MULTILATERAL EVALUATION MECHANISM (MEM)

Evaluation Report on Drug Policies: Measures to Control and Counter the Illicit Cultivation, Production, Trafficking, and Distribution of Drugs, and to Address their Causes and Consequences

United States of America

Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)  Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (SMS)  2022
Evaluation Report on Drug Policies:
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EIGHTH EVALUATION ROUND

2022
PREFACE

The Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), established by a mandate from the Second Summit of the Americas (Santiago, Chile - 1998), is a unique multilateral evaluation tool designed to measure the progress made and challenges faced by the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) in implementing the Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs of the OAS Hemispheric Drug Strategy, currently in force.

The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (SMS) is the OAS specialized agency in charge of implementing this Mechanism.

The current MEM round is based on the objectives of the Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs 2021-2025 of the Hemispheric Drug Strategy 2020 and their respective priority actions. These documents take into account the recommendations of the outcome document of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016) and the United Nations 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, as well as cross-cutting issues, such as the gender perspective and human rights, cultural context, and social inclusion approaches, among others.

Seven evaluation rounds have been completed from 1998 to 2019 and, during 2020, the MEM Intergovernmental Working Group (IWG), composed of member state delegates, agreed on a new methodology for the eighth round, consisting of annual thematic evaluations with the support of independent technical consultants, as follows: 2021 – Measures for Prevention, Treatment, and Recovery Support; 2022 – Measures to Control and Counter the Illicit Cultivation, Production, Trafficking, and Distribution of Drugs, and to Address their Causes and Consequences; 2023 – Institutional Strengthening; Research, Information, Monitoring, and Evaluation; International Cooperation; and 2024 – Comprehensive Evaluation based on updated information from all thematic areas.

MEM evaluations are carried out based on information provided by the member states’ National Coordinating Entities (NCEs), which is analyzed by the MEM Governmental Expert Group (GEG), composed of experts designated by the countries, who do not participate in their own country’s evaluation, thus ensuring the transparency and impartiality of the process. The GEG is always supported by the group of independent technical consultants and the MEM Unit. The eighth round represents a more rigorous evaluation process, in which countries are requested to provide valid means of verification to support the information submitted and ensure compliance of each priority action.

Specifically, the GEG’s work for the thematic assessment for the area of “Measures to Control and Counter the Illicit Cultivation, Production, Trafficking, and Distribution of Drugs, and to Address their Causes and Consequences” was conducted during 2022, and covers the 2019 to 2022 period (unless otherwise specified). This work was adapted to the COVID-19 pandemic with
the use of technology and virtual tools, as well as taking it into consideration in the evaluation assessments.

Finally, it should be noted that one of the main purposes of MEM evaluation reports is to serve as a useful diagnostic tool to identify opportunities for improvement in drug policies and strategies, both at the national and regional levels.
**Priority Action 1.1:** Develop or strengthen intelligence and interdiction capabilities to detect, investigate, and dismantle laboratories or facilities used in the illicit manufacture of drugs.

The United States of America (U.S.) implements ongoing training programs to detect, investigate, and dismantle laboratories or facilities used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, for personnel involved in interdiction operations. Said programs are Clandestine Lab training programs provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other law enforcement agencies.

The DEA provides training to federal, state, and local law enforcement on the safe investigation and dismantlement of clandestine labs.

The country has protocols and operating procedures to detect, investigate, and dismantle clandestine laboratories or facilities for the illicit processing or manufacture of drugs, which provide adequate safety and health measures for personnel involved in the dismantling of the laboratories or facilities, and include actions that minimize damage to the environment and optimize the management of chemical and hazardous waste.

**Priority Action 1.2:** Implement policies that promote gender mainstreaming in agencies and organizations in charge of drug control.

The following agencies in charge of drug control in the U.S. implement policies that promote gender mainstreaming: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on sex, which is defined to include pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity. This binds the federal government, state and local governments, and employers with more than 15 employees. Therefore, all agencies with a role in drug control policy are bound by this law, which has the effect of promoting gender mainstreaming. Additionally, the following entities, among others, safeguard these rights: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Civil Rights Division.

**Priority Action 1.3:** Design, implement, and strengthen programs aimed at land, riverine, maritime, and aerial interdiction.

The U.S. has programs or strategies aimed at land, riverine, maritime, and aerial interdiction, through monitoring, inspections, or checkpoints.
**Priority Action 1.4:** Review and update, as appropriate, legal frameworks related to the use of specialized investigation tools and techniques.

The U.S. has Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap Act) providing for the use of intercepted communication (wiretap) as a specialized investigation tool to prevent and reduce drug trafficking. The country also uses controlled delivery and undercover operations as specialized investigation tools to prevent and reduce drug trafficking.

**Priority Action 1.5:** Review and/or update mechanisms countries use to monitor the evolution of drug trafficking and related crimes, for the purpose of identifying and responding to new trends and threats.

The U.S. has updated assessments and studies to identify new trends and threats on drug trafficking and related crimes.

**Priority Action 1.6:** Define and implement coordinated actions between national and regional entities to dismantle organized criminal groups involved in drug trafficking and related crimes.

The U.S. implements actions to identify organized crime groups involved in drug trafficking and related crimes. Law enforcement agencies at the local, tribal, and federal levels have internal intelligence mechanism and external mechanisms, such as interagency task force platforms and liaisons to identify, locate, disrupt, and dismantle organized crime groups involved in drug trafficking.

Law enforcement agencies at the local, tribal, and federal levels have internal intelligence mechanism and external mechanisms, such as interagency task force platforms and liaisons to identify, locate, disrupt, and dismantle organized crime groups involved in drug trafficking.

- **Agency Intelligence Mechanisms:** Department of Homeland Security’s Intelligence and Analysis and State intelligence fusion Centers and Drug Enforcement Administration’s Intelligence Division
- **Joint Intelligence and Investigative Platforms:** Customs and Border Protection’s National Targeting Center; Department of Defense’s Joint Interagency Task Forces South and West and Joint Task Force North; Drug Enforcement Administration’s El Paso Intelligence Center and Special Operations Division; Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Border Enforcement Security Task Forces; Office of National Drug Control Policy’s The Interdiction Committee and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program, including the HIDTA Domestic Highway Enforcement Initiative; Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces’ Fusion Center
- **Priority Targeting Programs:** Homeland Security’s Homeland Criminal Organization Targets, and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces’ program structure and targeting
mechanisms Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) and Regional Priority Organization Target lists

The country carries out inter-institutional collaboration and cooperation mechanisms to coordinate activities aimed at dismantling organized crime groups involved in drug trafficking and related crimes. There are several law enforcement fusion centers that coordinate and deconflict investigations between U.S. law enforcement agencies on a national level. A few of these fusion centers are DEA’s Special Operations Division, the El Paso Intelligence Center, and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Fusion center. Additionally, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) initiatives have intelligence centers that coordinate and deconflict investigations.

The U.S. has participated in operations and investigations in cooperation with other countries aimed at dismantling organized criminal groups involved in drug trafficking and related crimes. Many federal law enforcement agencies, including DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), have foreign liaison officers assigned to offices outside the US. These liaison officers coordinate cases with their foreign law enforcement counterparts. Additionally, foreign law enforcement counterparts have liaison officers assigned to DEA Special Operations Division, and other fusion centers, to provide seamless coordination between countries of law enforcement matters.

**Priority Action 1.7:** Enhance the capacity of national and regional forensic laboratories or similar investigation entities to analyze and identify chemical substances, precursors, pharmaceutical products, and synthetic drugs, including new psychoactive substances (NPS) and facilitate information sharing with global repositories and across governmental counterparts.

The U.S. DEA, CBP, and other law enforcement agencies are responsible for, and capable of, analyzing chemical substances, precursors, pharmaceutical products, and synthetic drugs, including new psychoactive substances (NPS).

The country offers and participates in ongoing training programs for personnel involved in the analysis of chemical substances, precursors, pharmaceutical products, and synthetic drugs, including NPS. Through the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of Training, it offers the Basic Forensic Chemist Training (BFC) to both U.S. and foreign law enforcement chemists.

The U.S. does not have formal mechanisms to facilitate or share information at the national level across relevant governmental counterparts, nor global repositories on chemical substances, precursors, pharmaceutical products, and synthetic drugs, including NPS. However, information is shared through informal channels including meetings, inter-agency committees and email distribution lists.
**Priority Action 1.8:** Enhance the capacity of relevant drug control and financial regulatory competent authorities to identify and address new challenges whereby synthetic drugs and their precursors and pharmaceutical products, being illicitly sold online and shipped through land, riverine, maritime, and aerial means.

The U.S. has mechanisms to investigate and disrupt drug trafficking through the Internet. In this sense, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOJ retain investigative responsibilities to disrupt drug trafficking through the internet. ICE Cyber Crime Center (C3) and FBI Joint Criminal Opioid Darknet Enforcement (JCODE) are the lead agencies. U.S. Postal Inspection Service is an important partner due to the nature of internet drug sales and the use of consignment shipping. DOJ serves as the primary means of deconfliction for federal law enforcement.

