RESUMO
DA SESSÃO DE 15 DE DEZEMBRO DE 1998
CONSELHO PERMANENTE DA
ORGANIZAÇÃO DOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS
COMISSÃO DE SEGURANÇA HEMISFÉRICA |
OEA/Ser.G
CP/CSH/SA.60/98
2 novembro 1999
Original: inglês |
Resumo da sessão realizada em 15 de dezembro de 1998
A Comissão de Segurança Hemisférica realizou uma sessão em 15 de
dezembro de 1998 a fim de considerar os seguintes temas: desarmamento e segurança; armas
portáteis; o Registro das Nações Unidas de Armas Convencionais; e o Relatório
Padronizado das Nações Unidas sobre Gastos Militares. Nesse contexto, foram feitas
apresentações pelo Subsecretário-Geral das Nações Unidas para o Desarmamento, Senhor
Jayantha Dhanapala; pelo Diretor do Centro das Nações Unidas para a Paz, Desarmamento e
Desenvolvimento, Senhor Pericles Gasparini Alves; e pelos Estados membros que
participaram, em 1997, no Grupo de Peritos sobre o Registro das Nações Unidas de Armas
Convencionais.
Em sua exposição, o Subsecretário-Geral Dhanapala abordou as
atividades das Nações Unidas no setor de desarmamento e segurança, a Conferência das
Nações Unidas sobre Desarmamento; armas portáteis e a cooperação ONU-OEA.1
O Senhor Gasparini Alves falou à Comissão sobre o Registro das
Nações Unidas de Armas Convencionais; o Relatório Padronizado das Nações Unidas sobre
Gastos Militares; e os objetivos e procedimentos operacionais do Centro e propôs que o
Centro da ONU, juntamente com o Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento e a OEA, bem como
outras instituições poderiam iniciar uma reflexão sobre o melhoramento desses
instrumentos para servirem ao fortalecimento da confiança.2
Peritos dos Estados membros sobre o Registro das Nações Unidas de
Armas Convencionais usaram da palavra na seguinte ordem: Senhor Juan Carlos Valle Raleigh,
Argentina3; Senhor Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto, Brasil4; Doutro Mark Gaillard, Chefe da Divisão de Não-Proliferação
e Desarmamento do Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Canadá.5; e o Embaixador Claude Heller, Representante Permanente do México
junto à OEA.6
ANEXO I
Presentaciones de representantes de las Naciones Unidas
en la reunión de la Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica, celebrada el 15 de diciembre de
1998
- Jayantha Dhanapala, Secretario General Adjunto para el Desarme.
- Pericles Gasparini Alves, Director del Centro de las Naciones Unidas para la Paz, el
Desarme y el Desarrollo
PRESENTATION BY
THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR DISARMAMENT
JAYANTHA DHANAPALA
Distinguished delegates:
On behalf of the Department of Disarmament Affairs, and of my
colleague, Pericles Alves Gasparini, I would like to thank you for the warmth of your
welcome and for your invitation to me to be present here before your committee in order to
brief you on the work of the Department of Disarmament Affairs, in general, but more in
particular on the subject of small arms and light weapons.
I believe it is extremely important that the United Nations has a
regular dialogue with regional organizations and with the Organization of American States,
in particular in this subject in order to advance our common cause of disarmament and arms
limitation.
As you know, the need for the UN to coordinate its activities with
regional organizations is very much a part of the UN Charter. Chapter VIII lays down very
clearly the ways in which we should be working together and the articles concerned,
particularly Article 52, are articles that we take very seriously in New York. And my
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has attached special importance to the relations between
the United Nations and regional organizations. Indeed, we have regular conferences between
the representatives of regional organizations and the UN, and I was, myself, privileged to
participate in the most recent meeting that was held a few months ago at New York.
We in the UN also attach a great deal of importance to the subject of
regional disarmament in order to ensure that global norms that are evolved in UN fora are
translated into practical action in the regions of the world. And it is in pursuance of
that that we have established in three regions of the world regional centers for peace and
disarmament: in Katmandu, we have a regional center for Asia and the Pacific; in Lomé,
Togo, we have the regional center for Africa; and in Lima, we have a Regional Center for
Peace and Disarmament for Latin America and for the Caribbean.
Now, the Centers in Lomé and Lima, unfortunately, have been not
functioning at optimum level for some years for a number of reasons. But the Member States
decided, in 1997, that these Centers should be reactivated. And in pursuance of that and
following my own appointment as Under-Secretary-General, I have made it an important
policy of my Department to reactivate these Centers. And I am proud therefore that my own
appearance before your Committee coincides with the appointment of the new Director of the
Regional Center for Latin America and the Caribbean in Lima -Mr. Gasparini has just begun
his functions on December 1, and it is therefore a happy coincidence that he should be
present here today with me and he will be making his own presentation after I provide you
with an overview of the activities of my Department.
Let me begin by stating very clearly and up-front that the
re-establishment of the Department of Disarmament Affairs was an important component in
the reforms that my Secretary-General made last year in his document of July 1997, which
was adopted by the UN General Assembly last year. This proposal to re-establish the
Department of Disarmament Affairs after a lapse of about six years, was the result of a
conviction on the part of the Secretary-General that disarmament in the post-Cold War
period remained a very vital area of international activity. It also was an area of
activity where the UN had a very central role to play, and it is out of this conviction
therefore that the Department was re-established.
Now, in reestablishing the Department we were given a number of
mandates to ensure that the Member States were able to, not only evolve new norms in the
field of disarmament, but also have an organization committed to the implementation of
existing norms in order to ensure that these norms were very widely adhered to in the
international community.
In undertaking my tasks at the beginning of February, I decided it was
necessary for us to ensure an organizational structure that would help to serve the
international community better in the field of disarmament. And so, I decided that we
would have a five-branch structure with a branch in Geneva servicing the needs of the
Conference on Disarmament, which, as you know, is the sole multilateral negotiating body
which negotiates treaties and agreements in the area of disarmament. And the branch there,
which services the Conference on Disarmament both substantively as well as logistically,
is also responsible for all activities in Europe with regard to disarmament matters.
In headquarters, in New York, we head four branches: a Weapons of Mass
Destruction branch, which, as it says, deals with weapons issues nuclear chemicals
and biological as well as the missile question. It services the existing treaties like the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the nuclear field; the treaty with regard to
biological weapons and liaises with the established organizations such as the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention
as well as the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna, which is there to set in
motion the process that will have the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization in place
when the CTBT is ratified by the 44 countries that are expected to ratify it under Article
14.
We also have then a Conventional Arms branch, and that branch, as the
name implies, deals with the entire range of conventional weapons including particularly
the subject of small arms, on which I will give you a more detailed presentation shortly.
Conventional arms, as you know, are the arms that have been used in armed conflicts since
World War II and have caused over 20 million deaths. We, therefore, have to address the
issue of conventional arms. I have found from the inception of my own work in the UN that
this issue of small arms assumed very important proportions and Im particularly glad
that the OAS and your Committee, in particular, has been of such great assistance in
trying to formulate norms in this particular area.
Third, we have the branch in headquarters dealing with Regional
Disarmament. Again, the fact that I have a special branch for the coordination of a
regional disarmament and the three Centers is an example of the importance that we are
attaching to the subject of regional disarmament in various parts of the globe.
And finally, we have a Monitoring Database and Information branch which
maintains outreach activities with nongovernmental organizations, with the research
institutes devoted to the subject of disarmament and security, as well as maintaining
databases, which will be available to the general public as well as to the specialized
scholars in this particular field. We also, through the Monitoring Database and
Information branch, maintain liaison with the UN Institute of Disarmament Research, which
is an autonomous institution in Geneva devoted to conducting research in the areas of
disarmament and security; an organization which I was privileged to head for five years in
the 1980s and early 90s when my colleague was also working there.
We also maintain an Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters where we have
20 eminent persons in the field of disarmament providing the Secretary-General with expert
advice on the work of the United Nations in this field. And here, Im happy to state,
that we have representatives from your region also on this board.
Let me now say that the work of the Department is, in the first
instance, to provide advice and support, of course, to the Secretary-General in
discharging his own responsibilities and in accordance with the relevant Charter
provisions as well as the mandates given to us by the General Assembly and the Security
Council. We monitor and analyze developments and trends in the field of disarmament; we
prepare necessary reports and background papers to various intergovernmental bodies and
we, generally, ensure that we also try to expand the frontiers of disarmament by providing
new information and new ideas in order that the Member States could feel that the UN is
providing a leadership role in this area.
