# NATIONAL CITIZEN SECURITY AND COEXISTENCE POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

Presidential Advisory Office on Citizen Security and Coexistence

National Planning Department – Head Office of Justice, Security and Government–

# PART I NATIONAL POLICY

#### Introduction

The National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy (PNSCC, in Spanish) is the outcome of an inter-institutional process led by the Presidency of the Republic, with the participation of the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, the National Police and the National Planning Department, along with other entities on the national and territorial levels<sup>1</sup>.

The PNSCC formulation process involved four main stages: a) the elaboration of a conceptual and diagnostic framework of citizen security policies in Colombia's major cities; b) the definition of an institutional map, detailing responsible entities and areas for institutional coordination; c) the planning and realization of working groups and interviews with local authorities and experts; d) the collection of feedback on the policy formulation process through consultation with and the participation of public and private stakeholders.

The result of this process –the National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy– is structured as follows: 1. Challenges of the PNSCC; 2. Objectives, Guiding Principles and Intervention Criteria; 3. Central Strategic Pillars and their respective Lines of Action; 4. Policy Cross-cutting Components; and, finally, 5. Implementation Strategy, which will be accompanied by a partnership scheme for its territorial management and operation that includes entities on the national, departmental and municipal levels, in addition to non-profit organizations and private companies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The National Planning Department developed a base proposal with the technical support of the *Ideas* para la Paz Foundation (FIP, in Spanish), within the framework of technical cooperation promoted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

There are several conceptual approaches to and definitions of Citizen Security and Citizen Coexistence. Some are broader, based on the concept of human security, while others have a more limited scope. For the purposes of the PNSCC, a restricted scope approach was adopted without overlooking the valuable contributions of broader interpretations on the matter, with the aim of focusing the actions of State agencies and the society at large on the improvement of citizen security and coexistence.

In this regard, and for the purposes of the Policy, **Citizen Security** is understood as the universal protection of citizens from crimes and contraventions that affect their dignity, their personal security and the security of their property; and from the fear of insecurity. **Coexistence**, in turn, is understood as the promotion of attachment and support among citizens of a citizen culture based on respect for the law, for others, and for basic norms of social behavior and coexistence.

#### 1. Challenges of the National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy

With regard to the challenges faced by a National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy, it is possible to identify two types: structural challenges and others associated with the crime situation.

First, within the challenges that we could identify as structural, we find those related to the country's urban development process and its accompanying complexities; the growth of the goods and services market, as well as the opportunities for crime that it generates; the existence –although waning– of illegal armed groups; drug-trafficking and its diverse manifestations –including its impact on cultural paradigms and age groups, especially young people– and criminal and organized crime networks tied to this phenomenon; and finally, a weak presence of the State in some municipalities, despite significant advances in terms of public and private institutions, with associated advances in quality of life.

The foregoing is further fueled by general risk factors such as the sale and consumption of alcohol and psychoactive substances, as well as weapons possession which, in some cases, have some incidence on the crimes committed or on their violent outcomes.

Within this structural framework, the increase in development levels in urban centers and the higher interconnectivity between cities and markets have promoted contagious phenomena of scenes of violence and illicit activities where children, adolescents and young people become the target of crime networks. Thus, there is a convergence between crime rates, the presence of criminal structures and deteriorated urban environments that harbor establishments linked to prostitution and the sale of alcohol and psychoactive substances. In this way, for example, homicides affect not only the individuals involved in criminal networks and organized crime but also average citizens that frequent these establishments.

This situation, together with domestic and sexual violence and weak insertion in the school system and the labor market –especially among young people– contributes to the vulnerability of some social groups, which sometimes makes them more likely to become the target of emerging crime, whether as available human resources or as a group at risk of victimization. At the same time, the process of urban expansion and the economic growth taking place in a system of large and medium-sized cities concentrates human capital, infrastructure and greater labor demands, exerting pressure on local governments' capacity to prevent and control delinquency and violent crime, provide social services, regulate citizen behavior and integrate new residents who arrive, mainly, to these urban areas.

Secondly, although the impact of illegal armed groups has fallen, they remain among the recently identified challenges. Their ability to adapt to, learn about and transfer criminal practices persists, in particular through new forms of organized crime at the urban level. These forms range from actions with terrorist characteristics to the operation of various illegal activities related to drugtrafficking, weapons sales, land piracy, gambling, prostitution and usury loans.

While the demobilization of the bulk of the executive and military structures of the so-called self-defense groups, especially the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC, in Spanish) and in some cases their criminal networks, succeeded in disarming and dismantling the armed confrontation among thousands of their members, thereby reducing their capacity to do harm, new criminal elements have emerged and include some members of the self-defense groups that did not demobilize, or that demobilized and withdrew from the process of reintegration into civilian life.

At the same time, the direct and indirect extortion targeting carriers, formal and informal merchants, houses and apartments, and the diverse forms of extortionist kidnapping in urban centers –especially short-term kidnappings– negatively impact the real conditions of citizen security as well as how they are perceived.

In addition, there is a series of challenges associated with citizen behavior and the failure to take ownership of the basic tenets of citizen culture. Among these challenges, it is worth noting the complacency and, on occasion, complicity of citizens in illicit activities (for example, purchasing stolen goods or shopping at illegal points of sale), contraventions, intolerance –which seems to have increased or at least become more visible– and incompliance with informal rules of conduct, among others. These require the proactive intervention of the Government and the society.

As this is not an exhaustive description of the structural and situational characteristics that should be considered in the definition of a strategy on the national level, and as there are diverse interpretations on the issue that deserve due consideration, as well as local idiosyncrasies –including the logic of territorial areas and neighborhoods– that explain particular crime situations, the challenges that the National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy faces are summarized below: i) Prevent the emergence of new criminal actors and re-offending; ii) Fight crime and organized crime; iii) Combat and dismantle the illegal economic markets upon which criminal structures are built, organized and consolidated; iv) Respond effectively to any conduct that threatens or puts individual and collective security at risk; v) Strengthen the rule of law, guaranteeing the power of law and justice; vi) Safeguard individual and collective rights; vii) Promote a civic and citizen culture; and viii) Promote legality, respect and coexistence as social values and practices.

#### 2. Objectives and Principles

The National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy –PNSCC– is framed within the public policy guidelines established in the 2010-2014 National Development Plan, "Prosperity for All", with regard to constitutional principles, civil liberties, pluralism and the State's political-administrative organization.

#### 2.1. General Objective

To protect the nationals and foreigners that are in Colombia, in connection with their life, integrity, liberty and economic assets, by reducing crime and enforcing punishments, mollifying fear of violence and promoting coexistence.

This objective will be achieved by reducing the general impact of crime, the number of homicides, the offences and contraventions related with coexistence, the citizens' fear of crime and by increasing the judicialization and sentencing of violent crimes.

#### 2.2. Specific Objectives

Para alcanzar el objetivo general, se han identificado siete objetivos específicos, que a su turno establecen unos lineamientos generales para la implementación:

- Reduce the likelihood of initiating a criminal career and the recidivism of perpetrators, and make it more difficult to commit a crime, especially a high impact crime;
- 2. Improve the presence and response of the police force as well as their deterrent capacity for social control, criminal investigation and dismantling criminal networks;
- 3. Increase the judicialization and punishment of those responsible for crimes and the guidance and assistance given to victims of severe crimes. Also increase viable resocializations;
- 4. Achieve collective social behavior that is law-abiding, and which favors social coexistence and the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts;
- 5. Make citizens aware of their responsibilities as members of the society in the fight against crime and of their active role within the community;
- 6. Reach public policy decisions by improving the national crime information system and by studying and evaluating policies related to the issue;
- 7. Facilitate the work of authorities in the fight against crime by adapting the criminal legislation and the regulations regarding citizen coexistence.

#### 2.3. Guiding Principles and Intervention Criteria

The National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy is governed by Guiding Principles and Intervention Criteria that support the actions to be implemented in alignment with the institutional vocation, respecting the pluralistic legal system which inspired their drafting and formulation.

#### The **Guiding Principles of the Policy** include:

- 1. Safeguarding individual rights and liberties: Citizen rights are the backbone of the PNSCC. It is the duty of the State to fully protect the citizen. Therefore, the Policy contributes to the generation and maintenance of "the conditions necessary for the exercise of public rights and freedoms and to ensure that the inhabitants of Colombia may live together in peace"2.
- 2. Coordination within the State: The success of the PNSCC depends to a great extent on the harmonious collaboration among public authorities; And, in particular, on the capacity of the policy-enforcing entities and agencies of the National Government to understand its logic and to adjust and focus the programs and projects to the Objectives, Strategic Pillars and Lines of Action defined herein. This will require collaboration and an ongoing dialogue, as well as collective follow-up and evaluation.
- 3. Coordination, Nation Territory: The PNSCC sets out general guidelines for the administration of citizen security and coexistence in the entire national territory, notwithstanding the principle of territorial autonomy. Governors and Mayors should recognize the particular characteristics of crime and violence in their territories and foresee the most pertinent actions. The Policy is based upon the following principles: i) coordination, which implies that the territorial entities should harmonize their activities with the State-defined strategy; ii) concurrence, meaning that local and departmental entities should act in accordance with the competencies of each territorial authority; and iii) subsidiarity, which establishes that, in the event that a department or municipality does not currently have the institutional or budgetary capacity to prevent and contain crime and violence within its territory– its needs will be addressed by entities at higher levels.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Political Constitution. Article 218.

- 4. Territorial autonomy: The PNSCC is aimed at creating and strengthening the existing capacity of territorial entities to prevent and control violence and crime within their territory and at restoring constitutional order and the necessary conditions of security and coexistence. This principle seeks to encourage the leadership of departmental, district and municipal authorities in the territorial management of security and coexistence and to foster territorial responsibility, within the framework of the established competencies.
- 5. Co-responsibility: Citizen security and coexistence is an issue than concerns everyone. Its achievement requires not only the collaboration of the various public authorities according to their mission competencies, but also the joint efforts of the State's national and territorial entities, together with the private sector, the organized civil society and the citizenship at large.

The National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy's **Intervention Criteria** and implementation strategy include:

- **1. Long-term Vision:** The reduction of violence and crime, given their complexities, requires a long-term vision. This notwithstanding the timeframe and specific scope of each intervention, as well as the importance of and need to achieve short and medium-term results.
- 2. Comprehensive Focus: Violence and crime are phenomena that require a multi-dimensional approach involving different measures, entities and stakeholders –both public and private– from a variety of sectors and governmental levels, based on comprehensive criteria. However, such criteria require focused actions aligned with the previous criteria.
- **3. Determining Factors:** There are multiple causes for violence and crime. However, it is difficult to specify the exact causes of violence and crime. Therefore, it is important to determine the factors that, individually or together, provide the most satisfactory explanation for a criminal circumstance based on risk and protection factors.
- **4. Territorial Specificity:** Violence and crime tend to present similar characteristics nationwide. However, as mentioned earlier, there are idiosyncrasies at the regional and local levels –or even zone, neighborhood

and district levels— that establish differences, sometimes significant ones, in the manifestation of violence and crime. Therefore, strategies, lines of action and interventions should be determined taking into account the idiosyncrasies at the territorial level and according to the other criteria stated here.