**Priority Action 1.9:** Enhance coordination with private sector entities to prevent diversion of chemical substances and precursors and deny criminals access to the materials, platforms, and services of the licit supply chain, which are exploited by criminal organizations for the illicit manufacture, sale, and trafficking of drugs.

The U.S. has partnerships and information exchange mechanisms with private sector entities to prevent access to materials and services exploited for illicit drug trafficking purposes. Over the course of the last decades, there have been numerous mechanisms and relationships built between the public sector and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) to address this topic; however, most of the vehicles and mechanisms that enable such exchange are very sensitive in nature and therefore cannot be publicized. However, there are two examples that are more publicly available:

- **Universal Postal Union/Postal Security Group:** The US is a member of the Universal Postal Union (UPU), which is the primary forum for cooperation between postal sector players of 192 countries. Some international Posts are considered a private organization and not a governmental organization. The UPU sets rules for international mail exchanges and makes recommendations to stimulate growth in mail, parcel and financial services volumes and improve quality of service for customers. This also includes the required transmission of Advanced Electronic Data (AED). Within the UPU, the Postal Security Group (PSG) was established to protect the employees, customers, and assets of Posts, and to safeguard mails from fraud, theft and misuse such as the shipment of illicit drugs. The US plays a vital role within the PSG by implementing training initiatives, consultation missions and prevention programs to identify and interdict dangerous goods and illicit drugs.

- **National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance:** The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCTFA) is an American non-profit corporation focused on identifying, mitigating, and neutralizing cybercrime threats. This is done through partnerships between private industry, government, and academia for the sole purpose of providing a neutral, trusted environment that enables two-way collaboration and cooperation.
The country uses tools and resources of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) to strengthen cooperation with the private sector to prevent the diversion of chemicals. In this sense, several U.S. agencies use GRIDS and IONICS to report relevant information.

**Priority Action 1.10**: Enhance capacities for forfeiture, seizure, and management of assets, tools, or products related to illicit drug markets.

The U.S. has national authorities with the appropriate budget, human and material resources for the forfeiture, seizure, and management of assets, tools, or products related to illicit drug markets. This is outlined in the National Drug Control Budget.

The country competent personnel receive ongoing training for the forfeiture, seizure, and management of assets, tools, or products related to illicit drug markets. In this sense, the Asset Forfeiture Program (AFP or the Program) touches every federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement agency in the country and the related cases are handled by all 94 U.S. Attorney’s Offices and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ or the Department) Criminal Division. Through joint partnerships among law enforcement at all levels, domestically and internationally, the AFP’s mission is to use asset forfeiture consistently and strategically to deter, disrupt, and dismantle criminal enterprises by depriving wrongdoers of the fruits and instrumentalities of criminal activity. Whenever possible, the program seeks to restore property to innocent victims of crime.

Also, the Money Laundering & Asset Forfeiture Training Program (MLAFTP) – which is designed for law enforcement professionals seeking a foundation and understanding of how to investigate money laundering and the issues involved with asset forfeiture. MLAFTP is open to agents, investigators, auditors, analysts, and prosecuting attorneys.
STRENGTHEN NATIONAL MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES POSED BY NPS AND ILLICIT SYNTHETIC DRUGS, AND THE THREAT OF FENTANYL-RELATED SUBSTANCES, NON-MEDICAL SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS, AND ILLICIT AMPHETAMINE DERIVATIVES.

Priority Action 2.1: Establish and/or strengthen early warning systems (EWS) at the national level to promote collaboration and the exchange of information with other existing regional or international systems.

The U.S. has an early warning system (EWS) to identify and trace new psychoactive substances (NPS), illicit synthetic drugs, and the threat of fentanyl-related substances, non-medical synthetic opioids, illicit amphetamine derivatives, and other substances subject to international control. This information is shared at the local, state, and regional levels through the following:

- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Drug Overdose Surveillance and Epidemiology (DOSE) System: The CDC DOSE system was developed to analyze data from syndromic surveillance systems to rapidly identify outbreaks and provide situational awareness of changes in drug overdose-related emergency department (ED) visits at the local, state, and regional level. DOSE leverages timely ED syndromic data captured by health departments to gather aggregate data on ED visits involving suspected all drug, all opioid, heroin, and all stimulant overdoses. Aggregate data include demographic characteristics of those who overdosed, such as sex, age, and county of patient residence. Jurisdictions share their data with CDC as frequently as every two weeks either by uploading data using a secure server or allowing DOSE staff access to their data in CDC’s National Syndromic Surveillance Program’s (NSSP) BioSense platform. The number of jurisdictions included in the calculations of monthly and annual percent change estimates in rates will vary over time. Comparisons between jurisdictions should not be made because of variations in data quality, completeness, and reporting across jurisdictions.

- CDC’s State Unintentional Drug Overdose Reporting System: Uses data from medical examiners and coroners, death certificates and advanced toxicology testing to identify the substances, circumstances and characteristics associated with drug overdose deaths.

Relevant information on the existing EWS to identify and trace NPS, illicit synthetic drugs, and the threat of fentanyl-related substances, non-medical synthetic opioids, illicit amphetamine derivatives, and other substances subject to international control is shared with other countries through existing formal and informal arrangements, and through the DOSE (for non-fatal overdose data) and SUDORS (for fatal overdose data) dashboards that are available for external audiences, including non-US audiences, as well as through the dissemination of TOM and Opioid Polysubstance Mix Kits which are used by public health labs and ME/Cs to identify emerging drugs.
**Priority Action 2.2:** Improve domestic capabilities to detect and analyze NPS by making resources and tools available for those responsible in this area.

The U.S. improves its capabilities to detect and analyze NPS through the use of the following special investigative techniques, updated equipment, and acquisition of technology:

- **Traceable Opioid Material Kits:** Laboratories have a key role in the response to the opioid overdose epidemic. Successful detection and identification of opioids in clinical, toxicological, and environmental samples is largely dependent on a testing laboratory’s access to reference standards for compound comparison and confirmation. CDC is expanding the national capability of U.S. laboratories to detect and identify current and emerging opioids through development of Traceable Opioid Material® Kits (TOM Kits®). The TOM Kits® product line provides reference materials for fentanyl compounds and other synthetic opioids based, in part, on US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Emerging Threat Reports and the National Forensic Laboratory Information System. The TOM Kits® products and services are available free of charge through their respective vendors to public and private laboratories located in the US. Proof of current DEA controlled substance registration is required for scheduled products.

**Priority Action 2.3:** Design and implement, when appropriate, national regulatory tools to address the challenges posed by NPS and national controls on emerging illicit synthetic drugs and their precursor chemicals.

The U.S. has the following regulatory frameworks or guidelines to identify and address the challenges posed by the onset of NPS and emerging synthetic drugs:

- **U.S. code 21 U.S. Code § 1708 - Emerging Threats Committee, plan, and media campaign provides statute to address this**

**Priority Action 2.4:** Promote participation in the Project ION Incident Communication System (IONICS) to facilitate real-time communication of incidents involving suspicious shipments of, trafficking in, or illicit manufacture or production of NPS, including fentanyl-related substances and other non-medical synthetic opioids and amphetamine derivatives.

The U.S. participates in the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)’s Project ION (International Operations on NPS). The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the country’s focal point agency for Project ION.
Priority Action 2.5: Develop innovative regulatory approaches, such as generic controls, analogue legislation, and temporary or emergency controls, to enhance national controls on synthetic opioids for non-medical use, and NPS, particularly when scheduling fentanyl-related substances by class.

The U.S. has the following innovative legislation and regulatory approach to synthetic opioids for non-medical use and NPS: it has emergency scheduling authorities, which was utilized to schedule fentanyl related substances by class on a temporary basis. The United States Congress is considering legislation to permanently control FRS as a class. Furthermore, the U.S. utilized the 65th CND to schedule 3 Fentanyl precursor chemicals for international Control, the vote was unanimous.
**Priority Action 3.1:** Promote inter-agency coordination with industry to prevent diversion of controlled chemical substances.

The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) of the U.S. is the competent national authority responsible for developing guides, codes of conduct, or other instruments to inform the industry and users in general of controlled chemical substances.

The country has the following instruments and mechanisms to inform the industry and users in general of applicable controls and cooperation methods, to prevent the diversion of controlled chemical substances:

- Code of Federal Regulations

The U.S. has an updated register of all individuals and corporations handling controlled chemical substances.

