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This chapter presents guidelines for the preparation of critical facilities maps, giving examples of such maps, and explaining how they can be analyzed together with multiple hazard maps to assess vulnerability and to select appropriate hazard reduction techniques.

The general goal of any national, regional, or community development program should be to promote the health, safety, and prosperity of the people. Certain public and private facilities are crucial to this goal, which cannot be achieved if they are destroyed, damaged, or their services interrupted. A more specific goal, then, should be that of protecting these facilities from hazardous natural phenomena.

The importance of giving attention in development planning studies to critical facilities and the risks to them from natural hazards is described in Chapter 1. The vulnerability of new critical facilities needed to support development can be reduced by avoiding hazardous areas, designing for resistance, or operating with minimal exposure. Strategies for existing critical facilities include relocation, strengthening, retrofitting, adding redundancy, revising operations, and adopting emergency preparedness, response, and recovery programs.

Mapping critical facilities, comparing or combining that information with a multiple hazard map (MHM: see Chapter 6), and integrating both into project preparation improve decisions during the different stages of the development planning process. The use of the maps ranges from location decisions to criteria for developing construction standards.


1. Definitions
2. Characteristics of Critical Facilities
3. Damage Scenarios

Throughout this primer a natural event causing loss of life and destruction of social and economic environments beyond the control of the affected population is considered a disaster. Large numbers of victims and economic losses are experienced every year as a consequence of natural events. For example, the Mexican earthquake of September 1985, which affected Mexico City and seven states, killed over 10,000 people and caused damage estimated at over US$4 billion. These figures, without precedent in the earthquake history of Mexico, represent a single instance of how natural events affect areas having numerous production facilities and infrastructure.

This section defines man-made structures that can be considered critical in an emergency due to natural events, and describes a technique to estimate the expected behavior of critical facilities in case of such events.

1. Definitions

The term "critical facilities" in this chapter is used to include all man-made structures or other improvements which because of their function, size, service area, or uniqueness have the potential to cause serious bodily harm, extensive property damage, or disruption of vital socioeconomic activities if they are destroyed, damaged, or if their services are repeatedly interrupted.

The definition used is an expanded version of that proposed by the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy (1978). In terms of the development planning process it is important to ensure that the key elements described in the box below are included when considering critical facilities within project planning.

Terms such as "lifelines," "urban lifelines," and "emergency infrastructure" are used in post-disaster damage studies, emergency preparedness planning, and socioeconomic impact evaluations. They usually refer to two particular categories: transportation and utilities. These two categories are of particular importance to (1) locating and serving new economic activities, (2) supporting existing economic activities, (3) providing the connections to, and support of, emergency facilities, (4) contributing to any disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction activity, and (5) receiving a high priority for strengthening before a disaster, for emergency operations, and for rerouting or rapid repair after damage or interruption. The term "lifelines" has been variously defined as:

- Systems vital to the support of any community (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 1977).

- Facilities which are required to transport people, things, energy, and information, necessary "for a community in a modern industrial society to survive and prosper," and "indispensable... to other facilities and services that are critical in a disaster setting such as hospitals, fire fighting, and emergency operation centers" (Schiff, 1984).

- (1) Those water, sewage, transportation, and communications facilities necessary for the survival of a community, (2) those systems that provide essential services to a community, (3) those services that are important in our daily lives and that, if interrupted, could cause widespread social and economic inconvenience or loss, and (4) geographically spread networks on which society is dependent (Taylor et al, 1982).

- Critical segments or components (for production facilities, infrastructure networks, and support systems to settlements) which should be recognized as priority elements for rehabilitation following a disaster (Bender, 1987).


- Unique or large structures whose failure might be catastrophic.
- Emergency facilities whose operation is crucial immediately before, during, or after a disaster.
- High-density occupancy structures whose failure would result in numerous deaths and injuries.
- Facilities required for public safety and security.

According to Taylor et al (1982), "fire, medical, food, banking, education, and industrial services might be included as lifelines," and what is important "is not a precise definition of lifeline systems so much as a coverage of those safety issues that are likely to be of great concern." For example, the term "vital community facilities" has been used by the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy (1978) to include hospitals, fire and police departments, communication and administration centers, and major repair and storage facilities.

In this chapter all vital structures necessary for community health, safety and prosperity are considered critical facilities. Figure 7-1 provides an expanded listing of critical facilities beyond the traditional definition of lifeline systems.

2. Characteristics of Critical Facilities

When a natural or man-made event affects a critical facility, the impacts are dramatically multiplied when compared to the effects that a similar event may have on non-critical systems. Chapter 1 discusses the effects of an event on the built environment as dependent on the characteristics of the structures (location, design, materials used, and maintenance) and characteristics of the occupants (density, freedom of movement, and health during the event). The effects of hazardous events on critical facilities depend not only on such characteristics, but also on a number of other characteristics unique to a critical facility.

The secondary hazards created from critical facilities (collapse or failure of dams, toxic-chemical storage facilities, etc.), the disruption of certain services (medical, fire, police, etc.), and infrastructure disruption (electricity, damage to roads and highways, etc.) can all bring increased negative impact to the community above the importance of the critical facility itself.

The critical facilities discussed in this chapter can be destroyed, damaged, or interrupted by technological hazards which are beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the facilities discussed are "critical" regardless of their exposure to hazardous events because of their special function, size, service area, or uniqueness. These characteristics can be summarized in the box below.

Other vital national or regional economic activities or facilities besides those defined above vary with each governmental jurisdiction, its resources, and its needs, and should be included in the preparation of a CFM.

Different scenarios have been used to anticipate the behavior of critical facilities when a hazardous event occurs. The property losses to structures and their contents and the number of deaths and injuries of its occupants are estimated. Examples of the use of damage scenarios are given below.



Civil defense installations
Communications centers
Emergency management centers
Fire stations
Hospitals and other medical facilities
Mass emergency shelters
Police stations and other installations for public security


Auditoriums, theatres, stadiums
Educational facilities
Office buildings
Penal institutions


Airways-airports, heliports
Highways-bridges, tunnels, roadbeds, overpasses, transfer centers
Railways-trackage, tunnels, bridges, yards, depots
Waterways-canals, locks, seaports, ferries, harbors, drydocks, piers


Communications-lines, stations, printing presses, relay points, antenna complexes

Electric power-water impoundments, fuel storage, generators, transmission lines, substations, switchyards

Petrochemical installations-production, transmission, storage, terminals

Potable water-collection, transmission, siphons, flumes, treatment, storage

Waste water-collection, treatment, discharge


Corrosives-manufacture, transfer, storage, disposal
Explosives-manufacture, transfer, storage, disposal
Flammable materials-manufacture, transfer, storage, disposal
Radioactive materials-manufacture, transfer, storage, disposal
Toxins-manufacture, transfer, storage, disposal


Food-storage, processing, transfer
Irrigation systems
Water containment-dams, reservoirs, levees, dikes, other impoundments


- Extensive exposure in terms of their lineal character (e.g. railways and pipelines).