Second, we also help the Secretary-General with regard to the
multilateral disarmament agreements in order to monitor compliance with these agreements
and to ensure that the review process of some of these treaties are undertaken, and so,
for example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Process is very much a
responsibility of my Department. We conduct the Preparatory Committees meetings and
the review conferences that are held once every five years. And we report on the effective
implementation of these agreements.
Third, we, as I said before, help Member States in multilateral
disarmament negotiations and deliberations in order to try to evolve new disarmament norms
and agreements. And here, we provide the background support for the First Committee in the
UN General Assembly, we provide support in the UN Disarmament Commission and other
subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly and, of course, in the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva where there are many subsidiary bodies and expert groups which require expert
support and background work on the part of our department.
Fourth, we try to provide Member States and the international community
with objective information on disarmament and international security matters, through our
program of information and outreach activities. We organize conferences, seminars, and
workshops, and also try to stimulate exchanges of views on arms control disarmament and
international security.
Finally, we try to promote openness and transparency in military
matters, in verification, in confidence-building measures, and in regional approaches to
disarmament. Now, it is in this context that we have the Convention on Arms Register and
the Standardized Instrument in order to try to have a military expenditure reported by all
Member States. And my colleague, Mr. Gasparini Alves, will give you a detailed report on
how the Convention on Arms Register and the Standardized Instrument for the reporting of
military expenditure functions.
With that brief overview of what we do in the Department, let me move
on to the subject of small arms. The issue of small arms, of course, has acquired
considerable importance in the last few years, we estimate that there are something like
500 million pieces of small arms in circulation throughout the world today.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the end of the Cold
War, we also estimate that there have been about four million deaths caused by small arms
in armed conflicts, and of these four million deaths, 90 percent are civilians, 80 percent
are women and children. And so the impact of the use of small arms in armed conflict has
been much more on civil society rather than on the armies of the world.
We know that the use of small arms is very difficult to control because
they are also used for legitimate national defense purposes by law enforcement agencies
and by armies in various countries. But what has happened is that there has been an
explosion in the proliferation of small arms and in their accumulation. And although we
accept that arms by themselves do not cause conflicts, they certainly exacerbate conflicts
and cause enormous death and destruction in countries throughout the world.
And so it is a priority today for the United Nations to work on this
subject. And our own experience of working on this subject began with resolutions which
set in place a panel of government experts who reported at the end of last year on exactly
what the problem was and what their recommendations were to combat this problem. This
panel of experts, Chaired by Japan, came up with a series of recommendations and a
follow-up panel has been appointed, which continues to function until the end of next year
when they will submit a further report on the implementation of these recommendations.
We derive our mandate, of course, from the General Assembly resolutions
and this year, you will be interested to know and I have arranged for these resolutions to
be circulated to you because they were only adopted in the General Assembly at the
beginning of this month after the First Committee had already approved it. We adopted four
resolutions on the subject of small arms: One was on Assistance to States for curbing the
illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. There was a general resolution, second,
on small arms; a third resolution on Illicit Traffic in Small Arms; and finally, a
resolution on the Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures.
These four General Assembly resolutionsNo. 53/77B, 53/77E,
53/77T, and 53/77Vare the mandates which gives my department additional
responsibilities in the area of small arms. And I will, of course, be requiring the
assistance of regional organizations such as the OAS in the implementation of these
responsibilities.
Also in your batch of resolutions that were distributed to you is a
resolution on the Security Council, which adopted its first ever resolution on illicit
arms traffic. This was a consequence of a report submitted in April of this year by the
Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, on the causes of conflict in Africa. And this report
included many paragraphs on the subject of the circulation of small arms and the Security
Council decided that it would try to act out this issue and it had a resolution on illicit
arms traffic, Resolution 1209, on Illicit Arms Flows to and in Africa and a new resolution
on Arms Embargoes, Resolution 1196, on Strengthening the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes.
As a result of these resolutions, the Secretariat has been given a
mandate by the General Assembly to hold consultations with all Member States interested,
regional and subregional organizations, international agencies, and experts, in the field
of three areas. First, the magnitude and scope of the phenomenon of illicit trafficking in
small arms; second, possible measures to combat illicit trafficking in and the illicit
circulation of small arms including those suited to indigenous regional approaches; and
third, the role of the UN in collecting, collating, and sharing and disseminating
information on illicit trafficking in small arms.
Together with these established mandates that we have received from the
General Assembly and the Security Council, we also receive. from time to time, requests
from individual Member States to undertake weapons collection programs in their countries.
And at the beginning of this year, the President and Prime Minister of Albania requested
the Secretary-General to undertake such a program in Albania, which last year was the
scene of a great deal of internal unrest when the people of Albania took away from
government depots an estimated 650,000 small arms. And these small arms remained in the
unauthorized possession of the people of Albania constituting a very great threat to a
country that is in the process of establishing democratic institutions after the Cold War.
Therefore, it was my task, in June of this year, to lead an evaluation
mission together with representatives of the Department of Political Affairs, my own
Department of Disarmament Affairs, and the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations in order
to try to draw up a proposal for weapons collection. In doing so, we visited Tirana; we
undertook consultations with all aspects of Albanian society, governmental
representatives, opposition parties, nongovernmental organizations, students, and all
other interested organizations.
We visited districts where the problem was particularly acute and we
came up with a program where we suggested that weapons collection should best be linked to
development projects which would be of a value to the community. And so as an incentive to
the surrender of weapons, we suggested that there should be community development projects
and this proposal was welcomed by the people at the grassroot.
And we have begun a pilot project in a central part of Albania called
Gramsh where we have the UNDP assisting us with this idea of having community development
projects as a means of providing an incentive to the people to surrender their weapons in
order to ensure that there would no longer be this danger of having an over-weaponized
society in Albania. And in the process, the Government itself has undertaken to destroy
many of these weapons that are being collected as a visible proof of the need to
strengthen the peaceful resolution of disputes within Albania.
Now in doing so, we will draw from the lessons of other areas. I would
like to emphasize that your experience here, in the OAS, and the experience in Latin
America are experiences that we are learning from because we would like to see a
cross-fertilization of ideas throughout the global community. We would like to see what
has worked well in one region translated into action in other regions as well with, of
course, adaptation taking into consideration specialized local conditions.
Let me also now mention that because of the increasing importance of
small arms I found it necessary in addressing this issue to recommend to the
Secretary-General that we should have a focal point within the United Nations to address
the issue of small arms. And following a paper presented by me at the Senior Management
Group, which functions as a cabinet in the UN headquarters presided over by the
Secretary-General, we hadthe Secretary-Generalidentified the Department of
Disarmament Affairs as a focal point for small arms.
And we created a mechanism which we call "Coordinating Action on
Small Arms (CASA)" an acronym whereby we wanted to address the small arms issue in
all its dimensionsthe security dimension, the humanitarian dimension, the
development dimension, and all other dimensions including the human rights. And so in the
CASA mechanism, which meets regularly, we have representatives from all the departments in
the UN who are concerned about the subject of small arms. We have all the specialized
agencies as well represented, for example, UNICEF, UNDP, and others also present and, in
this way, we try to evolve a coordinated response on the part of the UN system to the
problem of small arms.
And we have a number of projects that we are evolving as a result of
this coordination that is working so smoothly. One is, for example, a documentary film on
the subject of small arms. Another is an exhibit on the question of how small arms impact
on children and here UNICEF is working very closely with my department in order to come up
with this exhibit which will be funded by a contribution from Andorra, one of the smallest
Member States in the UN. But this is an example of how we are trying to bring in the
Member States, bring in all the different aspects of the UN system in order to provide
precisely a coherent, a cohesive response to the problem of small arms. And my presence
here is another indication about the importance that we are attaching to working with
regional organizations also to address this issue.
Let me also tell you, in this context, what we have done with regard to
the subject of practical disarmament measures which is a series of disarmament measures
where we take disarmament to the grassroots, particularly in post-conflict situations in
various countries. Where the problem of weapons collection from former combatants or
defeated armies represents a very serious threat which could result in the recrudescence
of violence in those countries. And so it is vital as part and parcel of any conflict
resolution or peace agreement that is finalized in these countries that we should have a
weapons collection component built into that agreement.
And we have analyzed the situations that have occurred throughout the
world and tried to formulate something which will be going into a manual that we are
preparing in my department on the subject of weapons collection. But in addition to
weapons collection, we need to also integrate the combatants and the looser armies into
civil society: Give them new skills, train them in order to be useful and productive
members of society abandoning the life of wielding weapons which they have bled hitherto.
And for these practical disarmament measures, I would like to say that
there is a group of interested states which has been formed at the beginning of this year.