The country’s competent authorities carry out regular inspections and audits of the establishments of individuals and corporations authorized to handle controlled chemical substances, as listed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the competent national authority</th>
<th>Does it carry out regular inspections and audits?</th>
<th>Is it responsible for controlling domestic trade?</th>
<th>Does it consider the CICAD Model Regulations?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)</td>
<td>Every 1-3 years</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Priority Action 3.2:** Conduct analyses, including through existing mechanisms of information exchange, on substances, their analogues, and precursors, which pose a threat to public health in member states, to identify substances for expedited international control.

The U.S. carries out analyses that include the exchange of information through existing international mechanisms of substances, their analogs, and precursors, which pose a threat to public health. In this sense, information is shared both formally through the DEA Special Testing Lab and other law enforcement laboratories, as well as through working liaison between U.S. law enforcement agencies and their foreign and domestic partners.
**Priority Action 3.3**: Strengthen the existing international control system to prevent the diversion of controlled chemical substances, pharmaceutical products, and precursors used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, as well as interdiction to counter the trafficking of chemical substances.

The U.S. has legislation incorporating the control measures in Article 12, Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the 1988 United Nations Convention to prevent diversion of controlled chemical substances towards illicit activities.

**Priority Action 3.4**: Strengthen or develop appropriate domestic controls over precursors including measures to control the international trade in precursor chemicals and other controlled chemical substances, consistent with the framework established in the United Nations Drug Conventions, and law enforcement measures.

The U.S. has implemented the following control measures listed in Article 12, Paragraph 8 of the 1988 United Nations Convention:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control measures</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control of all persons and enterprises engaged in the manufacture and distribution of controlled chemical substances</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control, under license, the establishment and premises in which manufacture or distribution of controlled chemical substances may take place</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require that licensees obtain a permit for manufacturing or distributing controlled chemical substances</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent the accumulation of controlled chemical substances in the possession of manufacturers and distributors, in excess of the quantities required for the normal conduct of business and the prevailing market conditions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The country has implemented the following control measures listed in Article 12, Paragraph 9 of the 1988 United Nations Convention:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control measures</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A system to monitor international trade in controlled chemical substances to facilitate the identification of suspicious transactions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The monitoring system shall be used by manufacturers, importers, exporters, wholesalers, and retailers to inform the competent authorities of suspicious orders and transactions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any controlled substance is seized if there is sufficient evidence that it will be used in the illicit manufacture of narcotics or psychotropic substances</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The competent authorities are notified, as soon as possible, if there is reason to believe that the import, export, or transit of a substance is destined for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, including, in particular, information about the means of payment and any other essential elements which led to that belief</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Requirements to ensure that imports and exports are properly labelled and documented. Commercial documents such as invoices, cargo manifests, customs, transport, and other shipping documents must include the names of the substances, the quantity, and the name and address of the exporter, the importer and, when available, the consignee. These documents are kept for a period of no less than two years and may be made available for inspection by competent authorities.

The U.S. complies with the request for information in Article 12, Paragraph 10 of the 1988 United Nations Convention.

As an additional domestic precursor chemical control measure, the DEA establishes annual import and manufacturing quotas for DEA Registrants that handle ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine to ensure legitimate U.S. needs are not exceeded.

**Priority Action 3.5:** Promote participation in the Pre-Export Notification (PEN) Online system and Precursor Incident Communication System (PICS) to facilitate information exchange on controlled chemical substances.

The U.S. uses the International Narcotics Control Board’s (INCB) information system for pre-export notifications (PEN Online) of controlled chemical substances.

The country uses the INCB’s Precursor Incident Communication System (PICS).

**Priority Action 3.6:** Train relevant drug investigation, control and interdiction personnel and researchers on the identification and handling of precursors and other controlled chemical substances used in the illicit manufacture of drugs.

The U.S. receives the following training for drug control personnel and for the identification and handling of controlled chemical substances:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Programs</th>
<th>Institution in charge (national or international)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Forensic Chemist Training</td>
<td>Office of Training Programs, U.S. DEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Diversion Investigator Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Investigator Training</td>
<td>Federal Enforcement Training Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Priority Action 3.7:** Allocate resources to acquire necessary equipment and supplies for the preliminary identification of substances, and the protective equipment required by personnel in charge of these tasks.
In the U.S. there are budgetary mechanisms to ensure allocation of resources to acquire necessary equipment and supplies for the preliminary identification of substances and the protective equipment required by personnel in charge of these tasks. In this sense, each agency responsible for this task has its own budget and allocates resources according to needs. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has oversight and coordination authority on the budgets of federal drug control agencies.

**Priority Action 3.8:** Use, as appropriate, CICAD’s Model Regulations for the control of Chemical Substances Used in the Illicit Production of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (2019) in the formulation of national chemical control regulations.

The U.S. uses the OAS/CICAD Model Regulations for the Control of Chemical Substances Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In this sense, the DEA - the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of Diversion Control combats both the diversion of legal pharmaceuticals to illegal purposes and the diversion of chemicals to use in the production of illegal drugs.
**Priority Action 4.1:** Streamline, in accordance with national legislation and international obligations, the process for issuing authorizations for national production, and to import and export controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes.

The U.S. has special processes for issuing authorizations for the national production, import, and export of substances subject to international control for medical and scientific purposes. The following table indicates how long it takes on average, for an import or export authorization to be issued:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product type</th>
<th>Average time to issue import permits</th>
<th>Average time to issue export permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narcotic or psychotropic raw materials for the manufacture of medicines</td>
<td>4-5 days</td>
<td>4-5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medication containing narcotic or psychotropic drugs</td>
<td>4-5 days</td>
<td>4-5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical patterns classified as narcotic or psychotropic</td>
<td>4-5 days</td>
<td>4-5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medication classified as narcotic or psychotropic for the personal use of travelers entering or leaving the country</td>
<td>No permit is required per 21 CFR 1301.26</td>
<td>No permit is required per 21 CFR 1301.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The country has an updated register of individuals or companies importing and exporting substances subject to international control for medical and scientific purposes.

**Priority Action 4.2:** Adopt measures, in accordance with national laws, to train competent authorities and health professionals on ensuring access to substances subject to international control for medical and scientific purposes.

The U.S. has awareness activities for competent national authorities and health professionals on the proper access to substances subject to international control solely for medical and scientific purposes. These include the CDC Guidelines, the Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), regulations for labeling requirements for FDA approved medications, and Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) which can provide specific training recommendations and certifications for prescribers to appropriately prescribe medications with abuse and dependence risks.
Priority Action 4.3: Improve access to controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes by addressing existing barriers, including those related to laws, regulations, and measures to promote access and build capacity for health care systems.

The U.S. has the following regulatory framework to govern the acquisition of substances subject to international control for medical and scientific purposes:

- The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is the primary U.S. law governing the manufacture, importation, possession, use, and distribution of controlled substances. Regulations implementing it have been promulgated. Under the CSA controlled substances are grouped into five schedules based on their misuse potential. Schedule I substances are deemed to be highly susceptible to misuse and to have no accepted medical use. These include heroin, marijuana, and LSD. Schedule II drugs are also deemed to have high misuse potential but have medical uses. These include cocaine, methamphetamine, methadone, hydromorphone, meperidine, oxycodone, fentanyl, Dexedrine, Adderall, and Ritalin. Each subsequent schedule reflects lower deemed risk of misuse.
- Schedule II-V drugs can be prescribed in the U.S. One exception is methadone, which can be prescribed for the treatment of pain, but can only be administered through a registered accredited opioid treatment program when used for the treatment of opioid use disorder.
- By definition, Schedule I drugs are deemed not to have a recognized medical use and are therefore not available for medical purposes. However, Schedule I substances can be made available for the purposes of research. Investigators wishing to conduct research involving Schedule I substances must register with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Applicants must provide information about their qualifications, research protocol, and institution where the research will take place. Medications on schedules II to V are available for medical and scientific use subject to federal and state regulations.
- Individuals or entities wishing to manufacture, distribute, sell, or conduct research with controlled substances must register with the DEA.
**OBJECTIVE 5**

ADOPT OR STRENGTHEN CONTROL MEASURES TO PREVENT DIVERSION OF CONTROLLED PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS CONTAINING NARCOTIC DRUGS AND/OR PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, AND THOSE CONTAINING PRECURSOR SUBSTANCES USED IN THE PRODUCTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.

**Priority Action 5.1:** Strengthen or implement control measures on pharmaceutical products containing precursor substances, narcotics, or controlled psychoactive substances, to prevent their diversion for non-medical purposes, abuse, and trafficking.

The U.S. has an updated register of individuals and corporations handling pharmaceutical products containing precursor substances, narcotics, or psychotropic substances. In this sense, the required information includes the registered location and the controlled substances and List 1 Chemicals handled by the registrant.

The country issues licenses to manufacturers and distributors authorizing the handling of pharmaceutical products containing precursor substances, narcotics, or psychotropic substances.

The U.S. carries out regular inspections and audits of the establishments of individuals and corporations authorized to handle pharmaceutical products containing precursor substances, narcotics, or psychotropic substances.