- **5. At-risk Population:** Social interventions will be aimed, in principle, at models of secondary and tertiary prevention of high-impact crimes in particular, according to a categorization of municipalities and in prioritized areas. The aforementioned does not conflict with the responsibility some State entities have to support interventions for a target population of a universal character or primary type.
- 6. Adolescents and Youths, A Priority: Special attention will be given to the population between the ages of 12 and 26, pursuing environments that prevent their involvement in criminal activities and networks. In the event of punishable conduct, the mitigation of re-offending as well as resocialization and socio-economic insertion will be a priority, notwithstanding the responsibilities inherent to the crime committed and the relevant legal procedures and penalties, established according to age.
- 7. Crime Priorization: It is the State's duty to counterweigh all of the crimes classified under the current regulations. However, the occurrence, form, seriousness and impact of crimes are not the same and resources are limited. Therefore, and without neglecting legal obligations, the interventions to be implemented should correspond to a prioritization of criminal offense types such as homicide, personal injuries, theft, traffic accident deaths, extortion (micro-extortion in particular) and drug and arms trafficking (micro-trafficking specifically). Prioritizing the State's response to the criminal behaviors described above is pertinent considering their high impact, interrelation with other forms of crime and impact on the perception of security.
- 8. Learning from Successful Experiences: There are national and international lessons to be learned regarding the real effectiveness of specific interventions, particularly those related to prevention, police and justice. Therefore, the Policy will aim to identify, define and prioritize the interventions to be carried out –starting with those on the national level– by using knowledge of successful and promising experiences (see Boxes 1 and 2, Successful Experiences and Lessons Learned).

- **9. Suitable Incentives:** The development of the Policy's different lines of action should promote suitable incentives (appropriate, relevant and strategic) that strengthen protection factors and neutralize risk factors, while identifying and counteracting their possible perverse incentives.
- **10. Monitoring, Follow-up and Evaluation:** Monitoring, tracking and evaluating policies and strategies is not common practice, among other reasons, because of their inherent cost. However, in order to achieve specific objectives and continually adjust the Policy, these activities should be carried out –especially to examine the effectiveness of the main interventions and pilot initiatives.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, monitoring, tracking and evaluating will enable the identification of successful and promising experiences that may be replicated.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Guidelines establish that "analyzing institutional performance through the achievement of the goals established for each one of the objectives of the programs and projects, in terms of their effectiveness, efficiency, attainments and difficulties, which will enable drawing conclusions useful as feedback and for planning of other programs and projects" (BID. Guidelines for a citizen security policy in Colombia. 2010).

#### Box No. 1 - Successful and Promising Experiences<sup>4</sup>

- Interventions in early childhood, promoting good parenting practices and protective family environments (prenatal training, accompaniment in the child's first years, support for mothers).
- High quality day-cares and pre-schools, stimulation of children's intellectual curiosity, parental interest in child's learning and parents' ability to peacefully resolve differences within the couple and with the children.
- Therapies promoting changes in behavior, communication and attitude in dysfunctional families; family tutoring programs and multisystemic therapies within families and with violent youth.
- Knowledge and skills training in the prevention and control of disease, responsible sexuality, inherent risks associated with the consumption of psychoactive drugs, self-regulation and control of alcohol consumption.
- Schooling of children and youth; constructive school environments; leaning stimulus; extended class periods; and use of schools' sports facilities on the weekends (Open School Model).
- Detention of violent re-offenders; sanctions in the community for high impact crimes committed by non-violent offenders and non-reoffenders; and probation or parole for others.
- Restorative justice, especially for adolescents involved in punishable behavior, with the exception of re-offenders or violent criminals, in which case their detention is advised.
- Differentiated detention for adolescents (site location, pedagogical and resocialization model, and internal security) according to the seriousness of the crime, criminal record, and age of the adolescent.
- Focus on perpetrators, sites and recurring times (called Hot Spots), and repeat victims in cases in which their participation as victims of certain crimes or in certain places is disproportional.
- Focused police patrols, in places, on days and at times of recurring criminal activity; permanent presence in small areas associated with specific crimes, with strict surveillance and control.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Various studies, especially at the international level, identify successful and promising interventions as well as lessons learned that have been taken into consideration in establishing the ENSCC's Pillars and Lines of Action. (Lloreda, Francisco; "Public Policies for Reducing Violence With Particular Reference to Youth Violence in Colombia", Doctoral Thesis, Oxford University, England. March 2010).

- Restrictive measures for alcohol consumption, according to the characteristics of each territory, and especially as regards drunken driving and carrying of weapons.
- Improve the Police legitimacy, credibility and reliability, especially in areas that have a history of inefficiency, abuse or corruption, and in communities considered high-risk.
- In an organized way, and with concrete tasks and projects, get the communities in critical or high-risk areas involved in mechanisms to inform the authorities and neighbors and to promote self-protection.

#### Box No. 2 - Lessons Learned<sup>5</sup>

- Preventing crime is more effective and less costly than rehabilitating criminals.
- Prevention is not incompatible with law enforcement; instead, they complement each other.
- Crime is multi-causal, but there are determining factors.
- Interventions should be comprehensive, but the actions should be focused.
- The earlier the intervention, the better (prenatal, pre-school).
- Relevant interventions in the family and in school are critical.
- The ideal duration of an intervention varies, but the longer the better.
- Police activity is critical, but is most effective if it is focused.
- Alternative penalty procedures should be the standard.
- Incapacitation should be exceptional (re-offending and violent crime).
- Restorative justice, standard for young, non-violent perpetrators.
- Evaluating is expensive, but not doing so carries greater costs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Id.

#### 3. Central Strategic Pillars and Lines of Action of the Policy

Within the framework of the aforementioned principles and criteria, and with the purpose of addressing the multiple and changing challenges to security and coexistence, the PNSCC is supported by seven strategic pillars, five of which are central, as explained below: Social and Situational Prevention; Police Presence and Control; Justice, Victims and Resocialization; Culture of Legality and Coexistence; and Active and Responsible Citizenship. It is clear that these pillars and lines of action will be applied to municipalities according to their criminal specificities.

#### 3.1. First Pillar: Social and Situational Prevention

This pillar refers to strategies for the neutralization, control and reduction of specific and impending risks associated with the occurrence of crimes, from a social standpoint (individuals) and a situational perspective (punishable act). Accordingly, it entails various levels and forms of prevention, with a population and territorial approach. This is to say, it goes beyond the threat of punishment and the police factor. Prevention aims to reduce the probability of initiating and continuing a criminal career; it also creates environments that make it difficult to commit a crime and imply high costs for those who do commit them.

#### 3.1.1. Social Prevention

- a. Promote training in sexual and reproductive rights and in knowledge and skills regarding early pregnancy, sexuality and responsible parenting, for children and adolescents in vulnerable situations, including their parents and the nuclear or extended family.
- b. Train parents in vulnerable situations about good parenting practices during the prenatal stage, and promote accompaniment, guidance and support in the first years of the child's life, to prevent domestic violence and sexual abuse.
- c. Train parents in vulnerable situations about basic skills related to the resolution of domestic and interpersonal conflicts and differences, to prevent acts of violence and social intolerance within families and communities.

- d. Train students and their parents, as well as the directors and teachers of educational centers in vulnerable areas, on skills for the resolution of interpersonal differences, thereby improving self-esteem and promoting a common interest in learning.
- e. Foster initiatives to prevent de-schooling, especially among vulnerable children and youth, promoting their return to the educational system in cases of school drop-out, and generating a multi-gradual and multi-modal catch-up program.
- f. Promote extended or complementary school days with extracurricular activities and academic support, allowing children and youth in vulnerable situations to use their schools' sports and recreational facilities on the weekends.
- g. Promote, within the territorial development plans, local rehabilitation and social inclusion programs for the homeless population, together with urban renovation processes that may reduce the perception of urban insecurity and criminal activity.
- h. Promote the identification and development of talents, abilities, and artistic, musical and cultural skills; encourage reading and the use and appropriation of libraries and other alternative cultural spaces, in vulnerable areas.
- i. Foster initiatives for the use and appropriation of communication and information technologies in educational and cultural centers, as well as community telecenters, stimulating educational and occupational alternatives and a positive use of free time in vulnerable areas.
- j. Promote training for the general population about the risks and harms associated with the consumption of psychoactive substances and the inadequate use of alcohol, especially for children and youth in vulnerable situations, including their nuclear or extended family.

- k. Promote restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol and give priority to exemplary penalties for those who drive under the influence of alcohol –given the risk that this implies for society—with a more severe penalty if the driver is also carrying a weapon.
- Promote the empowerment of governors, should no agreement among mayors of metropolitan municipalities exist, to define policies and adopt measures related to the sale and consumption of alcohol, the operation of public establishments and the use of public spaces.
- m. Promote training for high risk youths –including those who do not attend school for exogenous reasons– in arts, trades, work skills, and income-earning activities, in addition to encouraging their socioeconomic insertion.
- n. Foster specific actions –in areas of the prioritized urban centers– that complement those listed above to prevent criminal networks, common criminals and organized criminals from recruiting and using children and adolescents.

#### 3.1.2. Situational Prevention

- o. Promote the recovery of pedestrian and vehicular routes, passages and roads, and their lighting, in urban settlements in municipalities and areas prioritized according to their crime rates, in order to reduce the opportunity to commit crimes.
- p. Coordinate citizen security and coexistence initiatives with the Integral Neighborhood Improvement Program (MIB, in Spanish), emphasizing the prioritized municipalities and areas, improving the communities' environments and quality of life, and preventing criminal activity.
- q. Recover, maintain and build new public spaces for leisure, recreation, sports and culture, to encourage the healthy use of free time and involvement in sports and cultural activities, especially in prioritized areas.

- r. Promote, within the framework of the Integrated Security and Emergency System (SIES, in Spanish), sustainable CCTV -with filming, monitoring and analysis- in strategic places in prioritized urban centers, for the purpose of prevention, deterrence, control and judicialization.
- s. Reduce the opportunity for crime and the economic benefit that may be gained from the theft of consumer goods, including mobile phones, vehicles and homes, among other crimes that occur frequently and have a high social impact (see Box No. 3, Measures Against Mobile Phone Theft).
- t. Incorporate, gradually but effectively, urbanistic and architectural criteria for situational prevention in urban and architectural developments, especially in priority housing programs that are of social interest, beginning with pilot projects.

