

Evaluation of the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan 2008-2011

Final Report - Volume I

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Executive Summary

In 2008, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Organization of American States (OAS) established a Cooperation Plan 2008-2011 (CP) to reinforce the role of the OAS as the premier multilateral political organization in the Americas and help address a variety of regional issues to complement the Government of Canada's bilateral approach throughout the Americas.

In 2011, the General Secretariat commissioned The Universalia Management Group Limited to carry out an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan. The objectives of the evaluation were to:

- Identify the main results of the five programs in the Cooperation Plan;
- Analyze the design, implementation and management of the Cooperation Plan;
- Evaluate the sustainability of the main results of the Cooperation Plan;
- Make recommendations to improve the formulation, design and implementation of similar future interventions.

Methodology

The evaluation was guided by an approved Evaluation Matrix; data collection and analysis were carried out between October 2011 and January 2012, and included data collection in Washington, D.C.

The evaluation was based on a stratified sample of 17 CP activities/projects that represented 66 percent of the Cooperation Plan's total expenditures. The sample included the largest project in each of the five CP-financed OAS programs, all projects with a value of \$1 million or more, and a random sample of projects of lesser value.

A total of 64 stakeholders were consulted through individual and group interviews conducted in person or by telephone. Stakeholders included OAS and CIDA staff members and representatives of OAS Missions. The Evaluation Team conducted a review of OAS documents and relevant literature from the OAS and other sources. The Evaluation Team used descriptive analysis, content analysis and quantitative analysis to analyze data and triangulated data from different sources to enhance credibility of findings.

Limitations and Mitigation Strategies

Evaluability: Due to the lack of clearly stated results or performance measurement frameworks, explicit results statements, corresponding indicators, and related data to use as a basis for assessment, the Evaluation Team assessed CP effects on target groups using qualitative data derived from interviews, and, to the extent possible, attempted to assess the effects of CP support beyond the achievement of activities and outputs.

Lack of performance data: As the CP-financed projects were not monitored by the GS/OAS with a results-oriented approach, the Evaluation Team relied heavily on information provided by the project managers.

Additionality: The evaluation attempted to assess the effects of the CP in terms of increased development results (outputs, outcomes, impacts) and increased resources (inputs) provided to the OAS, but was constrained by the lack of baseline data, limitations of the OAS budgetary information system, and lack of mandatory results-oriented reporting.

Evaluation Findings and Conclusions

The evaluation findings apply mainly to project management issues related to the activities funded by the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan 2008-2011. In certain cases, some of the findings could also apply to issues related with the overall management of the OAS General Secretariat.

CP Context

The OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan 2008-2011 aimed to advance democratic governance and more effective development programming in OAS Member States. The grant supported five overall program areas:

- **The promotion of policy dialogue and Summit/Ministerial follow-up** to reinforce the OAS as the principle multilateral forum in the Western Hemisphere and consolidate the Summit of the Americas process into the leading body for defining the agenda of the Inter-American system.
- **The strengthening of sustainable democratic governance in the Americas** to provide programming directed at the public sector institutions and civil society organizations of Member States in areas such as the modernization of the state, e-government, development of civil registries, judicial reform, anti-corruption mechanisms, and public administration including public oversight and transparency systems.
- **The strengthening of organizations for development** to provide programming directed at public sector institutions and civil society organizations of Member States that target human resources and organizational capacity building, the implementation of sound public policies and sustainable, efficient, effective and accountable programs to their citizens. This involved programming in areas such as disaster mitigation, social development, education, energy, the media, migration, trade and corporate social responsibility.
- **The promotion of gender equality and vulnerable groups** to provide programming to support gender mainstreaming efforts with the OAS' policies and programs, as well as to support the social inclusion and more equitable access for vulnerable groups, including indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants.
- **OAS organizational strengthening** to further consolidate GS/OAS efforts in areas such as strategic planning, project management, results-based management and reporting, financial modernization and human resources management.

The three-year initiative officially ended in June 2011, but CIDA granted a few months administrative extension to complete on-going activities. Financial support for the Plan amounted to CAD 20 million in voluntary funding.

The CP was created and evolved in a Western Hemispheric context characterized by increased attention to democratic governance on the one hand, and widespread acknowledgement of political and socioeconomic advancements on the other. The internal context at the GS/OAS was shaped by important events following the restructuring led by the Office of the Secretary General, the establishment of a “projects culture” spearheaded by the Department of Planning and Evaluation, the establishment of a project evaluation mechanism (CEP), and the commencement of the institutionalization of a results-based monitoring instrument (IPEP).

CP Performance

The evaluation's overall assessment of the CP is positive regarding its relevance and effectiveness; it is also positive for the GS/OAS to the extent that there is now a commitment to move towards institutionalizing results-based management (RBM) and managing for development results (MfDR) as the GS/OAS realizes that an RBM approach should have been taken (as suggested in the CP *Final Report*).

The assessment is also positive regarding the efforts directed at the public sector and civil society organizations of Member States in e-government, judicial reform, anti-corruption mechanisms, and public administration including oversight and transparency systems. The majority of stakeholders consider that the CP has contributed significantly to promoting policy dialogue and Summit/Ministerial follow-up, as well as promoting gender equality and vulnerable groups. Whether the CP's effects will contribute to lasting changes in the Member States and the GS/OAS remains uncertain and will depend on future interventions.

The CP has helped increase democratic governance and capacity building activities in the targeted sectors, with most activities being integrated into or linked to other existing or planned GS/OAS work. While the CP has contributed to building an evidence base for the empowerment of Member States' organizations (e.g., by broadening the pool of existing data, knowledge, and tools), more remains to be done, especially in transforming individual knowledge products created under the CP into evidence and applications that can be widely used and supporting the Member States in implementing them – promoting a sort of “demonstration effect.” While the CP has helped to shift the OAS' organizational culture towards RBM and MfDR, more needs to be done to overcome its culture as a “political organization” and its organizational capacity in applying RBM and MfDR principles still requires considerable strengthening.

The CP design was ineffective given the lack of an overarching theory of change and the absence of an overall strategy, rationale and explicit program intervention logic. The evaluation noted factors limiting the CP's ability to realize its potential, especially regarding systematic tracking and reporting on results.

Overall, the evaluation concludes that due to a weak design and the absence of results-based monitoring and evaluation complemented by systematic follow-up action, some of the CP's achievements will probably not have significant and lasting impact in the Member States.

Recommendations

The recommendations flow from the findings of the evaluation and also consider the recommendations of earlier studies that remain relevant in 2012. These include: Deloitte & Touche Management Study (November 2003), the Due Diligence Report prepared by Kenneth Dye (June 2006), and the Consultancy to review the Organization of American States-CIDA Working Relationship prepared by Cowater International (November 2006).

The recommendations are grouped into three areas:

- 1) Recommendations on GS/OAS follow-up actions;
- 2) Recommendations to the GS/OAS regarding the design, effectiveness and sustainability of future efforts; and
- 3) Recommendations on CIDA follow-up actions.

GS/OAS Follow-Up

Recommendation 1: The GS/OAS should facilitate building a strategic partnership with donors by establishing an internal monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

The three main donors (United States, Canada and Spain) each have their own priorities and interests. Voluntary contribution as a funding structure tends to increase stress on the Organization, due to different reporting requirements, which contribute to its inefficiency. In a context where the GS/OAS cannot or will not streamline its cumbersome number of priorities and mandates, the final choice as to what should and will be financed is left to donors. The establishment of an internal monitoring and evaluation mechanism, if it meets donors' basic requirements and information needs, can help reduce the workload.

Recommendation 2: The GS/OAS should develop a short-term strategic plan, including a rationale and explicit program or project intervention logic that clearly explains how OAS programming is intended to contribute to results (immediate, intermediate and final outcomes).

The need for a strategic plan was noted in the 2003 Deloitte & Touche Management Study, the 2006 Due Diligence Report, and the 2007 Cowater Report. Interviews with Missions to the OAS suggest that there would be receptivity to, and support for, an effort to develop a short-term strategic plan for the GS (not necessarily for the OAS) but this will necessarily be a function of the type of dialogue established for this purpose between the Missions and the Office of the Secretary General.

The strategic planning would be based on a streamlining exercise of OAS's priorities and mandates, conducted through extensive dialogue amongst GS/OAS and its Member States, a process that apparently has begun. Such a short-term (e.g., 2-3 years) strategic plan, with realistic priorities given the OAS's financial realities, would provide the different Secretariats and Departments with guidance to establish their respective strategic plans, allowing the Organization to concentrate its development work around shared priorities, limiting the multiplicity of projects and improving the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of its work. Based on this strategic planning process, GS/OAS should develop its overarching theory of change, overall strategy, rationale and explicit program intervention logic that clearly explains how OAS programming is intended to contribute to results (immediate, intermediate and final outcomes).

Recommendation 3: The GS/OAS should structure a centralized overall CP management system to clarify lines of responsibility and supervision and reduce transaction costs.

The OAS should consider implementing a more centralized management system for its programmatic work. This would enable better coordination of internal operations across departments. This more centralized management would also be responsible and accountable for providing the OAS Departments with programmatic guidance, managing donor relations (including coordinating fundraising and reporting), and ensuring that all projects respect internal control mechanisms in place as well as RBM and MfDR principles. OAS Departments would liaise with this centralized management to plan, design, implement and manage any development intervention. This would require continuing training of GS/OAS staff in project design and management, if possible by instituting some type of testing and certification. Senior management should also receive this training.

To facilitate the establishment of a strategic partnership with CIDA, the GS/OAS should designate a focal point for managing all external relations with the donor inside this centralized management.

Design of Future Efforts

Recommendation 4: The GS/OAS should front-load RBM/MfDR and strengthen DPE as the RBM/MfDR focal point. RBM/MfDR principles should be applied to any future CP from inception (see CIDA Process Roadmap 2010).

Installing RBM/MfDR cannot be grass roots-led; rather, it needs to be championed at the very top level of the GS, namely by the SG himself. Moreover, it cannot simply depend on mid-level champions or resource persons; senior management needs to be trained and thoroughly involved in this process. Staff training needs to be strengthened, but it should be emphasized that senior management at the GS – who are normally loathe to admit that they require training – also requires training, including perhaps in-service training at other multilateral organizations which are proficient in RBM. Additionally, the following should be considered:

- Developing a proper Logic Model as a general guide, but with a performance management framework or logical framework – this Logic Model should clearly express the intervention's logic and the specific "problems" to be addressed;

- Requiring all initiatives financed to be programmed as projects, each with complete logical or results framework and preliminary implementation plans;
- Requiring all initiatives financed to be examined rigorously by internal technical committees (perhaps a peer reviewer for each) and by the CEP prior to consideration for approval;
- Requiring all approved projects to submit quarterly IPEPs, properly documented;
- Requiring all IPEPs to be examined critically by internal technical committees – annual reports would be based on the corresponding quarterly IPEPs;
- Enabling CEP with authority to withhold disbursements from projects for which timely and complete IPEPs are not filed;
- Requiring all project documents to contain a detailed and updated description of activities of other development partners in each project's sphere of action, including a discussion of possible synergies and complementarities; and
- Actively exploring possibilities of promoting South-South cooperation.

Recommendation 5: Within CIDA's general guidelines governing a new CP, the GS/OAS should prioritize "successful" lines of action conducted under the first CP.

Within the framework of its aid effectiveness agenda and to sharpen the focus of Canada's international assistance, the Government of Canada has established three priority themes to guide CIDA's work: increasing food security, securing the future of children and youth, and stimulating sustainable economic growth. These priorities are supported by three crosscutting themes:

- Increasing environmental sustainability,
- Promoting equality between women and men, and
- Helping to strengthen governance institutions and practices.

The GS/OAS should develop the new CP by focusing on and prioritizing "successful" lines of action conducted under the first CP that are relevant given these priorities and crosscutting themes. Additionally, the GS/OAS should, whenever possible, emphasize and concentrate its work on the Organization's own strengths and comparative advantages.

Recommendation 6: The GS/OAS should find appropriate mechanisms to encourage a more demand-based approach to project selection.

Such mechanisms would allow Member States and participating organizations to contribute to the project design phase, thus ensuring that the development intervention is built and managed according to their specific needs and contexts. Establishing ownership at policy and practitioner level by involving beneficiaries from the commencement of a development intervention will increase the chances that its results are sustained over time.

Recommendation 7: The GS/OAS should rethink all CP-financed capacity building and technical assistance activities – including approaches designed to effectively strengthen targeted agencies and organizations – by moving away from individual-focused activities to agency-focused training. Follow-up activities should be incorporated in every capacity building activity conducted by the GS/OAS.

Because the GS/OAS uses capacity building as one of its main development thrusts, it should ensure that agencies/individuals selected for capacity building activities are in position to apply the skills imparted. Furthermore, OAS Managers should make specific provisions for conducting follow-up of training activities to measure the increase in skills, awareness, access or ability among recipients (immediate

outcome, through testing) and how this increase has contributed to improving organizational capacity and performance (intermediate outcome). Therefore, each participant in training activities should be systematically evaluated before and after training, and monitored closely to see how far he has been able to use the skills / knowledge gained. The longer term outcome would take the form of sustainable change in beneficiary organizations.