And I attended its fifth meeting yesterday, which has resulted in a great deal of money
being generated to finance programs. One of the programs that we had was a workshop in
Guatemala from November 18 to 20, which was entitled, "Weapons Collection and
Integration of Former Combatants into Civil Society." And we looked in this workshop
at the experiences of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Colombia.
We are in the process of preparing an information paper on the findings
of this workshop, which we will send to your committee as soon as it is ready.
Id like to also say that we, in the evolution of norms with
regard to the subject of small arms, have derived great encouragement from the
Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. Im particularly
impressed by the fact that, under Article 8 of this convention, there is provision for an
exchange of information whereby state parties shall exchange amongst themselves in
conformity with their respective domestic laws and applicable treaties, relevant
information on matters such as the producers, dealers, importers, and exporters of
firearms; the means of concealment used in the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in
firearms; and third, in the legislative experiences, practices and measures to prevent,
combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms.
Now it is precisely in the context of this exchange of information that
I would like to draw your attention to paragraph 9 of the Security Councils
Resolution 1209, where the Secretary-General was asked to explore means of identifying
international arms dealers acting in contravention of national legislation or embargoes
established by the UN on arms transfers to Africa. This is a welcomed development.
Therefore we are learning from your experience and, I think, the greater scope there is
for coordination between what you do in terms of Article 8 of your convention and the
sharing of information with us will help us to advance this issue on a global scale.
Id also like to take this opportunity of welcoming the signing in
July of this year by Member States of MERCOSUR together with Bolivia and Chile of the
Joint Mechanism for the Registration of Recipients and Suppliers of Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives, and Other Related Materials. I note that the Register provides minimal
necessary information such as the name of the individuals or enterprises authorized to
trade in arms as well as those ports which are authorized to host trade operations in
firearms, explosives, ammunition, and other related materials.
Let me conclude by mentioning two instruments that are implemented by
my department in the field of conventional weapons. The first is the Conventional Arms
Register that has been in existence since 1992. Today, we have over 90 governments
voluntarily providing us with information on imports, exports, and national production
with regard to seven categories of conventional weapons. I will let my colleague give you
a more detailed exposition of how the Convention operates.
But I would like to emphasize the fact that this is undertaken on the
principle of voluntary submission of information. We would like to see the number of
countries greatly expanded. As you know, we have 185 Member States, but only 90 countries,
in fact, provide us with information.
Second, the scope of the Register is confined to seven categories and
this is because this has been done through consensus. We have still not been able to
expand beyond these seven categories into, for example, the area of small arms. But we
need to, I think, gradually expand both the number of countries participating in the
Conventional Arms Register as well as the categories of weapons in which we need to have
statistical data.
My further point is that it is extremely important for the Department
of Disarmament Affairs to work closely with regional organizations in order to encourage
wider participation in the Conventional Arms Register because this is a vital tool in
trying to promote transparency and confidence-building in regions. If you are confident
about the arsenals of your neighbor you are more likely to have a stable relationship with
that neighbor. And it is in this spirit that I appeal to the OAS and, particularly, to the
Committee on Hemispheric Security to work closely with us so that the Conventional Arms
Register will become an important item in building regional confidence measures as well as
in building stability.
The other element of our work in this particular field is on the
question of the standardized instrument for reporting of military expenditure. And here
again the participation by Member States in the UN in this voluntary submission of the
military expenditure has been very, very disappointing. We need to have more countries
participating in it and most of the countries that have volunteered information happen to
come from Europe. But we do need to have more countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, in Africa and in Asia and the Pacific participating in this standardized
instrument which we have evolved as a result of working with experts in the World Bank, in
the IMF, and in other regional organizations in order to try to be as scientific in our
designing of the instrument that we would like countries to use in submitting this
information.
And so let me conclude, distinguished delegates, by saying that we have
a number of areas in which the Organization of American States and the Department of
Disarmament Affairs can work in common in the cause of evolving a concept of cooperative
security/common security at the lowest level of arms. And I think this is what we need to
do to ensure that the use of arms to resolve disputes is put away so that we could
emphasize peaceful resolution of disputes and also that we could divert resources that are
being utilized at the moment for arms expenditure into more productive social and economic
uses.
I would like to conclude now by thanking you once again for your
invitation to address you and to express the hope that this is only the beginning of a
close dialogue between my department and your committee in order to link the UN and the
OAS closer together in the field of disarmament. Thank you very much.
PRESENTATION BY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE UN CENTER FOR PEACE, DISARMAMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT, PERICLES GASPARINI ALVES
Muchas gracias, señor Presidente. Para mí es un placer y un honor
estar acá junto con el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarme que
demuestra la determinación de las Naciones Unidas para trabajar con las organizaciones
regionales, principalmente en un marco histórico del desarrollo de un departamento con la
reactivación del Centro Nacional de Naciones Unidas para Paz, Desarme y Desarrollo en
Latino América y el Caribe, donde empecé como Director el primer de diciembre.
La semana pasada estuve participando en las Naciones Unidas en una
reunión con la Organización de los Estados Americanos y CARICOM donde se están
desarrollando un acuerdo de cooperación concreta en un tema muy específico
"prevención de conflictos". Esto se hace a través del Departamento de Asuntos
Políticos, o sea, ya no se pregunta más si tenemos que trabajar juntos pero sí ¿qué
vamos hacer juntos? Y hoy con la presencia del Departamento de Desarme, creo que también
tenemos esta oportunidad de se preguntar ¿en que temas vamos a trabajar juntos? Los dos
temas, donde voy hablar ahora y habló el señor Subsecretario son posibilidades muy
concretas.
Voy a hacer una presentación muy corta, simplemente para dar algunas
informaciones y algunos detalles sobre lo que pasa en los dos instrumentos que pueden ser
útiles a ustedes en preparar los seguimientos de la resolución 1566 y 1570.
We will be looking at the two instruments that we use for reporting.
Mr. Dhanapala has spoken about the Departments activities, the Conference on
Disarmament and Small Arms, the Registration of Conventional Arms, and the standardized
report will be done by me. Let me just start by showing some of the objectives, the
coordination, the CASA Agreement that was discussed by Mr. Dhanapala and the next one will
be mine.
The Conventional Arms Register functions in a voluntary contribution
approach and actually the operating article is this one here which holds the seven
categories of weapons considered to be heavy weapons. The states are called on to give
information on these elements including combat vehicles, large caliber artillery shells
systems, attach helicopters, warships are really heavy weapons stuff equipment.
States are also invited to produce information on military holdings,
procurements through national production and relevant policies, which actually give a
greater picture of the military potential of the different countries and, therefore,
enhances the capability of the Conventional Arms Register for being an instrument for
confidence-and security-building and transparency.
States are all encouraged to produce additional information which
includes national arms imports policies, legislation, and procedures on authorization and
prevention of illicit transfers. Actually these two elements here are additional
information which help build that environment for analyzing the military potential of a
particular country.
Let us look at the data at what happens, in terms of the existence of
the Conventional Arms Register in the last six years of existence 1992-1997 (as you know
the calendar year for the 1998 year will finish only on March 31 next year).
Let me just call your attention to the exports because the Conventional
Arms Register covers both exports and imports. If you look at the exports -the no answers,
the yes answers, and the blank- there was an evolution in what we have received throughout
these six years: a relatively stable number of reports; an increase in the new reports -it
should be noted that a new report is also considered to be an important contribution to
the Register because it indicates that the country does not have or has not exported any
particular element of the seven categories; a sharp decrease in the years in the number of
blanks -that is also important because it shows that whenever a country is reporting an
export it believes that it is important to give the information yes or no and not
necessarily just leave it in blank.
If you look at the data also related to imports, here too we have a
relatively stable number of reports throughout the years; an increase again in the number
of "nils", which again reinforces the theory that states believe that whenever
they give information they should give complete information, also evidenced by the
decrease in the number of blank reports.
Lets look at now another important data which would be the
percentage of reports by region, and focus on the region of Latin America and the
Caribbean, which is of our particular interest. If you look at the five regional areas
here you will see that -this is by percentage- in 1992, 100 percent of the countries in
Western Europe and other states, which include the United States and Canada, have reported
to the Register, and it is rather consistent throughout the years; it went down for maybe
one or two countries that have not reported here one or two years, but it is a consistent
line. So what comes out of this experience is that throughout the six years Western Europe
and other states have been very consistent. There is a decrease in the number of reports
from Latin America and the Caribbean Group though: about 39 percent at the end of the
exercise, from 51 to 39 percent. It actually puts Latin America and the Caribbean as
fourth in the group of countries.