#### Box No. 3 - Mobile Phone Theft<sup>6</sup>

Mobile phone theft has become a frequent form of crime, with estimated thefts totaling between 550,000 and 3,000,000 in 2010. This wide range is explained by low reporting rates for stolen devices that use the mobile phone companies' prepay systems. In addition, this type of crime is seldom reported to the authorities.

In general, those who are involved in this illegal business commit other crimes as well -from personal injuries to homicides. In Bogota, Medellin and Cali, to cite some examples, mobile phone theft accounts for between 30 and 60 per cent of personal thefts.

For that reason, the Presidential Advisory Office on Citizen Security and Coexistence included within this Policy the need to reduce the economic benefit associated with this crime. Consequently, the Presidency of the Republic, in coordination with the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, the National Police, the Communications Regulation Commission, the Congress of the Republic, and mobile phone operators and manufacturers, made headway in identifying measures that may effectively reduce this type of crime.

As of May 2011, the following measures have been adopted:

1. The elaboration of a Positive Database; that is to say, a database of the devices that are legally activated in Colombia, based on telecommunications operators' verification of the devices' legal origin.

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- 2. The creation of mechanisms that enable the verification of the importation and legal origin of new and used devices as well as parts for sale, thereby facilitating the authorities' specific tasks.
- 3. The inclusion of unlawful device manipulation and reprogramming as a crime in the Citizen Security Statute legislative initiative.
- 4. The commitment, on the part of the National Police, to strengthen operations to discourage and control theft in places of highest incidence and the sale of devices with illegal origins and to dismantle networks.
- 5. The implementation of a large-scale self-protection campaign about mobile phone theft that encourages citizens to report theft to telecommunications companies and to the authorities so that the phone can be blocked and an investigation and legal proceeding can be carried out.
- 6. The exchange of databases detailing stolen devices with telecommunications operators in the neighboring countries where the stolen devices are sold. In addition, the Policy will seek agreements with the American Police Community (AMERIPOL), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Organization of American States (OEA) in order to combat this type of crime.
- 7. The study, by telecommunications operators, of the possibility of launching low-cost devices on the market in order to compete in price with illegal and stolen devices, revising the current replacement policies.
- 8. Progress in the study of the technological restrictions for devices and software to promote the protection of information, to track devices and –if possible– to permanently block stolen mobile phones.

#### 3.2. Second Pillar: Police Presence and Control

Citizen security and coexistence require the strategic strengthening of the National Police's ability to deter and control crime, especially that which operates within the framework of organized crime. To counteract crime, the police must have a permanent presence near the community and a strategic and focused deployment capacity and logic, geared to concrete manifestations of crime, understanding that this last form usually corresponds to criminal organizations and networks.

At the same time, it is important to adjust local security policies in order to anticipate and neutralize changing criminal dynamics. To this end, the active participation and involvement of territorial entities is needed in the characterization and treatment of the criminal phenomenon, according to constitutional and legal functions and competencies.<sup>7</sup>

#### **Lines of Action:**

- **3.2.1. Permanent Police Presence near the Community**, in order to deter and control crime and support citizens.
  - a. Implement the Quadrant Community Surveillance National Plan in the municipalities prioritized for this purpose and in those particular areas and towns with high crime rates, with the flexibility required according to the specificities of each city.<sup>8</sup>
  - b. Focus operations and patrols on high crime rate areas in prioritized zones, in order to guarantee citizen security and coexistence within the framework of the Quadrant Community Surveillance National Plan.
  - c. Modernize and unify the Police's communication systems for reporting and inquiring the identity of citizens –as well as their criminal and contravention records– online, thereby facilitating police work, especially in prioritized areas.
  - d. Advocate, strategically and gradually and within the framework of the Integrated Security and Emergency System (SEIS), the Unique National Number 123, promoting its responsible use by citizens and an even more effective institutional response.
  - e. Revise the requirements and procedures for issuing permits to own and carry weapons and for ballistic identification, and create a single national record of weapons that can be accessed online by authorities, and third-party liability insurance for weapons possession.

<sup>8</sup> The National Police has prioritized the implementation of the Quadrant Community Surveillance National Plan in eight metropolitan areas, namely: Bogota, Valle, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Bucaramanga, Cucuta and Pereira.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Territorial leadership is fundamental in the formulation, development and evaluation of comprehensive plans for citizen security and coexistence; master plans for security equipment, coexistence, citizenship and justice; and road plans. The above rests within the framework of the Safe Departments and Municipalities Program (DMS, in Spanish) whose objective is to strengthen local governance in terms of citizen security and coexistence.

- f. Promote the retention of police commanders, police officers and judicial police for a minimum period of time, especially in municipalities with high crime rates, insofar as the National Police's internal regulations and urgent service needs permit.
- g. Promote the Safe Departments and Municipalities Program (DMS, in Spanish) to raise awareness among authorities at the national and territorial level among those who aspire to popularly elected positions and among citizens about the importance of security and the PNSCC.
- h. Specify and reinforce the National Police's mechanisms for communication, confidence-building and permanent service to the community, thereby strengthening the credibility of the institution and the police personnel as a result of their ethical and efficient conduct.

### **3.2.2. Focused and Strategic Deployment** for the reduction of high impact crimes, according to national and territorial prioritization.

- Strengthen the intelligence instruments and mechanisms used by National Police in urban centers to fight crime and, in particular, organized crime, urban expressions of organized gangs and illegal armed groups.
- j. Assign and increase the number of National Police officers according to criteria of municipal prioritization and specific requirements based on the type of crime to be counterweighed, notwithstanding the existence of Quadrant Community Surveillance National Plans.
- k. Set forth, in cooperation with the Attorney General, strategic actions to counteract organized and urban crime groups, the urban manifestations of criminal gangs (networks and structures), and illegal armed groups.
- I. Create specialized groups to counteract extortion and microextortion, with the support of the Attorney General, to dismantle their criminal networks and organizations, especially in cities where the phenomenon has grown stronger or threatens to do so.

- m. Promote specialized actions to counteract the trafficking and commerce of psychoactive substances, and particularly to eradicate the networks and organizations involved in microtrafficking and micro-retail, with support from the Attorney General and other State authorities.
- n. Implement control and disarmament operations, in critical areas in particular, strengthen the interdiction of the market and the illegal trafficking of weapons and ammunition, and conduct an indepth study of the country's legal and illegal weapons and ammunition market.
- o. Promote regulated and exceptional strategic mechanisms, to provide incentives for genuine and precise information, leading to the identification of recurrent perpetrators and to the dismantling of criminal organizations and networks.
- p. Promote the professional study of criminology and train police personnel –according to their strategic specialties and needs to counter crime and organized crime– on urban intelligence, criminal investigation and forensic science.

#### 3.3. <u>Third Pillar</u>: Justice, Victims and Resocialization

Justice is a key component of citizen security and coexistence. Respect for the legal system and individual and collective rights are guaranteed within the framework of the social rule of law. An effective and independent judicial system is fundamental for democracy, progress and the reduction of violence. Along these lines, it is important to strengthen the institutions responsible for guaranteeing compliance with regulations and the effective enforcement of criminal law for adults and the Juvenile Justice System (SRPA, in Spanish) for adolescents, notwithstanding an effective resocialization process, the promotion of alternative mechanisms for the application of justice and the guidance and support of crime victims.

#### Lines of Action:

#### 3.3.1. Adult Criminal Justice System

- a. Strengthen mechanisms for coordination among the Police, the Attorney General and the Higher Council of the Judiciary to increase the number of convictions, especially for individuals responsible for violent or heinous crimes.
- b. Strengthen the investigative capacity of the Attorney General and organizations that carry out judicial police functions, particularly in terms of personnel, technical tools and specialized training, especially in prioritized municipalities.
- c. Strengthen the jurisdictional authority of the Higher Council of the Judiciary, particularly in terms of personnel, technical tools and specialized training, in prioritized municipalities and in coordination with the Police and the Attorney General.
- d. Promote, within the framework of the criminal policy review, headed by the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, re-offending as a determining factor in sentencing decisions, in the reduction of prison benefits and in punitive circumstances.
- e. Promote, in the reform of the jail and penitentiary code, the formulation of a rigorous penitentiary policy that fulfills a rewarding purpose, prevents current abuses and jail-breaks, and guarantees safe and reliable probation mechanisms.
- f. Prevent crimes from being committed within prison facilities. To this end, the use of mobile communication devices and internet will be prohibited among inmates, notwithstanding locked cells and complementary mechanisms.
- g. To make it difficult for inmates to continue criminal activities from within jails and penitentiaries, it is recommended that –according to the authorities' criteria– they be transferred to prison facilities located outside of the region where the crime was committed.

#### 3.3.2. Juvenile Detention System (SRPA)

- a. Revise, within the framework of the State administrative reform, the strength of the SRPA administration's managerial mechanism, in order to guarantee the adequate provision of services, either directly or through third parties.
- b. Modernize and build new Juvenile Correctional Facilities, varying the location, pedagogy and interior security of the detention centers according to the seriousness of the crime committed and taking re-offending, behavior and age into consideration.
- c. Gradually entrust the National Learning Service (SENA, in Spanish) with the administration of job training programs as well as arts and trades programs in the Juvenile Correctional Centers, and introduce or strengthen guidance, enterprise and jobinsertion programs.
- d. Promote guidance and accompaniment programs, as well as Reference and Opportunity Centers for the social and economic insertion of adolescents and youth that have adequately served their punishments.
- e. Create an information system of adolescents linked to SRPA that enables the identification of re-offending and evaluates the services available to prevent this, connected to the national crime and contravention information system.

### 3.3.3. Alternative Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution and for Access to Justice

- a. Identify, disseminate and raise awareness about various alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution and justice, after due rationalization thereof, in vulnerable areas in particular.
- b. Strengthen, within the framework of a legal reform, the Justice of the Peace system, to ensure that the justices of peace are selected for their merits and perform specific functions in dignified conditions.

- c. Strengthen, after due evaluation, the Legal Aid system (Casas de Justicia) and Citizen Coexistence Centers accompanied by an information system, particularly in prioritized areas and municipalities.
- d. Promote the use of university legal consultancies and mechanisms for legal conflict resolution, facilitating the rational access to the justice system.

#### **3.3.4. Guidance and Response to Crime Victims**

- a. Promote mechanisms for reporting crimes and for providing guidance to crime victims; facilitate victims' timely access to the authorities and the justice system as well as responses from these entities, to ensure that the victim is not re-victimized.
- b. Improve the legal and psychological support and attention given to victims of violent domestic crimes or sexual abuse, through Centers for Victims of Domestic Violence (CAVIF, in Spanish), Centers for Victims of Sexual Abuse (CAIVAS, in Spanish)<sup>9</sup> and Family Police Stations.