Recommendation 8: The GS/OAS should continue developing its communications strategy and prioritize the streamlining and upgrading of websites and collaborative networks that have clearly shown effectiveness and eliminate those that have not.

Due to the cumbersome number of websites and networks developed by the Organization, it should adopt an approach based on a clear, specific communications strategy (and Missions to the OAS should be prioritized in the communications strategy). Now that the activities and functions of the former Strategic Communications Department have been reassigned to other departments and the Secretariat of External Relations, the latter should be responsible and accountable for allowing and supervising the establishment of all new communication tools, for implementing and managing the communications strategy, as well as for applying pertinent management tools (e.g., Google Analytics) to each website. Moreover, the GS/OAS should consider incorporating a CP information page on the GS intranet, updated frequently and regularly. This recommendation implies that all websites should be subject to centralized oversight.

Recommendation 9: Provision of equipment in/through a CP-financed OAS project should be appropriately justified as necessary to address problems within the project's specific purview and to achieve or contribute to specific project outcomes.

The provision of equipment in/through a CP-financed project should not exceed a small percentage (e.g., 10 per cent) of the total cost of the project, determined during the design phase. Furthermore, it should be examined separately and specifically approved by the CEP to ensure that it will achieve or contribute to the intervention's outcomes. Such a decision should also be subject to the Organization's formal rules of procurement.

CIDA Follow-up

Recommendation 10: CIDA should provide consistent oversight of any future CP.

To foster and strengthen the OAS-CIDA strategic partnership, CIDA should be consistently supporting and accompanying the GS/OAS in all CP management phases. Strategic planning exercises could be supported by CIDA to help GS/OAS in linking departmental planning to overarching strategic planning. This would allow the generation of strategic plans with greater focus, coherence, and results-oriented actions under the main programming activities of the CP. Ideally, CIDA should have on-site staff to provide ongoing support to GS/OAS management, ensure that RBM and MfDR principles are applied, and ensure that reporting requirements are met.

A c r o n y m s

AECID	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo
ALADI	Latin American Integration Association
CAAP	Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Affairs
CAN	Andean Community of Nations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEP	Comité de Evaluación de Proyecto
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CP	Cooperation Plan
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DPE	Department of Planning and Evaluation
ECLAC	UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
FEMCIDI	Special Multilateral Fund of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
GS	General Secretariat (OAS)
IACN	Inter-American Collaborative Networks
IAP	Inter-American Program (CIDA)
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IGPN	Inter-American Government Procurement Network
IPEP	Informe de Progreso en la Ejecución del Proyecto (OAS Project Monitoring Report)
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
JSWG	Joint Summit Working Group
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South
MfDR	Management for Development Results
MIDE	Migration and Development Program
MIF	Multilateral Investment Fund
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
OAS	Organization of American States
ODA	Official Development Assistance

A c r o n y m s

OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
SAF	Secretariat for Administration and Finance
SIRG	Summit Implementation Review Group
SISCA	Summit of the Americas Implementation and Follow-up System
SOA	Summit of the Americas
TIP	Trafficking in Persons
ToR	Term of Reference
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
WTO	World Trade Organization

Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Evaluation Methodology	3
3. Context and Profile of the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan	7
3.1 Overview	7
3.2 Regional Context	7
3.3 Development Assistance to LAC Region	7
3.4 South-South Cooperation and Emerging Regional Grouping of States	8
3.5 CIDA Programming in the Americas	9
3.6 OAS Profile and Context	11
3.7 Origins of the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan	12
4. Overview of CP Performance	13
5. Relevance of the Cooperation Plan	15
6. Effectiveness of the Cooperation Plan	17
6.1 Introduction	17
6.2 Program I: Promotion of Policy Dialogue and Summit/Ministerial Follow-Up	18
6.3 Program II: Strengthening Sustainable and Democratic Governance in the Americas	21
6.4 Program III: Strengthening Institutions for Development	29
6.5 Program IV: Gender Equality and Vulnerable Groups	37
6.6 Program V: OAS Institutional Strengthening/Capacity Building	42
7. Appropriateness of CP Design	45
7.1 Overview	45
7.2 Program Strategy and Logic	46
7.3 Funding Arrangements	50
8. Sustainability of the Effects of the Cooperation Plan	52
9. Efficiency of the Cooperation Plan	54
9.1 Introduction	54
9.2 Appropriateness of Resource Utilization	54
9.3 Value for Money	57
10. Management of the Cooperation Plan	60
10.1 Management Structure	60
10.2 Reporting	61
10.3 Monitoring and Evaluation	62

Contents

11. Conclusions and Recommendations	64
11.1 Overview	64
11.2 Conclusions	64
11.3 Recommendations	65

Exhibits

Exhibit 2.1 Stratified Sample of Projects	4
Exhibit 3.1 ODA of Canada to the Americas by Sector in 2009	9
Exhibit 3.2 CIDA International Assistance to the Americas by Branch, 2009	10
Exhibit 4.1 Overview of the Evaluation's Findings	14
Exhibit 6.1 Program's Apparent Effectiveness	18
Exhibit 6.2 Inter-American Collaborative Networks Program	35
Exhibit 7.1 Summary Analysis of the Design of the CP	45
Exhibit 7.2 LFA Logic Model approved by CIDA on 4 December 2008	48
Exhibit 9.1 Changes in the Appropriation of Funds to CP Programs	55
Exhibit 9.2 Changes in the Appropriation of Funds to CP Projects	55

Appendices

Appendix I List of Findings	71
Appendix II List of Recommendations	73

1. Introduction

Universalía is pleased to present to the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (GS/OAS) this draft Final Report of the Evaluation of the Cooperation Plan 2008-2011 (CP) established between the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the OAS.

The OAS brings together all 34 independent states of the Americas and constitutes the main political and juridical governmental forum in the Hemisphere. It uses a four-pronged approach – democracy, human rights, security, and development – to effectively implement its essential purposes. These main pillars support each other and are intertwined through political dialogue, inclusiveness, cooperation, and legal and follow-up instruments that provide the OAS with the tools to maximize its work in the Hemisphere.

In 2008, CIDA entered into a \$20 million, three-year arrangement with the GS/OAS to reinforce the role of the OAS as the premier multilateral political organization in the Americas and help address a variety of regional issues to complement the Government of Canada's bilateral approach throughout the Americas.

GS/OAS commissioned Universalía to carry out the evaluation of the CIDA/OAS Cooperation Plan 2008-2011 (CP). This evaluation covers the period of implementation of the CP, 10 July 2008 to 30 June 2011.

Evaluation Objectives and Foci

As required by the Terms of Reference (ToRs) presented in Volume II and as discussed during the inception phase of the consultancy, the key objectives for the evaluation were to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan 2008-2011.

More specifically, the ToRs required that the Evaluation Team:¹

- Conduct a formative² and summative evaluation in order to identify the main results of the five programs in the Cooperation Plan;³
- Analyze the formulation, design, implementation and management of the Cooperation Plan and make recommendations as needed;
- Evaluate the sustainability of the main results covered by the Cooperation Plan;
- Document lessons learned related to the formulation, design, implementation, management and sustainability of the Cooperation Plan;
- Make recommendations, as appropriate, to improve the formulation, design and implementation of similar future interventions.

Evaluation Client

The General Secretariat is the primary client for this evaluation, with specific reference to the Office of the Secretary General and the Department of Planning and Evaluation (DPE) of the Secretariat for Administration and Finance (SAF); OAS Senior Management are the secondary clients.

¹ BID 09.11 - Request for Proposals - Evaluation of OAS-CIDA Cooperation Plan - 04.25.11.doc

² Given the ongoing discussions between the GS/OAS and CIDA regarding a new Cooperation Plan, the evaluation is also aiming at deriving lessons learned that may be applied in a second Cooperation Plan with CIDA.

³ Program I: Promotion of Policy Dialogue and Summit/Ministerial Follow-up; Program II: Strengthening Sustainable Democratic Governance in the Americas; Program III: Strengthening Institutions for Development; Program IV: Gender Equality and Vulnerable Groups; and Program V: OAS Institutional Strengthening/Capacity Building

Organization of the Report

This report is structured in 11 chapters. Following this introduction, **Chapter 2** describes the methodology used to carry out this evaluation. **Chapter 3** describes the regional context in which OAS support to Member States has taken place, and presents a profile of the Cooperation Plan. **Chapter 4** presents an overview of the evaluation findings with regard to CP performance. **Chapters 5 to 9** present the evaluation's findings with regard to CP relevance, effectiveness, appropriateness of design, sustainability, and efficiency. **Chapter 10** provides a review of the management of the CP, and **Chapter 11** presents conclusions and some considerations for OAS as it moves ahead in its negotiations with CIDA.

Volume II, a separate document, contains the ToRs, the Evaluation Matrix, the bibliography of consulted documents, the list of respondents and the interview protocols used.

2. Evaluation Methodology

Evaluation Approach and Process

The evaluation was conducted by an external and independent Evaluation Team that worked in collaboration with the GS/OAS throughout the assignment. The evaluation process included four components: 1) inception; 2) data collection; 3) analysis and reporting; and 4) assignment management.

The Inception Mission in October 2011 was aimed at fine-tuning the assignment purpose, users, scope, foci, and methodology, schedule, and resource requirements. In collaboration with the GS/OAS, the Evaluation Team developed an Evaluation Matrix (see Volume II) that guided data collection, analysis, and report writing. Data collection and analysis were carried out between October 2011 and January 2012, and included data collection in Washington, D.C. On 30 January 2012 the Evaluation Team presented an interim report containing preliminary observations to the DPE, the Advisor to the Secretary General in Management, and the Advisor to the Secretary General in Washington, D.C.

Sampling

Due to the number (38) and variety of CP-financed activities, the Evaluation Team based the evaluation on a stratified sample of CP activities/projects (see sidebar). These included:

- 1) The largest project in each of the five CP-financed OAS programs (5 projects);
- 2) 100 per cent of CP-financed projects costing more than or equal to CAD 1 million (3 projects);
- 3) 50 per cent random sample of CP-financed projects costing more than or equal to CAD 500,000 and less than CAD 1 million (5 projects); and
- 4) 17 per cent random sample of CP-financed projects costing less than CAD 500,000 (3 projects).

Following the Inception Mission, the Team decided to include project 5.2 *Strengthening of RBM systems for strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation*, since the Team's preliminary observations indicated that the GS/OAS is currently at the beginning of the important process of instituting results-based management (RBM) and Management for Development Results (MfDR). This activity was added in category (d) above, defined as less than CAD 500,000.

This resulted in a sample of 17 projects that represents 66 percent of the Cooperation Plan's total expenditures, as shown in Exhibit 2.1.

Activities/Projects

Although this evaluation report refers to CP 'projects,' the CP was implemented mainly as series of *activities* in different areas that were carried out to contribute to five overarching results of OAS programs. The results of these activities/projects were categorized as "Immediate Outcomes" but did not have corresponding indicators.

The financial statements and the GS's *Final Report* to CIDA both refer to 'projects'; however, there were no individual project documents or concept papers with logical frameworks, performance measurement frameworks, or *ex ante* indicators on which to base the evaluation.

Evaluation of the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan 2008-2011 - Final Report - Volume I

Exhibit 2.1 Stratified Sample of Projects⁴

Category	Program	CP Projects Sampled	Amount (CAD)
Largest CP project in each OAS program	Program I: Promotion of Policy Dialogue and Summit/Ministerial Follow-up	Support the OAS in its Role as Technical Secretariat to the Summit	900,000
	Program II: Strengthening Sustainable Democratic Governance in the Americas	Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights	1,939,489
	Program III: Strengthening Institutions for Development	Inter-American Collaborative Networks (IACN) Program	1,519,733
	Program IV: Gender Equality and Vulnerable Groups	Strengthening Capacity of Law Enforcement Officials, Judges, Prosecutors in the Caribbean to Prevent and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP), especially Women and Children	593,013
	Program V: OAS Institutional Strengthening/Capacity Building	Development and upgrading of effective tools for management and human resources practices leading to the implementation of IPSAS	882,849
Project ≥ CAD 1,000,000 (100% sample)	Program II	Our Democracy Project	1,008,041
	Program III	LC-IAPM-Migration Policies, Legislation and Requirements (Legal Database on Migration Law) / IAPM- Management, Administration & Coordination of the Inter-American Program on Migration	1,041,171
	Program III	New Trade Developments in the Framework of Sub-Regional Integration Fora	1,002,834
Project ≥ CAD 500,000 but less than CAD 1,000,000 (50% sample)	Program I	Support OAS engagement in substantive, critical, and/or urgent topics in the Hemisphere	624,015
	Program I	Development and Implementation of Mechanisms for Strengthening Civil Society Participation in Decision Making Process	600,000
	Program II	Development and implementation of judicial reform to promote access to justice and legal assistance to disadvantaged groups	512,000
	Program II	Inter-American Government Procurement Network (IGPN) / Municipal Transparency and Efficiency (MuNet)	736,817
	Program V	Development and systematization of a communication strategy and outreach of the Organization	691,238
Project < CAD 500,000 (17% sample, plus Strengthening of RBM Systems)	Program II	Inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information	200,000
	Program IV	Strengthening of women's rights and promotion of gender equality Phase I- Advancement of gender equality within a decent work framework	300,000

⁴ The amounts in this sampling are based on the Final Appropriation. SF-CIDA08-06 AUGUST31-0.pdf. Specific Funds (OAS/CIDA COOPERATION PLAN) Statement of Changes in Fund Balance (Summary by Program)

Category	Program	CP Projects Sampled	Amount (CAD)
	Program IV	Incorporation of gender analysis and gender equity and equality as crosscutting topics and objectives in all OAS programs	292,345
	Program V	Strengthening of RBM systems for strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation	400,000
			13,243,545

Data Collection Sources and Methods

The sources of data for the evaluation included:

Personal interviews: A total of 64 individuals were consulted for this evaluation. Data were collected through group interviews, as well as through individual and small group interviews that were held in person or via telephone. A list of persons interviewed is provided in Volume II.

