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AN OVERVIEW AND PROSPECTUS OF FORCED MIGRATIONS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA 1

Rodolfo Casillas R. 2

Summary

This paper is basically about two questions: how to strengthen the processes of democratic and socioeconomic transition in Central America and what role forced migrants can play in those transitions. The transition processes within the region have not yet consolidated themselves, could still be reversed, at a high cost and loss to local communities and governments and to the international community, which has poured so much into furthering sociopolitical change. Legislating the cessation of the "refuge" of forced migrants and acting accordingly could create more problems than it solves. This paper describes what the negative consequences might be. It also points up the lessons and social practices that Central American migrants have internalized while in transit and at their final destinations, which they can pass along and thereby strengthen the societies from whence they came. The final part of the paper is a proposal for the physical transition of migrants to their native Central America, one that is advantageous to them personally and to the regional democratic processes as a whole.


As the 1990s come to a close, Central America is no longer the scene of the kind of violence it experienced in the 1980s. The political-military conflicts that devastated some Central American countries are over for now, at least their most painful expression, which was the indiscriminate harm inflicted upon communities that, justifiably or not, were regarded as either bastions of support for the insurgency movements or collaborators of the military and paramilitary fighting the insurgents. The various processes of pacification and democratic transition have helped cultivate new environments in which dissenting views and differing ideas about how societies should be organized do not, as they did some years back, pose a risk to those who espouse them or to the residences and routine of the social milieu in which those actors operate.

In the 1980s Central America became a focus of international attention from a number of angles. The conflicts were cast as part of the East-West confrontation. Within the region, the conflicts elicited social and government attempts to deal with the problem of refugees and displaced persons and elicited international solidarity and launched international organizations into action. The conflicts, the forced migrations and other potential effects became grist for the debate on national security and other domestic policy issues in neighboring countries, particularly Mexico, the United States and Canada.3

In these and other respects, today's Central America is very different from what it was just 20 years ago.

     As the 1990s wind down, the world has also changed with the breakup of the Soviet block, whose mere existence evoked fears and fantasies that distorted the way the complex Central American picture was viewed. From a regional standpoint, rightly or wrongly the peoples and governments of the northernmost reaches of this hemisphere (Mexico, the United States and Canada) took a variety of measures (acceptance, rejection, contact and relationship) vis-a-vis Central America and its peoples. For its part, without intending to, Central America helped bring about political, legal, social, economic, cultural and civic rights changes in the countries to the north, among the countries that comprise it and in relationship to Central America itself.

One can safely say that there was one specific contribution:

THE FORCED MIGRATIONS.

One effect of the conflicts was large-scale forced migrations, basically for similar reasons and on three distinguishable levels: 1) within the same country; 2) within the Central American region itself; and 3) outside the region, the most attractive target destination being the northern latitudes of the American hemisphere. Since then there have been other mass migrations. They continue even today, triggered by any number of life-threatening circumstances (although the nature of the threat may have changed) or circumstances that threaten any chance of having the minimum conditions necessary to be safe and secure and to satisfy one's needs. It is and was important to pinpoint who the refugees are within this particular extended migratory process so that those not recognized as refugees might be accorded refugee status. It also became one more recourse for subsequent migrations that, although undertaken for preventive purposes or out of well-founded fear, were nonetheless painted as migrations undertaken in search of economic betterment. In other words, in the 1980s the motives for the migrations became so interwoven that it was difficult to distinguish migrations that were products of political-military conflicts from those that were driven by dissatisfaction and certain expectations.4 In the particular case of immigrants with recognized refugee status, their numbers, sociodemographics and effects on the transit points and target destinations were such that organized civil agencies in the communities and region had to get involved, as did religious and government agencies, international agencies and the organizations that the migrants themselves created.