#### 3.4. Fourth Pillar: Culture of Legality and Coexistence

This pillar seeks to provide incentives for a culture of legality, of respect for others and of citizen coexistence, based on the adoption of basic norms of behavior accepted in the society within the framework of the social rule of law, the institutions and democratic principles. To this end, the National Government will promote the development of programs that increase the efficiency of legal sanctions and social regulations for law-infringing behaviors; that promote administrative and policy practices based on the principles of good governance and citizen participation; that use pedagogical strategies to disseminate constitutional and legal values; and that establish social policies that recognize the existence of diverse identities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> There are two Victim's Attention Centers (CAV, in Spanish) in Colombia (one in Bogota and one in Bucaramanga) that have professional teams composed of lawyers, psychologists and social workers who guide and accompany crime victims throughout the judicial process. This project has also trained the people that form part of the Victim Assistance Network in Bogota. This network includes the ICBF, Legal Medicine, Social Action, National Police, District Health Secretariat, Government Secretariat, Social Integration Secretariat, Transit and Transport Secretariat, and Law and Psychology Schools, among other entities.

It is important to remember that, for the purposes of the Policy, a culture of legality and coexistence is understood as one that abides by and respects basic social agreements and norms and that has the capacity for citizen self-regulation.

#### **Lines of Action:**

- a) Promote a culture of legality, upholding the rule of law and its consistence with the culture and the morale as a fundamental social value, rejecting both legally and socially the cultures of shortcuts and easy money.
- b) Raise citizen awareness about the importance of not purchasing stolen or substitute goods, especially pirated car parts, mobile phones and accessories, compact discs, DVD movies and books.
- c) Exercise strict control over acts that affect the peace, such as excessive noise in residential areas, on streets, or in public spaces, the inappropriate disposal of trash and the unlawful use of public spaces.
- d) Prioritize actions aimed at the prevention of traffic accidents and the creation of a road safety culture. Direct actions at the owners and operators of motorcycles and bicycles, as well as pedestrians.
- e) Encourage a culture of responsibility and citizen self-regulation with regard to liquor consumption, and raise awareness about the social and legal consequences of irresponsible alcohol consumption.
- f) Coordinate the actions of this road responsibility strategy with the 2010-2014 National Road Safety Plan, making certain that the prioritized areas and municipalities are included in its implementation.
- g) Promote effective measures for interpersonal and interethnic relationships that contribute to the healthy management of differences common to and necessary in all societies– and to the non-violent resolution of differences and conflicts.
- h) Promote public and private initiatives that contribute to transforming ideas about violence and crime, especially with regard to the resocialized population and the population linked to reintegration processes.

- Advocate the collective construction of the Citizen Coexistence Code and promote awareness of it as well as its adoption and application by all citizens and authorities, as applicable.
- j) Encourage education through formal and informal public competitions, with the support of the educational system, the private sector, the organized civil society and the coexistence committees of buildings and co-owners.
- k) Promote, on the territorial level, incentives to recognize at the municipal level those citizens or groups that, in the neighborhoods and districts, set a good example for civic behavior, solidarity and compliance with the law.

#### 3.5. Fifth Pillar: Active and Responsible Citizenship

Finally, in order to be successful, the Policy requires dedicated citizen participation. Citizens are the main target and main actors of the PNSCC, notwithstanding the responsibility of the National Government, regional and local authorities and other State entities in the leadership and promotion of the Policy. Reducing violence and crime is a long-term task that is only feasible with the active participation of and connection between the citizens and the society at large. That implies the dedicated cooperation of the authorities in issues of common interest related to security and coexistence.

#### **Lines of Action:**

- a) Strengthen Local Security Fronts and Security and Coexistence Schools in order to involve the community in crime prevention and reporting, the exchange of information and solidarity-based actions.
- b) Strengthen Private Security Companies' Citizen Security and Support Networks and the specific work of volunteer organizations such as the Fire Department, Civil Defense and the Civil Police, among others.
- c) Advocate a Citizen Self-Protection System that would advise the public on mechanisms of precaution and responsibility when faced with crime, through information hotlines, campaigns and brochures, among others.

- d) Promote a culture of security, legality and coexistence among members of unions, family compensation funds, associations, official entities and official and mixed companies.
- e) Specify the responsibilities of business people and merchants in terms of security and coexistence inside their companies and stores or at events, reserving police intervention for public spaces.
- f) Reinforce regulated and unregulated spaces for meeting and discussing about issues of common interest, promoting respect, communication, interpersonal listening and consensus-building.
- g) Promote a mechanism –or strengthen an existing one– for citizens to report police shortages or alleged crimes committed by members of the authorities, including indolence in the performance of their duties.
- h) Negotiate technical support from international cooperation agencies for the implementation and reinforcement of the lines of action formulated in this strategy.

#### 4. Policy Cross-cutting Components

In order to support the development and implementation of the central pillars, it is necessary to make progress in two cross-cutting components, namely: i) information systems and public policy research; and ii) regulatory implementation.

#### 4.1 Information Systems and Public Policy Research

The purpose of the Information Systems and Public Policy Research component with regard to Citizen Security and Coexistence is to facilitate the design, implementation, follow-up and evaluation processes of public policies implemented to counteract crime and violence and related to sanctions, police control and judicial processes. The country has extensive experience in the set-up and operation of official primary information systems and in crime observatories that use these official sources.

The official sources of information on violence and crime include: i) the National Police System of Statistics, Criminal, Misdemeanor and Operational Information (SIEDCO, in Spanish), which manages and gathers a great number of quantitative and qualitative variables to anticipate a complete description of a criminal event; ii) the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Science's National Reference Center on Violence, which provides and analyzes information regarding violence indicators generated by the Colombian forensic system; iii) the Oral Accusatory Penal System (SPOA, in Spanish), which consolidates records related to finable offenses, criminal records gathered at the time of the criminal's arrest and remaining criminal records.

The process of consolidating information sources is complex and has not been free of impediments. Among these are differences regarding the figures and units of analysis used in the official information sources available. Another difficulty is related to the absence of a national survey on victimization, conducted regularly, that would complement the information provided in the official reports<sup>10</sup>.

For the reasons indicated, it is necessary to guarantee the conditions required to adequately record and analyze information related to crime, violence and delinquency in the country in order to provide sound, sustained and unified tools for the prevention and control of violent crime and the promotion of coexistence. Along these lines, it is necessary to complement criminal statistics with surveys on victimization and self-reporting and to include the use of information in the implementation of Citizen Security and Coexistence policies, plans and programs at the municipal, departmental and national levels in the next four years.

#### Lines of Action:

**4.1.1.** Foster the creation of a **National Crime Information System** (SNID, in Spanish). The system will incorporate, among other sources, the following:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> In Colombia, the Survey on Victimization was conducted only once, in 2003, by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE, in Spanish), in the three largest cities (IADB-DANE, 2004). This gap has been partially covered by private entities that have periodically conducted this type of survey. These include the Chambers of Commerce (and the Bogota Chamber of Commerce in particular); the Security and Democracy Foundation; Corpovisionarios; the Ministry of Social Protection which together with the University of the Valle conducted the ACTIVA Survey; and other efforts.

- Information systems administered by the National Government and judicial authorities, and Police information systems in particular.<sup>11</sup>
- Public and private crime observatories at the national, regional and local levels, following the definition of an agreement on common standards and criteria to guarantee the quality of the information.
- National and international non-governmental organizations, technical agencies, cooperation agencies and international agencies which handle relevant information about crime.

The SNID will administer a **Standardized Crime Database** that will incorporate, among others, the following informative instruments, which will be reinforced and combined with:

- a) Single Registry of Criminal Law Violations (SIEDCO, in Spanish). In the case of homicides, the information should be confirmed with the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Science.
- b) Single National Registry of Criminals and Criminal History; this will facilitate the identification of people having pending issues with the law, to be used in real time by Law Enforcement
- c) Annual National Survey on Victimization and Self-Reporting starting with capital cities and municipalities prioritized based on their crime rate, to complement official registries.
- d) Regional System of Standardized Citizen Security and Coexistence Indicators, within the framework of a regional system, which enables comparative analysis within the region and at the global level.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Among these advances is the progress made in the information system administered by SPRA (the Penal Responsibility System for Adolescents), which provides timely and strategic information about adolescents, their criminal records and the effectiveness of the attention they have received.

# **4.1.2.** Encourage **Public Policy Research on Citizen Security and Coexistence** in existing or new centers. To this end, the Policy will seek to promote:

- e) Identification of Best Practices against Crime and characterization of successful experiences in the reduction of crime and coexistence-building on local, national and international levels.
- f) Follow-up and Evaluation Mechanisms for Public Policies regarding Citizen Security and Coexistence, which may contribute to identifying, empirically, the effectiveness of the most significant interventions.

For this, the Policy will seek to promote, in a coordinated and systemic fashion, the following public and private entities, among others:

- State entities on the national, regional and municipal levels that undertake research on violence, crime, coexistence, and/or public policies regarding citizen security and coexistence.
- National and international Higher Education Institutions with an interest in researching violence, crime, coexistence, and/or public policies regarding citizen security and coexistence.
- Centers –at the local, regional, national and international levels– specializing in research on violence, crime, coexistence, and/or public policies about citizen security and coexistence.

#### 4.2. Regulatory Implementation

With the objective of complementing the Strategic Pillars and their Lines of Action, the National Government decided to promote a legal platform consisting of two initiatives, aimed at providing a more robust regulatory framework to combat crime and stimulate citizen coexistence.

#### 1. Citizen Security Statute

This initiative reforms aspects of the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Code on Children and Adolescents; corrects restrictions that are encumbering the Police's work; expands terms for the investigation and trial of suspects; extends sentences for certain punishable crimes, deemed severe; establishes that adolescents must serve the entirety of the imposed punishment; and criminalizes the manipulation of mobile telephone device terminals within the framework of a strategy to discourage mobile phone theft, among other objectives.

#### 2. Citizen Coexistence Code

The second and most important initiative is the Citizen Coexistence Code, which aims to reform the old Police Code. The initiative entails current police tools and regulations, including all the necessary aspects; but it goes beyond a classic Police Code. It is a key instrument in securing an improved social coexistence and the opportunity to contribute to shaping behavior instead of legalizing it. The Code sets out regulations on the national and territorial levels. Likewise, it distinguishes between regulations for urban contexts and those for rural contexts, among other aspects.