Profile of OAS Stakeholders Interviewed

51 OAS staff members

Representatives of six Missions to the OAS

7 CIDA Staff members

Note: A further breakdown of these numbers may be adjusted for the final version of the Evaluation Report.

Reviews of Documents/Literature:

The Evaluation Team conducted a review of OAS documents and relevant literature from the OAS and other sources. The list of documents referenced in this report is presented in Volume II.

Data Analysis

The Evaluation Team used several methods to analyze data:

- **Descriptive analysis** was used to understand the context in which the OAS's work has taken place, its objectives, expected results, intended beneficiaries, investments made, and so forth.
- **Content analysis** made up the core of the qualitative analysis. Documents and consultation notes were analyzed to 1) identify common trends, themes, and patterns, and 2) to flag diverging views and opposing trends.
- **Quantitative analysis** was used to summarize and interpret quantitative information derived from the financial information.

The mix of methods provided opportunities to triangulate data from different sources and thus enhanced the credibility of findings. Based on the data analysis, the Evaluation Team developed findings and recommendations.

Limitations and Mitigation Strategies

The evaluation faced the following limitations. These, as well as mitigation strategies applied by the Evaluation Team (where applicable), are outlined below.

Basis for assessment and evaluability: The CP was not guided by an overarching results or performance measurement framework that specified the envisaged results, targets, and baseline data associated with CIDA/OAS collaboration. Moreover, agreed targets and/or indicators for success (beyond planned outputs) were not identified and monitored. Although a considerable portion of CP funding was used in training activities, in general there was no systematic follow-up of trainees and therefore it is almost impossible to measure the degree to which public sector agencies in the beneficiary countries might have been

strengthened as a result of the training.⁵ Similarly, OAS support to specific Member States or organizations was not based on explicitly formulated, agreed upon organizational objectives. These limitations hinder the CP's evaluability.⁶

In the absence of results or performance measurement frameworks, explicit results statements, corresponding indicators, and related data to use as a basis for assessment, the Evaluation Team proposed to assess CP effects and impacts on target groups since 2008 using qualitative data derived from interviews; this approach was subsequently accepted by GS/OAS during the Inception Phase. Using this approach, the Evaluation Team, to the extent possible, examined the effects of CP support beyond the achievement of activities and outputs.

Additionality: Since many of the activities financed by the CP were “piggy-backed” on other ongoing activities of the OAS General Secretariat, the Evaluation Team considered it important to add the concept of additionality to the traditional concepts of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, and sustainability. The concept of additionality has both a substantive meaning and a financial one. Substantively, it refers to the effects of the CP in increased development results (outputs, outcomes, impacts) while financially it refers to the increased resources (inputs) provided to the OAS.

Both concepts assume a counterfactual situation in which some base level of either inputs or outcomes is anticipated, against which to compare the actual inputs or outcomes produced with the Cooperation Plan.⁷ Taking this concept into consideration, the Evaluation Team assessed CP additionality to the extent possible but was constrained to some degree by the following factors:

- The paucity of information, mainly due to the lack of appropriate baselines;
- The complexity of the CP (targeting different organizational units, some with other funding sources);
- Limitations of the current OAS budgetary information system (e.g., inability to disaggregate expenditures in Performance Contract by Headquarters and field assignments⁸); and
- The lack of mandatory reporting requirements on implementation of the Plan.

Resource limitations: The budget for this consultancy did not include provisions for travel to Member States.

Absence of performance data: Another limitation was the absence of performance documentation about project/programs and financial resources employed. The GS/OAS decided not to apply its monitoring system to CP-financed activities, mainly because this system had been only recently developed at the time the CP went into effect.⁹ The Evaluation Team therefore relied heavily on information provided by the project managers, which is currently the only information source available on CP activities.

⁵ The *Final Report* to CIDA indicates that 5,091 individuals were trained through various CP activities (p. 20).

⁶ The OECD DAC defines evaluability as the extent to which an activity or a program can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion.

⁷ In other words, in order to measure the contribution of the CP in both substantive and financial terms, the Evaluation Team required a baseline of the originally anticipated inputs and outcomes of OAS activities (i.e., carried out without the CP) against which it could measure CP additionality.

⁸ FINSTAT CIDA08-06_object of exp.pdf

⁹ The monitoring system currently used by the GS/OAS is based on the *Informe de Progreso en la Ejecución del Proyecto* (IPEP) which itself is based on the Logical Framework.

3. Context and Profile of the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan

3.1 Overview

With the assistance of donors and international organizations, Latin America and the Caribbean have made major progress in terms of their socio-economic development. The OAS has historically been a key player for strengthening democracy and governance in the region and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has recently shifted its attention towards the region, allocating significant energy and resources for development-related issues.

3.2 Regional Context

Over the past few decades, Latin American and Caribbean countries have experienced a process of democratization and significant political and socioeconomic advancements. With some exceptions, most countries in the LAC region currently participate in regular elections that tend to be free, fair, and transparent. In a region that used to be plagued by political instability, military coups, and authoritarian governments, there now exists a region whose population strongly supports democracy and generally rejects regression to authoritarian and oppressive governments. In recent years, the LAC region in general has seen progress in terms of economic growth, decrease in unemployment, and poverty reduction.

However, despite the current optimistic political, social, and economic outlook, the challenges that Latin American and Caribbean democracies face are numerous. If democracy and governance are measured in terms of free and clean elections, the outlook is positive, but if some other factors are included, such as government accountability and institutional capacity to meet social demands, then the outlook takes a different turn. Democracy goes beyond elections; it is a way to organize social, civil and political power and prevent the political domination of individual groups. According to a 2010 UNDP and OAS report on democracy in Latin America,¹⁰ the region faces three main challenges: the first is a weak level of institutionalization of political parties and party systems, which means that there is a lack of political and institutional capacity to turn responsibilities into actions. The second challenge relates to the under representation of certain social groups, particularly women, in the region's national legislatures, which is related to the lack of electoral options and avoidance of fundamental themes in the democratic agenda. The third challenge is the lack of control of political power and transparency, evidenced by ongoing corruption in both the public and private sectors.

While the region has adopted democracy as a political regime, the political institutions and civil society have not completely accompanied this move to effectively respond to social demands, particularly of excluded groups. The prevailing inequalities, institutional weakness, public and private corruption, and lack of urban security have also undermined countries' abilities to manage crises and improve the quality of their democracies.

3.3 Development Assistance to LAC Region

Multilateral organizations and donor countries are key players in strengthening democratic institutions in developing countries, including those in the LAC region. Since the 1990s, Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Latin America has shifted from channelling funds towards objectives related to economic infrastructure and general development, to objectives focusing on the development of social services and social infrastructure. The ODA share in social services and social infrastructure sectors (specifically basic

¹⁰ Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo y la Secretaría General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos. "Nuestra Democracia". 2010. Web. 10 febrero. 2012.

education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) rose from 23 per cent in 2002 to 30 per cent in 2007.¹¹

In the past, a considerable portion of ODA was allocated to external debt reduction, but this began to decrease in 2002; in 2007 only 4 per cent of ODA to the LAC region was allocated to external debt reduction.

Of the ODA that is allocated to Latin America, three-quarters is bilateral and one-quarter is multilateral. Within the region, ODA allocation criteria are similar to global criteria: countries classified as low-income or lower income receive greater volumes of ODA as a percentage of their incomes than countries classified as middle income. Since the 1990s, the trend has been to allocate ODA predominantly to economies classified as low-income. As a result, in 2008, Asia and Africa received the most ODA (34 per cent each), while Latin America and the Caribbean received only 7 per cent.¹²

In terms of the type of aid flows to developing countries, there has been an increase in allocating ODA in the form of grants rather than loans, and this trend can be seen in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is seen as a positive trend because grants do not have to be repaid, preventing recipient countries from incurring additional debt. Even though grants may have more conditions than loans, there is evidence of an increase in unconditional assistance.

3.4 South-South Cooperation and Emerging Regional Grouping of States

In the last decade there has been greater cooperation and identification of common needs in the LAC region; hemispheric organizations such as the OAS benefit from such common interests. While development assistance represents a very small portion of the national budgets of Middle Income Countries, there is an apparent growth of donor-supported South-South technical cooperation embodied in new regional groupings of states in Latin America and the Caribbean, all with developmental purposes and mostly relating to regional trade and cooperation. Progress toward effective governance at a regional level is now spearheaded primarily by many Inter-American bodies. Trade-related regional groupings include the 12-member Union of South American Nations (UNASUR),¹³ a European Union- inspired model created in 2008 with the purpose of integrating the South American states in trade-related issues by joining together two existing customs unions: the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). One of the initiatives of UNASUR is to create a single market, through the elimination of tariffs. Under the same objective, another regional grouping called the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) was created with the purpose to have a Latin-American common market and hence facilitate socio-economic development in the region.¹⁴ The countries in ALADI, who are economically less developed in the region, enjoy a preferential system. In the Caribbean region, the corresponding grouping is CARICOM, which comprises 15 member countries.¹⁵

¹¹ United Nations. The Millennium Development Goals. "Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges". 2010. Chapter VIII, p. 309. Web. 10 Feb. 2012

¹² Ibid

¹³ UNASUR. "Información y Análisis sobre la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones". 13 Feb. 2012. <<http://www.uniondenacionessuramericanas.com/estructura/index.html>>

¹⁴ ALADI. "¿Quiénes Somos?". 13 Feb. 2012. <http://www.aladi.org/nsfaladi/arquitec.nsf/VSITIOWEB/quienes_somos>

¹⁵ CARICOM. "The Caribbean Community". 2011. 13 Feb 2012. <http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/community_index.jsp?menu=community>

Most regional groupings in the LAC region have been trade-inspired. On the other hand, the OAS, being the oldest regional grouping in the Americas, is one of the few regional bodies whose objectives and accomplishments have shed light on critical issues relating to human rights, freedom of speech and democracy. Competing organizations such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) share similar objectives to the OAS, the difference being that CELAC excludes the United States and Canada. However, unlike the OAS, CELAC does not offer a venue for hemispheric North-South relations.

There are other regional organizations with development purposes other than democracy and trade, though not completely unrelated, such as the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC),¹⁶ which works towards the economic development of Latin America and Caribbean by coordinating actions targeted to this end. ECLAC acts as a regional outpost of the United Nations Secretariat and has been a traditional and important part of the institutional landscape in the region.

3.5 CIDA Programming in the Americas

Historically, Canada has differentiated itself amongst other donors. In the 1970s, most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries were already part of an international aid regime, but the aid arrangements by CIDA differed significantly from other donor countries; while ex-colonial powers concentrated their efforts in providing aid to their former colonies, and other countries such as Japan specialized in terms of regional and ideological criteria for donations, Canada's ODA eligibility framework has been development-oriented with less regional concentration. Canada has a historical reputation of being a responsive and effective donor.¹⁷

In Latin America and the Caribbean, CIDA has helped train stakeholders from the region, assisted in the formation of community associations, established funding mechanisms, and achieved other significant objectives. In 2009-2010, Canada directed 15 per cent of its international assistance to the LAC region, Haiti being its largest recipient.¹⁸ According to the OECD,¹⁹ Canada was the region's fourth largest ODA donor in 2009, contributing 8 per cent of the total net disbursements by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, behind the United States (29 per cent), Spain (25 per cent), and Germany (12 per cent). As shown in Exhibit 3.1, most of the ODA from Canada to the Americas was directed to social sectors, which includes education, health, population and reproductive health, water supply and sanitation, and government and civil society. Within these sectors, most of the resources were allocated to government and civil society, which is consistent with worldwide ODA trends, and no significant development assistance from Canada went towards debt alleviation.