Lets look at the same data from another angle to better
understand the implications here: the number of countries the countries report by
region. Here, too, we have Western Europe and other states as being the most predominant:
24 states out of 27 have reported here and you go all the way to the 100 percent, which is
27. A decrease in the number of reports from Latin America and the Caribbean group: 13 out
of 33 countries report to this Register, which puts it as fourth out of five groups of
states. So its not the last one, but its certainly less than half of the
number of states.
Let me go a little bit further here and look at the reasons why -some
of the reasons being discussed.
Definition of common terms: there is a feeling that the Register does
not have the same meaning for every potential contributor .
Common standards: the standards within different countries are not the
same; not necessarily only within the same region. So we may talk about the neighboring
countries which look at the standards of the Register from a different angle.
Legal and administrative difficulties: sometimes some countries have
difficulties in reporting a particular item according to their constitution or according
to their practice of unarmed forces. Sometimes the three or four different branches of the
armed forces do not have the same procedure. And also there is a feeling that there should
be among some countries an increase in the scope of the Register including other items.
Some speak about small arms that should be included or the weapons of mass destruction per
se. So there is a host of different issues which for some countries are not yet resolved.
So if you ask me after the ongoing discussions how to improve the
Register, particularly from the standpoint of Latin America and the Caribbean? Well,
first, we believe that the causes of nonparticipation should be looked at and in these
areas of the causes there are what we had mentioned in the previous lines. Also a call for
61 percent of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to resume participation in
the Register.
It is also important to continue the effort of explanation that
"nil reports" equal support for the Register. It is difficult at times for
countries to have the same person in charge of the Register -the same focal point. Only
two countries in Latin America have designated focal points for the Register.
So the question which may follow is how much is the Register talked
about, how much is known of the Register, the importance of the Register in different
countries?
This takes me into another area which could be discussed which is the
increase in advocacy. The increase in advocacy, actually, could be seen from two different
points of view. The first one is precisely gathering more people who actually work in the
area of military procurement, military thinking, doctrine, and diplomatic political
issues. Putting them together and continuing some sort of information of the Register,
what the Register is all about and how it should be reported. This is what I would call a
more "mechanical" solution to the problem.
There is a more fundamental issue which is what is the value of the
Register. It seems that countries would not necessarily find any interest in the Register
if they think that the Register is there only to collect information. And therefore the
more fundamental question is what is the role of the Register? One of the roles and
perhaps the most important one of the Register is to create an environment of transparency
and therefore, confidence-building among different states.
Now this is a very delicate issue. As we saw from the evolution of the
Register and the information that was given to the Register in the case of the Western
European countries. Thats why I also highlighted that particular group of countries:
it seems that these countries have started giving that information after the
confidence-building process in Europe was very advanced. Therefore, the Register for the
standardized information on military expenditures is used as a tool for
confidence-building. It is not the confidence-building in itself but part of a process of
confidence-building. It is perhaps time to look at the Register from the regional
standpoint as part and parcel of a confidence-building tool.
If you look at the standardized reporting of military expenditures, the
objective of these reports was, as per the resolution, the reduction of military
expenditures, the transfer of 10 percent of savings to development programs, promotion of
transparency, and confidence-building. Here, too, there is a willingness to use this
instrument as a confidence-building tool. Well in order to use it as a confidence-building
tool one needs to analyze it and see in what ways it could be used as a
confidence-building tool. It serves no purpose for us to have it written in a resolution
in the body of the agreement if its not conceived by the Member States as such.
So if you look at the reporting record since 1981 to 1997 you will see
three different trends at least: one is the very low reporting levels. You can see 20
countries per year. In the first group, Western Europeans and other states: you can see a
sort of a stable reporting level, actually picking up a little bit more after the end of
the Cold War, which also confirms that within the OSCEs framework there was a lot of
involvement of information exchange on military expenditures, and therefore, that the
Europeans looked at the global reporting system as an additional report: it is something
which is part of a whole process.
When you look at Latin America and the Caribbean, again, you see very
low levels; no more than five countries. At least I believe one year, only six countries,
but no more than four or five countries at a time, have reported to this instrument
throughout the existence of the agreement which is 20 years old.
So there is a perception, expressed in the lack of reporting, that this
instrument is not used as a confidence-building tool, its not used as a transparency
tool, as was intended, and certainly not as an instrument which would permit the diversion
of military fundssaved in the diminishing purchase of weaponsinto the program
for development.
If you look at the reasons, its basically what you see in the
Arms Register: problems of definition of common terms, common standards. It is
understandably very difficult: some countries develop certain weapon systems or maintain
certain troops under budgets which are not necessarily budgets for military expenditures.
Maybe the Ministry of Education has part of the military school under its budget. So there
are a number of points which are not common especially when you talk about worldwide
spectrums. Legal and administrative difficulties may also apply to this type of
instrument. And a perception that there has to be an increase in the scope of the
reporting instrument, which also is derived from this understanding of the fact that
different countries may have different elements for designing their budgets -procurement.
Let us look at how to improve reporting instruments. Here I would say
we could address the causes of nonparticipation, again, in the Conventional Arms Register
and in the Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures. We will find similar problems
and similar proposals to address them. A call for the countries to participate,
particularly Latin America, which does not have the greatest participation, and as we saw
in the case of Europe, that maybe there is a need to undertake cross-regional comparisons,
understand how the process went through in the European context -an increased advocacy.
Perhaps here I could make a call for your reflection as you think on
how to proceed, how the United Nations Regional Center could, eventually, with the OAS,
the Inter-American Defense Board, or other organizations, embark on a deeper reflection of
information on how the two instruments could be improved. Also, and perhaps most
importantly, how these two instruments could fit hemispheric security better.
I will end with that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
ANEXO II
Presentaciones de los representantes de los Estados Miembros que
participaron en el Grupo de Expertos en el Registro de Armas Convencionales de las
Naciones Unidas de 1997,
formuladas en la reunión de la Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica,
celebrada el 15 de diciembre de 1998
- Argentina: Juan Valle Raleigh, Consejero, Representante Alterno de Argentina ante la
Organización de los Estados Americanos.
- Brasil: Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto.
- Canadá: Dr. Mark Gaillard, Jefe de la División sobre la No-proliferación y Desarme
del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Canadá.
- México: Embajador Claude Heller, Representante Permanente de México ante la
Organización de los Estados Americanos.
Intervención de la Delegación Argentina en la reunión de expertos de
los Estados Miembros que participaron en el grupo de expertos gubernamentales sobre el
Registro de Armas Convencionales de Naciones Unidas, de conformidad con el párrafo
resolutivo 6 de la resolución AG/RES. 1566 (XXVIII-0/98).
Organización de Estados Americanos, 15 de diciembre de 1998
Señor Presidente,
La Delegación Argentina quiere expresar su agradecimiento al señor
Subsecretario para Asuntos de Desarme de Naciones Unidas, Sr. Dhanapala, por la valiosa
información brindada a esta Comisión en relación con las actividades que se encuentra
desarrollando la oficina a su cargo, y en el mismo sentido agradecer al Sr. Pericles
Gasparini por sus comentarios sobre el funcionamiento del Registro de Armas Convencionales
de Naciones Unidas y del Instrumento para la Presentación Internacional Estandarizada de
Informes sobre Gastos Militares.
Argentina también quiere expresar sus felicitaciones al Dr. Gasparini
por su reciente nombramiento al frente de la Oficina Regional para la Paz y el Desarme de
las Naciones Unidas, con sede en Lima, y desearle éxitos en sus funciones.
Introducción
El registro Armas Convencionales de Naciones Unidas es un ejercicio que
al momento de su lanzamiento, en 1991 fue realmente novedoso. Debe recordarse al respecto
que durante muchos años diversas iniciativas sobre este tema fracasaron, en gran medida
debido al hecho incontestable que se trata del tipo de sistemas efectivamente utilizados
en conflictos armados.
Superando no pocos obstáculos el registro se estableció sobre una
base universal y no discriminatoria. Se escogieron para su funcionamiento siete
categorías, que si bien recogían el ejemplo adoptado para el Acuerdo sobre Fuerzas
Convencionales en Europa, son las que concretamente revisten una especial significación
desde el punto de vista militar para operaciones de tipo ofensivo en cualquier lugar del
mundo.
Desde su entrada en vigor el Registro ha funcionado de manera
remarcable. Mas del 90 por ciento de las transacciones dentro de las siete categorías son
captadas por el mismo, y en este sentido, las voces que prematuramente anunciaron la
irrelevancia o las dificultades del sistema se han visto desmentidas. Debe destacarse que
los sucesivos informes del Secretario General de Naciones Unidas prueban que
estadísticamente el Registro ha alcanzado una velocidad de crucero que nos permite
afirmar que ya forma parte del paisaje de medidas y acuerdos tendientes a dotar de la tan
necesaria transparencia a las transferencias de armas.