#### PART II

#### **IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY**

The implementation of any policy is the same as or more important than its design. Well-planned initiatives can fail to reach their objectives due to an inefficient implementation, hence the importance given to the Intervention Criteria detailed in the General Section<sup>12</sup>. The implementation of the National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy will adhere to the following implementation strategy:

#### Crime Priorization:

There are many crimes which affect citizen security and coexistence and it is the duty of the State to deter, prevent, control and punish said crimes, insofar as they represent behavior rejected by society and, to a large extent, defined by criminal law. However, the strategy has indentified some criminal behaviors which, due to their high impact, must be prioritized by the authorities: Homicide, Theft, Common Personal Injury, Traffic Accident Fatalities, Micro-extortion and Micro-trafficking, crime categories that, whilst they have existed and seemed to respond in some areas to macro theories, they have evolved with respect to their characteristics, manifestations, organization and challenges they pose to society.

In the case of homicides and traffic accident fatalities, a fairly reliable statistical history exists. In the case of personal injury and theft, there is a statistical record despite a high level of underreporting in complaints, especially in theft. The micro-extortion<sup>13</sup> and micro-trafficking are not easily quantifiable given that they relate to criminal categories with high underreporting, particularly in the case of micro-extortion, whose low level of complaints originates partially from victims' fear of retaliation. The foregoing, however, does not hinder their identification as frequent criminal acts demanding attention.

<sup>12</sup> Long-term Vision, Comprehensive Focus, Determining Factors. Territorial Specificity, Population at Risk, Adolescents and Youths, A Priority, Crime Prioritization, Learning from Successful Experiences, Suitable Incentives, and Monitoring, Follow-up and Evaluation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> In 2010, the number of extortion and micro-extortion cases reported by the National Police was 1,352.

#### Review of Programs and Projects:

National agencies advance programs and projects on the different Strategic Pillars mentioned previously. An initial and general relationship within the National Government organizes 13 government agencies to advance 147 programs and projects on the Central Strategic Pillars, 86 of which in Social and Situational Prevention; the majority in social prevention.

Unfortunately, and as in other countries, few programs and projects are evaluated rigorously and consistently. That does not mean though that the initiatives in place are irrelevant; on the contrary, they are the starting point of the Policy. However, it is important to verify, in each case, their relevance with a view to achieving PNSCC objectives.

The role definition of each agency and the revision of interventions will be done with each agency, from Cross Tables coordinated by the Presidency of the Republic. The first national table sat on April 8, 2011. The same must happen with the departments and municipalities that advance programs and projects, many of which are effective and promising while others are not and require revision.

#### Analysis of the Security and Coexistence Situation:

Notwithstanding the identification of the **municipalities of the country** which contribute most to the increase in the national average relating to the first four crimes mentioned (Homicide, Personal Injury, Common Theft and Traffic Accident Fatalities), all of the municipalities must be taken into account at the time of establishing categories and modes of intervention. In the case of micro-extortion and micro-trafficking, given the high level of underreporting, the best recommendation is to identify the main municipalities where the crime has become established, or where there is a threat of it becoming established, and encourage them to take decisive action.

It is important to emphasize, therefore, that the National Security and Citizen Coexistence Policy is directed at all municipalities. That does not mean though that the Strategic Pillars and Lines of Action must be applied equally across all of them, or that the emphasis must be the same. It is fundamental, as indicated in the General Section, to recognize the specifics of each municipality in order to determine which Strategic Pillars and Lines of Action are the most pertinent for each one. Each municipality must contribute in a special way to this work; they are then the ones with responsibility over citizen security and coexistence on a regional level.

#### Intra-Municipality Focus:

As important as defining which Strategic Pillars and Lines of Action are most pertinent for each municipality is establishing the **zones**, **towns**, **neighborhoods and/or districts** which, within each municipality, contribute significantly to the increase in crime rates and the specifics of this crime in order to give these areas the attention required, with the right actions and types of intervention. For this reason, it is fundamental to identify within the municipalities, the zones, neighborhoods or districts, including blocks, with high crime and focus efforts on them.

#### Security and Coexistence Agreements:

The chief instrument of the Policy to establish local responsibility with regard to the management of citizen security and coexistence are the Citizen Security and Coexistence Agreements. Once the Policy is defined, and the programs, projects and municipality categories reviewed, the purpose of the National Government is to build, together with the municipality administrations, Citizen Security and Coexistence Agreements in which, on the basis of the local Comprehensive Security and Coexistence Plan, national and regional commitments for its execution are established, within the framework of the Principles laid down in the General Section of the Policy.

The Agreements will be structured through Security and Coexistence Meetings, and will include the participation of both public and private players. Due to the electoral situation and the arrival of new Mayors and Governors, until January 2012 pilot meetings in some municipalities will be carried out.

#### 1. Analysis of the Security and Coexistence Situation

The National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy is supported by the interventions and comprehensive, targeted actions for those crimes which are considered high impact, namely: homicide and common theft (for security), and personal injury and traffic accident fatalities (for coexistence), all of this with the aim of improving citizen security rates and coexistence in a pertinent and strategic way.

In order to apply the above-said criteria, 2010 criminal behavior was reviewed, identifying the municipalities that contribute most to the increase in the national crime rate average, weighted based on their individual population. The decision to review their behavior in 2010 does not conflict with the benefits of a longer-term view, in order to overcome temporary distortions or effects.

#### 1.1. Methodology

The exercise to categorize the municipalities within the Policy started with the analysis of information registered in the National Police System of Statistics, Criminal, Misdemeanor and Operational Information (SIEDCO) and reported by the National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Sciences (INMLCF) with regard to personal injury. The crimes considered for the analysis were homicide (2010), theft (2010), traffic accident fatalities (2010) and personal injury (2009)<sup>14</sup>. For all rate and contribution calculations carried out, the population projected by DANE (National Administrative Department of Statistics) for 2010<sup>15</sup> from the 2005 census was used.

The identification and characterization of the municipalities began with the analysis of the crime rates registered in 1,122 municipalities in 2010<sup>16</sup> (2009 in the case of personal injuries) and the weighting of their contribution to the national rates by population. To start the categorization of the municipalities, it was decided to identify those which, from highest to lowest and weighted by population, contribute to more than 50% of the national crime rates mentioned.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The National Institute for Forensic Medicine, the agency responsible for reporting personal injury cases in the country, reports information from the previous year and still has not entered data on this matter for 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Except for the calculation of personal injury, which was based on the DANE 2009 population projection.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> This figure includes 1,102 municipalities and 20 departmental townships.


#### 2. Analysis of Citizen Security Crimes

#### 2.1. Common Homicide<sup>17</sup>

Homicide, one of the crimes with the highest impact on society, is one of the main indicators of violence and security to consider. In 2010, the national homicide rate for every hundred thousand (100,000) inhabitants was 34<sup>18</sup>, a figure which coincides with figures reported by the Ministry of National Defense, in the monthly report "Logros de la Política de Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática" (Achievements of the Consolidation of Democratic Security Policy) presented in December 2010.

Of the 1,122 municipalities analyzed in the exercise, 74% register homicide rates equal to or lower than the national rate, whilst the remaining 26% show higher rates. The highest number of municipalities with this characteristic (132 municipalities) is found within the group with rates between 34 and 54 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants, and in the group with rates between 54 and 74 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants (67 municipalities). Graph 1 shows the distribution of the municipalities according to their homicide rate.

Graph 1 – Number and percentage of municipalities according to their homicide rate



Prepared by: DJSG - DNP. Data Source: SIEDCO - PONAL

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Classified as a crime against life or personal integrity according to the Criminal Code.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> 2014 target: 28 homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants according to the National Development Plan.

A total of 54 municipalities in Colombia record homicide rates higher than 104 homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants, rates that could be considered extreme if compared to the national average of 34. These municipalities, classified under categories 5 and 6, are located in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Caldas, Caqueta, Casanare, Cauca, Choco, Cordoba, Cundinamarca, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Nariño, North Santander, Putumayo, Quindio, Tolima and Valle (see Table 1). However, as it will be discussed later, none of the municipalities that record these rates are found in the group of municipalities which contribute most to the national homicide rate. Of these 48 municipalities (4.28% of the country's municipalities), 19 (40% of the municipalities with rates higher than 104 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants) correspond to consolidation areas.


Table 1 – Municipalities with rates higher than 104 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	POBLACIÓN 2010	HOMICIDIOS (2010)	TASA DE HOMICIDIO 2010
CORDOBA	LA APARTADA	13.890	42	302,38
VALLE	EL DOVIO	8.998	21	233,39
ARAUCA	PUERTO RONDON	3,893	9	231.18
META	VISTAHERMOSA	23.280	49	210,48
CAQUETA	LA MONTAÑITA	22.843	43	188.24
				,
CORDOBA	BUENAVISTA	20.259	38	187,57
PUTUMAYO	SAN MIGUEL	24.022	44	183,17
GUAVIARE	CALAMAR	10.161	18	177,15
CASANARE	SACAMA	1.862	3	161,12
NARIÑO	BARBACOAS	33.866	54	159,45
ARAUCA	TAME	50.210	76	151.36
GUAVIARE	MIRAFLORES	12.837	19	148.01
NORTE DE SANTANDER	CONVENCION	14.974	22	-,-
				146,92
PUTUMAYO	PUERTO CAICEDO	14.363	21	146,21
META	MESETAS	10.978	16	145,75
CHOCO	JURADO	3.455	5	144,72
CAUCA	SUAREZ	18.901	27	142,85
CAQUETA	EL DONCELLO	21.872	31	141,73
CALDAS	VITERBO	12.727	18	141,43
CAUCA	PIAMONTE	7.185	10	139,18
CUNDINAMARCA	SOACHA	455,992	117	25.66
ANTIQUIA	CISNEROS	9.375	13	138.67
ARAUCA	SARAVENA	45.134	62	137,37
VALLE	ARGELIA	6.555	9	137,30
CAQUETA	CARTAGENA DEL CHAIRA	30.942	42	135,74
CAQUETA	MORELIA	3.733	5	133,94
CAUCA	ARGELIA	25.507	34	133,30
VALLE	TORO	16.117	21	130,30
ANTIOQUIA ARAUCA	CAUCASIA ARAUQUITA	99.297 39.067	128 50	128,91 127.99
META	LA URIBE	14.283	18	127,99
CAUCA	CALOTO	17.467	22	125,95
ANTIOQUIA	VEGACHI	10.331	13	125,83
TOLIMA	PLANADAS	29.699	37	124,58
VALLE	ROLDANILLO	33.713	42	124,58
NARIÑO	TUMACO	179.005	223	124,58
VALLE	EL CAIRO	9.656 42.829	12 53	124,28 123.75
ANTIOQUIA CAQUETA	PUERTO BERRIO CURILLO	42.829 11.400	14	123,75
CALDAS	PALESTINA	17.921	22	122,76
CAQUETA	SAN VICENTE DEL CAGUAN	62.096	76	122,39
HUILA	HOBO	6.762	8	118,31
QUINDIO	MONTENEGRO	40.590	47	115,79
CAUCA	PUERTO TEJADA	44.934	52	115,73
NORTE DE SANTANDER	EL TARRA SOLITA	10.831	12	110,79
CAQUETA CAUCA	CORINTO	9.149 29.956	32	109,30 106.82
PUTUMAYO	PUERTO ASIS	57.494	61	106,10

Homicide Source: SIEDCO. Population Source: DANE - 2010 Population projection

In order to identify which are the municipalities that contribute most to the national homicide rate, it was necessary to introduce the population criteria as a weighting. In the second exercise, looking at this variable, it was noted that there are 23 municipalities which contribute most to the national rate, a fact that is explained by both the proportion of the country's total population in these municipalities and their homicide rates.