- Capacity or service areas affecting large numbers of people and vital national or regional socioeconomic activities (e.g., energy systems, irrigation systems, public offices, potable water installations).

- Large numbers of people exposed, requiring immediate and intensive use of skilled persons and limited resources during search and rescue operations (e.g., medical facilities).

- Size and continuous-use character, whose failure can cause secondary hazards over very large areas and an increase in the number of people affected (e.g., flooding because of dam failure, lost food production because of irrigation system damage, conflagrations because of chemical explosions).

- Sole supply to emergency facilities (e.g.. electricity) or sole access for repairs to other critical facilities (e.g., highways).

- Interconnections between other critical facilities, thereby aggravating damage and outages (e.g., pipelines and transmission lines). Remoteness which causes delays in repairs and increases in outage time (e.g., transmission lines, repeater stations).

- Vital for everyday emergencies, easily overloaded during a disaster, and no substitutes available if damaged (e.g., hospitals and emergency management centers).

- Operation necessary for effective response and recovery activities during and after an emergency (e.g., airports, power generators).

3. Damage Scenarios

A scenario is usually thought of as a synopsis or outline of what might happen; thus, a "damage scenario" can be considered a synopsis or outline of a hazardous event and its impacts on a region or community. The following scenarios and techniques have been designed to reflect a particular disaster setting in terms of earthquake hazard.

The designing of a scenario may assume a natural phenomenon that is hazardous and then estimate casualties, property damage, and failure of critical facilities (Figure 7-1). For example, property losses to buildings and their contents, deaths, injuries requiring hospitalization, and failure of critical facilities were estimated for seven postulated earthquakes by the (U.S.) Federal Emergency Management Agency (1980). In addition, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Algermissen et al., 1973) researched earthquake losses, the U.S. Geological Survey (1981) presented detailed scenarios for the seven postulated earthquakes affecting major population centers in the State of California (U.S.), and Blume et al. (1978) predicted damage to structures.

Davis et al. (1982) show how a scenario can be used to assess the effects of a future earthquake on several critical facilities. Using an intensity map provided by the U.S. Geological Survey, the State of California Division of Mines and Geology prepared a planning scenario based on a repeat occurrence of the great Fort Tejon earthquake of January 9, 1857. The mapped information was based on the method described by Evernden et al. (1981) and was modified according to additional geologic information. The scenario assumed a magnitude 8.3 earthquake on the southern San Andreas fault.

Zones roughly paralleling the postulated surface rupture along the San Andreas fault were displayed as isoseismal areas (that is, areas within which the anticipated seismic intensities are comparable). Each zone was assigned an intensity rating based on the Rossi-Forel scale. Davis et al. (1982) then showed the distribution of seismic intensity values based on the following hypothetical chain of events: the specified earthquake occurs, various localities in the planning area experience a specific type of shaking or ground failure, and certain critical facilities undergo damage while others do not. An analysis of readiness was then used to provide planning insights, recommend further work, and serve as a basis for making or improving emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction plans.


a/N = national, R = regional, U = urban settlement.

The University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) Ad Hoc Joint Senate-Administration Earthquake Safety Committee (1985) report begins:

A major earthquake on the San Andreas Fault or on one of the earthquake faults in the vicinity of UCLA could cause from 1,500 to 2,000 deaths on campus, if it were to occur during normal classroom/working hours. The number of serious injuries could be at least twice that number. The likelihood of occurrence of an earthquake of these dimensions within the next 20 years is considered to be high. These estimates take into account expert evaluations of the quality of construction and furnishings of classroom, dormitory, and office buildings as well as the libraries and auditoriums. This report proposes that a campus-wide program be initiated aimed at mitigation of a threat that poses a significant hazard to life as well as to property.

The report addresses vulnerability of the campus and includes performance ratings, priority, and structural evaluation of 27 buildings; nonstructural elements; overpasses and bridges; chemical, biological, and radiation spills; utilities and energy facilities; UCLA Medical Center; and Stone Canyon Dam.

Perkins (1987) used expected damage to selected building types as generalized from past earthquake experience. The building types included tilt-up concrete, concrete and steel frame, and wood frame buildings. This information was then used to create a damage potential map that combines several intensity maps. The cumulative damage factors ranged from "very low" to "extremely high" potential and were defined as the cost of repairing a building divided by the cost of replacing that building. Although these maps show damage for a particular type of structure, several critical facilities can be seen, namely, major highways, railways, bridges, harbors, and airports (Figure 7-7). The identified expected damage factors may or may not apply to the critical facilities.

Additional attention can be brought to expected damage by preparing a comprehensive inventory of past hazardous events and the resulting damage; see Singer et al (1983) for geologic hazards in Venezuela. For each state, a glossary of past events was prepared which included codes for administrative unit (state), a map-locator code, the location of the event, and its date of occurrence. For each event, the nature of the event, its physical evidence, its relationship to seismic activity, type of material damage that occurred, and the number of victims were noted.


1. Benefits of Critical Facilities Mapping
2. Preparing Critical Facilities Maps
3. Compiling Critical Facilities Information
4. Sources of Critical Facilities Information
5. Assessing the Vulnerability of Critical Facilities

Critical facilities maps (CFM) are a graphical reference which includes information on the location and characteristics of these vital systems. The impact of a natural event on critical facilities is sufficiently important that the mapping of such vital systems should be part of any development planning study. A CFM can be used to assess and reduce vulnerability especially when combined with a multiple hazard map. Such a process is extensively described in Section C.

The CFM discussed here is primarily for use in an integrated development planning study by the various working groups that execute the study prepared under this process. Reference is made in this section to ten examples (Figures 7-3 through 7-12). A summary of the characteristics of the information displayed on Figures 7-3 through 7-12 is shown in Figure 7-2.

Much of the information in Chapter 6, on multiple hazard maps, is applicable to critical facilities and is repeated or adapted in this section for the reader's convenience. Discussions on the benefits of critical facilities mapping, selection of base map, convenient scales and coverage, types of symbols to be used, facilities to be shown, accuracy, key elements, compilation, and sources of critical facility information follows.

1. Benefits of Critical Facilities Mapping

Maps are the most effective way to convey actual and relative location of critical facilities. A CFM is a prerequisite to addressing and reducing natural hazards that may affect new or existing critical facilities.

The primary purpose of a CFM is not just to convey to planners and decision-makers the location of a facility, but to show its capacity and service area in an accurate, clear, and convenient way. When using a CFM, an extensive number of critical facilities can be included and reviewed at the same time. Also, when combined with multiple hazard maps, they can provide information on which areas require more information, which ones require different reduction techniques, and which locations need immediate attention when a hazardous event occurs. The benefits of using a CFM are summarized in the box below.


Source: Adapted from OEA. Proyecto de Asistencia Técnica al Departamento de Planeamiento Regional de SEPLACOOI - República Oriental del Uruguay, Mapa de Infraestructura/Equipamiento. (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1980).


- A clear and convenient representation of critical facilities in the project area is provided.