Sin embargo existen áreas en las que el Registro de Armas
Convencionales de Naciones Unidas podría aun ofrecer más. Como ustedes saben, la
resolución 46/36 f estableció una secuencia concreta según la cual el mismo debe
ampliarse a fin de incorporar las existencias militares y las adquisiciones de material de
producción nacional en un pie de igualdad con las transferencias. Esta ampliación, bueno
es recordarlo, surgió en respuesta a un legitimo reclamo de los países en desarrollo,
quienes deseaban asegurar el carácter no discriminatorio del Registro, el que de
limitarse de modo indefinido a las transferencias focalizaría la transparencia en
aquellos países que adquieren en el mercado internacional sus armas, dejando de lado a
los grandes productores que poseen industrias domesticas y que por la misma razón
adquieren gran parte de sus arsenales dentro de sus fronteras.
Esa iniciativa, sin embargo, ha probado ser más difícil de llevar a
la practica que lo que podía preverse inicialmente. A pesar de tratarse de una idea
inspirada en ese marco, surgieron dificultades de orden político, ajenas a la naturaleza
y a los alcances mismos del Registro de Armas convencionales que por el momento no han
hecho posible su concreción. Ellas se refieren a problemáticas como la de las armas de
destrucción masiva, cuya importancia nadie puede poner en duda, pero que se sitúan mas
allá de los alcances actuales del Registro.
Desarrollos recientes
Mas allá de estos debates, la evaluación efectuada en 1997 fue de
gran utilidad, en la medida en que permitió constatar la validez del sistema y el
compromiso de la mayoría de la comunidad internacional con el Registro y aun con la idea
y el principio de su ampliación. Esto debe ser prolijamente apuntado de cara a la futura
revisión del Registro.
Con relación a las existencias y adquisiciones, el ejercicio de 1997
permitió anexar a los informes nacionales los datos que sobre una base voluntaria muchos
países ya aportaban. En este sentido es alentador constatar que el ultimo informe del
Secretario General evidencia que los estados han hecho uso de esta facultad, lo que parece
prefigurar una evolución favorable hacia la ampliación del registro.
Un aspecto importante al que los expertos dedicaron considerables
esfuerzos fue el de la operación practica del Registro. En este sentido se analizaron, o
volvieron a analizar según el caso, la panoplia de temas y cuestiones que conforman el
cuerpo del Registro. Se reconfirmó la descripción de las transferencias como una forma
practica de ingresarlas, sin recurrir a una definición común, que por la propia
complejidad y diversidad de las legislaciones nacionales hubiese resultado un objetivo
inalcanzable. Se acordaron algunos aspectos prácticos como la designación de puntos de
contacto en cada país, los que servirán para aclarar dudas y eliminar discrepancias
entre los informes nacionales de países que hubiesen realizado una transacción.
Con relación a las definiciones de los sistemas se estudiaron posibles
modificaciones, referidas por ejemplo a los Sistemas de Artillería de Gran Calibre. En
este acápite se considero seriamente la posibilidad de reducir de 100 a 75 mm el calibre
a fin de captar algunos sistemas (morteros) vastamente utilizados en conflictos regionales
y que escapan al Registro tal y como existe actualmente. Los debates sobre esta y otras
modificaciones (tonelaje de naves de guerra) fueron inconclusos debido a una serie de
factores entre los que debe apuntarse el hecho que al momento de las sesiones del grupo de
expertos, otro grupo, encargado del análisis de las armas pequeñas estaba abocado al
análisis de propuestas que podían en cierto sentido encabalgarse a las del Registro.
Algunos expertos prefirieron aguardar los resultados de esas deliberaciones antes de
decidir una eventual ampliación que -temían- pudiese resultar en mecanismos redundantes.
Perspectivas
Hoy, la comunidad internacional cuenta con las conclusiones de aquel
grupo sobre armas pequeñas y existe en la actualidad otra instancia de seguimiento cuyos
resultados esperamos con sumo interés.
En todo caso queda claro que entre el ámbito de las armas que capta el
Registro y el ámbito de las armas pequeñas existe una brecha que se conoce con mayor
claridad. Hoy por hoy, el Registro sigue siendo el único instrumento universal de
intercambio de información oficial entre estados sobre sus importaciones y exportaciones
de armas. Ello debería comprometernos aún más para avanzar de modo mas decidido cuando
en las Naciones Unidas se encare una nueva revisión del Registro. Los expertos de África
y Asia reiteraron de modo muy enfático la importancia que para sus regiones tendrían
algunos retoques técnicos de las actuales categorías. En ausencia de esquemas análogos
para otros sistemas y tipos de armas el Registro reviste aun más relevancia que en el
pasado. Queda entonces esta asignatura pendiente para la próxima revisión.
Como se puede ver, el Registro de las Naciones Unidas ha dado mucho
pero mucho mas puede esperarse de él. Entendemos que las iniciativas que se han adoptado
en el marco interamericano indican un camino y evidencian la voluntad de transparencia que
impera entre los estados miembros de la OEA.
Los criterios comunes que puedan desarrollarse para el tratamiento de
las armas pequeñas; instrumentos como la Convención contra la Fabricación y el Tráfico
Ilícito de Armas de Fuego, Municiones, Explosivos y otros Materiales Relacionados; la
adopción de un acuerdo sobre transparencia para la adquisición de armas convencionales y
la adopción de códigos de conducta a nivel regional; son todas líneas de convergencia
que encuentran en el Registro de Armas Convencionales de las Naciones Unidas el único
sistema universal en vigor. El Registro de la ONU puede y debe ser el punto de encuentro e
interfase entre lo global y lo regional, en un terreno en el que indiscutiblemente los
esfuerzos deben coordinarse y converger para ser útiles a la seguridad de todos.
En el ámbito de la Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica de la OEA,
nuestra Delegación considera impostergable subrayar cuan útil resulto el apoyo de los
expertos de la región a la labor de la Presidencia argentina del grupo. En todo momento
los expertos de las Américas se mostraron a la vanguardia de los esfuerzos para
fortalecer el Registro, lo que contribuyó a consolidar la imagen de un Hemisferio
legítimamente preocupado por la seguridad internacional.
PALABRAS DEL REPRESENTANTE DEL BRASIL
JUNTO A LAS NACIONES UNIDAS
El REPRESENTANTE DEL BRASIL (Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto): Muito
obrigado, Senhor Presidente. Gostaria de, por seu intermédio, agradecer a exposição do
Secretário-Geral Dhanapala e do Doutor Pericles Gasparini.
Confesso, nesse momento, que é a primeira vez que compareço a
Organização dos Estados Americanos e não estou muito acostumado a falar em português
em reuniões multilaterais, de modo que peço desculpas pela possível falta de ordem com
que eu fale aqui, principalmente aos meus colegas da Missão junto à OEA. Estou, no
momento, lotado na Missão do Brasil junto às Nações Unidas e lá o português não é
uma língua oficial.
Inicialmente gostaria de fazer alguns comentários à questão do
Registro de Armas Convencionais. O Brasil dá uma grande importância ao Registro de Armas
Convencionais e a expressão que o Doutor Pericles Gasparini utilizou na sua excelente
exposição, pergunta que nós fazemos, qual é o objetivo e a utilidade do Registro.
Muitas vezes nós nos perguntamos em debates internos no Brasil com os representantes das
Forças Armadas e, até o momento presente, o Brasil é um país que não tem um
Ministério da Defesa, então nós temos debates, de certa maneira, multilaterais no nosso
país. O Ministério da Defesa está sendo criado neste momento. Há uma mensagem do
Presidente da República ao Congresso para certas modificações na Constituição. E
alguns oficiais me perguntavam no início da nossa preparação para enviar as primeiras
informações do Brasil à Registro: qual é a diferença entre este Registro e o Military
Balance do Instituto Internacional de Estudos Estratégicos de Londres que, de certa
maneira, é o padrão de registro de armas convencionais utilizado pela maior parte das
forças armadas no mundo. O Military Balance não é um documento oficial, e essa
era exatamente a resposta que nós, diplomatas discutindo com os nossos colegas militares,
dávamos para incentivar a resposta efetiva do nosso país a essa solicitação das
Nações Unidas.
E a segunda era a questão da medida de confiança. Na medida em que o
Estado informa ao Registro de Armas Convencionais, ele está dando o seu aval a uma
informação que é previamente conhecida. Nós ao enviarmos as nossas informações ao
Registro de Armas Convencionais da ONU, nós, em princípio, não estamos enviando
segredos militares, mas informações que são amplamente conhecidas. Então trata-se
também de uma ação de cunho político, de uma vontade de engajamento num exercício que
levará a esta maior confiança entre os nossos países e entre os nossos estamentos
militares.