Graph 2 shows the distribution of the municipalities according to their percentage contribution to the homicide rate, revealing that 98% of the country's municipalities individually contribute less than 0.69% to the said rate and that 2% of the municipalities contribute the most.



Graph 2 – Municipality distribution according to their share in the 2010 national homicide rate

Prepared by: DJSG - DNP. Information Source: SIEDCO - PONAL

Cali, Medellin, Bogota, Barranquilla, Cucuta, Itagui, Palmira, Pereira, Cartagena, Tumaco, Villavicencio, Santa Marta, Tulua, Soledad, Manizales, Buenaventura, Ibague, Caucasia, Bucaramanga, Soacha, Popayan, Dosquebradas and Valledupar are the cities that, in that order, contribute to more than 50% of the national homicide rate.

Table 2 shows the 23 municipalities which contribute significantly (50.67%) to the national homicide rate. Whilst Cali, for example, comprises 4.9% of the population, its contribution to the homicide rate is the highest among the municipalities considered, showing that the number of homicides compared to its population is extremely high. Other cases worth reviewing are those of Tumaco, Itagui and Palmira, which record high contributions to the homicide rate but not to the

population, and therefore do not classify in the country's twenty top municipalities in terms of population.

Table 2 – Municipalities contributing approximately 50% of the national homicide rate

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	TASA DE HOMICIDIO 2010	PARTICIPACIÓN PORCENTUAL EN HOMICIDIO	PARTICIPACIÓN POBLACIONAL
VALLE	CALI	71,7	10,41%	4,9%
ANTIOQUIA	MEDELLIN	60,1	9,11%	5,1%
BOGOTA	BOGOTA	18,0	8,58%	16,2%
ATLANTICO	BARRANQUILLA	29,3	2,25%	2,6%
NORTE DE SANTANDER	CUCUTA	44,3	1,77%	1,4%
ANTIOQUIA	ITAGUI	98,7	1,61%	0,6%
VALLE	PALMIRA	83,2	1,58%	0,6%
RISARALDA	PEREIRA	49,9	1,47%	1,0%
BOLIVAR	CARTAGENA	23,7	1,45%	2,1%
NARIÑO	TUMACO	124,6	1,44%	0,4%
META	VILLAVICENCIO	39,4	1,10%	0,9%
MAGDALENA	SANTA MARTA	34,6	1,00%	1,0%
VALLE	TULUA	71,3	0,92%	0,4%
ATLANTICO	SOLEDAD	25,6	0,89%	1,2%
CALDAS	MANIZALES	34,5	0,87%	0,9%
VALLE	BUENAVENTURA	36,7	0,86%	0,8%
TOLIMA	IBAGUE	24,7	0,84%	1,2%
ANTIOQUIA	CAUCASIA	128,9	0,83%	0,2%
SANTANDER	BUCARAMANGA	22,5	0,76%	1,2%
CUNDINAMARCA	SOACHA	25,7	0,76%	1,0%
CAUCA	POPAYAN	44,0	0,76%	0,6%
RISARALDA	DOS QUEBRADAS	58,7	0,72%	0,4%
CESAR	VALLEDUPAR	26,3	0,69%	0,9%

Prepared by: DJSG - DNP. Information Source: SIEDCO - PONAL


The main contribution of these municipalities to the national homicide rate is influenced by two fundamental factors: municipality population size and their respective homicide rates.

## 2.1.1. Homicide Characterization

According to information from the National Police, Colombia records a falling trend in homicide figures, moving from 28,837 in 2002 to 15,459 in 2010 with a homicide rate drop from 69.8 per hundred thousand inhabitants to 34 in the space of eight years. However, despite the improvement in behavior of the indicator, the country continues to place highly in the world homicide rankings, together with countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Congo, amongst others.

Furthermore, whilst the national rate continues to fall, the homicide trends within intermediate cities require attention. Cases such as Soleded, Ibague, Soacha, Villavicencio and Valledupar are representative, inasmuch as their rates have risen over the previous year. In turn, Cali, Medellin, Bogota, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Cucuta maintained their rates, retaining their predominant contribution to the national homicide rate and revealing the lack of advances in the reduction of homicides.

Analyzing 2004 to 2010 one can see that the national homicide rate had an average variation of -5.4% during this period. Furthermore, a comparative analysis between the 2004 and 2010 rates indicates that the variation between these two years was -28%. In the period analyzed, the national homicide rate fell from 48 per 100 thousand inhabitants to 34 in 2010, and the actual number of homicides went from 20,209 to 15,459. Looking further into the municipal picture during this period, it can be noted that cities such as Cali, Armenia, Dosquebradas, Tunja and Pereira, despite having reduced their rates on average vis-à-vis the country, continue showing high rates. Furthermore Bogota, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Villavicencio, Florencia, Valledupar, Riohacha, Santa Marta, Bucaramanga and Sincelejo reduced their rates on average, although less than the national reduction; whilst Medellin, Ibague, Itagui, Popayan, Monteria, Facatativa and Neiva showed positive changes (increases in homicide rates).



Map 1 - National evolution of the homicide rate (2004-2010)

Γ	Variación Tasa de homicidio año a año - Periodo 2004-2010							
	2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010						Promedio Periodo	
	-11,5%	-4,6%	-2,8%	-7,3%	-3,2%	-3,4%	-5,4%	

Data Source: SIEDCO - PONAL

Map: Prepared by DJSG

According to the classification of homicides by day and time of occurrence reported by the INMLCF<sup>19</sup>, Barranquilla, Bogota, Cali, Cartagena, Medellin, Palmira and Pereira display the highest number of homicides on Sundays between 12:00am and 6:00am, Medellin and Cali being the most critical cases with 141 and 118 cases in the year respectively on these days and times.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Sciences / Grupo Centro de Referencia Nacional sobre Violencia (National Reference Violence Center).

During 2010, in 10 of the 23 cities which recorded the highest contribution to the national homicide rate (Bogota, Cali, Medellin, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Cucuta, Itagui, Palmira, Pereira and Tumaco), the leading cause of death was shooting by firearm (6,135 deaths), followed by attacks with sharp weapons (1,159 deaths)<sup>20</sup>. The majority of victims were males between 20-29 years, representing 40% of male homicides in the country.

It is worth noting that information related to the alleged aggressor, along with the circumstances of the events in which the homicides were committed assessed by Forensic Medicine, does not allow identifying significant patterns or drawing valid conclusions as, only in the first item, 7,114 of the 7,660 cases analyzed do not have information (shown with the wording "without information").

#### 2.2. Common Theft<sup>21</sup>

In 2010 a total of 91,661 thefts were recorded, resulting in a national rate of 201 thefts per 100 thousand inhabitants according to the calculations carried out based on the SIEDCO information (as at December 31) and on the DANE population projection for 2010<sup>22</sup>.

It was found that 90.64% of the municipalities analyzed recorded theft rates lower than the national average, leaving approximately 10% of the municipalities with higher rates. The most critical municipalities, from a rate perspective, were Villavicencio, Bucaramanga, Florencia, Tolu, Buga, Barbosa (Santander), Neiva, Guamal (Meta) and Acacias (Meta). However, in terms of their contribution to the national average, we find that the municipalities with the highest incidence are Bogota, Cali, Barranquilla, Villavicencio, Bucaramanga and Ibague, with a contribution of 52% to the national theft rate. Table 3 shows the relationship between the population and the theft rate of each of these municipalities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Id.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Includes personal theft (muggings) and personal and commercial burglaries. Classified as crime against property according to the Criminal Code.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> According to the National Development Plan 2010-2014, the theft rate for 2010 was 201. The target for 2014 is for 182 thefts per hundred thousand inhabitants.

Table 3 – Municipalities which contribute most to the national theft rate

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	TASA DE HURTO 2010	PARTICIPACIÓN PORCENTUAL HURTO	PARTICIPACIÓN POBLACIONAL
BOGOTA	BOGOTA	347	27,87%	16,18%
VALLE	CALI	381	9,34%	4,93%
ATLANTICO	BARRANQUILLA	381	4,94%	2,61%
META	VILLAVICENCIO	890	4,19%	0,95%
SANTANDER	BUCARAMANGA	603	3,45%	1,15%
TOLIMA	IBAGUE	433	2,49%	1,16%


Prepared by: DJSG - DNP. Information Source: SIEDCO - PONAL

Once again big cities like Bogota, Cali and Barranquilla and cases like Villavicencio appear. In this municipality, the smallest population contribution of the group, the number of thefts is sufficiently elevated so that it has an impact on the national average. Villavicencio appears as the municipality with the highest rate and at the same time as one of those that contributes most to the national average, something with does not occur in the case of homicides and the municipality La Apartada (Cordoba), which despite having a raised homicide rate, does not significantly impact the national homicide rate.

In terms of theft, Bogota and Barranquilla are ranked top together with Cali, recording rates higher than the national rate, differing from homicide where although they contribute heavily to the national average, they do so with rates below the average.

#### 2.2.1. Characterization of Common Theft

Common theft in Colombia has shown an upward tendency over the last eight years, reaching its peak in 2008 with 104,409 thefts. In the period between 2004 and 2010 an average 10% variation from the national rate was recorded. Municipalities such as Medellin, Itagui, Pasto, Cucuta, Armenia, Bucaramanga and Ibague revealed a lower tendency during the period, whilst municipalities such as Barranquilla, Cartagena, Manizales, Popayan, Monteria, Neiva, Pereira, Leticia, Cali, Bogota, Villavicencio, Santa Marta, Riohacha, Sincelejo, Arauca and Yopal displayed an upward theft rate tendency.



Map 2 - Evolution of the national common theft rate (2004-2010)

	Variación Tasa de hurto año a año - Periodo 2004-2010							
2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 Promedi								
26,6%	31,3%	-8,1%	24,1%	-9,7%	-3,2%	10,2%		

Data Source: SIEDCO - PONAL

Map: Prepared by DJSG

In the six cities which contribute to 52% of the national theft rate in Colombia, approximately 72% correspond to personal theft (muggings), followed by personal and commercial burglary. In Bogota, the municipality which contributes most significantly to the national theft rate (28%), common theft is composed 65% of the crime of personal theft (mugging).