Exhibit 3.1 ODA of Canada to the Americas by Sector in 2009²⁰

Sector	Percentage
Social	57.8
Economic	5.5

¹⁶ ECLAC. "Acerca de CEPAL". 2011. 13 Feb. 2012. < <http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getprod.asp?xml=/noticias/paginas/3/43023/P43023.xml&xsl=/tpl/p18f-st.xsl&base=/tpl/top-bottom.xsl>>

¹⁷ Morrison David R. "Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance." Wilfrid Laurier University Press: Ottawa, 1998: Chapter 1

¹⁸ CIDA. "Statistical Report on International Assistance Fiscal Year 2009-2010". 2009. Web. 10 Feb 2012

¹⁹ OECD. "Development at a Glance: Statistics by Region, America, 2011 Edition". 2011. Web. 13 Feb 2012

²⁰ Ibid

Sector	Percentage
Production	10.7
Multi-sector	12.2
General Program Aid	0.0
Debt	0.4
Humanitarian	2.8
Others	10.7

As shown in Exhibit 3.2, in the Americas, CIDA directed most of its resources to Multilateral and Global Programs and to Geographic Programs.

Exhibit 3.2 CIDA International Assistance to the Americas by Branch, 2009 ²¹

Branch	ODA in \$ millions	Percentage
Geographic Programs Branch	270.34	44.7
Partnership with Canadians Branch	61.16	10.1
Multilateral & Global Programs Branch	271.78	45.0
Other branches	0.98	0.2

In the Americas, CIDA’s Inter-American Program (IAP) supports most of the activities and addresses the issues that need a regional approach such as increasing trade benefits or controlling the spread of disease. The Inter-American Program was founded to address commitments made at the Summit of the Americas in Québec City (2001) and in Mar del Plata, Argentina (2005). The main goal of this program is to stimulate sustainable growth and secure the future for the region’s children and youth.²² Unlike traditional bilateral programs, which are characterized by ties between Canada and other countries, the IAP supports activities on a hemispheric scale that span several countries, and often several sub-regions of South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. Moreover, it looks to strengthen key regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Since Canada is looking to deliver on its objectives primarily by working with multilateral organizations in the region, it strongly supports and strengthens its work with the OAS on its key priorities of democracy and security.

Currently, CIDA’s main priorities for the Americas include: democratic governance, aimed at strengthening the respect for freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law in order to support sustainable development in the region; prosperity, by contributing to economic growth in the region and enhancing Canada’s competitiveness; and regional security, by battling organized crime, illegal immigration, drugs, natural disasters and pandemics.²³

Globally, CIDA currently focuses on three priority themes: increasing food security, securing the future of children and youth, and stimulating sustainable economic growth.²⁴ (Before the change of government in 2006, its main themes of focus were health, basic education, governance, private sector development, and tsunami relief and reconstruction.)

²¹ CIDA. “Statistical Report on International Assistance Fiscal Year 2009-2010”. 2009. Web. 10 Feb. 2012

²² CIDA website <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/JUD-32712382-NPB> [accessed February 15, 2012]

²³ CIDA. “CIDA’s Aid Effectiveness Agenda”. October 2008. Web. 10 Feb. 2012

²⁴ CIDA. “About CIDA”. 14 Dec. 2011. 14 Feb. 2012. <<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NIC-5313423-N2A>>

In 2006, Canada had a change in plans and priorities for its development assistance, and set an objective towards the effective disbursement of its ODA. It proposed that in order to optimize the resources given to developing countries, “donors must align with the countries’ priorities and systems, improve their coordination and harmonize their procedures, and pursue a productive dialogue with their hosts.”²⁵ In the long term, CIDA expects this strategy will serve to promote a comprehensive relationship with the host country and focus on development results.

In 2007, Canada launched the Americas Strategy, which provides a vision of where CIDA’s activities in the Americas should be headed. As its general plan and priorities suggest, the Americas Strategy is also a way to harmonize all the activities carried out in the region by different departments of the Government of Canada, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. CIDA’s strategy of leadership in the Americas is based on three pillars: increasing economic prosperity, reinforcing democratic governance, and advancing common security.²⁶ It includes priorities for programming such as free trade agreements, trade-related technical assistance, governance in extractive industries, corporate social responsibility, energy, support for democracy, freedom, human rights, prosperity, social cohesion, parliamentary cooperation, disaster risk reduction, public health and prevention of pandemics.

3.6 OAS Profile and Context

The OAS is the oldest regional organization and constitutes the main political, juridical, and social governmental forum in the region. According to Article 1 of the Charter, among its 35 member countries in the Americas, the OAS intends to foster “an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.”²⁷ In order to implement its essential purposes, the OAS has a four-pronged approach based on its main pillars: democracy, human rights, security, and development. According to Article 2 of the Charter, the purposes of the OAS include:²⁸

- To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
- To promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention;
- To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the member states;
- To provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression;
- To seek the solution of political, judicial, and economic problems that may arise among them;
- To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development;
- To eradicate extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic development of the peoples of the continent;
- To achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the member states.

²⁵ CIDA. “Americas Strategy Implementation Plan”. 2 Sept. 2008. 10 Feb. 2012. <<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/ANN-92144947-Q46>>

²⁶ CIDA. “Evaluation of the Americas Strategy.” January 2011. http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2011/evaluation/tas_Isa11.aspx?lang=eng&view=d

²⁷ Organization of American States. “Who are we”. 2012. 13 Feb. 2012. <http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp>

²⁸ Organization of American States . “Purpose”. 2012. 13 Feb 2012. <<http://www.oas.org/en/about/purpose.asp>>

Since its inception, the OAS has been well known as the organization of choice for maintaining peace and the protection of democracy in the Americas. In the past five years, the OAS has responded to the region's demands for assistance in situations related to legitimate exercise of power, or when democracy is at jeopardy.²⁹ It has also responded to bilateral and regional challenges to peace and security by providing institutional and political support as well as by promoting dialogue.

3.7 Origins of the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan

Canada is regarded as an attentive supporter for the advancement of hemispheric interests. Since becoming a member of the OAS in 1990, it has maintained positive and constructive support for OAS priorities and mandates. In addition to its contribution to the OAS's Regular Fund (12.36 per cent), in

recent years, CIDA moved from a relatively onerous mechanism of contributions to projects to more strategic funding of programs using a grant approach to fund development programming.³¹

In 2002, CIDA provided CAD 8 million to the Special Multilateral Fund of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development (FEMCIDI) to be disbursed over a period of four years, but suspended its contribution in 2004. According to the Review of the OAS-CIDA Working Relationship prepared by Cowater International (November 2006), "most projects funded from the CIDA grant were small, they were mainly national in focus rather than multilateral, their sustainability was questionable, the drain on human resources was high, and the package of projects failed to add up to a coherent whole or to provide measurable results."³² Those factors, which were intrinsic and persistent, prevented GS/OAS from taking coherent action and identifying the overall impact of even a set of projects in a specific sector.

CIDA's decision to streamline its funding with the OAS resulted in the establishment of an institutional partnership that took the form of a grant, the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan 2008-2011. The use of a grant mechanism places Canada as a leader among donors in applying the Paris principles.

Grant Definition

Grants are defined by the Treasury Board of Canada as:

*"...a transfer payment subject to pre-established eligibility and other entitlement criteria. A grant is not subject to being accounted for by a recipient nor normally subject to audit by the department. The recipient may be required to report on results achieved."*³⁰

²⁹ Organization of American States. "Meeting the Challenges: The role of the OAS in the Americas 2005-2010". 2010. Web. 14 Feb. 2012

³⁰ <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=13525§ion=text>

³¹ At the time the CP was being considered, the General Secretariat was in the initial phase of reorganization and administrative reforms, including the establishment of the DPE as a new department (2006), the CEP as a mechanism for *ex-ante* evaluation of projects (2006), and the IPEP as a project monitoring instrument (2008); therefore, the shift from contribution agreement to a relatively unaccountable grant posed a risk, albeit one judged to be acceptable.

³² OAS%2027%20Nov%20draft%20report%20-%20CIDA[1]

4. Overview of CP Performance

This chapter provides a brief summary of the overall performance of the OAS-CIDA Cooperation Plan. The following chapters 5 through 9 examine CP performance in detail in terms of relevance, effectiveness, appropriateness of design, sustainability, and efficiency.

The CP Final Report to CIDA includes a Lessons Learned section in which the GS/OAS recognizes the inefficiencies in the design and the management of the CP and the main factors that hampered CP performance. This provides a window of opportunity for CIDA to support the OAS in institutionalizing and "learning" these lessons by strengthening these management components and to adjust the CP that is under negotiation in order to address them. The GS/OAS identified the following factors that hampered the overall performance of the CP:³³

- Design of the Cooperation Plan
- Management and Governance Structure of the Program
- OAS Organizational Structure
- Monitoring and Evaluation
- Management of Cooperation Funds
- Usage of Funds
- Knowledge Management

A first caveat regarding performance evaluation is that the CP consisted of both "political" and "developmental" activities or projects; political projects do not lend themselves easily to developmental approaches, such as the *ex ante* definition of a performance measurement framework.³⁴ A good example is Project 1.1 (Support OAS engagement on substantive, critical, and/or urgent topics in the Hemisphere) where it is clear that many crises cannot be predicted, and thus defining outputs and outcomes for such a "project" a priori is probably not a useful exercise – even if one takes the view that crisis prevention is a worthwhile objective to strive for.

A second element to bear in mind is that small Member States – especially in the Caribbean, but also in Central and South America – see the OAS primarily as a development agency, whereas medium and large Latin American countries consider the OAS as a venue or mechanism for North-South relations. In examining the details of most of the CP-financed projects, we find that most tend to benefit smaller Member States. However, it is also true that this is consistent with Canada's approach to Latin America and the Caribbean, in the sense that bilateral relationships with smaller countries are carried out through the multilateral mechanism that is the OAS. To some extent a corollary of this is that the English-speaking Caribbean Member States do not assign the same priority to democracy-related activities, and the cross-cutting gender equality issue is also substantially different from Latin American countries.

³³ OAS Final Report.doc p.33

³⁴ An important caveat to this discussion is that all too often, senior management and staff of the GS refer to the OAS as being "a political organization," especially when explaining why something necessary or desirable is not being done. The lack of a strategic plan (for the GS as well as at departmental levels) being an important case in point.

The following points summarize the overall performance of the five CP programs:

- **Relevance:** The overall relevance of the CP was relatively high. Programs I to IV were aligned with key regional governance issues. Many interventions under those programs directly or indirectly addressed OAS’ mandates and priorities, as well as donor priorities, and all were more or less aligned with GS/OAS corporate strengths and competitive advantages. Program V was aimed at strengthening OAS internal capacity in areas that had been identified as organizational weaknesses (e.g., human resources management, results-based management, and communications strategy).
- **Effectiveness:** The effectiveness of the CP varies among the programs. While the extent to which Programs I and IV achieved their objectives seems fairly good, Programs II, III and V achieved modest results. However, given the CP design (i.e., the lack of intervention logic within a program) and variations in the extent to which each intervention achieved results under one program, the Evaluation Team assessed effectiveness on a project by project basis.
- **Appropriateness of design:** The overall design of the CP was problematic and was considered weak. The CP design did not include many of the elements that would allow for appropriate monitoring of its results and the theory of change underpinning the program was unclear and not attributable to the CP’s activities and outputs.
- **Sustainability:** Most interventions under Programs I and IV are likely to see their results sustained over time. On the other hand, only some of the results of interventions under Programs II, III and V will be sustained.
- **Efficiency:** The overall efficiency of the CP is considered moderate. While sound financial and implementation management was applied throughout the CP, the lack of a cohesive approach in the overall management structure of the CP hindered its efficiency. Nevertheless, some interventions achieved relatively good value for money.

Exhibit 4.1 Overview of the Evaluation’s Findings

	Program I	Program II	Program III	Program IV	Program V
Relevance	High	High	Moderate-High	High	High
Effectiveness	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate-High	Moderate-Low
Sustainability	Unclear (probably high)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate-High	Moderate
Efficiency	Insufficient Data	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate-High	Moderate
Additionality	Unclear (probably low)	High	High	High	Moderate-High
Design	Low				

5. Relevance of the Cooperation Plan

Based on the internal and external contexts, this section examines the relevance of the CP to the GS/OAS, Member States, and CIDA in addressing key governance issues in the Americas.

Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies. Retrospectively, the question of relevance often becomes a question as to whether the objectives of an intervention or its design are still appropriate given changed circumstances.

OECD DAC Definition

Finding 1: Given its external and internal contexts, the CP's mix of five programmatic areas was appropriate and relevant in addressing key governance issues in the region, as well as the priorities of both CIDA and the OAS.