**Priority Action 5.2:** Update existing and other regulations and control measures to prevent diversion of pharmaceutical products containing narcotic drugs and/or psychotropic substances.

The U.S. has the following penalties for infractions or violations by individuals or corporations that handle pharmaceutical products containing precursor substances, narcotics, or psychotropic substances:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Penalty</th>
<th>Year when it was last updated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Priority Action 5.3:** Strengthen national capacity and regional cooperation to prevent trade in and diversion of materials and equipment for illicit production or manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including pill presses and encapsulating equipment.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency offers the Basic Diversion Investigatory Program for personnel responsible for preventing trade in and diversion of materials and equipment for illicit production or manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. This program includes
technological, legal and investigatory instruction and covers the areas of retail pharmacy, distributor and manufacturer operations, auditing techniques, report writing, security issues, pharmaceutical and chemical control, drug scheduling, and pharmaceutical identification.

The country shares the following information with other global systems on the diversion of materials and equipment for illicit production or manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances:

- International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) - Precursor Incident Communication System (PICS)
- INCB - Global Rapid Interdiction of Dangerous Substance Program (GRIDS)
- INCB - Project ION (International Operations on NPS) - IONICS

**Priority Action 5.4:** Promote the incorporation of competent national authorities to the International Import and Export Authorization System (I2ES) of the International Narcotics Control Board, a secure online platform, ready to issue, load, and exchange expeditiously import and export authorizations of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for medical use, between countries.

The DEA and, Customs and Border Protection of the United States uses the International Narcotics Control Board’s (INCB) International Import and Export Authorization System (I2ES).

The country has received training on the INCB’s I2ES System.
**Priority Action 6.1:** Train law enforcement personnel involved in drug investigations in specialized investigative techniques and intelligence collection, analysis, and operations, including through the use of existing information systems and intelligence data exchanges.

The U.S. implements the following periodic training programs for personnel involved in drug investigations in specialized investigative techniques and intelligence collection, analysis, and operations:

- **Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) – Basic Diversion Investigator Training (BDI)** - BDI Training is a 12-week program that familiarizes trainees with the pharmaceutical and chemical industry and emphasizes the goal of preparing students to conduct effective diversion investigations. The program consists of classroom instruction and numerous practical exercises designed to challenge a student’s newly-acquired knowledge and skills. BDI Training is a rigorous and demanding curriculum that incorporates technological, legal, and investigative instruction. Case studies, with varying degrees of complexity, are also used through the course. Other areas covered include: retail pharmacy, distributor, and manufacturer operations; auditing techniques; report writing; security issues; pharmaceutical and chemical control; drug scheduling; and pharmaceutical identification.

- **DEA – Basic Intelligence Research Specialist Training (BIRS)** - a 10-week entry-level program provided to new hires as they begin complex and demanding careers in intelligence analysis. The course offers intensive training and development of the analytical skills necessary to support DEA drug investigations and programs. The BIRS course will prepare the students for a broad range of domestic and foreign assignments and is designed to enhance individual abilities to formulate and present analytical recommendations to investigators, prosecutors, policy makers, and other agencies. Students will receive hands-on training using the most current investigative tools and techniques, with a concurrent focus on critical thinking, critical writing, and public speaking.

**Priority Action 6.2:** Enhance the capabilities of law enforcement agencies that investigate and counter drug trafficking and the crimes that facilitate and are associated with trafficking, such as corruption and money laundering, through ongoing training of the involved personnel.

The U.S. implements the following periodic training programs and other capacity-building activities to investigate and counter crimes associated with drug trafficking, such as corruption and money laundering:

- **Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: The Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture**
Training Program is designed for law enforcement professionals seeking a foundation and understanding of how to investigate money laundering and the issues involved with asset forfeiture. MLAFTP is open to agents, investigators, auditors, analysts and prosecuting attorneys.

- International Banking and Money Laundering Training Program: The International Banking and Money Laundering Training Program's (IBMLTP) primary focus is on the investigation of international money laundering and international financial investigations. The program includes a brief discussion of money laundering and related laws, including the Bank Secrecy Act and the Money Laundering Control Act. The program includes a discussion of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) as a resource in international investigations. Common methods of international money laundering are discussed. Traditional and non-traditional international banking is discussed as it relates to facilitating the movement of proceeds of criminal activity and terrorist financing. The program is interspersed with relevant case studies and class activities related to international money laundering and terrorist financing.

**Priority Action 6.3:** Strengthen cooperation and the exchange of information among the domestic, regional, and international law enforcement agencies to carry out operations and investigations to counter drug trafficking and related crimes.

The U.S. has information gathering mechanisms to exchange intelligence information, at a domestic, regional, and international level, to detect routes and methods used by drug trafficking criminal organizations. In this sense, law enforcement shares information on drug trafficking routes and methods through interagency exchange mechanisms, including a) periodic strategic, operational, and tactical reporting in annual reports, bulletins, and databases; b) interagency communications, fusion centers, and task forces; and c) public health and safety partnerships.

**Priority Action 6.4:** Promote and strengthen the exchange of information and intelligence on matters of drug interdiction and effective border control measures to prevent drug trafficking by land, river, sea, and air.

The U.S. has the following tools that promote and strengthen cooperation and the exchange of information and intelligence among domestic law enforcement agencies responsible for drug interdiction and effective border control:

- El Paso Intelligence Center
- DEA Special Operations Division, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) National Targeting Center
- High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program (HIDTA)
Priority Action 6.5: Improve the information systems on drug trafficking and related crimes, including alerts on changing behavior patterns and modus operandi of criminal drug trafficking organizations.

The U.S. has a national information system on drug trafficking and related crimes, including alerts on changing behaviors and modus operandi of criminal organizations. The agencies which provide information for the system are DEA and CBP. There is no a national information system that combines information from all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. However, there are several law enforcement fusion centers and targeting centers that have access to many agencies’ data and combines it into law enforcement products available nationally.
Priority Action 7.1: Strengthen implementation of the legal, regulatory, and operational frameworks in the areas of prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and control of money laundering associated with drug trafficking.

The U.S. has strengthened the legislative frameworks to counter money laundering derived from drug trafficking. In this sense, the country has mechanisms allowing for interagency coordination and cooperation in the area of preventing and controlling money laundering. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau within the U.S. Treasury Department, is the U.S. financial intelligence unit (FIU). There are mechanisms for analyzing money laundering risks, in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations.

On January 1, 2021, Congress enacted the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Act of 2020 to, among other things, improve coordination and information sharing among the agencies tasked with administering AML/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements and to modernize the AML/CFT laws to better adapt the government and private sector response to new and emerging threats. While not specific to money laundering derived from drug trafficking, the AML Act enhances the government’s authorities to combat all types of money laundering and other illicit financing. The U.S. government is working to implement the AML Act’s requirements through rulemaking and other initiatives.

Priority Action 7.2: Develop and implement specialized ongoing training in areas of prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and control of money laundering derived from drug trafficking, consistent with known and emerging risks.

The U.S. has the following periodic training programs for officials and legal professionals on prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of money laundering derived from drug trafficking:

- The Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section (MLARS) in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Division develops and delivers innovative and interactive asset forfeiture, money laundering, and financial investigations training courses and training tools. These resources support the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program, as well as federal, state, and local law enforcement and legal professionals nationwide. MLARS training courses cover topics such as asset forfeiture and money laundering law, practice, and policy; introductory financial investigation techniques; using bank reports and other reports in investigations; proving unexplained income; and using tax records. MLARS delivers its training
using both in-person and remote delivery methods

No specific training is provided directly to vulnerable sectors; however, the FinCEN publishes advisories online to alert vulnerable sectors of money laundering and other illicit finance risks.

**Priority Action 7.3:** Enhance investigations by competent authorities into drug trafficking cases linked to money laundering and illicit use of assets.

The U.S. has protocols that enable the authorities to conduct financial and asset investigations parallel to drug trafficking investigations. In this sense, the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C § 801 et seq.) provides for criminal, civil, and administrative forfeiture authorities, and 18 U.S.C. § 1956—one of the United States’ primary money laundering statutes—makes drug-related crimes predicate offenses for money laundering. The U.S. also has policies and guidelines underscoring the critical importance of asset forfeiture generally, including in drug-related investigations.

The Department of Justice’s Justice Manual, for example, notes that the Controlled Substances Act “provides for the forfeiture of property, profits, and other rights obtained through or used in the commission of felony drug offenses. Except in rare cases, prosecutors are required to include forfeiture allegations in all drug indictments where the defendant has identifiable assets that are forfeitable.” The Attorney General’s Guidelines on the Asset Forfeiture Program (2018), in laying out the goals of the program, notes that the “effective use of both criminal and civil asset forfeiture is an essential component of the Department of Justice’s efforts to combat the most sophisticated criminal actors and organizations—including terrorist financiers, cyber criminals, fraudsters, human traffickers, and transnational drug cartels.” The Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual (2021) further emphasizes these goals and provides guidance on asset forfeiture as a whole, including topics specific to drug trafficking investigations. Additionally, DEA works on both financial/asset investigations in cooperation with the Department of the Treasury.