- The land-use plans can be assessed prior to implementation.

- The impact of existing infrastructure on potential development can be assessed before project implementation.

- A more concise focus on different types, configuration, structural design, and use of critical facilities in the project area can be made.

- More realistic benefit-cost ratios for new development are possible.

- Lack of information (location, number, size or capacity, and service area) on critical facilities can be identified.

- Identification of a need for more (or better) investigations into the process or susceptibility of hazards is created.

- Facilities requiring emergency preparedness and immediate recovery or repair are identified.

2. Preparing Critical Facilities Maps

a. Base Maps
b. Information Display Techniques
c. Key Elements of Critical Facility Information

Maps are a planimetric reference which can be prepared to include critical facilities information in hazardous areas. These maps can be used to assess and reduce vulnerability, since they can postulate information on natural phenomena that is hazardous (location, likelihood, and severity) and estimate its effect on numerous critical facilities.

Identifying the various characteristics of critical facilities and understanding how natural events may impact these man-made structures can become a complex and time-consuming task. Weighing and accumulating the impacts may seem almost impossible. Various techniques for assessing critical facilities vulnerability are shown in Section C. However, simple guidance is required when planners and decision-makers prepare a CFM.

The following subsections describe the basic elements that should be considered when preparing a CFM.

a. Base Maps

A prerequisite to compiling critical facilities information onto a map is the selection or creation of a base map upon which to place this information. Such maps are usually identified during the preliminary mission; the team needs only to select a scale appropriate to the study area. Also, the base map used for an MHM (see Chapter 6) can be the same as that used for the CFM.

An adequate base map must (1) be planimetric, that is, a representation of information on a plane in true geographic relationship and with measurable horizontal distances; and (2) have sufficient geographic reference information to orient the user to the location of the facility to be shown. Figures 7-3 through 7-12 are all planimetric and each has sufficient reference information for its scale and areal coverage. For example, the map of Uruguay from which Figure 7-3 is taken shows each city; other maps show highways and rivers; some even show the size and shape of large buildings (Figures 7-11 and 7-12).

If existing maps cannot be adopted for use as a base map, then one must be constructed. This process can be expensive, since an adequate planimetric representation containing different kinds of information can require trained staff and the use of special equipment and techniques.

Whenever possible, the planning team should adopt as a base map one of the many maps widely available. Chapter 6 provides many examples of the variety of maps that can be used as a base map. Several base maps at different scales may be considered, depending upon the final study area or areas and the predominating scale of the individual facilities maps. The most detailed facilities map may be selected as the base, if it provides adequate geographic orientation. Many maps are created with north at their top, but not all. Therefore, a north arrow must always be included.

Sometimes local agencies prepare a base map that displays information on various man-made improvements (Figures 7-11 and 7-12). For example, base maps at a scale of 1:2,500 to 1:10,000 can be obtained for many urban areas. The OAS Department of Regional Development and Environment and other development assistance agencies have prepared various inventory maps (Figures 7-3, 7-4, and 7-10).


Source: Adapted from OEA. Plan Hidráulico del Jubones. República del Ecuador, Vol. I, Mapa 4-1. (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1984).

These types of base maps, sometimes called "topographic" or "contour line" maps, are invaluable because many of the critical facilities are shown. Figures 7-11 and 7-12 are good examples of topographic maps which show critical facilities.

Cadastral maps are excellent base maps for CFM because of their scale and orientation information (see Chapter 6). Their characteristics, coverage, scale, accuracy, and cost are discussed in Physical Resource Investigations for Economic Development (Organization of American States, 1969).

b. Information Display Techniques

It must be emphasized that the information shown on the CFM is an important factor that the planner or decision-maker should consider when assessing vulnerability or the location of new development. Thus information included in the CFM must be clear, convenient, and not just accurate but perceived as accurate. The selection of an adequate scale and symbols and avoiding large amounts of information which can be difficult to analyze are important display techniques necessary to consider when preparing a CFM. Information on these aspects follows.

Scale and Coverage

Map scale is the measure of reduction in size from the actual environment to that portrayed on the map. Maps are smaller than the area mapped and therefore have a ratio between map distance and actual distance, for example, 1:200,000. This ratio means that one meter on the map represents 200,000 meters on the ground, or one millimeter represents 200 meters. Larger-scale maps usually provide information showing more detail and greater resolution; however, less areal coverage can be shown.

Many different scales are appropriate for the CFM. For example, the map from which Figure 7-3 is taken shows a nation at a scale of 1:1,000,000. However, larger scales (greater detail) are more common for regional development planning (1:500,000 through 1:50,000, Figures 7-4 through 7-10), and community development plans (1:50,000 through 1:24,000, Figures 7-11 and 7-12). Maps at a scale of 1:125,000 can represent a division between presenting facility information in a symbolic way and fixing its location and areal size (compare Figures 7-6 and 7-7).

The scale selected will depend upon the map's purpose; there are no best scales, only more convenient ones (Figure 7-2). The box below lists what scales generally provide useful information for covering certain areas.

The scale used for a CFM is selected on the basis of the information on the facilities to be shown, but also may be dependent upon the scale of the base map. The area covered, scale, detail, facilities shown, and format of a CFM range widely, as shown in Figures 7-3 through 7-12. Sometimes the coverage is limited by the purpose of the map, jurisdiction of the map-maker, or enabling legislation. For example, an awareness of coastal hazards, disclosure of flood and fault rupture hazards, and regulation of fault rupture zones are illustrated by Figures 7-9, 7-11, and 7-12.

If a choice of scales is available, then the factors listed in the box on page 7-15 become important in making the selection.

Maps may be enlarged or reduced. In the case of a CFM, often various types of facilities are mapped at different scales. Also, when combining mapped information about different facilities, an enlargement or reduction to the scale of the base map may be required. Use of controlled photographic methods, or digital registration by computer, makes this process easier and more accurate.

Map titles and explanations are usually unaffected by enlargements or reductions, but not the verbal and numerical scales. Written scales (one millimeter equals one hundred meters) and numerical scales (1:1000,000) remain accurate only for the original map, a graphic scale should always be included.


Area Covered

Map Scales



Region (or island countries)


Urban areas



Source: Adapted from Santa Clara County Planning Department. Seismic Safety Plan. (San Jose, California: Santa Clara County Planning Department, 1975).


- Number and type of facilities to be shown.
- Size or capacity of the facilities.
- Area to be covered.
- Size of final flat or folded sheets of the map

The map scale selected affects not only the size of the area and the amount of detail that can be shown, but also the location of the facility. For example, if a small scale map (1:1,000,000) using a 1/millimeter-wide line symbol is enlarged ten times (1:100,000), the line symbol becomes one centimeter wide. Similarly, reduction of point and line symbols may result in their de-emphasis or even disappearance.


Everything shown on a CFM as well as the base map is a symbol representing reality. Innumerable variations of points, lines, and areas are available to the maker of a CFM. Point symbols can be shaded, patterned, colored, numbered, or lettered. Lines can be solid, long-dashed, short-dashed, or paired, as conventionally used by cartographers in preparing topographic maps. Areas can be shaded, patterned, or colored (Figure 7-7).