O Brasil desde o início da discussão do Registro de Armas
Convencionais tem encontrado este objetivo, que é um objetivo inclusive de preparação
das nossas forças armadas e das nossas sociedades neste tipo de exercício global. Outro
aspecto que gostaríamos de sublinhar e que também foi levantado pelo Doutor Pericles
Gasparini, é a diferença de participação entre os países da América Latina e do
Caribe e os países chamado Grupo dos Países Ocidentais e outros. Os outros, em
princípio, são a Austrália, Nova Zelândia, são aqueles países pertencentes ao
Japão, a alianças militares. Esses países vinham de um exercício anterior onde havia
um enorme grau de desconfiança entre os participantes. O Processo de Helsinki era um
processo de diminuição de tensão entre duas alianças opostas, inimigas e voltadas, em
princípio, para a destruição da outra.
No nosso continente, apesar de existirem casos, tópicos de
desconfiança baseadas em no que chamamos às vezes "fósseis
históricos" quer dizer, um legado de nossos antepassados e que está extremamente
localizado em certas áreas de fronteiras, nunca houve este tipo de percepção. Quer
dizer as nossas sociedades não estavam necessariamente preparadas para a destruição da
outra ou das forças armadas da outra. Isso talvez explique esta falta de participação
maior no Registro de Armas Convencionais, porque era difícil explicar a certos organismos
militares que muitas vezes tinham muito mais a missão tradicional da defesa do
território, da soberania do território e principalmente da manutenção da ordem
interna, de mostrar e de ser tão transparente. A posição brasileira nas Nações Unidas
é de dizer que o Registro, do nosso ponto de vista, ele é um êxito, ele é um sucesso.
A participação de metade dos países das Nações Unidas, cerca de
noventa, varia entre 90 e 97 de acordo com o ano, num universo de 185, é significativa.
Se examina dentro do quadro ou aqueles países que não informam são aqueles que são
pequenos, que têm uma estrutura administrativa que não tem condições de levantar todo
ano, ou que acham, de certa maneira, inútil fazê-lo porque não compram muitas armas,
são forças armadas que têm equipamentos que estão abaixo das categorias indicadas pelo
registro, ou então países que têm problemas de segurança que os impedem de participar
com a transparência que seria desejável. Isso é muito característico dos países do
Oriente Médio, alguns casos no nosso continente e de certos casos no Sudeste da Ásia.
Então a lição que o Brasil tira disso e que tem sido expressa pelos nossos peritos no
Grupo de Peritos sobre Armas Convencionais, é e aqui vou criar um problema para os
nossos intérpretes é um velho provérbio brasileiro que diz: "Devagar com o
andor que o santo é de barro". Basicamente diz que nós devemos andar relativamente
de uma maneira cautelosa I think I caused a problem for Mr. Dhanapala, but in Catholic
tradition, during a procession, you have all those Catholic saints that are taken to the
streets, and if you go too fast, maybe the saint will fall and as it is made of clay it
might break [take it easy in procession; saints are made of clay.]. Voltando ao
português, essa é a percepção que nós temos.
Quais são os grandes problemas do Registro? Diríamos, num extremo os
países do Oriente Médio, não só do Oriente Médio, querendo incluir a questão das
armas de destruição em massa. O Brasil faria aqui um parêntesis vota
afirmativamente nas duas resoluções que são anualmente apresentadas na Primeira
Comissão das Nações Unidas sobre Registro de Armas Convencionais. Uma delas, de
iniciativa do Egito, tem essa preocupação de tentar incluir ou de dizer que é
necessário incluir as armas de destruição em massa. A outra, tradicionalmente
apresentada pelos Países Baixos, pela Holanda, não se refere a esta área. Nós votamos
positivamente porque compreendemos as posições de ambos grupos de países.
No entanto, nós não co-patrocinamos a resolução de iniciativa do
Egito, porque consideramos que o Registro é de armas convencionais, ou seja, ainda que
reconheçamos a preocupação com armas atômicas e gostaríamos que essas armas
atômicas, que são as únicas armas de destruição em massa que não estão cobertas por
tratados multilaterais que as proíbe, porque as armas químicas estão, as armas
biológicas estão e os mísseis, se são de destruição em massa, estão cobertos pelo
TNP por esta área, porque os mísseis, em princípio, eles são vetores que levam certas
cabeças de guerra. Então nós não consideramos que seja apropriado colocar as armas de
destruição em massa dentro do Registro de Armas Convencionais porque elas não são
armas convencionais.
Depois as pequenas armas. As pequenas armas e nós utilizamos no
foro das Nações Unidas a perspectiva da Organização dos Estados Americanos nós
temos uma convenção que está referida na resolução do Conselho de Segurança, recém
mencionada pelo Embaixador Dhanapala, a 1290, e nós procuramos mostrar a Convenção como
um instrumento modelo e um instrumento que se adapta às necessidades do nosso Continente.
Isso é um outro ponto que o Brasil defende no Registro de Armas Convencionais, é que
nós aceitamos a criação de registros regionais e até o incentivamos em algumas
regiões como a região africana. E incentivamos que estes registros sejam compatíveis
com o registro das Nações Unidas. Isto por uma questão prática.
O Brasil é um país relativamente grande, que tem uma burocracia
relativamente numerosa o FMI de qualquer maneira quer que nós a reduzimos, há um
empenho permanente na redução do número de funcionários públicos, mas os
nossos funcionários encarregados de preparar os dados para o registro da ONU tem um
trabalho difícil, porque todos os anos há que descer até o escalão mais baixo das
forças armadas para verificar quais são as armas que são obsoletas, que foram
transferidas para a reserva, que foram destruídas, que foram danificadas e tudo isto
subir e ser consolidado. Imagine se nós temos que fazer isto com todas as pequenas armas!
Nós deixamos de responder a um questionário enviado pelo Doutor Dhanapala este ano, que
foi o questionário sobre explosivos e munições. Um questionário extremamente completo,
mas tão completo que eu, como perito encarregado de enviar à Brasília, disse, vou
deixar a administração pública brasileira enlouquecida. Porque nós teríamos que ir a
cada pequena pedreira quarry no Brasil, para verificar a quantidade de pólvora e
dinamite que seria utilizada, a cada organização de policia municipal, num país
federal, com 5 mil municípios. Se tivesse que efetivamente entregar uma informação que
fosse fide digna, completa, o meu país não tem neste momento condições de
fazê-lo.
Então nós temos que ter muito cuidado, do ponto de vista prático,
quando ao prepararmos as nossas resoluções e os nossos questionários entregamos à
nossa administração pública, em casa, em países, exceto Canadá e Estados Unidos e um
ou outro país caribenho, como Trinidad and Tobago, são países em desenvolvimento, que
têm instituições ainda em processo de aperfeiçoamento.
Nós vemos que o Registro é uma bandeira a ser mantida, a ser
aperfeiçoada e que devemos discutir com muito cuidado e que a discussão nas
organizações e organismos regionais deve ser compatível com a das Nações Unidas,
porque, por exemplo, se formos estudar a questão das informações na categoria de navios
de guerra, de meios navais, barcos abaixo de 700 ou 800 toneladas quase nenhum país do
Caribe, exceto talvez Cuba, disponha. Então se os países do Caribe têm uma intenção
ou se os países da África Ocidental de desenvolver um registro complementar que possa
colocar dentro daquele registro das Nações Unidas certos tipos de armas que aumentem a
confiança naquela região, nós consideramos bem-vinda. Então, se nós pudéssemos
partir para, isso é uma idéia, da criação, digamos, de building blocks que
sejam complementares ao registro das Nações Unidas, mas que nós também devamos evitar
grandes regras gerais que sejam tão complexas que na verdade elas vão evitar que países
que gostaríamos que participassem melhor como a Índia, a China, de uma maneira mais
completa, que teriam, efetivamente, dificuldades de aceitar.