**Priority Action 7.4:** Strengthen interagency coordination and cooperation in relation to the development of national anti-money laundering strategies, including through coordinating committees and task forces.

The U.S. has the following mechanisms allowing for inter-agency coordination and cooperation in the area of preventing and controlling money laundering:

- FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress: This statute establishes FinCEN as a bureau within the Treasury Department and describes FinCEN’s duties and powers to include:
  a) Maintaining a government-wide data access service with a range of financial transactions information
  b) Analysis and dissemination of information in support of law enforcement investigatory professionals at the Federal, State, Local, and international levels
c) Determine emerging trends and methods in money laundering and other financial crimes
d) Serve as the Financial Intelligence Unit of the United States
e) Carry out other delegated regulatory responsibilities

**Priority Action 7.5:** Strengthen the exchange of financial intelligence as related to money laundering, including through the standardization of information systems.

The U.S. has FinCEN, which is a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, as its financial intelligence unit.

The country has information systems aimed at the investigation and prosecution of money laundering in analyzing cases deriving from drug trafficking. In this sense, law enforcement drug investigations often include illicit finance investigations. Accordingly, interagency information sharing, and investigative systems include money laundering. Moreover, Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Suspicious Activity Reports are designed to share financial intelligence connected to drug and other illicit commodity investigations.

**Priority Action 7.6:** Identify and analyze money laundering threats to mitigate risks through public policies that strengthen the regime for preventing and countering money laundering, in accordance with applicable international instruments.

The U.S. has a mechanism for analyzing money laundering risks, in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. In this sense, the country conducts three National Risk Assessments related to money laundering risks: the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, the National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment, and the National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment. The latest edition of these Assessments was published on March 1, 2022.

**Priority Action 7.7:** Strengthen partnerships with the financial industries to identify and investigate illicit transactions and money laundering operations related to the proceeds of drug trafficking activities.

The U.S. has established partnerships with the financial industries to identify and investigate illicit transactions and money laundering operations related to the proceeds of drug trafficking activities. In this sense, most law enforcement agencies have relationships with the banking system to assist with subpoenas or other requests for financial information. Additionally, banks are required to send law enforcement a Suspicious Activity Report on suspect financial transactions. Government agencies such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network also work hand in hand with banks.
Priority Action 8.1: Establish and/or strengthen, as appropriate, national entities responsible for the administration and disposition of assets seized and/or forfeited in cases of drug trafficking, money laundering, and other related crimes.

Priority Action 8.2: Establish specialized agencies and appropriate mechanisms for the transparent administration of seized and forfeited assets, in accordance with national laws and international standards.

The U.S. has the Attorney General as the designated competent authority responsible for the administration and disposition of seized and forfeited assets, through the authority under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(e) and 853(h) and other statutes to dispose of forfeited property “by sale or any other commercially feasible means.”

Management and disposal of seized assets are generally handled by two United States agencies: the United States Department of Justice (Justice), United States Marshals Service (USMS) and the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF). In addition to separate asset forfeiture programs, each department maintains a separate fund that is the receipt account for the deposit of forfeitures. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 established the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF). Monies deposited in the AFF pay for the costs of operating the Justice Asset Forfeiture Program. The Treasury Forfeiture Fund Act of 1992 established the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF). Monies deposited in the TFF pay for the costs of operating the Treasury Forfeiture Program.

The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 authorizes the Attorney General to use the AFF to finance expenses associated with the execution of Justice-related activities and asset forfeiture functions and, with specific limitations, certain general investigative costs. USMS has primary authority over the management and disposal of assets in its custody that have been seized for forfeiture or forfeited by law enforcement agencies of the Department of Justice and, by agreement, certain other federal law enforcement agencies. Arrangements for property services or commitments pertaining to the management and disposition of such property are the responsibility of the USMS. The authority of the Attorney General to dispose of forfeited real property and warrant title has been delegated to the USMS Director by 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(i).

The Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF) maintains authority for the management and disposal of property seized by the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security law enforcement agencies (U.S. Secret
Service, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard). The TFF is the receipt account for deposit of forfeitures made pursuant to laws enforced by participating Treasury and the combined Department of Homeland Security agencies. As the administrator for the TFF, TEOAF oversees the management of seized and forfeited property.

Participating agencies of both AFF and TFF programs also seize and hold illegal drugs, firearms, and counterfeit items that have no resale value to the government and are typically held by the agencies until they are approved for destruction.

The U.S. has regulations to facilitate the accountability and transparency of the management of seized and forfeited assets.

**Priority Action 8.3:** Develop and implement specialized, ongoing training programs for law enforcement officials charged with the administration and disposition of seized and forfeited assets.

The U.S. offers the following specialized, periodic training programs for the management and disposition of seized and forfeited assets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National agencies</th>
<th>Name and type of training offered</th>
<th>Name and type of training received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMS Asset Forfeiture Training – Learn USMS administrative employees)</td>
<td>DEA Basic Asset Forfeiture Training</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Business of Forfeiture</td>
<td>DEA Basic Money Laundering</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced Asset Forfeiture Administration</td>
<td>DEA Advanced Money Laundering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business of Forfeiture – 1811 Asset Forfeiture for District Leadership</td>
<td>FinCEN Financial Analysis Conference (focus on the Bank Secrecy Act)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MLARS Financial Investigations Seminar</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FLETC Case Organization and Presentation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FLETC Financial Investigations and Analysis Training Program</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FLETC International Banking &amp; Money Laundering</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FLETC Internet Investigations Training Program</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International organizations</th>
<th>Name and type of training offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Marshal Service’s Asset Forfeiture Division (AFD) provided training to several international stakeholders including United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Bank, and German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Priority Action 8.4:** In accordance with each country’s constitutional principles, apply legislative and regulatory measures to facilitate the seizure, forfeiture and management of assets, instruments, or products of illicit drug-related activities.

The U.S. has the following legislation in accordance with international conventions and treaties, to facilitate the seizure, forfeiture, and management of assets and instruments derived from drug trafficking and other related crimes:

- In addition to the information described before, forfeiture authorities for U.S. money laundering offenses are governed by statute under federal law, not regulation. The relevant statutes for seizure and forfeiture are 18 U.S.C. 981 and 982 (general civil and criminal forfeiture provisions, respectively) and 21 U.S.C. 853 and 881 (controlled substances-related criminal and civil forfeiture-related provisions, respectively.)
Priority Action 9.1: Design, implement, and update national policies and programs to prevent and decrease illicit cultivation, production, and manufacture of drugs.

The U.S., through the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has updated national policies and programs to prevent and decrease illicit cultivation, production, and manufacture of drugs. ONDCP produces the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) which sets U.S. priorities for drug control. Individual agencies use the NDCS as a guide to set their policies and ensure they are in unison with national priorities.

Priority Action 9.2: Establish budgetary mechanisms to ensure sufficient and consistent allocation of resources to counternarcotics programs.

The U.S has direct budgetary allocations towards financing counternarcotics programs. In that sense, the following are some of the Major Drug Budget Allocations as contained in the US National Drug Control Strategy FY 2022 Budget and Performance Summary:

- Department of Defense: For FY 2022, DoD requests $821.9 million for drug control activities, a net decrease of $92.5 million from the FY 2021 enacted level
- Department of Homeland Security: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is requesting $642.1 million in FY2022 for counternarcotics (CN) efforts, including to investigate major drug trafficking and money laundering cases
- Department of Justice: The FY 2022 request for the Department of Justice (DOJ) includes over $9.5 billion in resources for investigations, prosecutions, state and local assistance, community programs, and intelligence efforts to address drug control challenges, including the opioid epidemic
- The Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) FY 2022 request includes over $2.9 billion in support of DEA’s mission to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States. The request focuses on disrupting and dismantling major Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO), coordinating drug investigations in foreign countries, and providing state and local assistance
- The Department of State is requesting a total $456.8 million in FY 2022 for drug-related international programs for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
- The United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) request includes $76.4 million for drug...
control activities, including to investigate, arrest, and dismantle drug trafficking networks and utilizes intelligence to effectively target and seize illicit substances nationwide.

- Finally, the following is an overview of the Overall Budget for the last three years by different subjections of the Supply and Demand Reduction efforts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Federal Drug Control Funding by Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2020 Final</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supply/Demand

| Demand Reduction | $18,636.6 | $22,873.5 | $23,501.0 | + $627.5 | +2.7% |
| Percent | 47.0% | 56.7% | 57.3% |
| Supply Reduction | $21,046.7 | $17,500.5 | $17,542.9 | + 42.5 | +0.2% |
| Percent | 53.0% | 43.3% | 42.7% |

Total | $39,683.3 | $40,374.0 | $41,043.9 | + $669.9 | +1.7%

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

*US National Drug Control Budget, FY 2022 U.S. Budget and Performance Summary

**Priority Action 9.3:** Promote supply reduction measures that take into account licit traditional uses, whenever there is historical evidence of such uses, as well as environmental protection.