As noted in the 2006 Cowater Report, the OAS and CIDA share a commitment to democratic governance as a core value and operating principle. According to CIDA's managers, the OAS stands out as one of the most significant organizations in the region to address key governance issues. Moreover, as a membership organization of which Canada is a member, the OAS plays a fundamental role in Canada's engagement in the hemisphere. The regional reach of the OAS, and its focus on improving democratic governance, position the organization as a key partner for CIDA.

The majority of key informants interviewed at CIDA noted that the OAS remains the lone organization for addressing regional democratic governance issues. However, the same informants also mentioned that in a context where the OAS has important shortcomings (burden of diverse mandates, funding shortfall limiting its ability to implement its mandate, and the lack of an overall strategic framework and performance management culture), other regional bodies are now being targeted by donors as potential alternatives to receive Canada's ODA, a fact which could definitely harm OAS's strategic positioning in the near future.

Good governance and democratization are recognized as prerequisites to achieve sustainable development by both the Government of Canada and CIDA (see sidebar). In this sense, the CP's programmatic goals, as represented in the Intermediate and Final Outcomes of the Logical Framework, faulty or not, are relevant to Canada's priorities in the hemisphere and are consistent with democratic governance programming areas focused on by CIDA. This congruence and complementarity, which were noted in the 2006

Cowater Report before the CP grant was allocated, remained pertinent throughout the CP's implementation and up to this day. This point was also highlighted during the various interviews conducted with CIDA's key informants.

OAS' legitimacy and credibility to navigate the complexities and differences inherent in the hemisphere makes it a valuable partner for all Member States and their foreign policy objectives. As highlighted in the Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on the OAS: "*The OAS...is the core institution for addressing regional issues, especially those concerned with political matters. No other organization has the credibility and mandate to bring together the collective influence of the hemisphere's countries to resolve disputes among member states, encourage compromise among governments on salient regional*

Speech From the Throne, 4 April 2006

"...]More broadly, this Government is committed to supporting Canada's core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights around the world. In this regard, the Government will support a more robust diplomatic role for Canada, a stronger military and a more effective use of Canadian aid dollars."³⁵

³⁵ <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1087>

issues, credibly monitor national government performance on sensitive concerns, and press countries to change course when they violate hemispheric norms. No (other body) can act with the unique legitimacy and broad mandate of the OAS.”³⁶

Additionally, the CP was relevant to GS/OAS mandates and priorities and its Member States as it helped the organization address key democratic governance issues of the hemisphere. OAS’ mission is to foster political dialogue and cooperation amongst Member States in four key pillars: democracy, human rights, development (including trade), and security. Its operations are organized through six Secretariats: Political Affairs, Integral Development, Multidimensional Security, Administration and Finance, Legal Affairs and External Relations. Data show that throughout the CP implementation, interventions were carried out under each of the six Secretariats, therefore supporting OAS in its mission. The themes and issues addressed by each of the five programs were aligned with OAS mandates and priorities. This was confirmed in interviews with the Permanent Missions to the OAS. Since many interventions that were financed by the CP were “piggy-backed” on other ongoing activities of the GS/OAS, the CP was in most cases (except maybe Program III) focused on GS/OAS corporate strengths and competitive advantages.

From a more internal OAS perspective, the CAD 20 million provided to the OAS by the CP grant arrangement represents one-quarter of the voluntary funding received by the organization. In a context of economic downturn and chronic under-funding, this compensates for other shortfalls of funding.³⁷ Throughout the evaluation, key informants emphasized that most of the financial support for strengthening the organization’s capacity in response to identified shortcomings, was provided by the CP.

In light of the evaluation findings, there is no doubt that the CP was relevant in institutionalizing the strategic partnership between CIDA and the OAS. It played a fundamental role in both Canada’s and OAS’ engagements in the Americas, focusing on improving democratic governance in the LAC region.

³⁶ Responding to the Hemisphere’s Political Challenges: Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on the OAS, Inter-American Dialogue, 2006.

³⁷ Quota funding was slightly increased in the past years, although not regularly adjusted for inflation. Moreover, quotas may be increased, but not all the countries are actually paying their quotas, especially the US.

6. Effectiveness of the Cooperation Plan

6.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses the extent to which each CP program achieved its stated or implied outputs, and, to the extent possible, assesses the outcomes achieved by the CP interventions in the short term, given the limited basis for assessment and evaluability of the CP (see Chapter 2).

Effectiveness: The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

OECD DAC Glossary

Assessing progress towards expected results

Finding 2: Several factors hampered the extent to which the sampled interventions could demonstrate achieved results (the absence of an overarching results framework or performance measurement framework, the lack of monitoring, and the output-oriented nature of the projects, among others).

Determining the overall effectiveness of the CP has been challenging for the GS/OAS as well as the Evaluation Team. The lack of monitoring, the output-oriented nature of most activities, and the absence of follow-up mechanism to assess what happened once activities had been carried out have impacted the extent to which the sampled interventions could demonstrate achieved results. Additionally, the CP was not guided by an overarching results or performance measurement framework that specified the envisaged results, targets, and baseline data. Agreed targets and/or indicators for success (beyond planned outputs) were not identified and monitored. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7 on Appropriateness of Design. Given this situation, documenting and reporting progress in a persuasive way has proven to be quite challenging for the organization.

For these reasons, the Evaluation Team focused on identifying initial outcomes of the CP interventions assessed. Since the budget for this consultancy did not include provision for travel to Member States, it was not possible for the Evaluation Team to triangulate data with other stakeholders. Nevertheless, various initial outcomes were identified during interviews with GS/OAS staff.

Finding 3: While all five CP programs made progress in carrying out planned activities and producing outputs, evidence of outcome achievement remains anecdotal – due to the absence of outcome results statements, outcome indicators, and proper monitoring and follow-up.

Based on the data available for the projects in the evaluation sample, most CP programs achieved their planned activities and outputs, although the extent to which activities were implemented differed significantly amongst projects. The *CP Final Report* (December 2011) submitted by the General Secretariat to CIDA presents activities and outputs for the CP.

The extent to which projects achieved results beyond outputs differed considerably among initiatives. As noted above and as discussed in Chapter 7, the design, strategy and logic of each intervention had substantial impact on its effectiveness and thus of the CP.

Since there was no *ex ante* basis for assessment, the Evaluation Team assessed the extent to which each sampled initiative achieved short-term or initial outcomes that appeared to be

High: Most of the intervention's apparent objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved.

Moderate: Some of the intervention's apparent objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved.

Low: Few of the intervention's apparent objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved

a consequence of the achievement of project activities and outputs. The Evaluation Team used a simple three-point scale (see sidebar). To better reflect the projects' effects on each CP program, ratings were weighted by the amounts financed.³⁸

Exhibit 6.1 shows the overall ratings of the CP programs' effectiveness, based on their components.

Exhibit 6.1 Program's Apparent Effectiveness

Program	Apparent Effectiveness
I	High
II	Moderate
III	Moderate
IV	Moderate - High
V	Moderate - Low

The following sections (6.2 to 6.6) examine the effectiveness of the sampled projects in each of the five CP programs.

6.2 Program I: Promotion of Policy Dialogue and Summit/Ministerial Follow-Up

Finding 4: The overall effectiveness of Program I is high, reflecting the high priorities accorded to it by the Member States. Important initial outcomes were identified as a result of the activities carried out under this program.

In the CP Logical Framework, the immediate outcome of Program I is *Reinforced political role of the OAS and a strengthened and productive Summit of the Americas Process (SOA)*. Because this immediate outcome is not specific, measurable, or supported by outcome indicators, the extent to which one can assess the Program's effectiveness is hindered. However, important initial outcomes were identified as a result of the activities under this program. For this reason, the overall effectiveness of Program I is rated as high.

Project 1.1: Support OAS engagement in substantive, critical, and/or urgent topics in the Hemisphere

Effectiveness Rating: High

Outputs

This project consisted of supporting actions led by the Secretary General to respond to crises, seven of which occurred during the CP period. Crises are defined mainly as bilateral or regional challenges to peace and security, situations that "affected the legitimate exercise of power or jeopardized the democratic process" in Member States, and certain situations judged to be critical that required some form of institutional support from the OAS, including mediation and promotion of dialogue. Essentially these are responsibilities of the Organization that are spelled out in its Charter. While actions led by the Secretary General are carried out following the instructions of the political bodies, the apparent intention of this project was to allow the Secretary General to be more pro-active in the event of crisis by virtue of having the necessary resources.

³⁸ OAS CIDA Financial Statements 03.31.11- Annex IV.pdf

To some extent this project was “twinned” with the Democracy Project (2.1.1 – see below) which allowed the building of a small “think-tank” of sorts, marrying an existing software for political analysis named SAPEM run by academics to predict crises, to a more “experienced and pragmatic” group of well-known and former high-ranking individuals with credibility at the highest levels of government, in order to arrive at a proper approach and, if possible, take appropriate preventive steps.

This project consisted essentially of two outputs: (1) Crises addressed through mediation and conflict-resolution efforts; and (2) “Sounding Board” established and meetings held.

- Seven crises were addressed: Bolivia and El Salvador – constitutional referendum and pre-election mission; Guatemala – stability of the democratic constitutional order; Honduras – coup d’état; Venezuela – hunger strike; Nicaragua – conflict between Congress and Government; Haiti – political developments after earthquake; and Ecuador – attempted coup d’état.
- The second output consisted essentially of four meetings held with members of the “Sounding Board” in June 2009, September 2009, September 2010, and January 2011.

Since, as stated above, these responsibilities of the Secretary General are found in the Charter, and previous Secretaries General had also been active in this regard, an initial question concerns the *additionality* represented by this CP-financed project – the question being, would other OAS funding have been used (or special contributions have been made by OAS Member States) to allow the Secretary General to respond to these crises, which after all required decisions by the political bodies? The response to this question by stakeholders interviewed was that in view of the difficulties with Regular Fund contributions by Member States, the Secretary General would not have been able to marshal the resources required without the contribution of the CP and thus the implication is that the response to the seven crises would not have been as effective.

Outcomes

The Evaluation Team assigned an effectiveness rating of “**High**” to this project because it appeared to foster pro-active efforts by the Secretary General that prevented seven crises from escalating into widespread violence. The Evaluation Team did not otherwise judge the merits of each action, but it is important to note that representatives of OAS Missions that were interviewed had differing interpretations regarding the outcomes of each crisis-related action.

Project 1.2: Support the OAS in its Role as Technical Secretariat to the Summit

Effectiveness Rating: High

Outputs

With CP funding in the amount of CAD 900,000, this project’s six principal outputs were: (1) Summit Follow-up System (SISCA) designed, approved and launched;³⁹ (2) Summits document management systems and processes revamped; (3) Summit Information Network re-designed and launched;⁴⁰ (4) *Summits Informs* newsletter re-designed; (5) Volume V of “Official Documents from the Summits of the Americas Process” designed, published and distributed; and (6) three annual reports of the Joint Summit Working Group (JSWG) implementation of Summit commitments designed, published and distributed.

Regarding SISCA, two versions were implemented, the second being an improvement of the first, and several instructor-led training events were held in Member States as well as at OAS Headquarters for Missions to the OAS. Training in the use of SISCA was also carried out using a virtual webinar format for 50 users in the Member States.

³⁹ <http://www.oas.org/summit/sisca/>

⁴⁰ <http://www.summit-americas.org/>

Given the high priority accorded to the Summits of the Americas, it seems questionable whether Outputs 2, 4, 5, and 6 represent additionality of the CP.

Outcomes

National reports from 14 Member States detailing follow-up actions in regard to SOA mandates were prepared and uploaded to SISCA, with two additional reports on the way at the time of writing. However, in the case of very small Member States, the reporting requirements tend to be onerous, which appears to be the main reason the majority have not produced the follow-up reports. The functional database of mandates contained in SISCA and reproduced on the web page of the Summit of the Americas Secretariat (SAS), facilitate stakeholder access to mandates from the Summits process which have been considered very useful in Ministerial meetings. The Summits website experienced an 81 per cent increase in users between 2010 and 2011, to approximately 48,000 in 2011. Finally, representatives of Missions to the OAS that were interviewed generally expressed high praise for the work of the Summit of the Americas Secretariat (SAS). For all these reasons, the Evaluation Team assigned an effectiveness rating of “**High**” to this project.

Project 1.4: Development and Implementation of Mechanisms for Strengthening Civil Society Participation in Decision Making Process

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate-High

Outputs

According to its website, the Department of International Affairs (DIA), which was responsible for implementation of this CP-financed project, prioritizes three mechanisms to encourage the orderly and effective participation of civil society organizations (CSO) in OAS meetings and affairs – registration, special invitations, and cooperation agreements. On the other hand, the Final Report⁴¹ suggests that the following outputs were produced under this project: (1) Forums and meetings held – principally a Civil Society Hemispheric Forum, and meetings of CSO with the Secretary General during the three General Assemblies held during the CP period; (2) Registry of CSOs strengthened; (3) Committee on Inter-American Summits Management and Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities (CISC) supported; and (4) CSO website established (http://www.civil-society.oas.org/Pages/LINKS_CS0_ENG.htm). The website includes the registry of CSOs and information about CISC.