     A number of benefits accrued from this multi-sided involvement, although they were difficult to appreciate at the time. Some of the processes instituted had to overcome resistance, both on the home front and abroad. However uneven their results, these benefits were important all the same. The first and foremost was that agencies and organizations representing diverse sectors of society were created to address the needs of and dialogue with forced migrants who had for decades lived outside the institutional mainstream in their native countries. A second benefit was that the institutional structure within Central America itself grew as ad hoc agencies and mechanisms were created to address the population problem and its relationship to natural and productive resources. A third benefit was that human rights and citizens in general became a focus of attention, which helped to increase (and in most cases to introduce) public involvement, albeit on a limited scale, in monitoring government self-regulation and institutional affairs. A fourth benefit was an infusion of foreign capital, from a variety of organizations and from the migrants themselves. In general, this capital infusion became a principal source of foreign exchange and undoubtedly contributed to the gradual restoration of social peace, since the remittances became direct and immediate subsidies for people of modest means and for the economies of the nation states.

More than ten years after the emergence of the forced migrations and after long and arduous negotiation, organized returns have been effected with reliable margins of safety and guarantees that the physical safety of those returning home will be respected.5 And so, it would appear that the reasons for the "refuge" have ceased to exist, that the time has come for migrants to close one chapter of their lives and begin another, presumably in their native country. However, before making such a sweeping statement, the complex social processes involved need to be examined.

     While the widespread violence triggered the massive migrations, the end of that violence does not automatically mean the end of the forced migrations of that era and those that followed. The root causes of the conflicts of the 1980s was the breakdown of the Central American political systems, their inability to adapt, and the obstacles that denied sociopolitical participation, under the law, to the politically diverse sectors that were emerging at the time. Extreme intolerance began to give way thanks to the processes involved in the pacification and the transition to democratic government. Sill, it is obvious that the changes have not yet consolidated themselves.

     A new institutional order is underway in Central America. The question is, what is the best way to help it grow? It is doubtful that the political processes in Central America would be strengthened by forcing the return of the forced migrants of the 1980s, assuming that were possible. The democracies of the Central American isthmus are very fragile; their economies are still riddled with inequities; the economic reforms of recent years have a long way to go before achieving their intended social benefits; unemployment, social violence, dissatisfaction and public insecurity remain at disturbingly high levels.6 This scenario begs for the assistance that will create opportunities for involvement, if only to prevent a blow that could come at the slightest opportunity, as a necessary measure to "discipline" public exuberance. The choice is simple: either assist the process of democratic participation or set the stage for the generals to return to power.

     In the immediate past, the Ubicos, the Somozas and others of their ilk were useful for purposes of imposing, for a limited period, a certain social order. But they did nothing to build healthy societies with solid, respected and respectable political systems. In the Cold War era, the here-and-now was the primary concern, which meant maintaining the status quo. With that, a penchant for military response developed, as did the habit of demanding more and more military foreign aid. The result was that Central American societies grew in fear rather than in democracy. Foreign financing became a bottomless pit, while Central Americans themselves developed mixed feelings toward the United States: rejection, anger, a desire to exploit its fears while at the same time aspiring to its standard of living, and even a desire to live on Washington soil. It is one of history's ironies that the regimes of intolerance and their repressive tactics were driving forces behind the exodus to the north, which saved the lives of vast numbers of those whom the Central American systems of domination had rejected or excluded, enabling these same people to improve their standard of living, so much so that they were able to send their savings back systematically to their countries of origin, to help their families. This unexpected side-effect of the military regimes has been one of the best things for democracy in Central America.

     Apart from the remittances,7 in the course of being uprooted the forced migrants have learned, cultivated and developed knowledge and practices of the utmost importance for

FORMING CITIZENS

of free and democratic societies. For example:

     Two very important conclusions can be drawn from the above points: 1) within a relatively short space of time organized nuclei of immigrants have to some extent won acknowledgment and acceptance from the governments of their native countries, and 2) because of their impact on society, the importance of their remittances, their ties, relations, and their presence on the international agenda, these migrants, taken as a sector, wield more political clout in their native countries than in the countries in which they now reside. Given that fact, institutionalizing specific areas where migrants can play a role can strengthen democracy in Central America.

The idea, then, is to hasten the return of the forced migrants. The problem, however, is one of content, timing and form, and not just administrative or procedural matters, which are themselves a complex problem that will need time to get in place.8 In other words, no matter what, a minimum amount of time will be needed to enable the governments and the communities of forced immigrants to prepare for the latter's return and set it in motion. And if that is the case, shouldn't the solutions explored be ones that preserve an individual's dignity and bolster democracy in both north and central America?