Symbols are selected for easy reference and reproduction-examples include numbers (Figure 7-3), letters, conventions (Figures 7-10 and 7-11), computer printout (Figures 7-7 and 7-8), nonconventional symbols (Figure 7-10), and resemblance to real physical form (Figure 7-11). Conventional symbols used on topographic maps may show critical facilities; others indicate jurisdictional boundaries or provide orientation. Some symbols may convey a sense of the facilities; others are totally abstract (electric stations and lines in Figure 7-4). There are no best symbols, only more convenient ones.

The variety of symbols in a CFM is limited only by visual variables-location, shape, size, color, volume, pattern, and direction. The location, type, capacity, and service area of each facility should be given or, if unknown, clearly stated as such. The information provided in the box below presents an explanation of the use of symbols in a CFM.

It must be emphasized that all the facilities information shown on the CFM, as well as on the base map information, are symbols-some conventional, others abstract, and many innovative. Planners and decision-makers should be aware that the use and interpretation of symbols may be limited, since often they can be misleading. For example, filling up a CFM with the symbols from several individual facility maps may give the impression of a more thorough study, when, of course, this may be untrue. Simplified critical facilities maps only create an awareness of what information exists and, even more importantly, what information is missing. In this sense, the planning team should understand that a CFM cannot substitute for detailed studies and site-specific investigations.

Also, development planners or decision-makers may be tempted to misinterpret the symbols with the reality they represent. This erroneous practice can be very costly. For example, development planners or investors may want to locate critical facilities needed for economic development along a line that looks the straightest and most convenient on the map. Such a route may lie in a hazardous area. Examples of the misuse of maps by vertical and horizontal distortion, density of symbols, contrasting colors, scales, or the use of symbols and colors which have suggestive, connotative powers beyond their denotative role are discussed by Muehrcke (1978). Map limitation must be appreciated and, when necessary, further investigations should be undertaken.

A thorough discussion of graphic design is beyond the scope of both this chapter and the previous chapter on multiple hazard mapping (Chapter 6). However, the reader and map-maker will find an excellent discussion by Robinson et al. (1978) on a design process, relation to the arts, objectives, components, content, audiences, limitations, and graphic elements of maps.


Source: Adapted from OEA. Plan Hidráulico del Jubones, República del Ecuador, Vols. I and III, Mapa 5-A2. (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1984).


- Location can be shown through the use of basic geometric symbols, such as a point, a line, or an area. For example, points have been used to show cities where facilities are located (Figures 7-3 and 7-4); lines have been used to show general routes of electric power lines and water supply pipes (Figure 7-10); and areas have been used to show location of schools and runways (Figure 7-11).

- Type can be shown by point symbols, for example, educational and medical facilities (Figure 7-3), communications (Figure 7-10), and emergency facilities (Figure 7-5); lines have been used to show various types of highways (Figures 7-11 and 7-12).

- Capacity can be shown by lines, for example, electric transmission line kilowatts (Figure 7-4), and areas have been used to show population size of urban settlements. Combinations of varying line widths have been used to show both direction and volume of energy flow in pipelines or surface transportation. The size of the lettering for the name of a facility has been used to show reservoir capacity.

- Service Area can be shown by areas. If service areas have not been defined, interpretations or estimates can be made. For example, where there are only one or two medical facilities serving an isolated urban settlement (Figure 7-3), or a single power line or road serving several urban settlements (Figures 7-4 and 7-10), or specific fire stations in a metropolitan area having a uniform pattern of streets or density of development (Figure 7-5), or where the facility is unique, such as an international airport (Figure 7-11), the service areas should be obvious.

- Impact can be shown through various symbols. Computer printout lines have been used to show the intersection of a linear hazard and major water and gas mains (Figure 7-8). Lettered zones can show the percent of telephone system effectiveness (Davis et al., 1982). Computer printout colored patterns can be descriptive in terms of showing the percent of damage affecting specific building types (Figure 7-7).

Critical Facilities To Be Shown

A varying number of different facilities can be shown on a map depending upon scale, symbols, and coverage chosen (Figure 7-7). On a one-sheet national base map only educational and medical facilities are shown (Figure 7-3), or on the one-sheet map of an island numerous facilities are shown or indexed (Figure 7-10). Usually when an area or the number of critical facilities shown is very large, the base maps will be presented on more than one sheet. In some cases certain facilities (Figure 7-5) are shown on one sheet in a series, while other critical facilities-gas and electric transmission lines, or freeways, railways, and bridges-are shown on other sheets in the series. In other cases, three types of facilities and the capacity of one of those types are shown for only one critical facility-electricity (Figure 7-4).

To avoid overcrowding, facilities can be shown by color, by index (Figure 7-3), or by symbol (Figures 7-4 and 7-5). If room is available on the map sheet, or if a written report accompanies the map, photographs of typical and familiar critical facilities can be added.


The locational information on facilities available for the CFM may be accurate, but precision and uniformity may vary when it is transferred. When spherical surfaces are portrayed on a planimetric map, they are only accurate at the contact of the plane with the actual sphere surface. This can affect location in terms of a CFM. Thus, the locational accuracy of the CFM is dependent upon the accuracy of the base map selected.


Source: Adapted from Perkins. The San Francisco Bay Area on Shakey Ground. (Oakland, California: Association of Bay Area Governments, 1987).

Various cartographic projection techniques are used to reduce distortion. The projection technique used can be given to alert users. Depending upon the scale and accuracy of the hazard information, this distortion may not be crucial, particularly if the base map has sufficient geographic information to locate the facilities.

Another form of inaccuracy occurs when the information available does not have an acceptable degree of accuracy because of the limited number of field investigations, lack of available records, and incompatible purpose of the original compilation. The planning team should make sure that decisions for project formulation are based on adequate information. Thus, in a case where information is inaccurate an effort should be made to collect additional and more reliable information. When this is not possible, the planning team should express that any decision at this point is based on less than complete information.

c. Key Elements of Critical Facility Information

The user must perceive the destruction or interruption of the critical facility as adversely affecting human lives, property, or socioeconomic activities. Information translated into a CFM must contain at least four elements and be in a format that a nontechnical user can understand.

The key elements that should be shown when preparing a CFM are (a) location, (b) type, (c) size or capacity, and (d) service areas. These elements are needed by planners and decision-makers to assess the impact on (and protect) critical facilities from hazards. For example, if the facilities are not located in a hazardous area, have limited capacity, or serve a small area, they become of less concern in the planning process.

Usually location is provided because of the geographic nature of maps, although sometimes location can be schematic and not actual, as is the case shown in Figure 7-4.

However, other elements-facility type, capacity, and service area-are not always provided. The user must not assume that because the number of health facilities and schools is given, it is also available for other facilities, as in the case shown in Figure 7-3. Neither must they assume that because capacity is given for electric power lines, it is available for other facilities, as is shown in Figure 7-4.