Participación de los tres tipos de hurto en el hurto común: ciudades que aportan el 52% a la tasa nacional de hurto 90% 79% 80% 76% 68% 70% 65% 59% 60% Participación Hurto a 50% Personas Paricipación Hurto a 40% Comercio Participación hurto a 30% 25% residencias 21% 20% 16% 16% 16% <sup>11%</sup> 10% 10% 8% 10% BOGOTÁ D.C. (CT) BARRANQUILLA (CT) VILLAVICENCIO (CT) BUCARAMANGA (CT) CALL(CT) IBAGUÉ (CT)

Graph 3 – Contribution to the three types of common theft in the cities which make up more than 52% of the national theft rate

Prepared by: DJSG - DNP. Information Source: SIEDCO - PONAL

Regarding the latter, the National Police information indicates that in 42% of cases weapons were not used during the crime, in 25% of them firearms were used and in 16% knives were employed. According to the survey "Encuesta Bogotá Cómo Vamos 2010" under the umbrella of the program "Bogotá Cómo Vamos", of 27% of citizens who state having been victims of some form of crime in the last year, 80% report to have been mugged and of these 65% have been victims of mobile phone robberies.

Residential burglaries show that in 44% of cases weapons were not used, in 30% of cases they used blunt weapons $^{23}$ , in 12% firearms and in 5% knives. Similarly, the method most frequently used is breaking and entering in 27% of cases, followed by negligence in 23% and holdup in 13% of cases.

Commercial burglaries, on the other hand, show that in 46% of cases weapons were not employed whilst committing the crime, in 21% blunt weapons were used, in 20% firearms and finally in 5% knives were used. The method most frequently used is holdup with 22% of cases, followed by negligence with 30%.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> This is understood as a club or stone for example. Source: UNODC Colombia. Report: "Violencia, Crimen y Tráfico llegal de Armas en Colombia" (Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia). Page 14. 2006.

## 2.3. Joint Homicide and Theft Contribution

The analysis carried out identifies 23 municipalities in terms of homicide and 6 municipalities in terms of theft that contribute 50% to the respective national rates. In this sense, to reduce the said crime rates in these municipalities would have a significant impact on the national rates. Table 4 shows a joint analysis of the contributions in both crimes, allowing the identification of the municipalities which influence heavily on the two behaviors and which record critical levels of the analyzed problems.


Table 4 – Significant contribution (more than 50% of the rate) in common homicide and common theft

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	PARTICIPACIÓN HOMICIDIOS	PUESTO HOMICIDIOS	PARTICIPACIÓN HURTO	PUESTO HURTO
VALLE	CALI	10,4%	1	9%	2
ANTIOQUIA	MEDELLIN	9,1%	2		0
BOGOTA	BOGOTA	8,6%	3	28%	1
ATLANTICO	BARRANQUILLA	2,3%	4	5%	3
NORTE DE SANTANDER	CUCUTA	1,8%	5		0
ANTIOQUIA	ITAGUI	1,6%	6		0
VALLE	PALMIRA	1,6%	7		0
RISARALDA	PEREIRA	1,5%	8		0
BOLIVAR	CARTAGENA	1,4%	9		0
NARIÑO	TUMACO	1,4%	10		0
META	VILLAVICENCIO	1,1%	11	4%	4
MAGDALENA	SANTA MARTA	1,0%	12		0
VALLE	TULUA	0,9%	13		0
ATLANTICO	SOLEDAD	0,9%	14		0
CALDAS	MANIZALES	0,9%	15		0
VALLE	BUENAVENTURA	0,9%	16		0
TOLIMA	IBAGUE	0,8%	17	2%	6
ANTIOQUIA	CAUCASIA	0,8%	18		0
SANTANDER	BUCARAMANGA	0,8%	19	3%	5
CUNDINAMARCA	SOACHA	0,8%	20		0
CAUCA	POPAYAN	0,8%	21		0
RISARALDA	DOS QUEBRADAS	0,7%	22		0
CESAR	VALLEDUPAR	0,7%	23		0

50,67%

52%

Prepared by: DJSG - DNP



Graph 4 - Key municipalities regarding homicide and theft

Prepared by: DJSG - DNP

# 3. Analysis of Behavior Affecting Citizen Coexistence

## 3.1. Personal Injury

In 2009 the national personal injury rate per 100 thousand inhabitants was 307.3 according to the calculations completed using information recorded by Forensic Medicine on the number of personal injury cases and from the DANE population projection for 2009. The municipality rates for personal injuries calculated coincide with those presented by the INMLCF in their 2009 edition of the FORENSIS publication.<sup>24</sup>

From this exercise, it was found that 239 of the 1,122 municipalities analyzed showed personal injury rates higher than the national average. The most critical cases, from the point of view of the rate, are the municipalities listed in Table 5 below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Sciences. FORENSIS: Data for life. Bogota, Colombia. 2009.

Table 5 – Ten municipalities with the highest personal injury rates (2009)

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	LESIONES PERSONALES (2009)	TASA DE LESIONES PERSONALES 2009
GUAINIA	LA GUADALUPE	10	3.690
AMAZONAS	LETICIA(CT)	615	1.564
BOYACA	VILLA DE LEYVA	160	1.169
CUNDINAMARCA	CHOCONTA	241	1.113
CUNDINAMARCA	COTA	220	1.006
BOYACA	RAMIRIQUI	103	981
CUNDINAMARCA	CABRERA	45	975
CUNDINAMARCA	CAQUEZA	162	974
CASANARE	VILLANUEVA	216	956
CUNDINAMARCA	SESQUILE	100	883

Source: National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Sciences

However, to evaluate the contribution of the municipalities to the national personal injury rate, evidence shows that those which contribute most do not necessarily match those with the highest rates. Again, the population factor combined with the number of cases draws a result as shown in Table 6, which includes those municipalities that contribute to more than 50% of the national personal injury rate.

Table 6 – Municipalities that contribute to more than 50% of the national personal injury rate

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	TASA DE LESIONES PERSONALES 2009	PARTICIPACIÓN PORCENTUAL LESIONES PERSONALES	PARTICIPACIÓN POBLACIONAL 2009
BOGOTA	BOGOTA	577	30,30%	16,14%
ANTIOQUIA	MEDELLIN	269	4,51%	5,15%
VALLE	CALI	233	3,74%	4,94%
ATLaNTICO	BARRANQUILLA	288	2,45%	2,62%
SANTANDER	BUCARAMANGA	552	2,09%	1,16%
BOLiVAR	CARTAGENA	303	2,05%	2,08%
TOLIMA	IBAGUE	495	1,87%	1,16%
CUNDINAMARCA	SOACHA	556	1,79%	0,99%
HUILA	NEIVA	751	1,78%	0,73%
NORTE DE SANTANDER	CUCUTA	350	1,55%	1,36%

Prepared by: DJSG - DNP. Information Source: INMLCF

## 3.1.1. Characterization of Personal Injuries

In 2009, Colombia recorded a total of 138,617 personal injury cases which, according to the INMLCF<sup>25</sup> show an increase of 11,748 reports over the previous year. 92% of the known cases occurred in urban zones, compared to 7% in rural zones.

Similarly to previous years' behavior, fighting is the main circumstance from which personal injuries arise: 693,158 cases occurred during fights and 72,516 men and women were injured with blunt instruments<sup>26</sup>. Only 11% of personal injury cases are attributed to criminal violence, without including those caused by armed conflicts which are below 0.7%. Thus, we can state that personal injuries are closer to widespread or impulsive violence than what is known as instrumental violence, typically used in common or organized crime. Hence, its treatment must involve action that incorporates cultural and psychosocial variables.

According to the INMLCF the personal injury data broken down by age and sex shows that men suffer more from this type of violence than women –with a ratio of two to one (2:1)– and that the age ranges in which this type of violence is observed are between 20-24 years (24,733 cases), 25-29 years (21,186 cases), and 15-17 years (13,541 cases). This shows, therefore, that adolescents, youths and young adults are the age group more prone to suffering interpersonal violence<sup>27</sup>.

#### 3.2. Traffic Accident Fatalities

In 2010 Colombia recorded 5,281 traffic accident fatalities delivering a rate of 12 per hundred thousand inhabitants. The most critical cases from a rate perspective are shown in Table 7 below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Forensis 2009. Data for life. National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Sciences. "Algunas Reflexiones sobre la Relación entre capital social y violencia interpersonal" (Some Thoughts about the Relation between Social Capital and Interpersonal Violence). Page 71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Id.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Id. Page 80.

Table 7 – Municipalities with the highest traffic accident fatality rates in 2010

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	MUERTE POR ACCIDENTE DE TRANSITO (2010)	TASA DE MUERTE POR ACCIDENTE DE TRANSITO
CUNDINAMARCA	GRANADA	26	343
GUAJIRA	JAGUA DEL PILAR	8	272
ANTIOQUIA	SAN LUIS	29	264
CUNDINAMARCA	GUATAQUI	4	158
META	BARRANCA DE UPIA	5	143
CUNDINAMARCA	CHIPAQUE	12	143
CUNDINAMARCA	FUQUENE	7	131
CESAR	CURUMANI	33	125
SANTANDER	TONA	8	117
VALLE	YOTOCO	18	114

Source: SIEDCO - PONAL

However, when looking at the highest contributions in terms of the national rate, it is found that, by contrast with other behaviors analyzed, a greater number of municipalities contribute to more than 50% of the rate. A total of 38 municipalities contribute 50.30% of the national rate of traffic accident fatalities, the main ones being Bogota, Cali, Medellin, Cucuta, Villavicencio, Barranquilla, Pereira, Bucaramanga, Valledupar and Palmira.

## 3.2.1. Characterization of Traffic Accident Fatality

According to the INMLCF, motorcyclists are the most affected group with 39% of fatalities and 46% of injuries, with a higher concentration on Saturdays and Sundays. In an analysis differentiated by gender, the Institute states that whilst 21 men in every 100 thousand die in mobility-related events, this indicator displays 5 cases for every 100 thousand women<sup>28</sup>.

According to the Institute, throughout the years high fatality rates in men between 20-35 years caused by traffic continue, where the indicator more than doubles in relation to the national average in the general population. Other high-risk groups are those over 65 years, where the rate in men and women increases alarmingly<sup>29</sup>. Regarding traffic accidents, Forensic Medicine sustains that "5,697 fatalities from events related to traffic the previous year are clear evidence that a problem exists

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> FORENSIS 2009. Page 242.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Id. Page 243.

whose solution is very far away and that interventions to reduce its occurrence are not achieving the desired impact either because of its unspecific or poorly selective character when facing the target population or because the strategies do not focus on the most important elements of prevention such as the addressing of the risk factors"30.