     The ideal would be for the governments of the North American countries to promote and play a role in developing programs that expand the transition process in Central America and that make it possible for the forced migrants to return voluntarily and with dignity, rather than investing in building legal barriers and physical walls to keep out immigrants or to contain them and then return them. The key is to strengthen societies and governments in a way that will obviate the need for forced migrations; the corollary is to create conditions to enable those who wish to return to live decently and become socially integrated. This subject will be revisited further on in this paper. First, however, the problems that an immediate, forced return would create will be examined.

     Legislating the forced migrants' immediate return will create more problems than it will solve if the premise is a simplified equation: the end of widespread violence equals the immediate return of all migrants forced to leave by the now finished conflicts. An immediate return would make it incumbent upon the young democracies to create vehicles of social involvement, to provide everything needed to satisfy the forced returnees' migrants' needs and create jobs. The forced returnees, with their heightened civic consciousness, would make demands that would be impossible to satisfy as long as the democratic and socioeconomic transition processes are still in their early stages. Consequently, as has already started to happen with the enforcement of the new immigration laws in the United States, the affected governments would clamor for exceptions, extensions, contingency plans, and so on, as they face the prospect of situations that could eventually become national emergencies. In effect, one immediate consequence would be that the Central American economies would cease to receive the remittances that are a source of fresh foreign currency. This, in turn, would have an adverse effect on those countries' trade balance, their purchasing power abroad and their capacity to repay the foreign debt. Since a good part of their international economic relations are with the United States, the latter would also be adversely affected were the U.S. Government to decide to put an end to "refuge".9

     Central America's newly found and still fragile social stability would again be in peril, which would have still another immediate consequence: the enormous international investment made in recent years -mainly by Europe and the United States- to further the genesis and launch of the sociopolitical and economic transition processes would be irretrievably lost. Next would come the governments' unsuccessful negotiations, which would become trying exercises in trying to get as much as possible for as little as possible in return. At the same time, the Central American governments would be wrestling with problems of domestic unrest because of their inability to meet demands. In a few short years, all the governments involved, both within and outside the region, would have to assume relative losses that would contribute nothing toward building up democracy or relationships of mutual trust among the states involved. Obviously, the regional pacification and democratic transition would be thrown overboard.

     Worse still, the affected migrants, their families and immediate social circles would be left to fend for themselves, operating outside the institutional framework in their places of temporary residence, in their definitive places of residence and in their countries of origin. The governments might eventually sign agreements to end the "refuge", but such agreements would have limited effects in practice and do tremendous harm to the credibility and good name of public institutions, since most of the refugees, many whose legal status is still undefined,10 would have to choose between remaining an undocumented alien or returning to communities that, with circumstances as they are, cannot now or for the foreseeable future offer them the standard of living they have become accustomed to while in "refuge", or the jobs or safety they now enjoy. One can rest assured that given that scenario they will opt to remain undocumented aliens, relying on their enormous capacity to adapt and the practical knowledge they have acquired at their current place of residence. The big loser will be democracy in general, and specifically the peoples and governments of North and Central America.

     The best defense of strong societies is to strengthen weaker societies. It is understandable that the governments of the former should be concerned about population growth and implement various immigration control measures. Thus far the system has mainly been defensive in nature, legislating more selective standards for immigrants' entry and stay, more ironclad border controls11, and inducements to invest in the countries of origin which in the medium and long term may create markets attractive enough to retain potential migrants or to lure back those who have already left. This approach has failed, as three facts illustrate: 1) more and more Central American immigrants have already been absorbed into the target societies; 2) capital investments have not gone to the migrants' native countries as had been expected and, where they have, have not invigorated those sectors that employ migrant labor; and 3) the institutional structure, in both the migrants' native country and destination country, has not gained anything from this approach, since so much migration flows underground.

     In this situation, the earlier immigrant population would continue to draw relatives, friends and fellow countrymen with, without and despite government obstacles, so long as the thinking is that border patrols will stop the flow of immigrants for now and can continue to do so until capital investment alone miraculously manages to retain those who are struggling to save their own lives and to find a better way-of-life. While capital investments and patrols can do many things for the immediate, they can do little to stop the flows of immigrants and have little to contribute toward lasting stability, peace, democracy and life, which is what immigrants -refugees or not- are also seeking.