Information on the type of facility is usually provided. Different categories of road and highway systems are often clearly shown on maps. Nevertheless, other details in terms of type, condition, configuration, and age of the structures are usually reserved for more detailed studies applicable to engineering design stages of investment project preparation.

Information on size or capacity may include diameter of a pipeline, number of highway travel lanes, cubic feet per minute of flow, number of beds or operating rooms, and type of fire fighting equipment. Examples of location may be seen in Figures 7-11 and 7-12, of numbers in Figure 7-3, and of sizes in Figures 7-4 and 7-8..

Service areas are usually not shown, but can be estimated. For example, from Figure 7-10 urban electricity and water supply on Saint Lucia can be easily inferred. Rural service areas may be estimated (Figure 7-5) for a certain area, or easily developed for an area (Figure 7-10), or are obvious in the case of the only aqueduct (Figure 7-12). Population served may be given on the map (Figure 7-6), but many other CFM may lack such information (Figure 7-8). When the number of medical facilities, schools, and fire stations is given for urban areas (Figures 7-3 and 7-5), additional information concerning their capacity or type of equipment should be obtained to ascertain their importance to the lifeline network.

3. Compiling Critical Facilities Information

Compiling information on critical facilities to make a CFM is similar to making a MHM. It consists of the same four steps-collecting, evaluating, selecting, and combining information.

The map compilation process and procedures are discussed in various textbooks on preparing maps (for example, "Elements of Cartography" by Robinson et al, 1978). Chapters 1, 2, and 8 through 11 include recommendations applicable to facilities as well as hazards. Early consultation with technical specialists, identification of facilities early in the planning process, and an initial review of the type and content of available information is recommended.

There are various combinations of base, facilities, and hazard maps already prepared that may only require combining information to prepare a CFM. For example:

- A few critical facilities on a general base map to which hazards and other facilities may be added.

- Numerous critical facilities on a general base (Figure 7-10) to which the coastal hazard information (see Chapter 6) can be overlaid and compared.

- Three critical facilities and one hazard (Figure 7-8) which can be transferred to a topographic base map showing other critical facilities. Other hazards can be added.

- Topographic base maps showing numerous critical facilities (Figures 7-11 and 7-12) and one or two hazards to which additional hazards can be added.


Source: Adapted from Alexander, et al "Applying Digital Cartographic and Geographic Information Systems Technology and Products to the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program" in Proceedings of a Workshop on Earthquake Hazards along the Wasatch Front, Utah. (Reston, Virginia: U.S. Geological Survey, Open-File Report 87-154, 1987).


- Collecting base maps and appropriate facilities information from the sources identified in Appendix A.

- Evaluating the uniformity and completeness of such information-areal coverage, detail, content, information needed (location, number, type, size or capacity, and service area), format, and symbols.

- Selecting the most appropriate base map (and scale) to be used, facilities to be shown, and symbols to portray those facilities.

- Combining or integrating the selected facilities information into the CFM in an accurate, clear, and convenient way.

Use of controlled photographic methods and digital registration by computer are excellent ways to reduce the distortion when different types of facilities are compiled or superposed at different scales or maps must be enlarged or reduced to be compatible with the base map. Utria (1988) concluded that, "given the typical financial constraints that prevail... deployment of GIS and computer mapping systems should be first attempted by utilizing already available and reliable information (maps, statistical records, and remote-sensing data)."

4. Sources of Critical Facilities Information

There are many examples of critical facility information that can be used when preparing maps within the integrated development planning process. There is a vast array of sources of facility information including various agencies, offices, or institutions at international, national, regional, and community levels-government and corporate. These agencies, offices, or institutions may be concerned with economic development, resource exploration and extraction, land-use planning, emergency preparedness, disaster response, geotechnical studies, utility service, transportation systems, public works, traffic control, public health and education, national security, and community safety.

Sometimes critical information can be found in the form of engineering studies, "as built" plans, disaster reports, impacts of past events, facility inventories, etc. Usually this information is not readily understood by nontechnical users. It must be translated for planners and decision-makers and transferred onto maps. At other times, the source information is on maps and can be then transferred from land-use, photographic, topographic, demographic, and tourist maps already prepared for settled regions (see Appendix A).

Finally, conventional sources should not be overlooked when collecting critical facilities information. Chapters 8 through 11 suggest authorities responsible for public works, forestry, and agricultural activities as valuable sources of information. Also, Muehrcke (1978), in his appendix on "Sources of Maps," says:

When searching for a map of your own region, a wise first step is to consult local sources. City, county, and regional agencies and businesses can probably provide up-to-date information on the status of regional map coverage. If you live near the state capitol, your search will be simplified, because many state agencies use maps in their daily operations. Some states even employ a state cartographer to coordinate the preparation and dissemination of map resources.

If the bookstores do not stock the maps you need, it is possible that the local library will have them. Many universities and public libraries have been designated as map depositories, which means that they receive a copy of each map published by the larger federal agencies. State and local agencies also are prone to deposit copies of maps they no longer need for special projects with these libraries.


Source: Adapted from Griggs and Savoy (eds.) Living with the California Coast. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1985).


- Updating of hazard information and maps by scientists and engineers.

- Continuous updating of facilities information and maps by facilities managers and designers.

- Accurate site investigations by qualified geologists or geotechnical engineers.

- Careful evaluations of facilities by architects, engineers, and safety specialists.

- Prompt adherence to facility emergency procedures by operators and managers.

- Conscientious administration of regulations by building and zoning inspectors and consistent enforcement by government officials.

- Sustained support of inspection and enforcement officials by political leaders.

- Skillful advocacy by public officials and informed interpretation by the courts, if the techniques are challenged.

- Concern for individual, family, and community health, safety, and welfare by developers, investors, donors, and insurers.

5. Assessing the Vulnerability of Critical Facilities

The impact of natural events is increasing as the built environment expands. Failure to consider critical facilities in the development planning process and to protect them from natural hazards will result eventually in the loss of lives, bodily injuries, property damage, delayed recovery, impaired restoration of utilities and other services, and disruption of vital economic activities. Depending upon the location, capacity, and service area of a critical facility, its destruction or disruption can be catastrophic.

The emphasis of an integrated regional development planning study on the development of natural resources, energy, infrastructure, agriculture, industry, human settlements, and social services should include the assessment and protection of those critical facilities necessary for development. This effort promotes the activities oriented to reduce the vulnerability of new facilities by avoiding hazardous areas, designing for resistance, or operating with minimal exposure; and in terms of existing critical facilities, it promotes activities related to strengthening and retrofitting vital systems and implementing emergency preparedness, response, and recovery programs. The considerations identified in the box above should be addressed by planners and decision-makers in their activities to assess and reduce the vulnerability of critical facilities.

According to the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (1980), information on vulnerability of critical facilities is "less plentiful, less reliable, and less clearly defined than the information usually available on natural hazards.... Various categories of data are required, relating not only to the details of possible material damage, but also to the degree of social and economic disorganization that may take place."