Outcomes

According to the DIA, the benefits obtained through this project included “creat[ing] the conditions to institutionalize the participation of these social actors in the Organization through the development and maintenance of the CSO Website, effective communications systems and the increased access to information, as well as technical and logistical support needed for the organization and execution of thematic and regional conferences.”⁴² In other words, this project was largely piggy-backed on existing activities, thus bringing this project’s additionality into question.

⁴¹ See *Final Report*, p. 68.

⁴² See *Final Report*, p. 68.

6.3 Program II: Strengthening Sustainable and Democratic Governance in the Americas

Finding 5: The overall effectiveness of Program II is Moderate. While some projects achieved important initial outcomes, others demonstrated poor/moderate outcomes.

In the CP Logical Framework, the immediate outcome of Program II is *Enhanced democratic processes and effective and sustainable expansion of the political, civil and social aspects of citizenship in OAS Member States*. Such a broad statement and the absence of any outcome indicators makes it impossible to assess whether projects under Program II have contributed to strengthening democratic governance in the region. As described in the following sections, some of the projects evaluated under Program II achieved important initial outcomes, albeit to a lesser extent than what is expressed in the Logic Model, while others demonstrated low/moderate results. Therefore, the overall effectiveness of Program II is rated as moderate.

Project 2.1.1: Our Democracy

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate-Low

Outputs

The Democracy Project was carried out by the OAS with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) of Mexico as its executing partners. The main output of this initiative was a report, *Nuestra Democracia*, that explores and addresses the roots of the main deficits of democracy in the region, and analyzes in detail those that have a pervasive effect.⁴³ According to OAS staff, the report's framework had two different bases (academic and political).⁴⁴ The process of preparing the report started with the request for almost 60 academic and political papers from specialists from Latin America and Europe. Two versions of the document were then prepared, one abridged for quick consultation (1000 copies printed) and a complete version *La democracia de ciudadanía* (2200 copies printed).⁴⁵ *La democracia de ciudadanía* also contains the contributions of the participants in the validation workshops, as well as the contributions of the specialists who were commissioned to prepare papers for the project. This document was written with the collaboration of the team of Democratic Governance for Latin America and the Caribbean (DRALC) of the UNDP. A special focus was placed on a practical orientation of the document and its contribution to the design of public policies for the region.

A validation workshop was organized (Madrid, February 2009) to define what sections of the document would then be used for the national meetings. Subsequently, seven national and two sub-regional meetings were organized as the basic structure for preparing the report *Nuestra Democracia* (see sidebar on following page). Approximately 800 leaders from 14 countries of the region participated in these events – and included a wide range of participants from government, opposition, political parties, social and trade unions, as well as indigenous leaders.

Following the preparation of the report *Nuestra Democracia*, a first Forum on Latin American Democracy was organized and conducted in Mexico City in October 2010.⁴⁶

⁴³ http://www.oas.org/es/sap/secretaria/foro_democracia_latinoamericana.asp

⁴⁴ See the section on Project 1.1 above.

⁴⁵ <http://www.gobernabilidaddemocratica-pnud.org/archivos/1264016800OeaPnud-DemocraciaDeCiudadania-2010.pdf>

⁴⁶ http://www.oas.org/es/sap/secretaria/foro_democracia_latinoamericana.asp

Outcomes

As mentioned in the CP Final Report, there is a serious problem of attribution in assessing the extent to which the project contributed to two of the Program's immediate outcomes "*Reinforced political role of the OAS and a strengthened and productive SOA of the Americas Process (SOA)*" and "*Enhanced democratic processes and effective and sustainable expansion of the political, civil and social aspects of citizenship in OAS Member State.*"

However, even though it is difficult to measure immediate outcomes on this vast issue, a few initiatives

happened as a result of the Our Democracy project (discussed below). For this reason, we have assigned an effectiveness rating of "**Moderate-Low**" to this project.

Following the Forum on Latin American Democracy conducted in Mexico City in October 2010, IFE, one of the organizers of the event, launched a second forum in Mexico City in December 2011. IFE's President closed the second forum announcing there would be a third forum, with the expectation that the forum would be institutionalized to create a space for debate and discussion about the current status of democracy in the region. Furthermore, the project motivated the public debate on the use of concepts such as *electoral democracy* (democracia electoral) and *citizenship democracy* (democracia de ciudadanía). According to OAS staff, these terms are now being used in the political framework. ECLAC is now trying to measure citizenship democracy based on the report, and there have been a number of requests from academics soliciting meetings with the project team to discuss some of the new ideas developed in the report – both of which may be indications that the project contributed to the establishment and dissemination of the concepts. In addition, AECID provided funding for the production of a report on issues addressed in *Nuestra Democracia*. This report, to be published in 2012, comprises academic papers written by 40 specialists and is an important and unexpected initial outcome of this initiative.

Project 2.2.1: Inter-American Government Procurement Network (IGPN) / Municipal Transparency and Efficiency (MuNet)

Effectiveness Rating: High

Outputs

This initiative is comprised of two distinct components, IGPN and MuNet, both of which build upon previous efforts to strengthen the prevention and fight against government corruption. These two components complement each other and are focused on increasing government efficiency and transparency in the Member States.

As mentioned in the CP Final Report, the Inter-American Government Procurement Network (IGPN) aims at supporting modernization of government procurement systems in Latin America and the Caribbean by strengthening a mechanism to facilitate the exchange of government procurement expertise and solutions among the OAS Member States.⁴⁷ The initiative aimed at addressing the sustainability of the network as

National Meetings

Paraguay, Asunción, October 26 - 27, 2009

Guatemala, City of Guatemala, November 9 - 10, 2009

Uruguay, Montevideo, December 8 - 9, 2009

Colombia, Bogotá, February 16 – 17, 2010

Bolivia, La Paz, March 9 – 10, 2010

El Salvador, San Salvador, March 18 – 19, 2010

México, México DF, March 23, 2010

Sub-regional Meetings

Panama, City of Panama, (Costa Rica and Dominican Rep.), November 16 - 17, 2009

Brazil, Brasilia, (Argentina, Brazil and Chile), April 26 – 27, 2010

⁴⁷ CP Final Reportv11 p. 80

well as bringing in knowledge of new topics such as information and communication technologies and green procurement in the IGPN agenda. The following outputs were achieved:

- The IGPN strengthened through bylaws, governing bodies, a partnership structure and several communication tools
- Government Procurement officers trained on government procurement modernization
- Several Government Procurement Modernization projects to incorporate information and communication technologies currently in implementation (Jamaica, Grenada, El Salvador)
- Green Government Procurement report and roadmap published
- Government Procurement officers trained on green procurement
- Caribbean Government Procurement Policy Framework agreed upon by Caribbean countries

Municipal Transparency and Efficiency (MuNet) promotes efficiency and transparency in municipal management by incorporating information and communication technologies in municipal operations. This component is the second phase of a previous project that was completed in July 2008. One of its main objectives was to make sustainable what had been previously achieved by transferring know-how to local partners in all beneficiary countries. As such, a Municipal e-Government toolkit was developed to support phase II. The following outputs were achieved:

- MuNet National Programs in operation in several countries
- 140 municipalities supported in their modernization efforts
- Municipal government officers trained on e-government
- MuNet online community, MuniRedes, launched and operating

Outcomes

This initiative was relatively effective, as both components achieved initial outcomes. Therefore, an effectiveness rating of “**High**” was assigned to this project. In the case of IGPN, CIDA’s financing, which allowed strengthening the network through bylaws, governing bodies, a partnership structure and several communication tools, helped the IGPN gain credibility and leverage financial resources. As such, new resources were obtained by partnering with other international organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), the International Development Research Center (IDRC) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Also, the training offered on government procurement modernization and on green procurement to the procurement officers seems to have created a demand, although there was no follow-up mechanism which makes it difficult to evaluate what happened as a result of the training. As a matter of fact, during the annual meeting of the IGPN in the Dominican Republic in October 2011, procurement officers raised the need to promote hemispheric dialogue at a political level to address the fact that the governments of the region will soon have to agree on: product catalogues (codes and description), supplier registry structure, professional certification, green procurement certifications, data interoperability and exchange, validity of online procedures, among others, all of them requiring political decisions.

Finally, at the time of writing this report, IDB and OAS are in the process of signing an agreement that would allow 450 Haitian officials to be trained on procurement using the online course that was developed during the CP. Costa Rica has also demonstrated interest in training its procurement official through the same online course. If these agreements are signed, they would be unexpected outcomes of this component.

For its part, MuNet planned on establishing five National MuNets but four were actually initiated. The National MuNet is the mechanism to transfer know-how to the beneficiary country. Beyond the training and the portals, in several countries, MuNet is actually the only initiative the central governments have to support the modernization of municipalities: *"La única iniciativa articulada que conoció EF es MuNet e-*

Gobierno, programa integral que pretende mejorar la transparencia del municipio, aumentar los servicios que ofrecen en línea y mejorar su eficiencia e incrementar la participación ciudadana."⁴⁸ According to the Project Manager, establishing such a mechanism requires commitments from the national partners. Subsequently, the negotiations and the signing of the formal agreements have been delayed. The OAS team expects that, out of the four countries in process, Peru and El Salvador National MuNets will be set up in 2012. As for Venezuela and Colombia, they envision regional rather than national MuNets.

Other initial outcomes are worth mentioning in regard to MuNet. Through MuNet, the Government of Costa Rica is now bringing to the municipalities an e-procurement tool called Merlink, which is a key part of the transparency and accountability policy of that government at the municipal level. In addition, Panama has embarked on a second phase to add more municipalities to the 34 that the OAS has been working with within the 2008-2011 Cooperation Plan. Aside from CIDA's funding, the OAS and the Government of Panama have developed a plan to cover all of the 80 municipalities in 2012-2013. At the time of writing this report, the plan and budget are pending approval by the Secretary for Government Innovation, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance has expressed an interest in funding this initiative.

Project 2.3.2: Development and implementation of judicial reform to promote access to justice and legal assistance to disadvantaged groups

Effectiveness Rating: High

Outputs

Access to justice is traditionally poor or non-existent for vulnerable groups in the Member States. The main objective of this initiative was the implementation of cooperation projects to improve access to justice for disadvantaged groups through the creation and strengthening of graduates' free legal clinics. This initiative started in 2009 with a pilot project in Uruguay and was further developed in different locations focusing on the needs and strengths of each selected Member State (Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay). In Paraguay the OAS could not achieve expected results due to the country's inactivity; therefore, to reorient the project, the OAS team approached *Universidad de la República* in Uruguay and *Universidad Mariano Gálvez*, *Universidad Rafael Landívar* and *Universidad San Carlos* in Guatemala, with whom they could establish simple institutional agreements.

In each country the following outputs were achieved: i) University legal aid clinics were strengthened through staff training, transfer of materials and computer equipment; ii) diagnosis of the limitations on access to justice were carried out; iii) students, users and other stakeholders were trained and sensitized on the topic; and iv) cooperation agreements with universities were implemented. Agreements were also signed between the universities and local agencies.

Although there were no planned activities in support of university legal services offices in Brazil, the OAS closely collaborated with the *Centro Universitario de Brasilia* (UniCEUB), which participated in conferences and workshops in Guatemala and Uruguay, providing expertise on the subject.

Outcomes

The CP Final Report noted various results of this initiative and interviews carried out with GS/OAS staff responsible for this initiative confirmed that there was anecdotal evidence of initial outcomes. Consequently, an effectiveness rating of "**High**" was assigned to this project.

⁴⁸ EL FINANCIERO. Costa Rica digital: Un país de isla. Feb. 28, 2012.
<http://www.elfinancierocr.com/ef_archivo/2012/marzo/04/enportada3083658.html >

For instance, in El Salvador, as a result of strengthening the office of *Socorro Jurídico*, the emphasis was placed on strategic alliances and setting up offices at the Delgado City Integrated Judicial Center and the Supreme Court.⁴⁹ Activities were also coordinated with the Secretariat of Social Inclusion and the Mayor's Office of Mejicanos in San Salvador.

In Guatemala, in addition to Interdisciplinary Sessions, two International Congresses, and a course for national coordinators, several decentralized legal aid clinics were implemented with an emphasis on women, indigenous peoples, and persons living with disabilities in order to help guarantee access to justice.⁵⁰

In Uruguay, a cooperation agreement was signed with the *Universidad de la República* to strengthen the legal clinic through: i) the creation of a multidisciplinary decentralized office with psychologists and social workers at the Prison for Women in partnership with the Ministry of Interior; ii) a decentralized office specializing in domestic work as agreed with the League of Housewives House; iii) an office specializing in consumer law in accordance with the Municipality of San José; and iv) the installation of a monitoring system and electronic case management for all service offices.⁵¹

Following its involvement in the conferences and workshops delivered in Guatemala and Uruguay, UniCEUB offered coaching to the office coordinators of those countries to learn first-hand the modus operandi of legal assistance in Brasilia.⁵² This exchange was later repeated in an office in Montevideo, Uruguay. Moreover, this collaboration led to the realization of a joint publication and the drafting of a cooperation agreement for future activities which could be considered as unexpected initial outcomes.