     With the real or imagined Cold War conflicts a thing of the past, this is the ideal time for the international community to take on the great challenge of

STRENGTHENING AND DEVELOPING SOCIETIES IN DEMOCRACY.

While laws and governments sometimes change people, it is the people who change laws and governments. But they can also choose to disregard laws and ignore the government if they have no other choice but to endure it. Recall, for example, what the Soviet Union once was and what is today a plurality of national, cultural, religious, and ethnic identities trying to put forward their true faces, faces that had lurked in the shadows of the Soviet regime. With the experience and knowledge acquired during "refuge", in the social 'opacity' in which they live, the forced migrants are not what they were in the 1980s. They are citizens who can help strengthen the democratic process in their native countries. Therefore, without the pressure exerted by administrative timetables, programs have to be designed and put into practice specifically to ease

THE PHYSICAL TRANSITION

of as many migrants as possible to the society from whence they came. The transition and the boost to the democratic processes in the Central American region have come about as a result of a radical shift in perspective: things changed when those involved opted to look at the region and its problems in a different way, which in turn led to fresh new practices, with a new and different concept of social time and of the role of new players at the local level, within a system built upon rights and responsibilities. Just as pacification and the strengthening of the exercise of democracy came about through processes of transition, so, too, the return of the migrants must not be forced, effected according to some fixed timetable or indiscriminately applied. Instead, it must be the product of social interweaving that succeeds in making the fabric of Central American society more attractive. As I see it, three types of stitches, properly combined, will create this social fabric: 1) political relations; 2) economic relations, and 3) cultural relations.

     It is essential that Central Americans continue to regard themselves as full citizens of their respective countries, able to enjoy and exercise their political rights. The embassies, consulates, political news, patriotic celebrations and sporadic visits by government officials to refuge communities are not enough to keep their civic identity intact. To the migrants, these are all part of an institutional system that they do not feel entirely a part of and in which they feel they are passive participants. Mechanisms would have to be established and strengthened to make them feel they are partners in and protagonists of their native countries' political future. An example will illustrate: casting one's ballot in the presidential elections of one's native country, regardless of one's place of permanent or provisional residence. Another example: establishing government information and affairs bureaus abroad, possibly in the consulates, to deal with a variety of problems and matters of interest to the migrants. The difference would be that these bureaus would seek out the migrants instead of sitting back and waiting for the migrants to come to request a hearing.

     The idea is to institute a legitimate, established link between Central Americans abroad and their respective governments, one that will enrich the institutional structure and strengthen democratic social practice. This is important because migrants, particularly the undocumented and those who, culturally speaking, are classified with them, do not operate by the logic of formal institutions; instead, they try to avoid them. At best, when they have no other option, they put up with the institutional system, but will extricate themselves from it at the first opportunity. This behavioral pattern, which still persists, is one reason for the distant, ambivalent and even utilitarian relations between the governments, migrants and their representations in the target locations, as they have little to do with the system of authority and social representation. With the general government system in transition, the time is right to extend its coverage and relations with migrants who, it is hoped, can be re-integrated into the national dynamics of the country of origin.

     The money that the migrants send to their Central American communities is basically for household expenses, some social works and, if possible, setting up a small business. The merit of these remittances is unquestionable. However, one has to wonder how long it will be before a portion of the remittances can be put toward investments rather than basic needs, thereby multiplying the benefits possible from the hundreds of millions of dollars that flow into Central America in the form of individual remittances from abroad. Isn't now the time to devise strategies for investing what the migrants themselves contribute toward invigorating the economies of their native countries? Considering the amount of capital involved, this has to be an inviting challenge for financial strategists in the Central American states, pressed to find fresh, immediate resources for the nation's coffers, to create jobs and to supply basic needs. It would be a strong stimulus not only for the remittance of financial resources but also for the quest to find, convey and develop more advanced technologies better suited to the region. This approach would also strengthen the migrants' ties to their native countries. Part of every migrant's dream is to return home a success. Thus far, migrants have tried to accomplish that success on their own, by enhancing their personal prestige within the family and their immediate social circle. But there is always the chance that a migrant might accomplish his/her dream of success for benefit of his/her native country as well, earning the recognition and gratitude of the society into which he/she was born.12