## 3.3. Joint Contribution of Personal Injury and Traffic Accident Fatalities

The analysis carried out allows identifying 10 municipalities in terms of personal injuries and 38 in terms of traffic accident fatalities that contribute more than 50% of the national rates respectively. Therefore, reducing personal injuries and traffic accident fatalities in these municipalities has a significant impact on national rates, turning them into a direct goal within the lines of action foreseen in the ENSCC. Table 8 shows a joint analysis of the two crimes, allowing the identification of those municipalities which significantly influence the two behaviors and which record critical levels in the analyzed phenomena.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Id.


Table 8 – Significant contribution (more than 50% of the rate) in personal injury and traffic accident fatalities

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	PARTICIPACIÓN	PUESTO	PARTICIPACIÓN	PUESTO
7,000		LESIONES	LESIONES	MUERTOS AT	MUERTOS AT
BOGOTA	BOGOTA	30,3%	1	10,18%	1
ANTIOQUIA	MEDELLIN	4,5%	2	5,53%	3
VALLE	CALI	3,7%	3	5,84%	2
ATLANTICO	BARRANQUILLA	2,5%	4	1,26%	6
SANTANDER	BUCARAMANGA	2,1%	5	1,25%	8
BOLIVAR	CARTAGENA	2,0%	6	1,07%	13
TOLIMA	IBAGUE	1,9%	7	0,84%	18
CUNDINAMARCA	SOACHA	1,8%	8	0,68%	21
HUILA	NEIVA	1,8%	9	1,07%	14
NORTE DE SANTANDER	CUCUTA	1,6%	10	1,68%	4
META	VILLAVICENCIO		0	1,53%	5
RISARALDA	PEREIRA		0	1,26%	7
CESAR	VALLEDUPAR		0	1,22%	9
VALLE	PALMIRA		0	1,22%	10
MAGDALENA	SANTA MARTA		0	1,15%	11
CALDAS	MANIZALES		0	1,08%	12
SANTANDER	BARRANCABERMEJA		0	0,95%	15
NARIÑO	PASTO		0	0,92%	16
VALLE	BUENAVENTURA		0	0,89%	17
VALLE	CANDELARIA		0	0,75%	19
VALLE	TULUA		0	0,69%	20
CAUCA	POPAYAN		0	0,67%	22
CORDOBA	MONTERIA		0	0,63%	23
HUILA	PITALITO		0	0,62%	24
CESAR	CURUMANI		0	0,62%	25
CASANARE	YOPAL		0	0,58%	26
CESAR	AGUACHICA		0	0,58%	27
SUCRE	SINCELEJO		0	0,56%	28
VALLE	BUGA		0	0,55%	29
ANTIOQUIA	SAN LUIS		0	0,55%	30
QUINDIO	ARMENIA		0	0,53%	31
ANTIQUIA	ENVIGADO		0	0,50%	32
CUNDINAMARCA	GRANADA		0	0,50%	33
VALLE	DAGUA		0	0,49%	34
ANTIQQUIA	BARBOSA		0	0,48%	35
ARAUCA	TAME		0	0,48%	36
ANTIQQUIA	BELLO		0	0,44%	37
ATLANTICO	SOLEDAD		0	0,43%	38

52,14% 50,30%

Prepared by: DJSG -DNP. Information Source: SIEDCO and INMLCF

Graph 5 – Key municipalities (personal injury and traffic accident fatalities)



Prepared by: DJSG - DNP. Information Source: SIEDCO and INMLCF

# 5. Municipalities with Significant Contribution in Various Crimes

Table 9 shows the result of an exercise which compares the cities with the highest contributions to the national rates for the four criminal phenomena under analysis.

Table 9 - Highest impact municipalities

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	PARTICIPACIÓN HOMICIDIOS	PARTICIPACIÓN HURTO	PARTICIPACIÓN LESIONES	PARTICIPACIÓN MUERTOS AT	PARTICIPACIÓN SUMADA
VALLE	CALI	10,41%	9%	4%	5,84%	4
BOGOTA	BOGOTA	8,58%	28%	30%	10,18%	4
ATLANTICO	BARRANQUILLA	2,25%	5%	2%	1,26%	4
TOLIMA	IBAGUE	0,84%	2%	2%	0,84%	4
SANTANDER	BUCARAMANGA	0,76%	3%	2%	1,25%	4
ANTIOQUIA	MEDELLIN	9,11%	0%	5%	5,53%	3
NORTE DE SANTANDER	CUCUTA	1,77%	0%	2%	1,68%	3
BOLIVAR	CARTAGENA	1,45%	0%	2%	1,07%	3
META	VILLAVICENCIO	1,10%	4%	0%	1,53%	3
CUNDINAMARCA	SOACHA	0,76%	0%	2%	0,68%	3
VALLE	PALMIRA	1,58%	0%	0%	1,22%	2
RISARALDA	PEREIRA	1,47%	0%	0%	1,26%	2
MAGDALENA	SANTA MARTA	1,00%	0%	0%	1,15%	2
VALLE	TULUA	0,92%	0%	0%	0,69%	2
ATLANTICO	SOLEDAD	0,89%	0%	0%	0,43%	2
CALDAS	MANIZALES	0,87%	0%	0%	1,08%	2
VALLE	BUENAVENTURA	0,86%	0%	0%	0,89%	2
CAUCA	POPAYAN	0,76%	0%	0%	0,67%	2
CESAR	VALLEDUPAR	0,69%	0%	0%	1,22%	2
HUILA	NEIVA	0,0%	0%	2%	1,07%	2

Prepared by: DJSG - DNP

The analysis of the share of the municipalities in the four criminal phenomena, and the number of phenomena each contributes in a significant way, makes it possible to establish the first categories of municipalities, regardless of the grouping below being the most suitable one upon defining the interventions. The reality of how crime presents itself in some municipalities suggests, for example, that Bogota and Soacha, Medellin and Itagui, and Barranquilla and Soledad, which are grouped differently below, will be jointly analyzed at the time of defining the actions to be implemented.

GRUPO A. Aporte de más del 30% a homicidio y hurto. Participación en mínimo 3 conductas.

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	PARTICIPACIÓN HOMICIDIOS	PARTICIPACIÓN HURTO	PARTICIPACIÓN LESIONES	PARTICIPACIÓN MUERTE AT	PARTICIPACIÓN SUMADA
VALLE	CALI	10,41%	9%	4%	5,84%	4
ANTIOQUIA	MEDELLIN	9,11%	0%	5%	5,53%	3
BOGOTA	BOGOTA	8,58%	28%	30%	10,18%	4
ATLANTICO	BARRANQUILLA	2,25%	5%	2%	1,26%	4
		30,35%	42,15%	41,02%	22,81%	

GRUPO B. Aporte menor al 30% en homicidio en hurto. Participación en 3 y 4 conductas.

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	PARTICIPACIÓN HOMICIDIOS	PARTICIPACIÓN HURTO	PARTICIPACIÓN LESIONES	PARTICIPACIÓN MUERTE AT	PARTICIPACIÓN SUMADA
NORTE DE SANTANDER	CUCUTA	1,77%	0%	2%	1,68%	3
BOLIVAR	CARTAGENA	1,45%	0%	2%	1,07%	3
META	VILLAVICENCIO	1,10%	4%	0%	1,53%	3
TOLIMA	IBAGUE	0,84%	2%	2%	0,84%	4
SANTANDER	BUCARAMANGA	0,76%	3%	2%	1,25%	4
CUNDINAMARCA	SOACHA	0,76%	0%	2%	0,68%	3
		6,68%	10,12%	9,34%	7,06%	

GRUPO C. Participación en 2 conductas

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	PARTICIPACIÓN HOMICIDIOS	PARTICIPACIÓN HURTO	PARTICIPACIÓN LESIONES	PARTICIPACIÓN MUERTOS AT	PARTICIPACIÓN SUMADA
VALLE	PALMIRA	1,58%	0%	0%	1,22%	2
RISARALDA	PEREIRA	1,47%	0%	0%	1,26%	2
MAGDALENA	SANTA MARTA	1,00%	0%	0%	1,15%	2
VALLE	TULUA	0,92%	0%	0%	0,69%	2
ATLANTICO	SOLEDAD	0,89%	0%	0%	0,43%	2
CALDAS	MANIZALES	0,87%	0%	0%	1,08%	2
VALLE	BUENAVENTURA	0,86%	0%	0%	0,89%	2
CAUCA	POPAYAN	0,76%	0%	0%	0,67%	2
CESAR	VALLEDUPAR	0,69%	0%	0%	1,22%	2
HUILA	NEIVA	0,0%	0%	2%	1,07%	2
		9,04%	0,00%	1,78%	9,68%	

## 6. Analysis of the Security and Coexistence Situation

The implementation of the PNSCC suggests categorizing the 1,122 municipalities according to their characteristics and the behavior of the four prioritized crimes. As mentioned above, 74% of the country's municipalities show homicide rates lower that the national average while a large number indicates lower homicide and crime rates. These municipalities are very important for the Policy, not only in reducing crime but also for the purposes of examining the reasons which explain their relatively low criminal activity, especially in comparison to similar municipalities with high rates. Also, there are municipalities which, in the last few decades, have

presented low crime rates while others have shown average and high rates and quite a considerable number a volatile behavior, although in 2010 they recorded high homicide and crime rates. Please note, however, that the National Government has established Consolidation Zones, where the Police have managed to strengthen the regional control and the full presence of the State is a priority.

Finally, it must be mentioned that the high impact crimes prioritized (homicides, personal injury, traffic accidents, common theft) are concentrated in a few municipalities which contribute proportionately more to crime at a national level. These municipalities and those where micro-extortion and micro-trafficking are well established, or there is a threat of them becoming established, also require a thorough review by Strategy upon defining the categorization.

#### 7. Indicators

In order to track and monitor the impact of the Policy, with the aid of the Public Policy Evaluation Directorate from the National Planning Department (DNP, in Spanish), a set of indicators has been proposed. This set must be adjusted according to the discussions carried out during the socialization exercises. The selected indicators aim to monitor the impact of the Policy and its implementation Strategy in the cities. Common indicators to all policies are the homicide rate, common theft, personal injury and traffic accident fatality rates.

Indicator	Base Line (2010)	Four- year goal	Source	
Common Homicide Rate	34	24	National Police	
Common Theft Rate	201	182	82 National Police	
Personal Injury	115.9	99.6	National Police	
Rate	308*	255	Forensic Medicine	
Traffic Accident	12.9*	10.8	Forensic Medicine	
Fatality Rate	11.6	10.6	National Police	

<sup>\* 2009</sup>