In addition, cooperation agreements were developed and implemented with international entities such as USAID and Pact World. By donating the base software, these entities allowed the project to promote legal assistance to the most vulnerable groups by the implementation of an electronic System for Monitoring and Managing Cases (SIGESSCA), which was developed by the OAS and the IDB. The SIGESSCA was implemented in El Salvador, Guatemala and Uruguay, and Brazil is now considering implementing it.

According to the GS/OAS project team, the modernization of legal assistance through the provision of hardware, software and equipment allowed the offices to manage and provide the services more efficiently. In addition, the initiative encouraged and supported the establishment of decentralized offices and agreements with third-party organizations to extend legal assistance provided by universities. It also allowed for a more comprehensive approach including psychological and social care of the person, which helped to extend health care matters at participating locations. Furthermore, the initiative pushed the agenda of access to justice and the protection of persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, workers, consumers, and women. For instance, in Uruguay, newly established offices specialize in themes such as imprisonment, women, consumers and domestic work. For its part, Guatemala offices focused specifically on indigenous people, women and persons with disabilities. They hired a consultant to carry out a comparative study on the legal capacity of persons with disabilities, particularly those declared legally incompetent in the countries that have ratified the American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities. Finally, the initiative increased student participation in the beneficiary offices. In Guatemala and Uruguay, community assistance is mandatory as part of the curriculum, and the strengthening of the offices allowed them to improve the assistance. According to the Project Manager, in El Salvador, where community assistance is voluntary, student participation has almost doubled.

⁴⁹ CP Final Report to CIDA p 90

⁵⁰ Ibid p91

⁵¹ Ibid p91

⁵² Ibid p91

Although it is difficult to assess whether the initiative achieved its specific objectives, data show that it contributed to: i) improving and advancing the legal aid services and free legal consultations provided by universities, promoting the services provided by universities among the people, and expanding the pilot project to other countries; ii) increasing the participation of students providing assistance; and iii) developing diagnostics on judiciary reforms, necessary to help remove barriers to access to justice in participating countries.

Project 2.4.1: Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate-Low

The main component of project 2.4 “Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights” placed emphasis on strengthening the management capacities of governments' executive and legislative branches through the promotion of effective public management mechanisms, modernization and parliamentary cooperation.⁵³ At the center of this initiative is the Country Strategy Support Program, which seeks to strengthen public sector management in selected Member States. The OAS Department for Effective Public Management (DEPM),⁵⁴ which is responsible for implementing this initiative, designed programs for Bolivia, El Salvador and Paraguay.

Outputs

In the case of Bolivia, the first step of this initiative was a desk review to understand the dynamic of the country. An internal document “Country Reference Paper – CRP” was developed to gain knowledge of the Bolivian economic and political challenges and opportunities in order to inform the diagnosis process. As a second step, the OAS presented the concept underlying the initiative⁵⁵ to the Bolivian Permanent Mission in Washington, D.C. and an exploratory mission was organized to Bolivia. Following this first mission, a high-level mission of 12 senior experts went to Bolivia to consult with the government and frontline ministries⁵⁶ to evaluate how to best strengthen and make the identified state's strategies efficient. Workshops were conducted by the mission with government officials and their technical teams to identify the main institutional bottlenecks and strengthening needs. Following these workshops, the mission helped the Bolivian government in developing project profiles that would help complete mandates in the development plan and constitution. Throughout this initiative the OAS supported Bolivian public servants by transferring knowledge and assisting them in designing project profiles. For instance, it supported the design and implementation of the State Autonomous Service (SAS), a new public institution in charge of the technical coordination of the decentralization and autonomy processes. A steering committee, comprising the Minister of Planning, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the President, was also established to prioritize projects that should be pushed forward. Over 30 projects were designed, of which 17 were identified as priorities by the Steering Committee. Finally, in order to strengthen the Plurinational

⁵³ The document review demonstrated that a total of 30 outputs were planned under the project “Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights”, distributed among various Member States. Those outputs were grouped under five categories: i) Training (2), ii) Diagnostics, Studies and Publications (11); iii) Technical Assistance Initiatives (6); Initiatives Facilitated (6); and Networks Created and/or Strengthened (5). Since no follow-up mechanism was implemented by the DEPM to measure what happened as a result of the achievement of those outputs, the evaluation team focused on the six outputs that were addressed by OAS staff during the interview, which represent 55 per cent of the total amount allocated.

⁵⁴ The DEPM, which replaced the Department of Modernization, was established in February 2011.

⁵⁵ The Member State had previously requested support from the OAS in the public management field.

⁵⁶ Ministry of External Affairs; Ministry of the Presidency; Ministry of Public Works and Services; Ministry of Transparency; Ministry of Autonomy; Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Production; Ministry of Planning; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Rural Development

Legislative Assembly, 166 laptops and associated information and communication technologies training for legislators were provided to the beneficiary country.

Following a request from El Salvador, the OAS sent a mission to start a dialogue with the Technical Secretary of Presidency (TSP). The OAS and the Salvadorian government designed a technical assistance initiative to jointly support the work of the Presidential Committee for State Modernization and reform. According to DEPM documentation,⁵⁷ the assistance planned on achieving: i) a kick-off seminar on regional and extra-regional state reform experiences; and ii) a diagnostic study focusing on public policy and management innovations for the public sector in El Salvador. The seminar and the diagnosis were not achieved, but project profiles were designed by OAS and STP staff during a two-day visit to San Salvador, and were later approved by the CEP in June 2011. These two components were intended as preliminary activities to design a technical cooperation program to support effective implementation of El Salvador's Pluri-Annual Development Plan. According to the Project Manager, new funding will be necessary to continue the work in El Salvador.

A similar initiative in Paraguay was jointly undertaken with UNDP. In this initiative, OAS conducted a comparative study on reform processes of public structures – White Paper (Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay and others) – which was presented at a seminar in Asunción and later published. A mission was also sent to develop an action plan to support the Paraguayan administrative reform process for the executive branch. This action plan, which was later approved by the national authorities, comprised three distinct phases: i) a diagnostic study and support of the development of a reform law for a professional civil service; ii) implementation of new systems and mechanisms for an innovative and effective executive branch of government; and iii) monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the reform program. Due to the change in the Paraguayan government in 2008, the reform agenda collapsed, bringing the initiative down with it.

Outcomes

In Bolivia, two initial outcomes were identified. Following the training of the technical staff of the Ministry of Autonomy in Process Management that took place in the design phase of the SAS, acquired capabilities were used by the beneficiaries in the conceptualization of the SAS to develop the institutional processes, organizational chart, budget, and legal decree (approved on 23 February 2001) as well as the strategic plan, among others. However, it is unknown whether these initial outcomes were applied and if they contributed to any significant changes. In addition, according to OAS staff, the donation of 166 laptops, as well as the associated information and communication technologies training for legislators also enabled them to attract new funding from the German government through its development cooperation program (GIZ), which donated software to the Congress of Bolivia that permitted MPs to keep track of the laws they submit in session. However, there is no information that the intervention in Bolivia conducted a thorough analysis of the country's legislative processes and performance, or of the problems to be addressed, to warrant the investment in computer hardware, especially considering that the intervention was mainly focused on the executive branch of the Bolivian Government. Also, one could raise the question: If the German government had not given them the software, what would the laptops have been used for?

In Paraguay, the recommendations suggested by the comparative study on reform processes of public structures were taken into account in the Paraguayan Executive Reform Law (Draft issued in April 2011) and in subsequent corresponding actions.

⁵⁷ Official form output for CIDA-Annex 1

The Department for Effective Public Management states that the main objective of the Country Strategy “is to support a government in planning and implementing the big picture – the country’s medium/long term development strategy and legislative priorities– through the design, finance, and execution of a program to help the public sector address its own objectives more effectively.”⁵⁸ On the other hand, evidence shows that only the planning part has been conducted throughout the project. For this reason, an effectiveness rating of “**Moderate-Low**” was assigned to this project.

Project 2.4.2: Inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate

Outputs

This initiative, which is another component of project 2.4, comprised two main outputs one of which was complementary to the project 2.4.1 “Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights.” The first output was the drafting of the Inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information and the Guide for the implementation of the Model Law. The Model Law was drafted by a Drafting Committee supported by a group of 31 experts on access to information. The Guide was conceived to provide guidance for effective interpretation and implementation of the Model Law in the Member States, focusing on identifying specific measures applicable to different aspects of the organization and operation of a system of access to information.⁵⁹

The second output was the training of government officials, citizens and legislators on the contents, application and implementation of the Inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information; 500 people were trained in Mexico (300) and the Dominican Republic (200).⁶⁰

Training on Mechanisms and Strategies for the Promotion of Transparency and Integrity in the Latin American and Caribbean Countries was also delivered to 71 government officials and citizens through an online course. This training addressed the situation of corruption, prevention and promotion of integrity and transparency at a hemispheric and national level. A Guide was developed as a reference instrument for the exchange of experiences and best practices within the Member States on corruption control, transparency and the right to access public information.⁶¹ The Guide aims to research and publish studies on 24 Member States (13 published, 7 to be published, and 4 to be researched and published). In addition, a Methodological Framework for Capacity Building and Promoting a Culture of Transparency among Public Servants and Civil Society Organizations was also designed and applied in El Salvador and Bolivia within the context of the Country Strategy mentioned in project 2.4.1 “Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights.”

Outcomes

The approval of the Inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information by the OAS General Assembly in GA/RES. 2607 (XL-O/10) in Lima in June 2010, is an important initial outcome. The assistance provided to El Salvador in the implementation of the Law of Access to Public Information during 2011, which is a result of the guide developed for the implementation of the Model Law, is another considerable initial outcome of this project.⁶²

⁵⁸ http://www.oas.org/en/spa/depm/estrategia_gestion.asp

⁵⁹ Official form output for CIDA-Annex 1

⁶⁰ Subprogram 2.4 - Support Docs -P2-T4-S2-A1- Framework Transparency Report Inputs DIL ATI

⁶¹ Official form output for CIDA-Annex 1

⁶² A similar proposal was presented to the Bolivian Government for consideration. Bolivia is in the process of adopting a national law on access to information.

As mentioned in the project's reporting, following the on-line course developed for training on the contents, application and implementation of the Inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information, a research study was later completed with the contribution of CIDA, Canada, UNESCO and the UK Government through the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.⁶³ This led to the creation of another virtual course that was launched in October 2011 (31 participants).

Beyond those initial outcomes, it is almost impossible to measure whether this project contributed to effective and efficient public services by raising Member States' awareness of the importance of developing and strengthening institutional management. As in the other CP-financed projects, there was no follow-up of persons trained. Indeed, the absence of a systematic follow-up mechanism to measure what might have happened as a result hinders the evaluability of this project. For this reason, an effectiveness rating of "Moderate" was assigned to this project.

6.4 Program III: Strengthening Institutions for Development

Finding 6: The overall effectiveness of Program III is Moderate due to the significant variance in its projects' apparent outcome results.

In the CP Logical Framework, the immediate outcome of Program III is *Efficient and sustainable integral development achieved through capacity building of human resources and strengthened public institutions in OAS Member States*. Throughout the CP, the GS/OAS worked towards achieving a level of efficient and sustainable development through capacity building of human resources and strengthening public institutions in OAS Member States. Significant investments were made through the Cooperation Plan to help Member States tackle essential issues in development areas such as trade, migration, and corporate social responsibility. The Program's performance is rated as "Moderate".

Project 3.1: New Trade Developments in the Framework of Sub-Regional Integration Fora

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate-High

This project comprised five distinct components that can be considered as individual projects. For ease of reading, this section presents the achieved results (outputs and associated initial outcomes) for each of the five components/projects. Since those five components each achieved important outcomes, this project has been assigned an effectiveness rating of "Moderate-High".

New Trade CARICOM-Canada Negotiations

Outputs

This training "*Capacity building/consultation workshops on services and investment*" consisted of hands-on training bringing experts from CARICOM as well as other countries to strengthen capacity of government officials participating in the CARICOM-Canada negotiations. CARICOM countries were trained on the new developments related to the substantive elements of an investment agreement and investor-State dispute settlement procedures. Participants were provided with the required information to better define their common negotiating interests and objectives as part of a strategic framework, which is consistent with regional integration initiatives in the key areas of services and investment.

A study on market opportunities at the level of Canadian provinces and territories was also conducted for CARICOM countries' services providers. This study provided government officials with statistics and information on trade in services between each CARICOM country and Canadian province/territory.

