and tend to reconstruct their families in the receiving country. Such settlement has been stimulated in Spain by the immigrant status regularization programmes carried out in 2000 and 2001, paving the way for family reunification. Izquierdo et al. (2002) also note a recent increase in the demand for male workers by the agricultural, construction and service sectors.

### 4.5 Educational Attainment and Labour Market Participation

The education level of the immigrant population in Spain cannot be analysed based on the normal official sources. Given the bias that implies that the information refers to persons who are irregular immigrants, the regularization survey (Martínez Buján, 2003) provides only partial information. Even so, and assuming that the regularization survey refers to lower skilled sectors, the data reveal a relatively high education level: 22.2 per cent with university studies (including three-year diplomas) and 54 per cent having completed secondary school. The survey conducted for the study of the Colombian population (Universidad de Comillas, Universidad Autónoma, IOM and UN, 2003) had similar results: 20.4 per cent of Colombians interviewed had attended university and 45.3 per cent secondary studies. According to this information, the percentage of university educated people (39%) in the Colombian population residing in Barcelona was significantly higher than in other cities.

In the analysis by Martínez Buján (2003) cited above, important differences appear in the socio-occupational insertion of the migrants according to their legal situation in terms of residence and the availability of a work permit. The statistics also show different situations among those who fall under the European Union immigration regime which provides the right to insertion in the labour market, and those who fall under Spain’s general regime, who must apply for a work permit. The 2001 regularization process implied a three-fold increase in Latin American immigrants with work permits, significantly altering the statistics and conditions of integration into Spanish society for a large number of immigrants.

Insertion into the labour market has varied over time. It has been asserted that at the beginning, among Latin American immigrants “white-collar” workers predominated. According to the Estadística de Permisos de Trabajo a Extranjeros (EPTE, Statistics on Work Permits for Foreigners) in 1990, Argentine, Peruvian, Colombian
and Ecuadorian workers were employed mostly as technicians and professionals (26%-46%), in administrative jobs (13%-16%) and merchants (11%-15%). Furthermore, 5 per cent were high-level managers and business executives. The exception was Dominican immigration, which from the outset was concentrated in domestic service (64%). That was the distribution before the first regularization campaign, which took place in 1991. So it seems that the pioneers took skilled employment, with regulated schedules and with established job descriptions (Izquierdo et al., 2002).

While legal immigration had the characteristics described above, an important number of Latin Americans worked in lower-skilled jobs, and remained undocumented. The regularization processes brought to light the immigrants who, until then, had been hidden from the statistics, with much lower skill levels. The series of legalizations gave rise to a register that more closely reflected the heterogeneous nature of the Latin American immigrants.

The most recent data, published in the 2002 Migrations Yearbook by the Labour Ministry (Anuario de Migraciones de 2002) corresponds to 1999 and so does not include the legalizations of 2001. According to that source, more than 85 per cent of Latin American immigrants who held a work permit were in the service sector. According to those figures, their labour insertion is less diversified than that of Moroccans, for example, who have greater participation in the agricultural and construction sectors. According to Martínez Buján (2003), this concentration of activities in services is due to the over-representation of women in the Latin American migration flows and to the existence of a labour market notoriously segregated by gender.

The official registers do not contain information about the occupational groups in which immigrants work, nor is it broken down by citizenship. Based on the 2000 regularization survey, Martínez Buján (2003) found that 12.7 per cent of those included in the survey held jobs classified as professional or technical, compared to 19.8 per cent of the Spanish working population. Sixty per cent worked in personal services, compared to 35.7 per cent of Spaniards, 10 per cent in agriculture and just 4.8 per cent in industry, compared to 19.4 per cent of Spaniards. The analysis of this type of information leads the author to conclude that immigrants from Latin America establish a better position in the labour market than those coming from other regions.

As for Colombian immigration, the study cited above (Universidad de Comillas, Universidad Autónoma, IOM and UN, 2003) calculates the total at 92,554 people in mid-2002, according to the statistics department of the General Directorate of Police, a figure significantly lower than that recorded by the 2001 census. The data on labour insertion come from the records of Altas de la Seguridad Social (Social
Security), implying that it covers legally employed workers, but omits the unemployed and informal sectors of the economy. According to this information, as was observed in the Colombian population, the contingent of workers grew at a moderate pace from 1989 to 1999, and then underwent exponential growth, doubling between 2000 and 2001, and saw even greater growth between December 2001 and October 2002.

The concentration in the service sector is observed throughout the period 1993-2001, 20 per cent being in domestic service. Unemployment at 13 per cent is distributed variously, according to the date of arrival in the country. It reaches 20 per cent among recent arrivals, while just 5 per cent of those who have been in Spain for more than five years are unemployed. Among Colombian workers, just 7.3 per cent said they were self-employed, with the rest in dependent work relations.

As for the employed, 24 per cent said they worked in domestic service (the sample included more women than men), construction (21.1%), hotels and restaurants (15.8%), retail (10.3%) and personal services (8.5%). The information from the survey shows there are differences in occupation insertion in terms of gender, education and time since arrival in Spain, following the established patterns. While in hotels and restaurants and in retail the participation of men and women is divided equally, women predominate in domestic services and men in construction.

Regarding the length of stay, the survey revealed a lower participation in lower skilled jobs and in jobs where working conditions were worse (construction, domestic service) for those who had been in Spain several years. This means that a longer stay allows a certain social mobility. It also implies higher quality in the type of work contract and their duration.

Persons with higher education tend to work in jobs with better terms. However, it can be stated that, in general, a gap persists between the education levels and the jobs that immigrants obtain.

4.6 The Latin American Presence in Other European Countries

Latin American immigrants have a lower presence in the rest of the countries of Europe, which accounts for a dearth of information or specific studies of these groups.

The Latin Americans registered in Italy in late 2000 numbered 114,697, approximately 8 per cent of the total number of 1,388,153 foreigners (Ministry of Interior,
Peru was the country with the highest number of residents in Italy (29,896), followed by Brazil (19,277). These numbers do not include the “return immigrants”. It is quite clear that if this group were included in the count, the number of Argentines in Italy would be much higher.

The latest regularization process ended on 11 November 2002, and 705,400 applications were tendered, of which 634,728 were accepted. The totals indicate the magnitude of irregular immigrants living in Italy at the time. A break down of the regularization numbers shows that slightly over 10 per cent of all applications for regularization were filed by LAC migrants. With respect to the acceptance of regularization applications Ecuador and Peru were the most significant LAC countries with respectively 36,673 and 17,471 accepted applicants (Dossier Statistico Immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes, 2003).

As was observed in Spain, Latin American immigrants in Italy are mostly women. The feminization of migration is particularly high and is undoubtedly related to the modality of integration of migrants into the labour market (see Table 10). There has been a growing tendency among Brazilian immigrants towards feminization (Machado Bógus, to be published).

A special chapter should be dedicated to the profile of the “return migrants” to Italy. This category becomes invisible in the statistics, although its quantitative impact must be significant. A study about this type of immigrant in the Friuli region (Grossutti, 1997) showed that most “return migrants” came from Argentina, but there were also significant numbers from Venezuela, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Uruguay. According to the study, the “return migrants” belonged to the middle-class sectors in their countries of origin and were motivated to emigrate as a result of the series of economic crises that had hit them particularly hard. The investigation covers the migration that occurred from 1989 to 1994, but predates the more recent crises in Argentina and Uruguay, and the complicated economic and political situation of Venezuela, which generated the conditions that propel emigration.