Manuals for identifying and reducing the effects of natural hazards can be prepared for towns, villages, their public officials, and the general population (e.g. St. Helene, 1987). These manuals identify critical facilities at risk, responsible agencies and their role, and actions to reduce hazards, casualties, damages, and outages. They may include matrixes for assessing vulnerability or impact for each hazard and each facility.

It is important to emphasize that the vulnerability of a critical facility does not depend solely on its exposure to hazards. Specific vulnerability depends upon the structure's characteristics, such as uniqueness, type of construction, quality, modification, age, maintenance, height, and first-floor elevation. For example: the expected damage to tilt-up concrete buildings shown in Figure 7-7 is not related to a specific building or site, but rather it is a statistical potential for a selected building type to be damaged given a certain event.


Source: Adapted from OAS. Saint Lucia Lifeline Network Map, prepared with the collaboration of the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, Fisheries, Co-operatives and Labour of the Government of Saint Lucia. (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1984b).


- The conclusions regarding the performance of facilities are hypothetical and not to be construed as site-specific engineering evaluations.

- The damage assessments may be based upon a specific scenario, An event of a different type, size, or location will result in a markedly different pattern of damage.

- The facilities shown on small-scale Index maps may have been transferred by eye from maps of various scales and the user must view larger-scale (more detailed) maps of individual facilities for more precise locations.

- Service area boundaries may have been estimated based on settlement patterns. Facility managers must be consulted for actual boundaries.

- The scale of the map may prohibit sufficient detail to allow use of the maps for individual facility studies. Analyzing the vulnerability of specific facilities or individual sites should be performed by a specialist.

Identifying the various characteristics of critical facilities and assessing their vulnerabilities is a complex and time-consuming task. In particular, weighing and accumulating the impacts may seem almost impossible, but the method indicated in Figure 7-7 for evaluating specific building types and assessing their vulnerability to a specific hazard is usually suitable.

When assessing critical facilities the planning team should also be aware of the limitations included in the box above, in terms of a CFM.

The following Section C describes different methods of combining a CFM with an MHM. The combination of these two sets of maps becomes a useful tool for assessing critical facilities in term of natural hazard impact.


1. Uses of Combined Critical Facilities Maps and Multiple Hazard Maps

There are numerous examples of infrastructure or lifeline information describing critical facilities in the integrated development planning process. This information can be combined with an MHM and used not only for site selection but also for hazard reduction.

There are many benefits in making a CFM, comparing or combining it with an MHM, and integrating both into the development planning process. For example, the location of a critical facility in a hazardous area alerts planners and decision-makers to the fact that in the future a certain facility may confront serious problems. An evaluation of vulnerability dependent upon a careful analysis of equipment and the type, use, and condition of the facility would then be carried out. If the vulnerability of critical facilities is assessed and appropriate reduction techniques are incorporated into each stage of the planning process, social and economic disasters due to natural and other hazards can be avoided or substantially reduced.

The following box includes a listing of the benefits obtained by combining a CFM and an MHM.

1. Uses of Combined Critical Facilities Maps and Multiple Hazard Maps

a. Examples of Combinations of MHM and CFM
b. Regional Planning: The Integrated Development Planning Process

A number of planning and development activities take place at national, regional, and international levels. At these levels, the combination of CFM and MHM can be used by agencies concerned with land-use planning, preparedness and disaster response, utility services including energy, transportation, and communication, and national security and community safety. Moreover, the use of superimposed critical facility information and natural hazard information is important when preparing economic investment projects for national and international bank lending.

A discussion of the planning and development activities which can combine CFM and MHM follows.


Legend: Hazard zones: lightly shaded areas denote flood - prone areas; darker shaded areas denote fault - rupture zones. Numerous critical facilities are shown on this type of base map.

Source: Adapted from San-Mateo Burlingame Board of Realtors. Mid-peninsula cities street index map. (San Jose, California: San Metro-Burlingame Board of Realtors, 1979).


- Clear and convenient representation of critical facilities in hazardous areas is provided.

- wareness of hazards to critical facilities occurs among project planners and decision-makers prior to project implementation.

- A more concise focus on the effect and impact of natural phenomena on critical facilities is possible during the early stages of the planning study.

- Identification of the extent to which new development can be affected by the failure or disruption of existing critical facilities as a consequence of a natural event can be made.

- Hazards affecting new critical facilities may be reduced.

- More realistic benefit-cost ratios for new development are possible.

- Identification of the need for more (or better) investigations into process or prediction of hazards is created.

- Study areas can be identified and subdivided into sub-areas requiring different assessments, emergency preparedness, immediate recovery, or specific reduction techniques.

a. Examples of Combinations of MHM and CFM

The combination of CFM and MHM has been very effective for land-use planning, preparing for emergencies, increasing public awareness, and planning development.

Land-Use Planning

Land-use planning is one of the most efficient ways of avoiding development or reducing the density of development in hazardous areas. The Santa Clara County, California, Planning Department (1975) prepared an extensive land-use plan in compliance with a state law requiring all cities and counties to prepare and adopt a seismic safety plan. All the potential earthquake hazards-liquefaction, lurching, lateral spreading, differential settlement, ground displacement, landslides, and flooding due to dike failure-were combined on a seismic-stability map. Three zones were then used to indicate three different degrees of need for detailed site investigations, as determined by the level of hazards (Figure 7-5).

Urban settlements, transportation, utilities, and emergency facilities were then superimposed on the seismic-stability map. Citizens, as well as planners and decision-makers, were made aware of potential damage when presented with mapped information depicting homes, freeways, railroads, bridges, pipelines, power lines, hospitals, and fire stations located in the varying hazard zones on the map. In addition, large-scale maps are available to show potential hazards in relation to property boundaries (see Chapter 6).

Another county in California (Santa Barbara County Planning Department, 1979), in preparing its seismic safety plan, provided the location of several critical facilities for orientation, namely, highways, airports, railroads, air force base, and a federal correctional institution. (See the section in Chapter 6 on "Information Processed by Computer.")

Development Regulations

Sometimes critical facilities and hazards information are shown on a map selected for regulatory purposes. For example, the California Legislature (1972) provides for public safety by restricting development in surface fault rupture zones. These regulatory zones encompass 34 counties and 75 cities in California; reproducible copies of pertinent maps (Figure 7-12) have been provided to each affected county and city. Numerous critical facilities are shown on this type of map (e.g., major highways, overpasses, aqueducts, pipelines, and electrical transmission lines).

Disclosure in Land Title Transfers

Often the combination of critical facilities together with natural hazard information is used on maps selected for awareness and orientation of purchasers of land. For example, the U.S. Congress (1974), the California Legislature (1972), and the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors (1978) require lenders or sellers of real property to inform the prospective borrower or buyer as to whether the property is located in a flood, fault rupture, or landslide prone area.