Então a nossa percepção é: temos um instrumento de idealismo, que
é um instrumento de um registro amplo, profundo, que cubra todos os países do mundo e
que seja efetivamente um instrumento de confiança mútua, algo que se aproxime a um military
balance feito pelas Nações Unidas, complementada pela informação objetiva sobre
orçamento militar. Brasil é um país que desde o início e farei aqui, se o
Senhor Presidente me permitir, um pequeno parêntesis de que o registro de armas
convencionais seja pouco a pouco colocado em paralelo com a informação sobre despesas
militares. A informação sobre despesas militares é de extrema utilidade. Ela pode ser
melhorada, o documento deste ano, que é o documento A53218, apenas a Argentina, o Brasil
e os Estados Unidos apresentaram informações dos seus gastos militares. Nós temos
ainda, dentro do processo brasileiro, algumas dificuldades de fazê-lo. A nossa
informação antes da adoção do plano real, era quase inútil, no sentido que tínhamos
uma moeda cadente e saber qual o cruzeiro que se aplicava para medir em termos de dólar
aquelas despesas, eram uma dificuldade para o próprio Estado brasileiro.
Depois, foi levantado também pelo Pericles, o que são gastos
militares? No nosso país, as forças armadas, ao contrário do que foi mencionado, elas
cobrem grande parte de instituições educativas. O Ministério da Aeronáutica ele é na
verdade o Ministério da Força Aérea e do Transporte Aéreo, então gastos com
aeroportos são colocados dentro das despesas militares, e a marinha e a força aérea
não colocavam os seus aposentados enquanto o exército colocava. Mas de qualquer maneira,
este tipo de informação é um indicador importante, inclusive para a nossa própria
sociedade saber, quanto estamos gastando, que tipos de gastos vamos fazer, para a própria
sociedade examinar se aquele gasto com defesa é um gasto eficaz.
Fui um pouco desorganizado, tinha uma série de instruções do meu
Governo, de dizer que basicamente o Brasil dá um valor, deseja continuar e convida os
países do Continente a apresentarem, de uma maneira voluntária, tanto nas importações
quanto nas exportações, informações sobre os seus estoques de armamento, informações
de compras no seu mercado interno, e também, como nós temos procurado fazer e que é
algo muito importante, informações sobre a política de defesa, sobre a visão
estratégica de aplicação das forças armadas, porque esse conjunto de dados, junto com
as despesas militares é que mostra qual é a atitude de cada país na utilização dos
seus meios de defesa.
Nós temos uma certa precaução em dizer que vamos diminuir ou que
vamos nos abster de comprar armas. Muitas vezes, falando em palavras internas no Brasil,
quando diziam para que é que o Brasil necessita de um avião de guerra moderno? Eu
respondia: sou um pai, tenho um filho de 18 anos e realmente não gosto de entregar a ele
um volkswagen 1954 para que ele dirija pelas estradas esburacadas do meu país, e tenho
certeza que a mãe de um piloto da Força Aérea não gostaria que o seu filho pilote
também um avião de 1950, 1960. Essa preocupação com a segurança dos operadores
militares, com a segurança do país tem que ser levada em conta.
Acho que a participação do instrumento que a Nações Unidas criou
como Registro de Armas Convencionais possibilita aos nossos países de atenderem
legitimamente as suas preocupações de defesa ao mesmo tempo em que, de uma maneira
transparente, dão segurança aos seus vizinhos e parceiros de que aquela compra de arma
não é ou não se dirige a um objetivo de agressão. Era isto o que tinha que dizer.
Muito obrigado, Senhor Presidente.
PRESENTATION BY MARK GAILLARD
NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, CANADA
TO THE COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY:
DISCUSSION BY THE 1997 GROUP OF EXPERTS ON THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS
Washington, D.C., 15 December, 1998
Thank you, Mr. Chairman
The Canadian delegation is grateful to the Committee on Hemispheric
Security for this opportunity to share with you some Canadian perspectives on the issue of
conventional arms registers. Also, through you, Mr. Chairman, we would like to express to
Under Secretary-General Dhanapala and Dr. Gasparini our gratitude for their illuminating
briefings.
Your Excellencies, distinguished delegates, senhores e senhoras,
Transparency has come to be understood as the systematic provision of
information on specific activities in the military field under formal or informal
international arrangements. Depending on the terms of the arrangements, the information
can be made available between States or provided to a central repository.
The UN Register of Conventional Arms is a concrete manifestation of the
principle of transparency.
The primary function of the UN Register on Conventional Arms is to
promote greater transparency in international conventional arms transfers in the hope that
better information on the nature and extent of the arms trade will encourage greater
restraint on the part of both supplier states and recipient states.
Canada has strongly supported efforts to improve the utility of the UN
Register of Conventional Arms. We were active participants in the 1997 Group of Experts on
the Register, as we were in the Group convened by the Secretary General in 1994. Canada
has consistently called for a measured and careful deepening of the Register to improve
the qualitative nature of the data. There are qualitative differences between different
types and models of conventional weapons within each of the categories. Thus, types and
models should be part of the reporting requirements at the same level of commitment as
transfers. To encourage the development of greater transparency, Canada routinely provides
additional "background" information to the Register on our domestic holdings,
and national production of conventional weapons, and we have argued in support of the
addition of this information to the Register.
Canada has also actively supported the provision of the UN Register
data to regional organizations by their participating states, as a supplement to the
annual submission to the UN. We have also advocated analysis and discussion of the
relevant data in regional fora, including in special sessions devoted to the UN Register.
Since the inception of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, many
countries have pointed out that it is categories of small arms and light weapons that are
of the most direct security concern to them. These weapons, which include fully-automatic
weapons, grenades and their launchers, as well as shoulder-fired rockets and missiles, are
"conventional weapons" par excellence in that they are the principle tactical
weapons used by ground forces in "conventional warfighting". These weapons in
many cases in many parts of the world and in large numbers have spread from military
arsenals into the hands not of soldiers but of criminals and terrorists. The impact of
these weapons is not abstract nor theoretical. It is real and deadly. They cause death and
injury today. We know this only too well.
An idea has been mooted in some circles that perhaps an eighth
category, one to cover small arms and light weapons, could be added to the already
existing seven categories of conventional arms. However, the 1994 Group of Experts thought
such an inclusion was inappropriate or impractical. These weapons are traded in such large
volumes and among many different kinds of traders that it was felt that it would be an
impossible task for states to report on these transactions.
Is it time to reconsider this view? For one thing, the problem is
probably getting worse, not better. The UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms,
whose work was noted by the 1997 Panel, reporting at roughly the same time as the 1997
Panel of Experts on the Register, noted:
"In one way or another, virtually every part of the UN system is
dealing with the direct and indirect consequences of recent armed conflicts fought mostly
with small arms and light weapons. Some of the most intractable armed conflicts ...are
those in which a recurring cycle of violence, or erosion of political authority and a loss
of economic viability have deprived a State of its authority to cope either with the
causes or the consequences of the excessive accumulation, spread and use of small
arms".
Would increased transparency for small arms help? Of course. Only by
developing a more comprehensive and accurate picture of the global trade in small arms can
we really begin to tackle its negative consequences on communities and people. We know,
however, that event the best transparency measures are unlikely to include illicit
trafficking or grey market flows. We must still work harder to deal with these.
Nevertheless, transparency measures which spotlight overt and legal transfers can act to
stem the overall trade. This can be done by the gaining of the ability to measure flows
against international norms, and by the focussing of international attention on the scope
and nature of the problem, locally, regionally, or globally.
To date, measures to render conventional weapons more transparent have
consistently focussed on the seven categories of the UN Register. As small arms are not
included in any of these categories, the UN Register is not directly relevant to this
trade. The Register does however provide potentially useful models and precedents for
future measures.
There are three basic approaches to increasing transparency in small
arms that one could take:
(1) expand the UN Register to include small arms;
(2) develop a UN or global register exclusively for small arms; and
(3) develop regional registers.
As to (1), the UN Register we believe is probably not the ideal
instrument to deal with the small arms issue. The main reason is that the Register is a
mechanism to promote "regional peace and security" and its principle purpose is
to reduce the threat of armed conflict across international borders. The greatest threat
posed by small arms is the destabilization, insecurity and suffering occurring within
states. The effects of the spread and accumulations of these weapons are not so much on
military and strategic affairs as they are on the political, social and humanitarian
concerns of States and people.
As to (2), there is some potential here, but there has been little
discussion to date. We are certainly open to hearing ideas about how a separate global
register might operate. Canada desires to contribute in a modest way to the ongoing
discussion and thinking on this issue. Accordingly, the Non-Proliferation, Arms Control
and Disarmament Division has recently commissioned a study on an international register of
small arms, identifying certain issues and describing a possible model approach.
And as to (3), we feel that there is promise in this approach. There
are three reasons for this optimism. First, because the small arms problem is usually
regional in nature, a geographically focussed mechanism is more likely to be effective
than a global one. Second, in some places of the world, support for a regional register is
already beginning to develop. The OAS is a good example of this. And third, because a
regional register would be the product of an indigenous process, the norms established are
more likely to reflect local concerns and sensitivities. These will act to enhance the
credibility and the effective-ness of the register process.