In Portugal, as in Spain and Italy, Latin American immigration is a relatively new phenomenon. Portugal was historically characterized by strong emigration to the Americas, to its former colonies in Africa and to the countries of northern Europe, beginning in the years after World War II and lasting through the 1970s, approximately. In Latin America, the main destination was naturally Brazil, although from 1950 on there was also considerable Portuguese immigration in Venezuela, which extended until the beginning of the Venezuelan crisis in the mid-1980s. As a result, most “return migration” is from those countries. Ties with the Portuguese diaspora, estimated at more than 4 million people (including Portuguese-born individuals and
# TABLE 10
## IMMIGRANTS FROM LAC IN ITALY
### 31 DECEMBER 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>3,652</td>
<td>6,375</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bahamas-Islands</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>14,219</td>
<td>19,277</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,681</td>
<td>2,849</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9,968</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>6,869</td>
<td>8,119</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2,522</td>
<td>8,883</td>
<td>11,405</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>3,241</td>
<td>7,718</td>
<td>10,959</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>361</td>
<td>524</td>
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<td>Guyana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>148</td>
<td>237</td>
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<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>292</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>74.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>2,721</td>
<td>4,545</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>71.6</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>9,718</td>
<td>20,178</td>
<td>29,896</td>
<td>67.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>852</td>
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<td>72.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>3,072</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total LAC</td>
<td>33,746</td>
<td>80,951</td>
<td>114,697</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total EU</td>
<td>61,113</td>
<td>90,685</td>
<td>151,798</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Other Countries</td>
<td>691,311</td>
<td>545,044</td>
<td>1,236,355</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Foreign</td>
<td>752,424</td>
<td>635,729</td>
<td>1,388,153</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

people of Portuguese origin) have been encouraged by the government through the foreign ministry. This has helped strengthen closer relations between the diaspora and Portugal, manifested in frequent visits, the regular sending of remittances, participation in civil society associations, in parliamentary elections and in the consumption of “ethnic” products (Malheiros, 2002). The permanence of these ties has resulted in a greater tendency to return to Portugal, given the changes in the situations of the countries of residence. According to Malheiros, to a great extent, the cycle of recent migration is stimulated by the demand for workers. On another front, Portugal’s accession to the European Union in 1986 made it an attractive destination. The rising number of immigrants has not slowed. As in the other cases, there is limited data available because the “return migrants” tend to disappear in the immigration statistics. But, according to Malheiros (2002), if the “return migrants” were to be included, immigration numbers in Portugal would have to be increased by a factor of ten.

The Brazilians in Portugal mostly come from the middle strata of Brazilian society, with secondary level education or higher, and many are professionals. This gives them access to the labour market on equal conditions with the native Portuguese population. They are primarily in the service sectors, the arts and sports, where they can achieve higher socio-economic status (Rocha Trindade, 2002). There has also been a notable presence of Brazilian entrepreneurs in industry, commerce and services (Machado Bógus, 1995). Malheiros (2002) maintains that the professional nature Brazilian immigration had initially (in the 1980s) has recently changed to include medium- and lower-skilled workers, who are inserted in the retail, construction and hotel sectors. Machado Bógus (to be published) reaffirms the reorientation of Brazilian migration to Portugal towards less-skilled areas of the labour market. According to 1991 figures from the National Institute of Statistics, cited by the author, 28.4 per cent of the Brazilians recorded were professionals, 27.3 per cent students, 16 per cent in medium skilled jobs (technicians, clerical workers, bankers), 10.3 per cent worked as teachers and just 5.3 per cent were in unskilled jobs, including construction. By 1999, the situation had changed, and the data from the IGT (Inspeção Geral do Trabalho) indicated the following: 29.1 per cent of Brazilians worked in construction, 25 per cent in hotels and restaurants, and 27.1 per cent in unskilled services, including domestic and general maintenance work. According to Machado Bógus:

These figures demonstrate the worsened and more precarious conditions of Brazilian immigrants’ insertion into the Portuguese labour market in the recent period, revealing the significant changes in their profile: poorer, with less education, less professional status and therefore fewer opportunities to achieve their dream of social ascent through their incorporation into the labour market of a European country.
In the United Kingdom, immigrants represent just over 4 per cent of the total population: it ranks third in Europe in terms of immigrants (2.68 million), after Germany and France. The Latin American presence is very limited (73,785), although there is a considerable immigrant population from the Caribbean (253,176), particularly Jamaica. In the 1990s, and particularly after 1994, the migration balance becomes strongly positive. It is mostly labour migration, made up of people who are mostly of the age to enter the labour market (15 to 24 years).

In Switzerland, according to the national censuses the Latin American population categorized by citizenship of origin reportedly grew from fewer than 6,000 people in 1990 to 21,000 in 2000. The presence of women in the different immigrant groups is significant, confirming the feminization trend. Latin Americans concentrated in Zurich and Geneva, are mostly young and many have arrived in the past five years. According to information in a recent study (Stienen, 2003), the consulates of Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru estimate that 60 per cent of immigrants from those countries are living in Switzerland undocumented.

In relative terms, Sweden received significant numbers of exiles and refugees from Latin America during the region’s period of dictatorships and violence. Although many returned to their countries of origin, some groups were consolidated, particularly those from the Southern Cone: Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, the last having the largest community with nearly 27,000 registered in 2000 as “born in Chile”, of whom 10,000 are categorized as having Chilean citizenship, suggesting that two-thirds of the Chileans who remained in Sweden have obtained Swedish citizenship.

The information and studies available about other European countries are scarce and in most cases refer to only one aspect of the Latin American communities residing in Europe. Nevertheless, there are indications of a growing Latin American presence, with a profile that tends towards generalization.

The number of LAC asylum seekers in Europe has declined in recent years in line with the cessation of civil wars in the region. UNHCR data show that while LAC is not an important source of asylum seekers for Europe as a whole, with only 2-3 per cent of total flows, it remains the second-largest source of flows to non-European countries, primarily the US and Canada (UNHCR, 2004). Nevertheless, civil strife in Colombia, for instance, is still fuelling significant refugee flows from that country to Spain, in particular. Cuban asylum seekers are another large group. In 2001, Spain took measures to curb asylum applications from Cuba and Colombia by imposing transit and entry visa requirements on nationals of these countries. These measures were effective. One year later, the number of asylum applications from Cubans and Colombians was reduced by more than half, down to 1,200 and 1,100, respectively.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that despite these measures, in 2002 the LAC region remained second only to Africa in their share of refugee flows, with Colombians and Cubans accounting for 36.2 per cent of all asylum applications filed that year in Spain (Anuario Estadístico de Extranjería, 2002).

4.7 Summary

The profile of Latin American immigration in Europe requires further research in order to delve deeper into its specific characteristics and to be able to contribute towards the development of appropriate policies. To date, studies remain scarce and the sources of information make a comparative analysis difficult because of the different criteria used in each country, and even within the same country, for categorizing the phenomenon.

Nevertheless, we believe that the information available on Latin American immigration in Spain and the more limited reports from other countries can be used to arrive at some provisional and generalized conclusions.

First of all, the last years of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century saw a significant growth of the stocks of Latin American migrants in most of the countries studied. Latin American immigrants are highly represented within the age groups participating in economic activity which also results in a low incidence of potential dependants (aged below 15 and over 64) which clearly sets them within the category of labour migration. Because they are mostly recent migrants, their age profile remains valid as there are still few who would identify themselves as “second-generation Latin Americans in Europe”.

A second aspect to be underscored in connection with the design of appropriate policies, is the feminization of Latin American migration flows, especially from the Dominican Republic and Colombia and, though less so, from Ecuador and the Southern Cone. This feminization coincides with the increased participation of women in the labour market. The migration of women is to a large degree autonomous, that is, it does not involve “accompanying the spouse or family”, but rather a search for work and strategies for increasing household incomes. The feminization of Latin American emigration is also reflected in the incidence of trafficking and exploitation of women in the sex trade in other countries, an aspect that is significant in some of the flows studied in this report, and which are dealt with elsewhere.
Information on the education level of the migrants is quite limited; however, the little information available shows a high participation of persons who have been to university or have completed secondary school. This demonstrates a strong selectivity in terms of the average education of the population in the countries of origin. In recent years, there has been a tendency in some migration flows to target migrants for jobs requiring fewer skills.

Integration into the labour market is directed mainly towards the service sector. The high participation rate of women in migration responds to the demands of the labour market segments that are gender selective, such as domestic service or other types of personal services, such as caring for children or the elderly. There is little information available about the occupations of immigrants. But there are indications that overall there is a gap between occupational insertion and the education level of most of the migrants.

Analyses on immigrants and labour markets in the developed countries (Sassen, 1988; Martin, 1999) conclude that immigrants tend to be inserted at the extremes. On the one hand, they respond to the demand for highly-skilled workers and, on the other, they tend to find jobs in areas that are traditionally lower skilled. The labour market insertion of Latin American immigrants in the United States in the past two decades (Pellegrino, 2001b, 2002) involved their placement in sectors demanding highly-skilled workers, with the relative weight of these immigrants varying greatly according to countries of origin. At the other extreme, the majority of immigrants were inserted into labour segments such as domestic service, personal services, retail and activities related to hotels and restaurants. This profile of Latin American migration seems to be generalized throughout Europe as well.