The U.S. takes into account the licit traditional use in designing and implementing policies and programs to reduce the illicit supply of drugs. The opioid overdose epidemic in the U.S. had its roots in the overprescribing of opioids. While illicitly manufactured fentanyl and other illicit synthetic opioids are now the key drivers of opioid-related mortality in the U.S., it is the misuse of prescription opioids that initiated the significant increases in the rates of opioid-related mortality over historic levels that have since continued to climb. While working to prevent unnecessary prescribing of opioids and other controlled substances, the U.S. also works to ensure
that Americans have access to these medications when they are clinically indicated.

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued guidelines for prescribing opioids for chronic pain and is in the process of updating these guidelines and the U.S Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulate the manufacturing, distribution, prescribing, and dispensing of controlled substances. Additionally, the U.S. Federal Government funds state-operated prescription drug monitoring systems that track controlled substance prescribing across providers, patients, and pharmacy. This helps prevent prescriptions from multiple health providers without coordination and can identify potentially problematic prescribing patterns, including opioid and benzodiazepine co-prescribing and multiple controlled substance prescriptions for multiple providers. Moreover, the U.S. is working diligently to expand access to medications for opioid use disorder (MOUD) through general medical settings, such as primary care and hospitals, though specialty substance use disorder treatment programs, in correctional settings, and increasingly in low-threshold settings, such as harm reduction programs and emergency departments.

The FDA has approved the following medications for the treatment of opioid use disorder: methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone. Under U.S. law, with limited exceptions, methadone can only be administered through a licensed and accredited opioid treatment program when used for the treatment of opioid use disorder. Buprenorphine and naltrexone are available in various forms, including extended-release formulations and can be prescribed in a range of settings.

The U.S. includes environmental protection measures in its policies and programs to reduce the illicit supply of drugs. The recently released U.S. National Drug Control Strategy 2022 emphasizes environmental protection as a cross-cutting theme and calls for guidance on safe and environmentally responsible disposal methods to remove unused medications from the home and prioritizes a focus on addressing the criminal destruction of protected natural resources due to domestic marijuana grows on public land.

**Priority Action 9.4:** Strengthen interagency cooperation to provide a comprehensive response against the illicit production of drugs, including collaboration among the public and private sectors and the international community.

The U.S. has established the following mechanisms for interinstitutional cooperation between public and private institutions to provide a comprehensive response to the illicit production of drugs:

- DEA’s Drug Take Back Day
- ONDCP’s Drug Free Communities
- International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) Stakeholder Consultation on Cooperation Framework for the Prevention for Misuse of E-Commerce Platforms for Dangerous Substances Trafficking
**Priority Action 9.5:** Support supply reduction programs with crime prevention initiatives, in cooperation with civil society and other stakeholders, as appropriate, to address social and economic risk factors.

The U.S. supports the development of supply reduction programs with drug-related crime prevention initiatives that address social and economic risk factors, which includes the participation from civil society and other social stakeholders:

- Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)’s Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) aims to develop comprehensive systems through providing national leadership in the development of policies, programs, and services to prevent the onset of substance misuse. CSAP activities and programs specifically address substance misuses and lead to supply reduction and decrease in drug-related crimes. SAMHSA programs are targets to at risk communities and marginalized populations.

**Substance Use Disorder Prevention**

- **Talk. They Hear You. Campaign**—Aims to reduce underage drinking and substance use among youths under the age of 21 by providing parents and caregivers with resources to discuss substance use with their children.

- **Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Prevention of Underage Drinking (ICCPUD)**—Coordinates federal efforts to reduce underage drinking and served as a resource for the development of A Comprehensive Plan for Preventing and Reducing Underage Drinking. This committee is comprised of 15 federal agencies and is led by SAMHSA.

- **STOP Underage Drinking**—This interagency website portal of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Prevention of Underage Drinking (ICCPUD) provides research, federal and state resources, and funding opportunities to reduce and prevent underage drinking and its consequences.

- **National Prevention Week**—Held in May, NPW promotes community involvement, resource sharing, and partnership engagement to increase public awareness of substance use and mental disorders. In addition, NPW provides resources to communities so they can highlight their prevention successes throughout the year. Communities Talk: Town Hall Meetings to Prevent Underage Drinking—This nationwide initiative provides community-based organizations with the resources they need to start, or support, a conversation about evidence-based underage drinking prevention. Held every two years, Communities Talk events engage multiple stakeholders within each community to mobilize action in underage drinking prevention or strengthen existing prevention programs.
OBJEKTIV 10

DESIGN, IMPLEMENT OR STRENGTHEN LONG-TERM ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, INCLUDING RURAL AND URBAN ALTERNATIVES, COMPREHENSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, AND, AS APPROPRIATE, PREVENTIVE ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICIES, LAWS AND NEEDS OF EACH COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE, WHILE RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS.

Priority Action 10.1: Design and implement comprehensive and sustainable alternative development programs, including preventive alternative development, as appropriate, while respecting human rights.

The U.S. has not designed or implemented comprehensive and sustainable alternative development programs or preventive alternative development, as appropriate, as part of the strategies to control and reduce illicit crops.

Priority Action 10.2: Exchange experiences and best practices in the design and implementation of comprehensive and sustainable alternative development programs, including preventive alternative development, as appropriate.

Not applicable.

Priority Action 10.3: Promote and disseminate the results of comprehensive and sustainable alternative development programs, and the benefits they provide to affected communities.

Not applicable.

Priority Action 10.4: Design and/or strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems for comprehensive and sustainable alternative development programs aimed at reducing illicit crop cultivation and improving the well-being of communities, through the use of indicators that measure programs' effectiveness.

Not applicable.

Priority Action 10.5: Strengthen state presence in areas affected by or at risk of illicit drug cultivation, consistent with the circumstances of each member state.

Not applicable.
**Priority Action 10.6:** Promote, in accordance with national realities, the participation of local communities and relevant organizations in the development of comprehensive and sustainable alternative development programs, taking into account their needs and capabilities.

Not applicable.

**Priority Action 10.7:** Promote partnerships and innovative cooperative initiatives with the private sector, civil society, and international financial institutions to spur investment and job creation in areas and communities affected by or at-risk of illicit drug cultivation and production, and share related practices, lessons learned, expertise, and skills.

Not applicable.
OBJECTIVE

11

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT PLANS AND/OR PROGRAMS TO MITIGATE AND REDUCE THE IMPACT OF ILLICIT CROPS AND DRUG PRODUCTION ON THE ENVIRONMENT, IN COOPERATION WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND NATIONAL POLICIES OF MEMBER STATES.

Priority Action 11.1: Conduct research and studies on the environmental impact of illicit crop cultivation and illicit production of drugs.

The U.S. carried out, during the evaluation period (2019-2022), the following studies to determine the characteristics and extent of the environmental impact caused by the illicit cultivation of crops and illicit drug production:

- Combined field and clinical methods clarify mortality causes and survival patterns of Pacific martens
- Distribution of trespass cannabis cultivation and its risk to sensitive forest predators in California and Southern Oregon
- High rates of anticoagulant rodenticide exposure in California Barred Owls are associated with the wildland–urban interface
- Anticoagulant rodenticides in Strix owls indicate widespread exposure in west coast forests
- Grass is not always greener: rodenticide exposure of a threatened species near marijuana growing operations
- Where There's Smoke - The Environmental Science, Public Policy, and Politics of Marijuana
- Biology and Conservation of Musteloids: The Fisher is a Model Organism
- An ever-changing ecological battlefield: marijuana cultivation and toxicant use in western forests
- Mortality risks and limits to population growth of fishers
- Impacts of rodenticide and insecticide toxicants from marijuana cultivation sites on fisher survival rates in the Sierra National Forest, California
- Impacts of rodenticide and insecticide toxicants from marijuana cultivation sites on fisher survival rates in the Sierra National Forest, California
- Silent Forests: How Toxicants Associated with Marijuana Cultivation Impacting Wildlife on our Public and Tribal Lands
- Anticoagulant Rodenticides on our Public and Community Lands: Spatial Distribution of Exposure and Poisoning of a Rare Forest Carnivore

Priority Action 11.2: Design and implement specific research-based plans to mitigate the environmental impact of illicit crop cultivation and drug production, with the participation of local communities.