Legend: Part of the U.S. Geological Survey Ritter Ridge Quadrangle (topographic series), which has been used by the California Division of Mines and Geology (1979) as a base map for regulating fault-rupture hazards in the Special Studies Zones (lighter lines) along part of the San Andreas fault. Traces of potentially active faults (heavier lines) are indicated by solid lines where accurately located, by a long dash where approximately located, by a short dash where inferred, and by dots where concealed. Numerous critical facilities are shown on this type of base map.

Source: Adapted from California Division of Mines and Geology, Ritter Ridge Quandrangle-Special Studies Zones Map. (Sacramento, California: California Division of Mines and Geology, 1979).

To assist lenders and sellers in complying with these laws, local boards of real estate agents have prepared street-index maps showing the hazard zones. Figure 7-11 shows two of these hazard zones. The publisher of these street/index maps used topographic maps for the base map. Numerous critical facilities are shown on this type of base map (for example, major highways, airports, overpasses, schools, railways, electric transmission lines, and sewage disposal facilities).

Public Awareness

Often a prerequisite to obtaining support for integrated development planning and hazard reduction is public awareness of not only the hazards but those critical facilities that will be affected. As an example, Griggs and Savoy (1985) mapped more than 1,100 miles of Pacific Ocean coastline in California into three hazard zones reflecting a combination of coastal erosion, wave-cut cliffs, slumping, bluff retraction, landslides, creep, rockfalls, and storm waves. The authors intended to help their readers "make more educated decisions about building, buying, and living on the shorelines." Various critical facilities are shown (for example, a major highway, railway, and military base; see Figure 7-9).

Emergency Preparedness Planning

Alexander et al. (1987) used a digital cartography and geographic information system technology to depict natural hazards-landslides, liquefaction, floods, and fault ruptures. These hazards were then combined with various critical facilities (for example, fault rupture with schools, fire stations, medical facilities, and police stations; and with major gas and water mains; see Figure 7-8). The nature and capability of a geographic information system provides an excellent basis for displaying such information for emergency preparedness planning (see Chapter 5).

Davis et al. (1982), mapped the critical facilities that would require a major emergency response from a damaging earthquake. Facilities included highways, airports, railroads, marine facilities, communication lines, water-supply and waste-disposal facilities, and electrical power, natural gas, and petroleum lines. The communications map, for example, assesses telephone-system performance following a postulated earthquake. Maps for water-supply and waste-disposal facilities show the location and estimates of damage to facilities. Most of the lifelines are susceptible to significant damage that could require a major emergency response effort.

This last study covers a large spectrum of issues. Each CFM is accompanied by a discussion of the general patterns of the effects of an earthquake; for example:

Not all of the [telephone] systems in the greater Los Angeles [California] region are set up to process emergency calls automatically on previously established priority bases. Thus overloading of equipment still in service could be very significant.

Also, each anticipated mapped event is accompanied by specific examples of expected damage; for example:

The several hydroelectric-power plants located on the California and Los Angeles aqueducts in northwestern Los Angeles County and the Devil Canyon Power Plant near San Bernardino will be out of service for an extended period of time due to major damage to both of the aqueduct systems.

In addition, each map is also accompanied by emergency planning needs; for example:

Emergency planners need to identify major emergency routes that can be most readily opened immediately following the earthquake... alternative emergency routes should be selected which are at grade, wide, not flanked by buildings which are likely to be damaged, and not likely to be obstructed by fallen powerlines or other obstructions.

Site Selection

Often the likelihood, location, and severity of natural hazards are used as criteria in selecting a site for a critical facility. For example, Perkins (1978) identified potential Class I sites as part of a regional solid-waste-management plan. Class I sites are defined as disposal areas for such hazardous wastes as toxic chemicals, soluble industrial wastes, saline brines, and unquenched incineration ashes.

The Perkins study identifies areas that warrant further study for use as disposal sites for hazardous wastes, and recommends that these disposal sites and facilities be located so as not to adversely affect human health and safety, air and water quality, wildlife, critical environmental resources, and urbanized areas. Sites that may be subject to inundation, washout, faulting, liquefaction, landsliding, or accelerated erosion were deemed unacceptable.

The location and assessment of natural hazards have been a key determination in the evaluation and selection of sites for other critical facilities-offshore structures, nuclear generating stations, hydraulic fill dams, water pipes, liquefied natural gas terminals, educational facilities, and electrical substations.

b. Regional Planning: The Integrated Development Planning Process

The OAS Department of Regional Development and Environment has used mapping techniques for combining natural hazards and critical facilities information in its planning studies. Multiple hazard maps for national and regional areas were prepared for Ecuador, Honduras, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia and combined with facilities information, which included lifelines, energy supplies, health installations, high-rise structures, water supply, and transportation. A brief discussion of these studies follows.


After listing all development activities for the Santiago and Mira River basins, the planning team evaluated transportation and other infrastructure development proposals. Their workplan included not only a study of the region's human settlement system but the presentation of a chapter on infrastructure development strategy. The largest investment recommended (40 percent of the total) was allocated to critical facilities, namely, developing port facilities, a road system, telecommunication services, energy and rural electrification projects, and other infrastructure (OAS, 1984a).

In another development project (Plan Hidráulico del Jubones), the OAS Department of Regional Development and Environment (1984c) mapped many of the critical facilities-electrical (Figure 7-4) and health and educational (Figure 7-6).


The diagnostic stage of the Proyecto de Desarrollo Islas de la Bahía y Atlántida included a flood hazard map (see Chapter 6) which identified several critical facilities-electric transmission lines, highways, railways, hospitals, bridges, schools, and fuel storage. This type of infrastructure information is often available on maps at scales of 1:50,000 or larger prepared by national geodesic institutions.

St. Kitts and Nevis

As part of a development planning study, a critical infrastructure assessment can be addressed (Bender, 1986). Settlements were evaluated in terms of the potential effect of hazardous events. The study included the identification of major critical facilities, such as police, fire, and medical facilities. Their vulnerability was discussed and summarized as follows:

- Medical facilities may be susceptible to wind damage and flooding.

- Electric power lines are susceptible to wind damage and, to a lesser extent, to flooding, erosion, and debris flows.

- The domestic water supply is susceptible to flooding; pipelines from intakes in the higher reaches of the mountains are often damaged at locations where they cross guts.

- The road network and the electric power distribution system are vulnerable to service interruption.

- Damage to schools, medical facilities, and designated first aid stations and shelters can be expected.

Specific recommendations were then made to reduce damage to the road system, water supply, emergency shelters, first aid stations, medical facilities, and school buildings.

Saint Lucia

Extensive work on hazard awareness and mitigation has been carried out by the government in Saint Lucia. Of particular interest is a study (St. Helene, 1986) which identified the risks associated with known natural hazards for ten coastal settlements and their surrounding areas. Critical facilities were described using the generic titles of communications, emergency services, health, education, and energy (Figure 7-10), and facilities subject to hazards were examined (airports, roads, hotels, dynamite storage, a school for the deaf, churches, bridges, post office, electric power poles, navigational lighthouse, electric transformers, sea defense walls, petrol depots, and sewage treatment plants).