As the migration flows become increasingly widespread, they also become more heterogeneous. On the one hand, there is participation by migrants from rural areas, a phenomenon that was not common in Latin American emigration to Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, the relatively high-education level of these flows reflects the participation of the middle strata, which were severely affected by the crises in the past few decades and for whom emigration becomes a survival strategy even though it also involves downward social mobility regarding the type of jobs to which they have access.

A more precise description of the Latin American communities in Europe would need to be based on more information and more research on the related issues than is currently available.
5. THE CAUSES OF LATIN AMERICAN MIGRATION TO EUROPE

An analysis of the factors that influence the migration phenomena should focus on a variety of factors at different levels, ranging from those that respond to structural factors in the societies involved, to those that, at the micro level, respond to strategies and situations that motivate individuals in their personal and familial migration experiences.

A long-term view affirms that instances of high demographic growth generated population movements that in many cases crossed national borders. The European demographic transition was accompanied by major internal and international migratory movements. Emigration away from the European continent served as an important escape valve to relieve demographic pressures generated during periods of high population growth. But demographic growth does not necessarily culminate in international migration, because it is the effects of this growth on the labour market and the economy in general that affect the long-term migration potential. Nor is the opposite correct: low demographic growth does not necessarily lessen international migration. In some historic examples, just the opposite has occurred.

The accelerated population growth in Latin America over the past half century was accompanied by significant internal mobility, which also implied international migration, whether to developed countries or to other countries in the region. This assertion, which is valid in general terms, does not apply in all cases: among those that recorded considerable demographic loss because of emigration are countries like Uruguay and Cuba, which are also among the countries with the lowest population growth.

Rather than demographic growth, it is the actual population size that emerges as a relevant factor to keep in mind as a determinant of migration. Demographically small countries (the Caribbean islands, some countries of Central America, Uruguay, Paraguay) seem to develop a higher propensity for migration (Pellegrino, 2000). This coincides with the results of Zlotnik’s study (1997) on global international migration trends and is an aspect that merits specific study of the potential of small countries to incorporate their own labour forces and the problems of scale arising from development processes.

The historic view permits an association of the higher levels of international migration with the periods of free trade and acceleration of capital mobility (Thomas, 1961; Sassen, 1988). The phases of accelerated globalization processes
that occurred in the first decades of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the one we are experiencing today, have seen significant increases in the volume of migrants who move among cities and continents. Latin America has been a leading actor in these processes, though with different roles in each phase.

While economic factors most directly affect international migration, identification of the causes explaining why major flows develop from some countries and not others is no less complicated and a task that requires renouncing simplistic interpretations. The economic circumstances that affect employment and wages do not have the same impact in all countries and, in certain cases, the highest rates of emigration are found where economic indicators are not necessarily the most depressed. Certain levels of development are necessary for international migration to occur, which also tends to pose more difficulties than internal migration. In general, it is not the social sectors most affected by poverty that are involved in these processes.

Interstate relations create a nexus that predisposes the initiation of migratory flows. These relations may be economic or political, and also depend on the international context and on the power relations between states. Alejandro Portes (1995) maintained that emergency migration flows depended to a large extent on the history of contacts, colonization and interventions of the powerful nations in their areas of influence. Other authors (Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik, 1992) use similar theses in arguing the need to place migration in the context of the hegemonic relations that predominate in the international context.

From this perspective, the relations of the United States with Latin American countries constitute a perfect example of the influence of power relations and the weight of US hegemony over these countries, as reflected in migration. Although European influence in Latin America is much less, the historic ties are very present and are important when it comes to political and economic decisions. The efforts to re-establish and deepen ties with Latin America has been a strategy of European countries, which in this phase of liberalization and the race to capture markets for exports and to recruit skilled workers, has become more evident.

Violence and authoritarianism have been a determinant of population displacements. Refugees constituted a significant portion of migrations in the past century. In many cases, repression and persecution can be intermixed with economic causes, and the line separating them can be difficult to determine.

This has been particularly true for the Latin American case and was present at all stages of history, and especially relevant in the past century. In the decades we studied for this paper, various similar situations can be identified. The most notable
examples have been the emigration of Cubans to the United States, of Haitians to the United States and Canada, and the increased emigration from Central America in the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s. In the Southern Cone of South America, the displacement of political exiles to other countries in the region, to Europe and to North America was also a dominant trait in the 1970s and 1980s. Also in the 1980s, the violence in Peru significantly accelerated emigration to countries in the region and to Europe.

Colombia is a good illustration of the effects of social and political violence on emigration. Whether in terms of internal displacement or migration across borders, violence is one of the explanatory elements that cannot be ignored when attempting to understand the preponderant place that Colombia occupies as a country of emigration in Latin America. This violence was continuously manifested throughout the second half of the twentieth century, intensifying during shorter periods, and reflected more or less immediately in population movements.

Undoubtedly, emigration as a social phenomenon would not occur if there were no strong factors pushing people to move from their traditional place of residence. There is a tendency to consider the factors that act as determinants in the countries of origin and to underestimate the effects of the demand in recipient countries. However, certain policies and actions in the recipient countries should be taken as highly significant variables, giving rise to migratory flows with certain characteristics. In many cases, the existence and development of these movements is not easy to explain without taking into account the weight of the attraction of certain destinations.

The demand is sometimes expressed in recruitment processes organized by governments, as in the case of programmes aimed at attracting skilled immigrants, or through companies, public or private, that promote relocation with the promise of employment. Demand is also expressed through networks that disseminate information about labour market options. Piore (1979) sustains the thesis that the existence of unstable jobs, undervalued by the local populations, generates secondary labour markets that consolidate demand for immigrant workers.

The recruiters and the policies established by receiving countries play a key role in the constitution and volume of migration flows. Some authors, for instance Saskia Sassen (1988, 1991), have emphasized the characteristics of the labour markets of the “global cities” and the specific demands for workers that their economies create.

In general terms, it can be said that in certain circumstances “push” factors predominate, while in others the “pull” factors of demand lead to the intensification of
migration. Information about inflows and outflows are not sufficiently detailed to demonstrate these trends. Often they reflect the policies rather than the trends resulting from the determining factors in the societies of origin or the demand in the receiving countries. Regarding Europe, it can easily be seen that among the immigrants arriving in the 1970s and 1980s the element of expulsion predominated, while for those arriving in the recent period demand pressures act in addition to the expulsion factors and affect certain labour market segments in which immigrants are needed, even though unemployment in the labour market overall remains relatively high.

There are jobs in the personal and domestic services sectors, in hotels and restaurants and in construction for which immigrants are in high demand. The labour demand in specialized activities, particularly those related to information technologies (a notorious case was the German government’s recent convocation for workers) or the health sector (as is the case of countries like the UK), has been the subject of specific policies in the European countries.

Confirming the importance of factors related to demand and to policies responding to those requirements, Antonio Izquierdo makes the following assertion with respect to Spain and to the recent process of increased immigration:

We defend the thesis according to which internal demand and the policy followed are the reasons of greatest weight in accounting for the increase of Latin American immigration in Spain. Because while it is true that the conditions in the countries of origin worsened, as is the case of Argentina or Colombia in 2002, and did not obviously improve in Ecuador or Peru, we note that it is the factor of demand, and more precisely the Spanish labour market, that draws workers. It is the economy, reinforced by the policy followed by the government that summons them and selects in some countries and not in others (Izquierdo, 2002: 3).

Different agents are at work in the articulation of conditions propitious for migration and the possibilities in the countries of origin: explicit or implicit policies in certain administrative decisions, recruiting agencies and networks of family and friends.

The policies are subject to public debate and constitute one of the critical issues of the internal policy of European countries; and recently they also form part of the common European agenda. The recruiting agencies are widely known but scarcely studied in the Latin American case, and studies that would allow a determination of their true reach are not available.
Networks of families and friends have been amply studied in the literature on migration. Their role is especially well known in regard to Latin American emigrants to the United States (Massey et al., 1998). The explanatory power of the networks in the development of migratory flows is very strong to the extent that they serve as facilitators of migration, acting as vectors for transmitting information and as supports that articulate the ties of solidarity.