The U.S. designed and implemented the following specific plans based on the results of research and studies carried out to mitigate and reduce the negative environmental impact of the illicit
cultivation of crops and illicit drug production, with the participation of local communities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implemented plans</th>
<th>Participating local communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reclamation of Illicit cultivation sites on National</td>
<td>Numerous counties in the state of California, State Law Enforcement Agencies, Local Law Enforcement Agencies, Local, Regional and International Non-Profit research and restoration organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Lands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement and Prosecution</td>
<td>United States Department of Justice, State Law Enforcement Agencies, Local Law Enforcement Agencies, Local, Regional and International Non-Profit research and restoration organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Priority Action 11.3:** Promote and strengthen the use of environmental management tools, as appropriate.

The U.S. promotes and strengthens the use of environmental management tools in the implemented specific plans.
**Objective 12**

**ADDRESS THE EFFECTS OF SMALL-SCALE DRUG TRAFFICKING ON PUBLIC HEALTH, THE ECONOMY, SOCIAL COHESION, AND CITIZEN SECURITY.**

**Priority Action 12.1:** Develop and implement local approaches for controlling micro-trafficking and related crimes.

**Priority Action 12.4:** Encourage the development and implementation of comprehensive intervention strategies to counter local illicit distribution and sale of drugs.

The U.S. has developed and implemented approaches for controlling micro-trafficking and related crimes, that take into account effects on public health, the economy, social cohesion, and citizen security. In this sense, typically, state, local, and Tribal police departments investigate micro-trafficking. However, input from the federal government is administered through mechanisms such as local/federal task forces, the National Drug Control Strategy, and Presidential Statements of Priorities. As an example, the Biden-Harris Statement of Drug Policy Priorities emphasizes public health and social cohesion.

**Priority Action 12.2:** Promote the interagency exchange of information at the national level to better understand the scope and adverse effects of small-scale drug trafficking, including on health, society, the economy, and security.

The U.S. does not promote the interagency exchange of information on the effects of small-scale drug trafficking in the health, social, economic, or security sectors.1

**Priority Action 12.3:** Promote programs and strategies to prevent the exploitation of at-risk populations by drug trafficking networks, at the national and international level.

The U.S. does not have programs or strategies that prevent the exploitation of at-risk populations affected by drug trafficking networks, at the national or international level.2

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1 Within the context of the Seventy-second regular session of CICAD, the U.S. Government indicated that it has several programs that promote interagency exchange of information regarding small-scale drug trafficking and its effects on society. For example, one of the primary ways is the U.S. Government’s High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) is a program whose mission is to reduce drug trafficking and misuse by improving interagency collaboration, promoting accurate and timely information and intelligence sharing, and providing specialized training and other resources to its law enforcement, intelligence, treatment, and prevention initiatives. Each HIDTA is focused in a very specific geographic area that is affected by its own health, social, economic and security problems associated with localized drug trafficking. Each HIDTA is its own microcosm which they share with others to better understand, anticipate and combat the effects of drug trafficking.

2 Within the context of the Seventy-second regular session of CICAD, the U.S. Government indicated that one of the primary focus of the U.S. 2022 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) is Substance Use Disorder (SUD) Treatment. One of four principles of SUD Treatment in the NDCS is Supporting At-Risk Populations. The NDCS states that “to
substantially decrease overdose deaths and the burden from SUD, we must strategically address the barriers for treatment among those groups that are most at risk for overdose deaths and other negative consequences. One example is individuals who are incarcerated or reentering after incarceration - a disproportionate number of whom are Black, Indigenous or People of Color (BIPOC)⁹. The mechanisms established by the NDCS to support at-risk populations:

1. Utilize federal grant mechanisms to support people most in need of treatment to include reimbursing for wrap around services.
2. Expand mobile units for MOUD including to prisons and jails.
3. Arrange for treatment funding for people who are incarcerated.
4. Expand evidence-based treatment in federal prison.
5. Pilot methadone programs in federal prisons to leverage telemedicine and bureau of prison pharmacists.
6. Arrange for treatment for people leaving incarceration.

Furthermore, there are several funded programs that address prevention of at-risk for population exploitation, such as the FY 2021 Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP), the FY 2020 Comprehensive Opioid, Stimulant, and Substance Abuse Site-based Program (COSSAP), the BJA FY 19 Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Site-based Program, and the BJA FY 18 Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Site-based Program.
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY

Objective 1
Develop and/or strengthen national- and regional-level interdiction capacity, as well as the capacity to reduce the illicit cultivation, production, trafficking, and distribution of plant-based and synthetic drugs through the use of comprehensive and balanced programs in accordance with the realities of each country’s domestic legislation and respect for human rights.

CICAD notes with satisfaction that the U.S. implements ongoing training programs to detect, investigate, and dismantle laboratories or facilities used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, for personnel involved in interdiction operations; and observes that the country has protocols and procedures to detect, investigate, and dismantle clandestine laboratories or facilities for the illicit processing or manufacture of drugs. CICAD also notes that the agencies in charge of drug control in the U.S. implement policies that promote gender mainstreaming. CICAD observes that the country has programs and strategies for land, riverine, maritime, and aerial interdiction of drugs through monitoring, inspections, and checkpoints. Moreover, CICAD notes that the U.S. has laws providing for the use of specialized investigation tools and techniques to prevent and reduce drug trafficking. CICAD also notes that the country has updated assessments and studies to identify new trends and threats on drug trafficking and related crimes. Additionally, CICAD observes that the U.S. implements actions to identify organized criminal groups involved in drug trafficking and related crimes, carries out inter-institutional collaboration and cooperation mechanisms to coordinate activities aimed at dismantling organized crime groups involved in these crimes, and participated in operations and investigations in cooperation with other countries aimed at dismantling these groups. Moreover, CICAD notes that the country has institutions that are responsible for, and capable of, analyzing chemical substances, precursors, pharmaceutical products, and synthetic drugs, including new psychoactive substances (NPS), and participates in ongoing training programs for personnel involved in the analysis of these substances. However, CICAD observes that the U.S. does not have formal mechanisms to facilitate or share information at the national level across relevant governmental counterparts, nor global repositories on these substances, but notes that it uses existing informal channels to share information. Also, CICAD notes that the country has mechanisms to investigate and disrupt drug trafficking through the Internet. CICAD observes that the country has partnerships and information exchange mechanisms with private sector entities to prevent access to materials and services exploited for illicit drug trafficking purposes and uses tools and resources of the INCB to strengthen cooperation with the private sector to prevent the diversion of chemicals. CICAD observes that the U.S. has national authorities with the appropriate budget, human, and material resources for the forfeiture, seizure and management of assets, tools or products related to illicit drug markets, and its competent personnel to receive ongoing training in this area.
Objective 2
Strengthen national measures to address the challenges posed by NPS and illicit synthetic drugs, and the threat of fentanyl-related substances, non-medical synthetic opioids, and illicit amphetamine derivatives.

CICAD observes with satisfaction that the U.S. has an early warning system (EWS) to identify and trace new psychoactive substances (NPS), illicit synthetic drugs, and the threat of fentanyl-related substances, non-medical synthetic opioids, illicit amphetamine derivatives, and other substances subject to international control. Also, the country improves its capabilities to detect and analyze NPS through the use of special investigative techniques, updated equipment, and acquisition of technology. Additionally, CICAD observes that the U.S. has a regulatory framework to identify and address the challenges posed by the onset of NPS and emerging synthetic drugs, and participates in the INCB’s Project ION. CICAD also notes that the U.S. has innovative legislation and regulatory approaches to synthetic opioids for non-medical use or NPS.

Objective 3
Strengthen or develop legal and institutional frameworks for the effective monitoring and control of essential chemical substances and precursors to prevent diversion of these substances to the manufacturing of illicit drugs and counter its trafficking, including periodically updating national lists of controlled chemical substances.

CICAD notes with satisfaction that the U.S. has a competent national authority responsible for developing guides, codes of conduct, and other instruments to inform the industry and users in general of controlled chemical substances and has such instruments and mechanisms. CICAD also observes that the country has an updated register of all individuals and corporations handling controlled chemical substances and that its competent authority carries out regular inspections and audits of the establishments of individuals and corporations authorized to handle these substances. Moreover, CICAD notes that the U.S. carries out analyses that include the exchange of information through existing international mechanisms of substances, their analogs, and precursors, which pose a threat to public health. Likewise, CICAD observes that the U.S. has legislation incorporating the control measures in Article 12 of the 1988 United Nations Convention to prevent diversion of controlled chemical substances towards illicit activities, which include all of the control measures listed in Paragraph 8 and Paragraph 9 and incorporate the requests for information set forth in Paragraph 10. Likewise, CICAD notes that the country uses the INCB’s PEN Online system for pre-export notifications of controlled chemical substances as well as the PICS system and receives training for drug control personnel and for the identification and handling of controlled chemical substances. On the other hand, CICAD notes that the country has budgetary mechanisms to ensure allocation of resources to acquire necessary equipment and supplies for the preliminary identification of substances and the protective equipment required by personnel in charge of these tasks. Likewise, CICAD observes that the U.S. uses the OAS/CICAD Model Regulations for the Control of Chemical Substances Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
Objective 4
Ensure adequate availability and accessibility of substances subject to international control for medical and scientific purposes, while also preventing their diversion towards illicit activities, in accordance with international drug control conventions.