     Central America is an unequal participant in the processes of social modernization, as one of its weakest points is civic formation. Large sectors of society have developed their own types of organization for survival and endurance, but not for their share of the social power that is legitimized and recognized by the rules of institutional life. The vast majority of the forced migrants of the 1980s come from these sectors and carry this same kind of baggage. As I said before, they have quickly acquired knowledge and learned practices within the refuge societies that have enabled them to juggle the sociocultural ways of their native countries with those in which they now live.13 Thus far, the refuge societies have benefitted as their cultural horizons have been expanded, not to speak of the socioeconomic gains. But we still don't know how the migrants' recent lessons are shared with the people back home. One reason is that institutional mechanisms have not yet been developed whereby that knowledge can be passed along to aid the democratic transition in Central America.

     The migrants have introduced various codes of co-existence that they use selectively, in a manner appropriate to the place and circumstance. Their exposure to commonplace technical advances may be beneficial to health, hygiene, public safety, preservation of natural resources, and other matters in their native communities. Many activities that are commonplace in the societies of refuge and in which the migrants engage, are nothing short of extraordinary in their native communities for the simple reason that they are either not done or regarded as snobisms of a few privileged minorities. For example, migrants have an adequate command of pedestrian and traffic rules in the United States and Canada, yet when they cross the border heading south, they drive differently and somewhat erratically. If the periodic remittances of money and goods are combined with others of a civic-cultural nature, migrants could help relieve some of the heath and hygiene problems (gastrointestinal illnesses and malnutrition, for example), traffic accidents, environmental and noise pollution (use of streets, vehicles and parking), creation and observance of clear laws for the massive market in goods and products, to name only a few. In other words, the

IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING CONDITIONS

would be a much more effective means of convincing migrants to return to their native Central America and of persuading potential migrants not to leave.

     One final thought. The topic of forced migrations has to be examined in light of current developments, namely the increase -hopefully a temporary one- in large-scale expulsions worldwide: in North America; in Europe, and tribal Africa. In most cases, it is a question of enforcing macropolicies that regard immigrants as expendable, underestimate their contributions to the communities in which they live and ignore the potential they represent for their native societies. And so I ask myself, what type of humanism is developing and where is it being practiced? What type of democracy, society and citizen do we want? Where, if at all, would immigrants enter into the picture and what role would they be given? Are massive expulsions an atrocity of civilization? As I see it, the challenge is to find and make use of the affinities that the migratory processes have with developments in the socioeconomic and political transitions that weak societies and governments are experiencing. I hope the ideas expressed here will be useful in meeting that challenge.


1 Paper presented at the Conference on Regional Responses to Forced Migrations from Central America and the Caribbean, sponsored by the Organization of American States (OAS) and held by the Open Society Institute (OSI), the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), September 30, 1997, Washington, D.C.

2 Professor and researcher at the Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO) (academic headquarters in Mexico). The author wishes to thank the John T. and Catherine D. MacArthur Foundation for the grant to conduct research on a "Demographic Profile of the Central American transmigrant in Mexico, 1989-1996", which is one of the sources used in writing this paper. The author also wishes to thank Fabienne Venet and Sergio Aguayo, who were kind enough to read the first draft of this paper and contributed invaluable comments and recommendations. Institutional address: Carretera al Ajusco km 1.5, num. 377, C.P.10740, Mexico, D.F., Tels: 6317016 and 6317246, E mail: [email protected].

3 There are inevitable differences in the reasons for involvement, the timing, means, mechanisms and scope of the various parties involved. However, this paper will not attempt a complete evaluation of everything, however necessary that might be; there is more than enough bibliography and documents for that. This paper will merely mention the various sectors involved, both within and outside Central America.