In the case of the Latin American-European relation, in addition to the ties created among recent migrants, as we have said, is the reclaiming of family ties of past European migrations to Latin American countries. These ties facilitate migration by providing documents that authorize residence and work permits. In many cases they imply family contacts who help the migrant, at least in the initial phase. A complete analysis of this factor should include aspects such as the recuperation of historic identities and links that are easily identifiable between certain European and Latin American countries.

The study of Colombian immigrants in Spain (Universidad de Comillas et al., 2003) demonstrated the decisive role played by networks, whether in organizing the migrant’s trip, or providing support upon arrival, finding housing, work, information and more. By way of example, among the individuals surveyed, just 13 per cent said they had no contacts in Spain when they migrated, against 43 per cent who said they had relatives and 35 per cent who had Colombian friends or acquaintances already residing in Spain. In the search for housing and work, in more than 60 per cent of the cases the immigrants turned to their Colombian family and friends, with a smaller percentage (19.5%) consulting employment agencies.

In general terms it can be said that in the Latin American case, inequalities and violence have been two characteristics of the region’s historic context that influenced the growing rate of departure of the population for developed countries. An analysis of concrete situations shows that, in addition to these general explanations, there is an interweaving of motives, opportunities and facilitating mechanisms that operate at the level of individuals and of regional collectives, playing a decisive role in the volume and orientation of the migratory flows. The assertion that there is no comprehensive theory that encompasses the complexity of the migration phenomenon seems to have achieved strong consensus in recent years (Massey et al., 1993, 1998). As such, the study of its causes requires recognition of the fact that each of the different theories contributes to knowledge about the causes of migration, and that one must work within different levels of analysis, attending to the historic contexts of the situations analysed.
The expansion of migration movements to Europe is occurring in a Latin American context of significant migratory potential, with abundant information available and established social networks to facilitate the migration process in relation to specific demands for workers for certain segments of the labour market in European countries.

Migration policies influenced this situation in different ways: in the first place, policies that allow the descendants of European emigrants to recover their European citizenship are a factor affecting the choice of destination of many Latin American emigrants who have the possibility to obtain residence documents through that channel. The amnesty programmes that took place in Spain in 1996, 2000 and 2001 and in Italy in 1998, facilitated the permanence of many immigrants who had until then been undocumented, and were then able to claim the right to bring their families under the family regrouping policies.

On another front, the restrictions on immigration that emerged as a result of a series of reforms of US migration legislation, and the increased immigration controls introduced after 11 September 2001, very likely contributed to reorient part of the Latin American flow of emigrants to Europe instead.

It is difficult to assess the weight of recruiting agencies or of human trafficking organizations in the consolidation of Latin American migration to Europe. Networks of families and friends, which in the study of Colombian immigrants in Spain proved to be very important, undoubtedly are important mechanisms for facilitating migration.
6. THE EFFECTS OF EMIGRATION IN THE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

The effects of emigration in the countries of origin are also an issue of debate among academics and those responsible for developing migration policies. In general, there are fewer studies on these aspects than on the impacts of immigration in the recipient countries.

6.1 Remittances

Although the issue of the impact of emigration on the countries of origin continues to be a subject of debate and differing responses, by the end of the 1990s, the sums of remittances, in keeping with the growing volume of migrants in recent years, have tipped the balance towards the “optimistic” opinions about the effects of migration on the countries of origin.

The magnitude of money transfers sent by migrants to the principal countries of origin is quite significant. According to the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Latin American and Caribbean migrants in industrialized countries sent some US$ 32 billion dollars in remittances to their families back home 2002, an increase of 17.6 per cent over the previous year. Recent figures show that remittances flows to LAC rose to US$ 38 billion dollars in 2003, of which US$ 30 billion originated in the United States (IADB Press Release, 2004). These figures show that the LAC region is the world’s leading recipient of remittances (Table 11). Figures for 2002 show that in addition to the United States, other significant remittance sending countries included Japan (with US$ 2.5 billion), Spain (US$ 1.0 billion), the rest of Europe (US$ 1.0 billion), Canada (US$ 1.0 billion) and US$ 1.5 billion dollars from within the region.

A study of the three largest Latin American immigrant communities in Spain (Colombians, Ecuadorians and Dominicans) indicates that remittances represent a considerable portion of the total income of those older than 18, and that more than 90 per cent of emigrants (90.8% Colombians, 97.1% Ecuadorians and 98.4% Dominicans) send remittances to their families in their countries of origin. The study found that a total of EUR 706.9 million were sent annually to the three countries studied (CECA, Caja Murcia, Caja de Ahorro El Monte, Sadai, 2002).10

According to the same study, each migrant sends seven to ten remittances per year at an average of 370 euros, varying between 595 euros (Dominicans) and
322 euros a month (Colombians). That average is more than the remittances sent by Latin American migrants from the United States, where the study conducted by the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF-FOMIN-PEW Hispanic Center, 2003a) found that 56 per cent of Latino immigrants in the United States who sent remittances to their countries of origin did so at least once a month and that the sum varied between US$ 100 and US$ 300.11 A study of the situation in Italy estimated that remittances represented on average 109 euros, but does not detail the real sum of the transfers.

The means resorted to for sending the remittances are mostly cash transfer agencies, which move more than 80 per cent of the remittances sent by Colombians and
Ecuadorians and around 74 per cent of those sent by Dominicans living in Spain (Table 12). In the United States, the cash transfer companies, primarily Money Gram and Western Union, handle 70 per cent of the money sent by migrants, while 11 per cent is handled by banks and 17 per cent is sent through informal channels.\textsuperscript{12}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Socio-Economic Profile} & \textbf{Colombia} & \textbf{Ecuador} & \textbf{Dominican Republic} \\
\hline
\textbf{Mean Age} & 32.3 & 31.3 & 36.9 \\
\textbf{Average Household Size} & 2.4 & 1.5 & 2.9 \\
\textbf{Average Monthly Income per person (EUR)} & 503 & 595 & 378 \\
\hline
\textbf{Economic Sector} & & & \\
\textbf{Services} & 82\% & 50\% & 76.5\% \\
\textbf{Construction} & 9\% & 15\% & 7.4\% \\
\textbf{Agriculture} & & 23\% & \\
\textbf{Manufacturing} & & 11\% & \\
\hline
\textbf{Educational Attainment} & & & \\
\textbf{Completed University Degree} & 38.8\% & 8.7\% & 8.60\% \\
\textbf{University not Completed} & 14.8\% & 20.30\% & 2.1\% \\
\textbf{Only Basic Studies} & 3.8\% & 25.60\% & 44.40\% \\
\hline
\textbf{Remittances} & & & \\
\textbf{Percentage of migrants sending remittances} & 90.80\% & 97.1\% & 98.4\% \\
\textbf{Mean number of transfers (by year)} & 7.3 & 10.4 & 11 \\
\textbf{Mean time since remittances began to be sent} & 2.8 years & 1.9 years & 5.5 years \\
\textbf{Transaction service used} & & & \\
\textbf{Cash Transfer Agency} & 80.7 & 81.9 & 73.7 \\
\textbf{Banks} & 9.9 & 14.2 & 11.6 \\
\textbf{Use of transfers} & & & \\
\textbf{General household expenses} & 73.3 & 81.9 & 73.7 \\
\textbf{Housing} & 16.4 & 14.2 & 11.6 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{DATA CONCERNING REMITTANCES SENT BY MIGRANTS FROM COLOMBIA, ECUADOR AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM SPAIN (2003, ADULT POPULATION)}
\end{table}

Source: Confederación de Cajas de Ahorro (CECA) et al., 2002: 11.
The arguments of those who opt for cash transfer companies are “security, trust and speed” according to migrants interviewed in Spain. The irregular status of many migrants regarding residence permits prevents them from opening a bank account. The simplicity of the remittance agencies, which usually require only minimal information about the sender as well as the immediacy of the transfer and the ease of collecting the cash in the destination country are the main reasons why they are more popular than banks for the migrants’ cash transfers.