In conclusion, let me say that there is no dispute that the trade and
excessive accumulation of conventional weapons can, and does, in some circumstance,
threaten regional security, divert resources needed elsewhere for basic social and
economic development, and increase the likelihood of destruction and human suffering in
the event of armed conflict. Canada remains committed to the process that will improve the
efficacy of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and is desirous of contributing to the
process leading to the establishment of regional registers where these are appropriate.
Canada is also very concerned about the uncontrolled spread and
excessive accumulations of small arms and light weapons. To some, these are also
"conventional weapons". Notwithstanding this, by noting the conclusions of the
1994 Experts Panel, it is arguably inappropriate to include small arms as a new category
of conventional arms in the existing UN Register. A more promising approach might be to
consider including them when deciding on the scope and operation of yet-to-be crafted
regional registers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Intervención por el Embajador Claude Heller,
Representante Permanente de México ante la OEA
Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica: Registro de Armas Convencionales de
la ONU
En primer lugar quiero agradecerle la organización de esta sesión que
me ha parecido extraordinariamente productiva y rica, así como agradecer las
presentaciones que hicieron tanto el Secretario General Adjunto de Desarme, el Embajador
Dhanapala, como el Director del Centro Regional de Lima, doctor Gasparini, y los expertos
de la Argentina, Brasil y Canadá.
Yo quisiera hacer unos cuantos comentarios generales. Primero me
quisiera referir al tema de las armas pequeñas, de las armas ligeras, como un tema
que ustedes bien saben preocupó al Gobierno de México desde hace varios
años y que motivó de hecho la presentación de una iniciativa que culminó el año
pasado con la Convención Interamericana contra la Producción y el Tráfico Ilícitos de
Armas de Fuego, Municiones, Explosivos y Otros Materiales Relacionados.
Creo que debemos de ser profundamente realistas al tratar de este tema.
Avanzar en la Convención no fue una tarea fácil, hubo que vencer resistencias y
escepticismo. Creo que hay un problema más que conceptual que enfrentamos constantemente:
cual es la diferencia, o donde está la frontera entre lo que es legal y lo que es ilegal.
Ustedes bien saben de que la Convención cuando se planteó y se negoció
quedó muy en claro de que estaba esencialmente orientada, digamos a la naturaleza legal.
¿Porqué razón? Porque existe un comercio legal que es muy importante en varios países,
incluso de nuestra región y es tan importante que incluso la adquisición de armas
pequeñas es favorecida. No se han tomado, incluso en algunos casos, justamente
legislaciones que permitan reducir este proceso. Esto es un problema, creo yo que es
fundamental, que tenemos que abordar, hay países productores, exportadores, hay también
productores ilegales, efectivamente. Pero creo que hay que ver en sus distintas vertientes
este problema.
Cuando México hizo la presentación de su iniciativa, lo hizo pensando
obviamente en el vínculo que existía del tráfico y la producción ilegal con tres
vertientes fundamentales, con la del terrorismo, la del narcotráfico, y el crimen
organizado como fenómenos esencialmente transnacionales.
Lo que nos debe de preocupar en estos momentos, sentimos nosotros, es
la multiplicación de iniciativas que se vienen presentando en distintos foros. De alguna
manera este tema está siendo abordado en Viena, está siendo abordado en Nueva York. Hay
un riesgo, sentimos, de cierta duplicación y duplicidad de esfuerzos. En algunos casos se
piensa que hay que hacer registros, en otros convenciones. Creo que falta todavía
claridad sobre lo objetivo que debemos perseguir en esta dirección.
Por lo que nos parece esencial al Gobierno de México es precisamente
si vamos a avanzar en el tema de la codificación de la adopción de nuevos instrumentos,
es la importancia de los medios de seguimiento de estos instrumentos. Yo quisiera destacar
aquí, y es una iniciativa que el Gobierno de México piensa tomar próximamente, que la
Convención Interamericana contra la Producción y el Tráfico Ilícitos de Armas de
Fuego, Municiones, Explosivos y Otros Materiales Relacionados establezca un comité
consultivo. Un comité consultivo que desafortunadamente todavía no está en
funcionamiento porque este comité no podrá existir hasta que se obtenga la décima
ratificación por parte de los Estados. Es decir, todavía el proceso legislativo ha sido
lento. Pero nos parece muy importante la tarea que realizará este comité consultivo
porque será el que realmente podrá darle un monitoreo y un seguimiento a la Convención.
En el mismo sentido nos proponemos establecer una coordinación entre
este comité consultivo y otras entidades o instancias competentes en materia
internacional. Voy a dar un ejemplo, muy reciente tuvimos la reunión en Mar del Plata
sobre el tema del terrorismo en que la propuesta que se presentará a la Asamblea General
de la OEA en año próximo es la creación de un comité interamericano para combatir
justamente el terrorismo, integrado por las autoridades competentes en la materia. Lo que
se propone el documento de Mar del Plata es precisamente una coordinación entre comité y
el comité consultivo de la Convención. Pensamos que debemos de crear justamente una red,
una coordinación entre las distintas instancias que tienen un vínculo con este tema.
Aparte del tema de las armas pequeñas, ligeras, etcétera, unos breves
comentarios sobre el tema de registro de armas. Sin duda, el Gobierno de México así lo
vio desde un principio, la creación del registro como un paso positivo en la búsqueda
del fomento de la confianza pero también pensamos que debemos de reconocer las
limitaciones que está viviendo este proceso. Las limitaciones en el sentido de que no hay
una respuesta todavía, como la deseáramos. Se preguntaba el director del Centro de Lima,
pues que tal vez uno de los temas fundamentales será el de analizar las causas de la
no-participación. Creo que es un tema fundamental, creo que sería muy interesante
organizar seminarios para buscar unas respuestas a estas preguntas. Pero también tengo la
impresión que en ocasión hablamos de transparencia, hablamos de información como se
fuera un objetivo en sí mismo y, as veces, creo que es un poco abstracto como se maneja
el tema.
Francamente, muchas veces, uno ve una de las respuestas que existen de
información que se da en documentos de este tipo, pues, tiene que ser interpretada y
será válida en la medida en que sepamos conectarla con otras variables y otros factores
importantes. El país en cuestión tiene unos conflictos con países vecinos, se ven
inmersos en algún tipo de situación externa o interna especial y, creo, que muchas veces
se pierde un poco de vista, parecería con que basta con contestar información, dar
información, para cumplir, casi por inercia, un objetivo.
Coincido plenamente con el experto del Brasil que mencionaba que el
importante es lograr tener una visión sobre la concepción estratégica que tiene cada
uno de nuestros países sobre la utilización de los medios nacionales de defensa y al
mismo tiempo sus prioridades y sus concepciones mismas de seguridad nacional.
Creo que hay una pregunta que hay que hacerse muy frecuentemente
¿Cuando hay amenaza a una carga armamentista? Creo que el interés de tener información
no es únicamente como fomento de la confianza, pero cuando podemos prender una luz
amarilla o una luz roja porque está pasando algo inusual que amenaza o que puede amenazar
a la estabilidad regional. Creo que este tipo de preguntas deberían orientar más, por lo
menos un debate teórico e intelectual en el ámbito de la OEA y de las mismas Naciones
Unidas.
México ha favorecido, también coincide con la necesidad de ampliar el
tema del registro de armas convencionales a altas armas destrucción masiva. Nos parece
que este es un criterio correcto, el cual México ha apoyado.
Pero al mismo tiempo pensamos de que volviendo al tema de que la
presentación de información no es un fin en sí mismo, es que debe haber un vínculo
entre la información que se da a Naciones Unidas, posteriormente en el marco de la misma
Organización de los Estados Americanos, un vínculo con el objetivo de emprender
negociaciones concretas sobre regulación de transferencias de armas convencionales y
sobre reducción de armas convencionales. Pensamos de que el objetivo del desarme como
tal, de la utilización de recursos cada vez menos disponibles en tiempos de crisis, debe
estar orientado fundamentalmente a la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas de la
población, obviamente teniendo en cuenta las percepciones, las necesidades de seguridad
nacional. Pero creo que rescatar, precisamente, todo este trabajo que se ha venido
haciendo en el marco multilateral con el objetivo esencial de la búsqueda de acuerdos de
desarme, sigue siendo el objetivo y la prioridad principal. Muchas gracias, señor
Presidente.
1. Ver Anexo I.
2. Ver Anexo I.
3. Ver Anexo II.
4. Ver Anexo II.
5. Ver Anexo II.
6. Ver Anexo II.
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