4 One problem that scholars of the Central American migrations have not resolved is conceptual in nature. The political migrants/economic migrants dichotomy is too inadequate and imprecise to explain the variety of migratory flows. The reasons given in interviews with Central American immigrants cite factors that come from both sides of that dichotomy. See R. Casillas, "Central American Migration to Mexico in the Era of NAFTA" in Central American Migration to Mexico and the United States: A Post-NAFTA Prognosis. Washington, Georgetown University, PEW Monograph Series 1, November 1995. Additional information gathered in the field in Central America, Mexico and the United States in 1996 and 1997 confirms and expands upon this conceptual problem and appears in the research paper on a "Sociodemographic profile of the Central American transmigrant in Mexico, 1989-1996", mentioned in footnote 2.

5 See the text by M.A. Castillo "Immigration in Mexico: a Policy Brief" in Central American Migration to Mexico and the United States... op. cit., which includes an overview of the return programs and of the problems that have arisen. Aguayo, Sergio and Patricia Weiss Fagen, "Central Americans in Mexico and the United States", 1988, Washington, D.C. HMP/CIPRAR, Georgetown University. Aguilar Znser, Adolfo, CIREFCA: The Promises and Reality of International Conference on Central American Refugees, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, Georgetown University, 1991. lvarez Solis, Francisco, "Viabilidad de la estrategia de reproduccin social. El caso de las comunidades de repatriados y repobladores del Salvador. 1992. Thesis for a Masters Degree in Social Sciences, Mexico, June 1992, FLACSO, academic headquarters of Mexico. The reader is also referred to various reports on the same subject, done by the UNHCR before and after 1995.

6 In El Salvador, the findings of a recent study done by Luis Armando Gonzlez of the Universidad Centroamericana Jos Simen Caas, under the auspices of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), merit much closer scrutiny than they have thus far received.

7 Economic Commission for Latin America, "El impacto econmico y social de las migraciones en Centroamrica", 1992, 15 April 1992. Mimeo, ECLAC. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, "Remesas y economa familiar en El Salvador, Guatemala y Nicaragua", 1991, Mexico, June 25, Mimeo. Project ECLAC/Government of The Netherlands, NED/89/003. Montes, Segundo, El Salvador 1989: Las Remesas que envan los Salvadoreos de Estados Unidos, Consecuencias Sociales y Econmicos, UCA Publishers, Universidad Centroamericana Jos Simen Caas, San Salvador, 1989. Funkhouser, Edward, "Remittances from International Migration: A Comparison of El Salvador and Nicaragua", Review of Economics and Statistics, February, 1995.

8 See, for example, the regulations established by the UNHCR vis-a-vis the refuge cessation clauses. See the "Note on the Cessation Clauses", 8th Meeting, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Standing Committee, EC/47/SC/CRO.30, May 30, 1997.

9 In fact, the decline in remittances that can be anticipated with the entry into force of the new immigration regulations in the United States, will have any number of collateral effects on the economies of the migrants' native countries. Also, the Central American countries can soon be expected to submit proposals for additional financial support faced with the possible trade imbalances. However, because the immigration law went into effect so recently, it is still too soon to evaluate what its cost will be and what effects it will have in the future.

10 In the United States in 1996, 109,630 requests for asylum were filed by nationals of Central American countries: 74,850 by nationals of El Salvador; 26,560 by nationals of Guatemala, 4,310 by nationals of Honduras and 3,910 by nationals of Nicaragua. Of these some 1,750 were accepted. Canada received 1,040 requests (310 from El Salvador, 400 from Guatemala, 150 from Honduras and 180 from Nicaragua) and accepted 230. UNHCR. 1996 Statistical Overview, Tables 15 and 16, pp.58-59.

11 The most recent example is Operation Rio Grande. For details about the objectives, personnel and means involved, see "Operation Rio Grande", Texas Progress Report. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, August 1997.

12 It might be argued that a measure of this nature could become one more inducement to international migration. While this argument cannot be entirely dismissed, one would also have to bear two considerations in mind: 1) in Central America there are more than enough inducements to migrate, so that this would be just one more on an already long list; and 2) there would be one immediate and lasting benefit that other initiatives do not have: creation of jobs, which could reduce the kind of migration that is driven strictly by economic concerns.

13 While it is true that they have managed to socialize without necessarily coming in contact with institutions, it is also true that they have had to cope with very diversified institutional systems that are less easily avoided.

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