Thus, there appear to be differences in remitting behaviour between LAC migrants in Europe and LAC migrants in the United States. The reasons for these differences are not yet very well understood. The higher percentage of the total in the immigrant community in Spain who send remittances is perhaps due to the shorter time the Latin Americans have been in the country. In both studies it is evident that recent migrants tend to send more remittances, probably because they are maintaining part of the immediate family in the country of origin without having yet been able to reunite the family, or because they involve different strategies in the migration project.

The use of remittances in the countries of origin is generally centred on general household expenses. This is the case in more than 70 per cent of the cases recorded in the United States (with the exception of the Ecuadorians, where it is 61%); percentages above 70 per cent were also found in the cases studied in Spain. Remittances constitute a significant portion of household incomes in the countries of origin, taking into account also the extent to which the crises of the past few years have affected employment and wages.

Family expenses as the main purpose of the remittances cast doubt on the incidence of remittances in the economic development in the countries of origin, to the extent that the money is not invested directly in productive activities. However, their multiplier effect on the local economies must also be kept in mind, as they also benefit households that have no emigrants sending remittances home (Taylor, 1997). More recently, MIF, in summarizing the results of other studies, calculated that the multiplier effect of remittances could be considered at 3 for 1 (MIF-FOMIN-IADB, 2003a).

In a document focused on Central America, ECLAC (2000) proposed a series of measures to foster a more productive use of the remittances, one of the more notable being to encourage migrant organizations and groups to serve as local counterparts in order to channel collective remittances to projects of great impact in the communities of origin. The document advises governments to support such initiatives through
measures that allow activities to be financed by remittances. It also suggests that
international agencies should play a more active role in supporting and reinforcing
this activity and in setting up permanent programmes.

A more complete assessment of the remittances and their impact in the countries
of origin should include long-term follow up, to determine to what extent the transfers are related to the length of time the immigrant has been in the country, the modalities of the duration of stay, the incorporation of the nuclear family in the migration, the degree of interaction of emigrants with their families and their communities of origin, and so on. It might be that if migration is considered temporary, there is accumulation in the family of origin, with sights on returning. And if the migration plan is, or becomes, a definitive residence in the receiving country, the economic ties with the family of origin tend to become limited and the savings are channelled towards better integration in the destination country. Remittances are an important source of money, which can also turn into a source of initiatives and development in the country of origin. But they can also create situations of dependence, both at the national and individual or familial level, accentuating the inequality of the distribution of income within the local population. It is quite clear that policies should generate conditions that allow the income from this source to be channelled to productive activities that constitute enterprises independent from the transfers from abroad, in order to avoid the risks arising from fluctuations in the flow of remittances.

The policies should take care concerning the options of the senders and their families in determining the ultimate use of the remittances. Remittances constitute part of the household income and their use forms part of the private decisions made by the family members. In the field studies carried out in Central American countries, the receivers of remittances opposed any type of government action that implied taxing or any other diversion of the flow of remittances. However, the report says, “the participants were receptive to the idea of investing a part of the resources from the remittances in development projects that directly benefit their communities or promote national economic development” (MIF-FOMIN-PHC, 2003b).

Information on remittances sent from European countries to Latin America is still limited. However, the studies available confirm that in this area there are no great differences between the behaviour of immigrants in Europe and immigrants in the United States. The policies in both cases could be oriented in similar ways.
6.2 Skilled Migration

If remittances are considered a positive return on emigration, then the emigration of skilled resources could be considered as one having negative effects, though in recent years this aspect has also been the subject of debate and of different proposals regarding its effects in the countries of origin.

The availability of a skilled workforce, in particular in some sectors of the labour market, has been a priority of developed countries. In the past decade, there has been a clear emphasis on strategies aimed at developing certain specializations and implementing measures to attract skilled immigrants. In the case of the European countries, even when, in general terms, the borders remained closed to immigrants, several countries have recruited workers with certain specialized skills: one notorious example is the German programme to attract information technology specialists. Similar programmes were implemented in other countries and this phenomenon appears to be growing, turning into a priority issue in north-south relations.

The role European countries take in this regard could hurt the capacity of developing countries to build their own science and technology (S&T) capacities, to develop advanced productive activities and to train their professionals and scientists.

6.3 The Magnitude of Skilled Migration

Studies on the emigration of skilled workers maintain that appropriate information is not available for measuring its true impact (Barré et al., 2003). In the case of the United States, the National Science Foundation (NSF) maintains the SESTAT database which contains a significant portion of its information categorized by “country of birth”, permitting assessment of the incidence of immigration in that country’s science and technology base. There is no similar database in Europe, where information on skilled migration is scant and incomplete.

Evaluation of the impact of skilled migration requires, in the first place, a precise definition of its scope. The ones used in the literature range from those limited to scientists and engineers, to broader definitions that encompass all professionals and technicians, and in some cases even skilled labourers. The choice of any one of these definitions obviously depends on the objectives of the study. On the other hand, when working with official statistics or national censuses, the definitions adopted by those instruments limit the capacity to select indicators, and the studies have to be adapted to the available data. In any case, it is necessary to insist on the availability
of rigorous information in order to quantitatively assess the impact of this type of migration on Latin American countries.

Although there are no precise figures available on the phenomenon, there is evidence that globally skilled emigration increased throughout the 1990s (OECD, 2002; Wickramasekara, 2002). To estimate its magnitude in the countries of the OECD, Carrington and Detragiache (1998, 1999) conducted a study in the late 1990s that took into account 61 countries of origin, which, according to their calculations, represented 70 per cent of the population in the developing world.\(^\text{13}\) The information presented in this study is for 1990, which is prior to the increase that this type of migration is believed to have undergone in the last decade of the twentieth century. However, more recent data on such a broad range of countries are not available. The authors estimated that in the countries of the OECD there were 12.9 million highly-skilled immigrants originally from developing countries. Of that total, 7 million were in the United States, and the remaining 5.9 million in the other OECD countries. The NSF meanwhile estimated that in 1997 the number of people who had degrees in science and engineering\(^\text{14}\) (in the United States) was 12,530,700, of whom 1,493,600 (12%) were born in other countries. The same source indicates that the higher the academic degree, the higher the proportion of foreigners: they account for 26 per cent of those who hold doctorates, and up to 50 per cent in some branches of engineering and in computer science. According to Meyer and Brown (1999), more than 70 per cent of the people in the United States with doctorates in these areas were born in developing countries.

The NSF figures for 1997 on those born in other countries and residing in the United States and holding S&T degrees indicate that among the 50 countries with most immigrants of this type, 13 are Latin American and represent 10 per cent of the total. Asians occupy a prominent position, with India and China having the greatest number of immigrants with S&T degrees (184,900 and 131,300, respectively). Of the Latin American countries, Mexico has the largest contingent, with 35,000 people holding doctorates in those specialties.

Other parts of the developed world receiving significant inflows of immigrants do not have such information available,\(^\text{15}\) though the estimates of Meyer and Brown (1999) establish that in the United States, Japan and the European Union skilled migrants from developing countries who work in research and development totalled approximately 400,000 compared to a total of 1,224,000 living in the countries of origin.

The United Kingdom and France have a high percentage of foreign students in their science and engineering doctoral programmes. In 1999, foreign students
obtained 44 per cent of the engineering doctorates granted by UK universities, and 30 per cent of those granted by French universities. In Germany, the participation of foreign students in these areas is modest, although it has tended to increase in recent years (Barré et al., 2003).

Data from the UK for 1998 indicate that most of the foreigners who completed doctorates there remained in the country, although there are notable variations according to country of origin. The figures for France indicate that of those who obtain doctorates in the natural sciences or engineering, only 20 to 28 per cent return to their countries of origin (Barré et al., 2003). According to the same source, 14 per cent of students completing doctorates in France come from Latin America, while Africa is the region of origin for the vast majority of foreign students in that country.

Complementary to the information on the doctoral students remaining in the developed countries, it has been noted that among skilled foreigners residing in those countries, there is a significant portion who work in academic and research activities, while natives of OECD countries work in other activities (business, management, finance, etc.). This applies to the United States and to France. According to the report cited (Barré et al., 2003) in the research fields in France there is a relatively high proportion of foreigners. The study estimates that the number of researchers from developing countries working in the developed world is equivalent to a third of the researchers in their countries of origin, which coincided with the data mentioned earlier (Barré et al., 2003: 22).