CICAD notes that the U.S. has special processes for issuing authorizations for the national production, import, and export of substances subject to international control for medical and scientific purposes and that it has an updated register of individuals or companies importing and exporting substances subject to international control for medical and scientific purposes. Moreover, CICAD observes that the country does have training activities for competent national authorities and health professionals on proper access to substances subject to international control solely for medical and scientific purposes. CICAD also notes that the country has a regulatory framework to govern the acquisition of substances subject to international control for medical and scientific purposes.

Objective 5
Adopt or strengthen control measures to prevent diversion of controlled pharmaceutical products containing narcotic drugs and/or psychotropic substances, and those containing precursor substances used in the production of controlled substances.

CICAD notes with satisfaction that the U.S. has an updated register of individuals and corporations handling pharmaceutical products containing precursor substances, narcotics, or psychotropic substances, issues licenses to manufacturers and distributors of these products, and carries out regular inspections and audits of the establishments of individuals and corporations authorized to handle them. CICAD observes that the country has criminal, civil, and administrative penalties for infractions or violations by individuals or corporations that handle pharmaceutical products containing precursor substances, narcotics, or psychotropic substances. Similarly, CICAD notes that the U.S. offers periodic training programs for personnel responsible for preventing trade in and diversion of materials and equipment for the illicit production or manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and shares information with other global systems on this matter. Furthermore, CICAD observes that the country uses the INCB’s I2ES system and has received training on the use of the I2ES system.

Objective 6
Strengthen or develop specific operational and intelligence gathering and sharing mechanisms to detect methods used by criminal organizations, including the exploitation of land, riverine, maritime, and aerial routes.

CICAD notes with satisfaction that the U.S. implements periodic training programs for personnel involved in drug investigations in specialized investigative techniques and intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Furthermore, CICAD observes that the country participates in periodic
training programs and other capacity-building activities to investigate and counter crimes associated with drug trafficking, such as corruption and money laundering. Additionally, CICAD notes that the U.S. has information gathering mechanisms to exchange intelligence information, at a domestic, regional, and international level, to detect routes and methods used by drug trafficking criminal organizations. CICAD also observes that the country has tools that promote and strengthen cooperation and the exchange of information and intelligence among domestic law enforcement agencies responsible for drug interdiction and effective border control. Moreover, CICAD notes that the U.S. has a national information system on drug trafficking and related crimes, including alerts on changing behaviors and modus operandi of criminal organizations.

**Objective 7**

Establish, update, or reinforce, as appropriate, the legislative and institutional frameworks in the areas of prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and control of money laundering derived from drug trafficking, such as the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

CICAD notes with satisfaction that the U.S. has strengthened its regulatory framework to counter money laundering derived from illicit drug trafficking; and conducts periodic training programs for officials on prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of money laundering derived from drug trafficking. However, CICAD notes that no such training is conducted for the vulnerable sectors but takes note that the country adopts measures to alert vulnerable sectors of money laundering and other illicit finance risks. On the other hand, CICAD notes that the U.S. has protocols that enable authorities to conduct financial and asset investigations parallel to drug trafficking investigations. Additionally, CICAD observes that the country has mechanisms allowing for interagency coordination and cooperation in the area of preventing and controlling money laundering. CICAD notes that the U.S. has a Financial Investigation Unit and has information systems aimed at the investigation and prosecution of money laundering in analyzing cases deriving from drug trafficking. CICAD observes that the country has mechanisms for analyzing money laundering risks, in accordance with FATF recommendations. Additionally, CICAD notes that the U.S. has established partnerships with financial industries to identify and investigate illicit transactions and money laundering operations related to the proceeds of drug trafficking activities.

**Objective 8**

Establish and/or strengthen agencies for the administration and disposition of seized and/or forfeited assets in cases of drug trafficking, money laundering, and other related crimes, in line with applicable international law, and in line with relevant standards, such as the FATF recommendations and the recommendations on preventive freezing of assets.

CICAD notes with satisfaction that the U.S. has a designated competent authority responsible for
the administration and disposition of seized and forfeited assets and regulations to facilitate the accountability and transparency of the management of seized and forfeited assets. Furthermore, CICAD observes that the country offers specialized, periodic training programs for the management and disposition of seized and forfeited assets. Moreover, CICAD notes that the U.S. has legislation, in accordance with international conventions and treaties, to facilitate the seizure, forfeiture, and management of assets and instruments derived from drug trafficking and other related crimes.

**Objective 9**
Design, implement, and strengthen comprehensive and balanced national programs to reduce the illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of drugs through the adoption of effective measures, such as comprehensive and sustainable alternative development, enhanced law enforcement cooperation, and other appropriate policies and programs, taking into account the particular needs of sub-national regions of each country, respecting human rights.

CICAD notes with satisfaction that the U.S. has updated national policies and programs to prevent and decrease illicit cultivation, production, and manufacture of drugs. Furthermore, CICAD observes that the country has direct budgetary allocations towards financing counternarcotics programs. Additionally, CICAD notes that the U.S. takes into account licit traditional uses when designing and implementing policies and programs to reduce the illicit supply of drugs and includes environmental protection measures in these policies and programs. CICAD observes that the country has established mechanisms for interinstitutional cooperation between public and private institutions to provide a comprehensive response to the illicit production of drugs. Additionally, CICAD notes that the U.S. supports the development of supply reduction programs with drug-related crime prevention initiatives that address social and economic risk factors, which include the participation of civil society and other social stakeholders.

**Objective 10**
Design, implement or strengthen long-term alternative development programs, including rural and urban alternatives, comprehensive and sustainable alternative development programs, and, as appropriate, preventive alternative development, in accordance with the policies, laws and needs of each country, as appropriate, while respecting human rights.

CICAD notes that the U.S. has not designed nor implemented comprehensive and sustainable alternative development programs or preventive alternative development, therefore, the priority actions of this objective are not applicable.
Objective 11
Design and implement plans and/or programs to mitigate and reduce the impact of illicit crops and drug production on the environment, in cooperation with local communities and national policies of member states.

CICAD notes that the U.S. carried out, during the evaluation period (2019-2022), studies to determine the characteristics and extent of the environmental impact caused by the illicit cultivation of crops and illicit drug production. Additionally, CICAD observes that the country designed and implemented specific plans, based on the results research and studies, to mitigate and reduce the negative environmental impact of the illicit cultivation of crops and illicit drug production, with the participation of local communities.

Objective 12
Address the effects of small-scale drug trafficking on public health, the economy, social cohesion, and citizen security.

CICAD observes that the U.S. has developed and implemented approaches for controlling micro-trafficking and related crimes, that take into account effects on public health, the economy, social cohesion, and citizen security. However, CICAD notes with concern that the country does not promote interagency exchange of information on the effects of small-scale drug trafficking in the health, social, economic, or security sectors, and does not have programs or strategies to prevent the exploitation of at-risk populations affected by drug trafficking networks, at the national or international level.

3 Within the context of the Seventy-second regular session of CICAD, the U.S. Government indicated that it has several programs that promote interagency exchange of information regarding small-scale drug trafficking and its effects on society. For example, one of the primary ways is the U.S. Government’s High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) is a program whose mission is to reduce drug trafficking and misuse by improving interagency collaboration, promoting accurate and timely information and intelligence sharing, and providing specialized training and other resources to its law enforcement, intelligence, treatment, and prevention initiatives. Each HIDTA is focused in a very specific geographic area that is affected by its own health, social, economic and security problems associated with localized drug trafficking. Each HIDTA is its own microcosm which they share with others to better understand, anticipate and combat the effects of drug trafficking.

4 Within the context of the Seventy-second regular session of CICAD, the U.S. Government indicated that one of the primary focus of the U.S. 2022 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) is Substance Use Disorder (SUD) Treatment. One of four principles of SUD Treatment in the NDCS is Supporting At-Risk Populations. The NDCS states that “to substantially decrease overdose deaths and the burden from SUD, we must strategically address the barriers for treatment among those groups that are most at risk for overdose deaths and other negative consequences. One example is individuals who are incarcerated or reentering after incarceration - a disproportionate number of whom are Black, Indigenous or People of Color (BIPOC)”. The mechanisms established by the NDCS to support at-risk populations:

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Furthermore, there are several funded programs that address prevention of at-risk for population exploitation, such as the FY 2021 Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP), the FY 2020 Comprehensive Opioid, Stimulant, and Substance Abuse Site-based Program (COSSAP), the BJA FY 19 Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Site-based Program, and the BJA FY 18 Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Site-based Program.