** Alexander, R.H., et al. Applying Digital Cartographic and Geographic Information Systems Technology and Products to the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program. Final Report Atlas, Appendix B to Research Project RMMC 86-1 (Denver, Colorado: U.S. Geological Survey, 1987).

Algermissen, S.T., et al. A Study of Earthquake Losses in the Los Angeles, California, Area. Report prepared for the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (Boulder, Colorado: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Environmental Research Laboratories, 1973).

Bender, S.O. "Natural Hazard Assessment in Integrated Regional Development" in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Housing and Urban Development after Natural Disasters (Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association, 1987).

- St. Kitts and Nevis Forestry Development and Resource Management Planning Project: Report on Natural Hazards Assessment and Settlement Development Planning in St. Kitts and Nevis (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1986).

Blume, J.A., et al. Damage Prediction of an Earthquake in Southern California. Final technical report under contract 14-08-0001-15889 (Menlo Park, California: U.S. Geological Survey, 1978).

California Division of Mines and Geology. Ritter Ridge Quadrangle-Special Studies Zones Map, scale 1:24,000 (Sacramento, California, 1979).

California Legislature. Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zones Act, as amended. California Public Resources Code, sees. 2621 et seq. (Sacramento, California, 1972).

** Davis, J.F., et al. Earthquake Planning Scenario for a Magnitude 8.3 Earthquake on the San Andreas Fault in Southern California. Special publication 60 (Sacramento, California: California Division of Mines and Geology, 1982).

Earthquake Engineering Research Institute. Learning from Earthquakes-Planning and Field Guides (El Cerrito, California: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 1977).

Evernden, J.F., Kohler, W.M., and Clow, G.D. Seismic Intensities of Earthquakes of Coterminous United States-Their Prediction and Interpretation. Professional Paper 1223 (Reston, Virginia: U.S. Geological Survey, 1981).

* Federal Emergency Management Agency. An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken-Prepared from analyses carried out by the National Security Council Ad Hoc Committee on Assessment of Consequences and Preparations for a Major California Earthquake (Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980).

* Griggs, G., and Savoy, L. (eds.) Living with the California Coast (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1985).

** Muehrcke, P.C. Map Use-Reading, Analysis, and Interpretation (Madison, Wisconsin: J.P. Publications, 1978).

* National Research Council. Multiple Hazard Mitigation. Report of a Workshop on Mitigation Strategies for Communities Prone to Multiple Natural Hazards (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983).

Office of the United Nations Relief Co-ordinator. Natural Disasters and Vulnerability Analysis. Report of Expert Group Meeting, 9-12 July 1979 (Geneva: UNDRO, 1980).

* Organization of American States, Department of Regional Development. Course on the Use of Natural Hazards Information in the Preparation of Investment Projects, vols. I and II (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1987).

** - Proyecto de Desarrollo Islas de la Bahía-Atlántida (Isatlán), República de Honduras (Washington, D.C.: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1986).

* - Integrated Regional Development Planning: Guidelines and Case Studies from OAS Experience (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1984a).

** - Saint Lucia Lifeline Network map, scale 1:50,000. Prepared with the collaboration of the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, Fisheries, Co-operatives and Labour, of the Government of Saint Lucia (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1984b).

** - Plan Hidráulico del Jubones, República del Ecuador, vols. I and III (Washington, D.C.: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1984c).

** - Mapa de Infraestructura/Equipamiento, escala 1:1,000,000. Proyecto de Asistencia Técnica al Departamento de Planeamiento Regional de SEPLACODI/República Oriental del Uruguay (Montevideo: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1981).

- Physical Resource Investigations for Economic Development: A Casebook of OAS Field Experience in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1969).

** Perkins, J.B. Identification of Possible Class I Site Areas, Solid Waste Management Plan. Technical Memorandum 7 (Berkeley, California: Association of Bay Area Governments, 1978).

** - The San Francisco Bay Area-On Shaky Ground. Final Project Report for California Waste Management Board (Oakland, California: Association of Bay Area Governments, 1987).

** Robinson, A.H., Sale, R.D., and Morrison, J.L. Elements of Cartography, 4th ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1978).

* Santa Barbara Country Planning Department. Seismic Safety and Safety Element (Santa Barbara, California, 1979).

Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. Geological Ordinance No. ns-1205.35. Santa Clara County Code, sees. C-12-600 et seq. (San Jose, California, 1978).

* Santa Clara County Planning Department. Seismic Safety Plan (San Jose, California, 1975).

* San Mateo-Burlingame Board of Realtors. Mid-Peninsula Cities Map, scale 1:33,333. Special Studies Zones and Flood Hazard Maps (San Jose, California: Barclay Maps, 1979).

Schiff, A.J. "Lifelines in an Urban Post-Earthquake Environment" in Hays, W.W., and Gori, P.L. (eds.), Proceedings of Conference XXVI-A Workshop on "Evaluation of Regional and Urban Earthquake Hazards and Risk in Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah." Open-File Report 84-763 (Reston, Virginia: U.S. Geological Survey, 1984): pp. 203-225.

Singer, A., Rojas, C., and Lugo, M. Inventario Nacional de Riesgos Geológicos, Estado Preliminar (Caracas: FUNVISIS, 1983).

** St. Helene, L. The Identification, Monitoring, and Mitigation of Hazardous Risks in Coastal Settlements of Saint Lucia-A Manual for Town, Village, and Regional Clerks (Castries: National Emergency Organization, and Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1987).

- Natural Resources Management for Development-Natural Hazards Risk Assessment of Coastal Settlements in Saint Lucia, West Indies. A Report Submitted to Project Chief, Natural Resource Management for Development Project, OAS Mission (Castries: 1986).

Taylor, C.E., Eguchi, R.T., and Wiggins, J.H. "Lifeline Earthquake Engineering-State-of-the-Art of Hazard Mitigation Analysis" in Proceedings of 3rd International Earthquake Microzonation Conference (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington, 1982), pp. 1599-1627.

** Thompson, M.M. Maps for America-Cartographic Products of the U.S. Geological Survey and Others, 2nd ed. (Reston, Virginia: U.S. Geological Survey, 1981).

University of California, Los Angeles. A Campus at Risk-Report of the UCLA Ad Hoc Joint Senate-Administration Earthquake Safety Committee (Los Angeles, California: University of California at Los Angeles, 1985).

U.S. Congress. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended. Public Law 93-383,88 Stat. 739, 42 U.S.C. 4104a (Washington, D.C., 1974).

U.S. Geological Survey. Scenarios of Possible Earthquakes Affecting Major California Population Centers, with Estimates of Intensity and Ground Shaking, Open-File Report 81-115 (Reston, Virginia: U.S. Geological Survey, 1981).

U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy. Earthquake Hazards Reduction: Issues for an Implementation Plan (Washington, D.C.: Office of Science and Technology Policy, 1978).

** Utria, B.E. Notes on the Application of Geographic Information Systems in Natural Hazards Risk Assessment and Development Planning at National and Metropolitan Levels (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1988).

* Key reference.
** Key reference specifically for critical facilities mapping.

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