In conclusion we reiterate the need for better data in order to evaluate an issue as important as the one outlined here. The available information, although fragmented, allows us to affirm that skilled migration is growing and will probably continue to grow over the next few years given the conjunction of conditions in the countries of the south and the persistent rise in demand in developed countries, with the added factor of the policies pursued by them to attract this type of immigrant. The countries of the south, with some exceptions, have scant possibility to compete with the salaries offered in the north, and even less in terms of working conditions and professional development. In the case of the Latin American countries, the flows to the north have, on average, lower levels of training than those heading to other countries in the region, such as Brazil or Mexico, by virtue of the demand for certain specializations in those countries, as well as the relatively high salaries offered for those activities. In the flows to developed countries, the averages hide the presence of highly-skilled groups which, although small in respect of the magnitude of Latin American emigration, are determining factors when it comes to development and innovation in their countries of origin.
6.4 The Arguments Cited with Regard to Skilled Migration

The discussion regarding the effects of skilled migration on the countries of origin that was intense in the 1960s and 1970s has been taken up again since the middle of the past decade. In the first phase, “brain drain” divided what were known as “nationalists” and “internationalists” in an important debate that reflected the opposing positions with respect to the north-south relationship, in line with the general terms used in that debate in those years. In the international arena, the issue was included in the agenda of discussions of the United Nations – primarily in UNCTAD – and in the International Organization for Migration. On the occasion of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, held in Santiago, Chile, in 1972, the term “reverse transfer of technology” was adopted, a change in terminology that aimed to include the problem in the framework of three central issues: trade, transfer of resources and transfer of technology and, in other areas, sought to avoid the emotional content implicit in the term “brain drain” (IOM, 1990). An objective of that period was to include the problem in the context of the discussions aimed at achieving greater economic independence of developing countries in respect of developed countries. The proposals drafted at the time, in particular those suggesting taxing the receiving countries to compensate the countries of origin for the loss of their skilled migrants, were not successful.

Since the mid-1990s the issue has reappeared as a subject of debate in academic and policy arenas. From a policy perspective the current proposals imply a shift from a negative view, i.e. one of loss, to one that tends to focus on the positive aspects of mobility to the extent that circular or shuttle migrations where migrants temporarily return to their home countries, contribute to the consolidation and development of certain local labour markets. It is a phenomenon that has been referred to as the transmutation from “brain drain” to “brain gain”. In addition to the term “brain drain”, the complementary terms “brain exchange” or “brain circulation” have also emerged. The idea of considering mobility and circulation as mechanisms for recovering skilled migrants has thus turned into a lead topic in some policies.

In the recent literature on migration the concept of “transnational migrant” corresponding to a migration pattern involving individuals who move across borders, establish and build social ties in the countries of residence while simultaneously maintaining an intense relationship with their communities of origin (Glick Schiller, 1999) has developed. They involve individuals who feel part of more than one collective and seek to share the rights and duties of citizens in the transnational “living space” in which their migration experience takes place. There tends to be a much greater desire to return to and maintain ties with their countries of origin among this
type of migrant than among those who have distanced themselves more from their origins and are more firmly integrated in the receiving countries. It is these feelings of belonging and loyalty to the societies of both origin and destination that the proposals are trying to vindicate in organizing programmes to promote scientific and technological developments in the countries of origin, with the aim to thereby recover the positive aspects of the flow of expatriates from these countries.

In a similar vain there are proposals to adopt the concept of “diaspora”\(^{18}\) and extend it to the dispersed scientific communities. According to Shuval (2000), this expression has acquired a new semantic meaning which goes beyond its traditional sense and is being increasingly used by displaced persons who maintain a connection with their land of origin. The same author maintains that the diaspora discourse reflects a feeling of belonging to an international network that includes different people who maintain a sense of their “uniqueness” and an interest in their country of origin.

The identification of members of the diaspora with projects in their country of origin would permit the stimulation of scientific or economic development through cooperation from a distance or occasional visits. According to a recent report (Barré et al., 2003) scientific diasporas can emerge either as spontaneous movements which organize themselves on their own initiative and make use of electronic communications, or in response to requests from the governments of their countries of origin.

In Latin America, a scientific conference held in Bogotá in 1996 entitled “International scientific migrations today: the new problematic”, drew academics and politicians from within the region and from other parts of the world with the objective of discussing conceptual plans and case studies of scientific communities integrated into networks. Of particular note was the presentation of the Colombian Caldas Network example, which was one of the first initiatives to group the “scientific diaspora” in Latin America (Charum and Meyer, 1998). Various programmes have been launched in Latin American countries with the objective of recovering mobility for the sake of national projects. For the most part these programmes were promoted by the governments and supported by the IOM and in some cases by other international cooperative agencies. According to Meyer (1999), 41 networks of knowledge exchange have been identified worldwide, made up of expatriates from 30 countries (which, in some cases, are involved in more than one network), including seven Latin American networks centred on Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay, Peru and Venezuela. Recent years saw a considerable expansion of formal and informal networks that bring together emigrants with the residents of the countries of origin, and pursue different motives.
The resurgence of the issue of skilled emigration as a “problem” to be confronted by governments has also led to a reactivation of programmes to encourage the creation of ties between skilled migrants living abroad and local communities. Initiatives of this type have been created in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Colombia. The increasingly widespread use of the Internet and of electronic communication in general has been a decisive factor in putting these endeavours into practice.

The previous proposals respond to “realistic” evaluations of the national situations in most Latin American countries with respect to the possibilities of scientific technological development and the insertion of emigrants in projects in which they can fully develop their abilities. They also respond, as has already been stated, to the new migration modalities that imply the adoption of transnational practices, which allow broad “living spaces” that transcend national borders, professional or academic practices that are carried out in various spaces simultaneously and imply high mobility.

However, the emigration of skilled workers remains a serious obstacle to the development of national and regional spaces dedicated to advanced scientific and technological research or to productive business innovation. The significant number of people with doctorates or of students who have indicated their desire to remain in the United States or in Europe once they complete their studies has been discussed. This lays the bases of a highly negative factor for the possibility of consolidating a critical mass and creating strong factors for academic and scientific development.

On the other hand, it is well known that the presence of individuals with clear leadership in the field of knowledge creation and innovation is an important factor for consolidating favourable “environments” for scientific and technological (S&T) research and development. By contrast, the absence and departures with the intention of orienting projects towards other countries are a source of discouragement that tends to depress societies and sap their energy from innovative projects.

The European countries can play a positive role in this regard. Keeping in mind the cultural influence of Europe on Latin America and the training of highly skilled scientific and professional elites, the European countries, whether through national programmes or within the EU agenda, can assume leadership roles with the objective of developing spaces for S&T by promoting cooperation programmes in innovative activities and in collaborating in the advanced training of human resources. Conversely, a European policy for attracting highly-skilled workers in strategic sectors can cause severe harm to the present and future development of Latin American countries.
The following is a summary of recommended policy measures:

- Cooperation in scientific and technological development projects, creating centres of activity that encourage individuals to remain in the countries of origin in an environment that stimulates their creative activity.
- Collaboration in generating spaces that favour the return of students once they have obtained their degrees from European universities.
- Promote the activity of scientific diasporas, encouraging circulation and connection with the countries of origin. In particular, the possibility of spending several months a year to work on national projects is of greatest importance.

6.5 Irregular Migration and Human Trafficking

In tandem with rising migration flows from LAC to the EU, the incidence of irregular migration has also risen dramatically, although it is of course very difficult to estimate exactly the numbers involved as this type of movement is by its very nature clandestine. Although the United States traditionally figure as the preferred destination for most irregular flows, several factors combined to influence the increase to other extra-regional destinations, including the EU. To begin with, the global economic recession and, in particular, the deep recession affecting the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and, by 2001, also Brazil and the continuing political instability in Colombia, have increased the migration pressures in the region. The situation was aggravated by the post-September 11 atmosphere and the measures taken by the United States in the context of the fight against terrorism. The exclusion in 2002 of Argentina from the US Visa Waiver Programme and the increased scrutiny of all visa applications by the US authorities contributed to a diversion to Europe of some of the irregular flows which otherwise would have gone to the United States. These and other factors have led to increasing numbers of irregular migrants, especially in southern European countries. As a point of reference, a recent study on Colombians in Spain estimated that up to two-thirds of the Colombian community, which is one of the largest immigrant communities in Spain, could be present irregularly (Universidad de Comillas, Universidad Autonoma, IOM and UN, 2003).

