### Key Elements for Preparing the NRA



Tuesday, February 13, 2018

#### OAS More rights for more people


#### Three keys to risk assessment

- Threat
  - Who is out there and what do they want to do?
     Person or group of people with the potential to cause harm.
- Vulnerability
  - Things that either can be exploited by the threats or may support or facilitate their activities.
- Consequences

– The impact or harm that ML/TF may cause



# Risk: function of the likelihood of occurrence and the consequence of risk events






### Risk events occur when a threat exploits vulnerability

# $R = f[(T), (V)] \times C$



#### In ML, a threat is mostly related to the nature and scale of the potential demand for ML





#### Categories of Vulnerability Indicators

- Geographic location
- Financial services and products
- Levels of informality in various sectors
- Weaknesses in the AML/CFT systems and the adequacy of existing AML/CFT controls, general levels of corruption
- Effectiveness of law enforcement agencies, and the criminal justice system



#### **Consequences of using successfully laundered assets**

- Have broader, longer-term social, economic, and political consequences
- Applied to citizens, businesses, communities or national or international interests,
- Encourages further criminal activity and thus, further laundering

#### **ML/FT Controls**

In ML/FT there are two types of controls:

- General controls and mitigants: e.g., general regulatory requirements;
- Specific AML/CFT controls, including those implementing the FATF Recommendations.



#### **Contextual Factors to ML/TF risks**

- General circumstances & "materiality" (specific things that are relevant or have a material impact on AML/CFT in the country);
- Structural elements in the overall national system;
- Other contextual factors



#### From measurement to mitigation


Risks are assessed from low to high

- **low** no mitigation required
- medium-low no mitigation expected, reason required if in place
- medium-high mitigation expected, reason required if not in place
- **high** mitigation required




	High	<ul> <li>No mitigation</li> <li>"Close &amp; Continuous" monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Justify mitigation</li> <li>Enhanced monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Mitigation (justify <u>inaction</u>)</li> <li>Watchlist</li> <li>Upward escalation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Mitigation</li> <li>High intensity watchlist</li> <li>Upward escalation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Remediation</li> <li>High intensity watchlist</li> <li>Upward escalation</li> </ul>
Impact	Medium High	<ul> <li>No action</li> <li>Baseline monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Justify mitigation</li> <li>Monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Mitigation (justify <u>inaction</u>)</li> <li>Watchlist</li> <li>Upward escalation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Mitigation</li> <li>High intensity watchlist</li> <li>Upward escalation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Remediation</li> <li>High intensity watchlist</li> <li>Upward escalation</li> </ul>
Ĩ	Medium Low	<ul> <li>No Action</li> <li>Baseline monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Justify mitigation</li> <li>Monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Mitigation (justify <u>inaction</u>)</li> <li>Monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Mitigation</li> <li>Watchlist</li> <li>Upward escalation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Remediation</li> <li>Watchlist</li> <li>Upward escalation</li> </ul>
	Low	<ul> <li>No Action</li> <li>Baseline monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>No Action</li> <li>Baseline monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>No Action</li> <li>Baseline monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Thematic mitigation</li> <li>Baseline monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Remediation</li> <li>Baseline monitoring</li> </ul>
			lium ow	Medium High	High	Crystallised
Probability						












## Interrelationships between contributors to the NRA process\*



\* Source FATF




#### Organization





#### **ML/TF Risk Assessment Process\***



\* Source FATF



#### **One set of guidelines, three** different approaches








Development Bank





#### John Grajales

- Technical Specialist
- Department against Transnational Organized Crime (DTOC)
- Secretariat for Multidimensional Security
- jgrajales@oas.org