One aspect of irregular migration receiving increasing international attention is that of human trafficking. Trafficking in human beings is a global phenomenon which many commentators have likened to a modern form of slavery. Trafficking has a long history in Latin America, and Europe has historically been one of the principal destinations of trafficked women and children. Trafficking should be distinguished from smuggling; the latter involves facilitation of illegal entry of migrants into a
country, while trafficking involves the recruitment, transport and exploitation of migrants under deceptive or coercive conditions.\textsuperscript{19} The legal definition of trafficking contained in the \textit{United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons especially Women and Children} includes persons trafficked for purposes of forced labour, slavery and other kinds of labour exploitation. The focus of the discussion below is on trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation, a growing phenomenon in Latin America.

Trafficking both within and from LAC countries appears to be less well understood than for other regions, and the research literature on this topic has only recently begun to expand. In the absence of hard data, studies have tended to rely heavily on information gathered from NGOs, governments, law enforcement and consular officials, press articles and interviews with victims. Despite the data gaps, there is nonetheless a consensus among experts and policy makers that trafficking both within and from the region is significant and growing, and probably involves tens of thousands of victims each year.

In the absence of hard data on trafficking from LAC to Europe, other indicators have been used to assess the magnitude of the phenomenon. For instance, it is commonly observed that LAC countries constitute one of the main suppliers of sex workers to Europe. Figures which are commonly cited in the literature include an estimated 60,000 Dominican and 75,000 Brazilian women working in the sex industry in European countries. Although the reliability of these estimates is uncertain, they do illustrate that there are well established routes for the movement of women from LAC to Europe and leave open the possibility that trafficking between Europe and LAC has reached significant proportions. According to press reports, calculations of the Spanish police revealed that in 2000 there were 12,804 foreign prostitutes working in Spain, of which more than half were from LAC countries, specifically, 4,761 Colombians, 1,888 Brazilians and 1,099 Dominicans (IHRLI, 2003a).

European countries, including Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Italy and Austria constitute major destination points for trafficked Latin American women and children. A recent study on Brazil noted 32 different routes used by traffickers to move victims from Brazil to Spain, many of which involve transit through Portugal (PESTRAF, 2002). Portugal has also been used as a transit country for Dominican women, although other countries with more relaxed visa requirements are increasingly being used to move women into Spain. Also, popular tourist destinations in Spain are viewed by traffickers as easier to enter than, for instance, Madrid, where immigration controls are stricter (IHRLI, 2003a). The Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and Germany are also common destinations for Brazilian women and
girls (PESTRAF, 2002). A variety of methods are used for the trafficking of women to European countries and they usually involve the procurement by traffickers of fraudulent documents and the use of deception, coercion and financial debt to keep women in bondage on arrival. Overlapping with other criminal activities, including drug trafficking, is sometimes reported. In the case of the Netherlands, criminal gangs have used Dutch laws which allows a man to “recognize” a girl under 17 as his daughter to traffic women from the Dominican Republic to the Netherlands (IOM, 1996). Other methods include the abuse of visa systems, including in the case of Switzerland, the “artist visa” and fraudulent marriages at consulates. One study based on extensive interviews with Dominican women found that many trafficking victims were aware that their trip to Europe involved some element of illegality, but were not aware that they would be forced into sex work. The women interviewed for this study reported that traffickers routinely withheld travel and identity documents upon arrival to prevent escape and that they suffered threats and physical violence (IOM, 1996).

Although some recent initiatives are attempting to address the information gap on trafficking in LAC much more needs to be done to put mechanisms in place to be able to measure and understand the problem better. Equally, enhanced cooperation between origin and destination countries will be critical to combat trafficking successfully.
7. TOWARDS A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR EU-LAC MIGRATION

7.1 Maximizing the Development Contribution of the LAC Diaspora

There is growing global awareness that migrant *diasporas* can contribute in several important ways to the social and economic development of their country of origin. Modern communication and transportation technology makes it easier for migrants to maintain links with their home countries and also facilitates the transfer of skills and funds. Often it is the migrants themselves who serve as the most effective link between the sending and receiving countries. Diasporas often organize themselves and form associations that are able to promote the flow of investments and of know-how to their home countries. The challenge for policy makers in developed and developing countries is to create an environment conducive to enhancing the contributions by diaspora communities to development. Host countries could encourage initiatives to create migrant associations in their territories, while home countries could facilitate the creation of networks among their expatriates to help maintain close linkages with the home communities and assist in the transfer of know-how, information and development initiatives.

One of the most important linkages between *diasporas* and the home country consists in the transfer of remittances. In recognition of this, one of the consequences of migration being examined today in greater depth by numerous governments and international organizations is the potential contribution of remittances to development. Policy makers have been concerned with four major issues relating to the management of remittances: (1) how can the transfer of remittances be made cheaper and easier; (2) how to ensure that remittances are transferred through more reliable channels; (3) what use is made of remittances, and (4) how to best harness the development potential of remittances?

The largest share of remittances flowing to Latin America obviously comes from LAC migrants residing in the United States. By way of comparison, it is estimated that LAC receives US$ 30 billion in remittance from the US, compared to 2 billion from the EU. However, as previously noted, remittances from Europe have grown rapidly in recent years and are expected to continue to do so. LAC migrants in Europe on average remit more frequently and in larger amounts than LAC migrants in the US. There is a need, therefore, to take stock of the various measures that have been tried in different parts of the world to manage remittances more efficiently, and
to see whether successful approaches that contribute to development and poverty reduction could be replicated in the EU-LAC context. Some initiatives have already been taken to reduce the cost of transfers, for instance from Spain to Ecuador. However, beyond increasing competitiveness, reliability and transparency of transfers, efforts are also needed to encourage savings and investment options in countries of origin. Examples of “best practice” might be gleaned from initiatives taken in the context of remittances flowing from the US, including matching funds and community investment schemes which have been tried in Mexico and other LAC countries. Labour migration programmes already established between some southern European countries and the LAC may constitute a useful context in which to spread information about remittance transfers and investment options to future migrants. In addition, the level of LAC migrants in Europe without a bank account is relatively high, in some cases higher than for LAC migrants residing in the US, and greater efforts are needed to promote participation in banking institutions at both ends of the remittance lifeline. This will increase the likelihood of savings and give migrants and their families back home access to a range of other important banking products, such as insurance and investment options.

Returning migrants and migrant diasporas can also be an important source of other types of financial flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI). The Indian diaspora, for example, contributes close to one-tenth of FDI flows to India, while the Chinese expatriate communities contribute around half of all FDI (IOM, 2003d). Governments can foster return migration and maximize the investment potential of the experience, skills, networks and financial capital of return migrants by introducing policies to streamline investment procedures for interested returnees, involve return migrants more actively in policy making, and encourage return migrants to contribute to and network with, public sector institutions so that their contributions do not remain confined to the private sector.

As more EU countries seek to attract highly-skilled labour migrants, concerns about brain drain have resurfaced. The effects of the emigration of the highly skilled on countries of origin will vary according to skill levels, the sectors from where they leave, the numbers that leave and whether they subsequently return to their home countries. As we have seen, the Colombian diaspora in Spain is highly skilled, creating the risk that the country is losing significant human capital. Adopting countervailing measures to mitigate the potential negative effects of skilled emigration should therefore constitute an element of LAC-EU cooperation. Such efforts are ongoing in other regions including through programmes implemented by international organizations, such as IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA). Other policy options might include identifying the most vulnerable to skill losses for LAC countries and the establishment of a list of countries that should not be targeted
by employers seeking to recruit overseas workers. Improved regulation of international recruitment agencies and the introduction of guidelines for the ethical recruitment of workers from developing countries are other policy options being discussed. Creating incentives for students to return and use their acquired skills at home, thereby increasing the potential of the home country to acquire skilled professionals is also of major importance.

Also, lessons from Asia seem to indicate that whether migrants return to their countries of origin thereby turning “brain drain” into “brain gain” depends on what their countries of origin can offer them in terms of, for instance, professional and investment opportunities (Skeldon, 2002). In the case of Indian and Chinese expatriates, they returned in large numbers to India, China and Taiwan mainly because of the opportunities opened by the rapid economic growth of these countries. Economic development is therefore an essential element in any strategy aimed at fostering return migration.

7.2 Reducing the Risks of Migration

Trafficking in women and girls from developing countries is a serious and growing concern for many governments. Trafficking is fuelled among other factors by changes in the global economy and major economic disparities between and within countries, exposing poor people, especially women and children, to the risk of trafficking and economic and sexual exploitation. Although there are few reliable indicators for trafficking in LAC, most trafficking studies identify poverty as one of the most important risk factors for trafficking in the region, with trafficking routes flowing from the poorer countries to the relatively more developed, such as the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, as well as extra-regionally to the US and European Union. Therefore, trafficking should receive priority attention in strategies aimed at overcoming poverty in LAC where more than 40 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. In this connection, there is an urgent need to “mainstream” trafficking into development cooperation strategies and for measures intended to reduce poverty to also target those most vulnerable to trafficking. Enhanced cooperation in law enforcement and information gathering and exchange between EU and LAC is also critical to a better understanding of the problem and its prevention.

Poverty is also a major factor driving irregular migration and migrant smuggling. The number of irregular migrants continues to increase despite the rise in spending on enforcement measures in the EU. The absence of viable regular migration opportunities can lead individuals to fall back on smugglers and traffickers for help to
access developed countries. As a result, they are often caught in conditions of personal insecurity and exploitation. The money paid for the services of criminal networks is lost for the development of home countries. In the absence of legal low-skilled labour migration channels, thousands of LAC migrants are engaged in illegal work in Europe.

Comprehensive approaches to manage irregular migration are needed. Such approaches require a range of measures, including foreign direct investment, where possible, development assistance and better protection of the rights of migrants. Another key component is the creation of temporary and targeted labour migration channels to provide viable and attractive alternatives to irregular migration for migrants from developing countries. A recent Spanish initiative under which such agreements were concluded with a number of LAC countries is a constructive step in the right direction. Though more legal entry routes will not end all attempts at irregular entry and residence, but produce at least two positive effects: (1) such policies, if well targeted and well understood, could reduce the incidence of illegal entries and residence and, (2) bilateral labour agreements can act as an incentive for labour-sending countries to assume more responsibility to counteract irregular migration.
8. CONCLUSION

Latin American and Caribbean migration to Europe has grown rapidly in the last decade. Southern European countries have received most of the flows, although other European countries have also seen significant increases. Economic hardship caused by the recession and high poverty levels in LAC as well as the tightening of visa regimes in the United States after 11 September 2001, have been major contributing causes for increasing flows. The close cultural and historic ties of LAC countries to Europe as well as the fact that many Latin Americans are returning to Europe by invoking dual nationality have undoubtedly also facilitated such movement. The most recent data on flows from countries receiving most LAC migrants, such as Spain, show that the greatest increases have occurred in only the past two to three years. The existence of what can now be considered a significant LAC diaspora in Europe may itself be driving further migration, and flows are likely to continue increasing in the future.

However, because LAC migration to Europe is a recent phenomenon and because LAC migrant communities are still small in comparison to other immigrant communities in many European countries, this study has shown that data sources on LAC migration remain relatively underdeveloped. There are exceptions, the best example of which is Spain where the LAC migrant community has become very significant. A better understanding of the dynamics of LAC migration will require stronger efforts in the realm of data gathering.

Demographically, the migrant population is young, with high rates of labour force participation and relatively high rates of educational attainment, the latter causing concerns relating to “brain drain” in countries of origin. Remittances from LAC migrants have reached significant levels and are expected to continue to grow. Improved remittance services and management strategies are therefore becoming more important. LAC migration represents a prime example of the current trend towards the feminization of migration. Unfortunately, the negative aspects of this trend include rising levels of trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation as already observed in both regions. Irregular migration also poses a significant challenge as the number of undocumented migrants moving from LAC to Europe increases.

Within the context of enhanced cooperation at the bi-regional level between LAC and Europe, rising migration flows offer opportunities as well as challenges for policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic. Making migration more orderly, safer, more productive and of greater benefit will involve the development of comprehensive
frameworks for migration management that establish the right balance between the interests of all concerned. In this connection, the effective integration of migration concerns within ongoing development cooperation activities will be critical to ensure successful outcomes.
NOTES

2. The 15 EU countries plus the Commission; 15 Caribbean countries, members of the Lomé Convention; 17 Latin American countries, members of the “Rio Group” and Cuba.
7. According to Spanish legislation, foreign residents are those who hold documentation allowing them to reside in Spain. There are two residence regimes for foreigners in Spain: one includes foreigners from the European Union or from the European Economic Area and their families, and the families of Spaniards that fall under the EU regime and who hold a residence card; the other includes foreigners who are not included in those categories and must apply for a residence permit, which may be temporary or permanent (*Anuario Estadístico*, 2002).
8. There has been a change in the insertion of Latin American migrants that corresponds to the general changes in the labour markets. In the 1960s and 1970s, professionals and industrial workers predominated in Latin American migration to the United States, while later there was a shift towards the service sectors.
9. Information on annual income tends to indicate that residence permits are granted per year, or the entry visas with residence permits, but rarely does it indicate the real volume of immigrants entering per year.
10. In the case of Italy, a study (Caritas di Roma, ILO, 2002) indicates that remittances from that country to Latin American have been estimated at 12.5 million euros, or 2.1 per cent of all remittances sent. Unfortunately this study does not have detailed information on the remittances to Latin America, which is surely due to the scant weight of the region in the destination of remittances from Italy.
11. 1 euro was the equivalent of US$ 1.25 in January 2004.
12. In Spain also, Western Union and Money Gram are the leaders among the remittance companies used most by immigrants.
13. The study did not include the states that comprised the former Soviet Union, or the countries of Eastern Europe.
14. According to the National Science Foundation, included in this definition are engineers of the various branches, basic scientists (mathematicians, physicists, chemists and biologists), social scientists (economists, political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists) and other unspecified social scientists.
15. There do not exist adequate databases to study this issue, with the exception of SESTAT (Scientist and Engineer Statistics), which belongs to the National Science Foundation of the United States.

16. The synthesis of the arguments about the effects of migration on the development of the countries of origin is based on Pellegrino and Calvo (2001).

17. A summary of these activities is found in D’Oliveira e Sousa, 1987.

18. The word *diaspora* (meaning dispersion in Greek) originally referred to the dispersal of the Greek sages around the Mediterranean with the aim of disseminating Greek culture. In its biblical sense, the term was used to describe the dispersion of the Jews and later other peoples subjected to persecution and extermination. More recently it has been used to describe any communities that have a population disseminated in other regions of the world and which maintain links and identity ties amongst them. (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1998: 41).

19. The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons especially Women and Children provides the following definition: “Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, or fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” The term *exploitation* has been interpreted to include sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery, servitude and the removal of organs.
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Migration to Europe from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has grown rapidly over the last decade. Most flows are directed towards southern European countries, although other European countries have also seen significant increases. Widespread poverty and economic hardship caused by the recession in LAC, together with the tightening of visa regimes in the United States have been a major contributing cause of increased flows. The most recent data in major destination countries, such as Spain, show that the largest increases occurred over the past two to three years. The existence of what is now a significant LAC diaspora in Europe may itself be a driving force for further migration, and flows are likely to continue increasing in the future. The demographic profile of LAC migrants in Europe shows a young population with high rates of labour force participation, relatively high levels of education and strong remitting behaviour.

LAC migration is highly feminized, with women constituting over half of all LAC migrants. Irregular LAC migration is significant and human trafficking causes serious concerns. As Europe seeks to recruit increasing numbers of highly-skilled migrants, including from the LAC region, there is a risk of brain drain from those regions. The growing importance of migration flows from LAC to EU and the challenges it raises calls for strengthened cooperation between LAC and EU on migration issues. In particular, the effective integration of migration dimensions into the ongoing development cooperation activities and political dialogues will be critical to ensuring successful outcomes.