⁶³ Official form output for CIDA-Annex 1

Outcomes

According to OAS staff, CARICOM negotiating teams were better prepared in the key areas of investment and services, which allowed them to agree on a common position for the first time and contribute to ensuring that the agreement was suited to their countries' development needs. Moreover, new funding from the Canada-Americas Trade Related Technical Assistance (CATRTA) Program, managed by the Conference Board of Canada (CBoC), was leveraged following this capacity building/consultation process.

New Trade Development / Capacity building in LAC

Outputs

This component consisted of delivering courses and workshops for government officials. Government officials were trained on: rules governing multilateral and regional trade, the management of investor-State dispute settlement procedures and dispute prevention, and innovation and transfer of technology systems to improve the capacity of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) to participate in the production and export of high value products and services. 100 were trained on the main issues of the current multilateral and regional trade agenda. Another 100 government officials were trained on investments to strengthen their capacity in managing investor-to-State disputes in the implementation of their recently signed trade agreements and investment treaties. Finally, 310 Latin American and Caribbean officials were trained on how intellectual property export strategies can help SMEs capture the intangible value of their products and services. This training was associated with a pilot project in Mexico that trained government officials at the state level on the agreements signed by the country.

Outcomes

According to OAS staff, trainees have contributed to strengthening organizations responsible for the design and administration of trade and innovation policies. Officials now ensure that new regulations are consistent with trade agreements, which helps avoid costly dispute settlement. A good example of greater preparedness is the establishment of *Alerta Temprana*, a mechanism established by Peru to ensure that government officials are better equipped and have access to a network of experts to ensure compliance with trade agreements in place as well as raise any issue that might emerge from other governments, ensuring that trade agreements are respected.

New Trade Development / Caribbean Economic Outlook

Outputs

Originally, this component was intended to be a study on competitiveness done in collaboration with the OECD, but it was realigned on the countries' and regional partners' priorities using the Inter-American Competitiveness Network (RIAC) to facilitate political dialogue of Caribbean Competitiveness Authorities and exchange successful experiences/best practices related to policies, programs and institutional frameworks to promote competitiveness. Two annual meetings of the newly created RIAC (11 countries in Atlanta 2010, 13 countries in Santo Domingo in 2011) devoted a specific section to Caribbean interests and concerns, allowing policy dialogue on competitiveness, analyzing competitiveness authorities in the region, exchanging best practices, and identifying how best to implement what already existed at that time. The meetings allowed the public authorities dealing with competitiveness and economic matters, Ministers and Vice-Ministers, Embassies and the private sector, to discuss and better understand the decision process needed to develop a public-private partnership on competitiveness.

Outcomes

As a result of this component, several countries undertook the creation of their own competitiveness organizations. For instance, Trinidad & Tobago created its first competitiveness authority⁶⁴ and took leadership by formally requesting to host the Americas Competitiveness Forum (ACF) and to serve as chair of the Inter-American Competitiveness Network (RIAC) in 2014. The Government of Saint Lucia has commenced work on the establishment of a National Competitiveness and Productivity Council.⁶⁵ The country is now going through a consultation process at the national level to analyze what model (public-private, just public, or just private) would best suit their needs.⁶⁶ Aruba, which is not a Member State but which participated in the 2010 event, also created a Council of Innovation and Competitiveness and has benefited from the exchange of practices and policy dialogue.⁶⁷ Similarly, Belize and Suriname, which already have bodies in this area, are working on improving those organizations to best use what they already have in place.

The countries also agreed on a document (The Santo Domingo Consensus) that includes ten principles based on regional priorities to stimulate innovation and improve sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean. These principles are a guide for countries aiming to improve productivity and prosperity in the 21st Century. These countries have agreed to use the principles as guidelines, with each country selecting one to three of these principles and including them in the national agenda.

The CP cannot claim credit for the national efforts of the Member States, but the policy dialogue and exchange of experiences at the regional level in RIAC have been contributing factors to developments related to institutional strengthening of competitiveness organizations in the region.

New Trade CARIFORUM Implementation

Outputs

The Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) serves as a base for economic dialogue with the European Union. Established in 1992, its membership comprises the 15 Caribbean Community states, along with the Dominican Republic. In 2008, they signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union, the first reciprocal trade agreement negotiated by CARICOM. Following this trade agreement, the CARICOM Secretariat and the OECS Secretariat reached out to the OAS to help them identify the legislation they must change/adapt in order to bring them into conformity with the European Union, and therefore develop an implementation mechanism. The OAS hired an expert who examined the countries' laws and regulations to plan how to adapt and draft the required legislation.

In this context, the CP initiative trained government officials in the CARICOM countries and the Dominican Republic and provided them with the updated Schedules of Tariff Liberalization commitments (at the CET 8-digit level) required to comply with their obligations under the CARIFORUM-EC EPA and the notification obligations under the WTO. The CP also supported two in-depth studies to identify required changes to current laws and regulations in Belize and the OECS countries to comply with obligations under the EPA. A three-week course on the implementation of trade obligations was also delivered with CP support.

⁶⁴ <http://www.newsday.co.tt/businessday/0,135574.html>

<http://pesrga.gov.tt/news/2011-01-22-council-competitiveness-and-innovation>

⁶⁵ http://www.stlucia.gov.lc/pr2011/september/cabinet_approves_establishment_of_national_competitive_and_productivity_council.htm

⁶⁶ http://www.finance.gov.lc/press_releases/view/28

⁶⁷ <http://www.arubaherald.com/politics/1462-ncic-decree-on-innovation-2012-to-be-presented-during-innovation-summit-on-november-14.html>

Outcomes

According to OAS staff, those countries now comply with their obligations under the CARIFORUM-EC EPA and the notification obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁶⁸ This component of the project probably contributed to the strengthening of the countries' institutional capacity to ensure compliance with their obligation under the CARIFORUM-EC EPA by reinforcing their standing as trusted trading partners, avoiding unnecessary risks of disputes, and preparing them to take advantage of a solid legal framework for promoting foreign investment and taking advantage of trade opportunities.

New Trade Development / Marginalized Groups

Outputs

To ensure that micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME), small producers, and marginalized groups would benefit from trade opportunities, the CP project established a dialogue among MSME high-level authorities to exchange successful experiences/best practices related to policies, programs and institutional frameworks and promote MSME competitiveness, innovation and participation in international trade. As inputs to dialogue, the project documented replicable and successful programs to promote MSME exporters and carried out pilot initiatives to illustrate models of assistance for MSME internationalization (such as: participation in value chains and cooperatives; mentoring programs; and the use of intellectual property tools to harness the intangible value of distinctive products).

Outcomes

The project provided OAS Member States with a space to exchange successful experiences and best practices related to policies, programs and institutional frameworks to promote MSME competitiveness, innovation and participation in international trade. As mentioned in the CP Final Report,

This culminated in the adoption of policies to promote MSME competitiveness and participation in the benefits of trade. This initiative serves to highlight the advantages of the OAS's convening power as a hemispheric political forum.

As an example of the initial outcomes of this project, 500 organic quinoa producers from the Puno region of Peru, led by a woman producer, strengthened their organization by turning it into a cooperative (COOPAIN-Cabana) that is now successfully participating in international market opportunities. Building on this success, CIDA financed the Canada-Americas Trade Related Technical Assistance (CATRTA) Program,⁶⁹ funded a project to support COOPAIN-Cabana to export to the Canadian market, and expanded the intervention to the organic mango producers of the Piura region at the request of the Peruvian Ministry of Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR).

⁶⁸ The EPA solves a long running dispute between the EU and ACP and other developing countries. Under WTO rules developed countries must treat all developing countries equally rather than favour those where they have historical or cultural links, as was the case with the Cotonou trade arrangements. This led to years of legal wrangling and complaints from non-ACP developing countries that undermined security for ACP traders and investors. The EU and ACP therefore agreed with other WTO members to negotiate new WTO-compatible trade arrangements under a special waiver from their WTO commitments that expired in 2007. To comply with WTO rules and continue to provide the ACP with preferential EU market access, EPAs must establish a Free Trade Area that opens up "substantially all trade" between the ACP regions and the EU. They do this immediately by opening on the EU side and gradual change on the ACP side. EPAs also make full use of the provision in WTO rules for exclusions, safeguards and monitoring to protect sensitive and emerging industries.

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_141029.pdf

⁶⁹ CARTRA is managed by the Conference Board of Canada (CBOC).

Project 3.2: Inter-American Program on Migration Policies, Legislation and Requirements (Legal Database on Migration Law) / Management, Administration & Coordination of the Inter-American Program on Migration

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate-Low

Outputs

The Migration and Development Program comprised various components geared towards building an international migration information system for the Americas..

The CP initiative supported the report on the implementation of the first phase of the system, which is named *Continuous Reporting System on International Migration in the Americas*, SICREMI for its acronym in Spanish. The SICREMI aims to contribute to the monitoring of international migration movements in the region through rigorous and up-to-date information on migration flows, principal policies and programs which governments of the hemisphere direct towards an ever-growing migrant population both in the countries of the Americas themselves and in the countries of destinations of their emigrants.⁷⁰

The main output of this first phase of the project was the first SICREMI report, which was developed by the OAS in close collaboration with the OECD, following its Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI), which provides an information exchange mechanism to its Member countries through a network of national level correspondents that produce an annual national report on migration. The SICREMI also produced nine national reports, in close collaboration with the national correspondents, which constituted the input for the first SICREMI report.

As part of the implementation of the system, the OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan also supported the development of two sub-systems that contributed to the preparation of the national reports. One is the Database of Legal Frameworks, Regulations, Policies and Programs relating to Migration in the Americas (MILEX) and the other is the Interactive Map of Temporal Work Programs for International Migrants (MINPET). Both databases are updated based on the information provided by the national correspondents and working closely with national officials related to the themes. They also serve as a tool for participating countries to learn about other regional practices.

The CP project supported “Youth on the Move,” a joint initiative of the OAS and the Young Americas Business Trust (YABT) that promoted the development of young entrepreneurs through programs and projects in the areas of leadership and networking, training, technology and strategic partnerships. Youth on the Move encourages and facilitates local market access for young people at risk of emigrating. It reportedly helped create partnerships and collaboration among international organizations, academic institutions, youth cohort and public and private entities to:⁷¹

- Diagnose the conditions and reasons why young people move and identify and locate organizations working in the field of youth and migration;
- Compile and document cases of domestic and international study, results and best practices on the issue of youth migration to establish successful strategies and enhance international cooperation, design a training plan skills for young people; and
- Develop an action plan to increase participation of young migrants in current programs, design new programs and tools to support organizations that are working with youth.

⁷⁰ International Migration in The Americas; SICREMI 2011 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/36/48423814.pdf>

⁷¹ REPORTE Programa “Juventud en Movimiento”
http://www.migracionoea.org/documentos/REPORTE_CIDA_YouthOnTheMove_V8.pdf

According to the project's report "*REPORTE Programa - Juventud en Movimiento*" most activities have been completed. However, the report does not provide information on what has been achieved as a result of the project.

In line with the objective to promote the labor and human rights of migrant workers in the Americas, the Migration and Development Program also held three technical seminars within the framework of the Special Committee on Migration Issues.⁷² During the seminars, 25 experts presented topics such as return migration, extra-continental migration, and horizontal cooperation in migration management. Aide-memoires were compiled and published for each seminar and can be found, alongside videos of the presentations, on the Migration and Development Program's website, which was completed within this project.

Various other activities and outputs were completed, such as the development of an integral care model for women victims of violence in the Tijuana area; the promotion, education and dissemination of Human Rights of labor migrants (Annual Session IAPM); and the development of technical cooperation agreements with ILO, IOM, ECLAC, OECD, and IDB.

Outcomes

Some initial outcomes were identified. For instance, the national correspondents' network has proven to be a useful mechanism to work with national organizations that produce information on migration. Participating countries have improved their capacity to produce and systematize administrative records on migration, with the technical assistance of the SICREMI specialists and the exchange of experiences among country correspondents in the technical workshops organized by the project. In turn, the collection and systematization of migration administrative records has contributed to the participating countries' knowledge of their situation. Additionally, technical exchanges on migration administrative records management have taken place among participating SICREMI correspondents, who are officers of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior, or to central statistical offices. Finally, the first SICREMI report has been successful in using administrative records combined with other more traditional sources of data on migration to follow main tendencies of international migration flows. For the first SICREMI report, nine Member States participated by naming a correspondent, attending the technical seminars and contributing the information for the national reports that were produced in conjunction with the SICREMI specialists. For the second report, nine additional Member States joined the project. The third technical seminar was attended by national correspondents of 18 Member States that, together with the OAS and OECD specialists, established the technical grounds for the second report, to be launched in September 2012.

The OAS Migration and Development Program (MIDE) has targeted areas that respond directly to different mandates of the Inter-American Human Rights of Migrants, including Migrant Workers and their Families Program. According to the Project Manager, it aims to promote a constructive dialogue among the countries of the region with the goal of advancing towards the creation of basic understandings, standards, and guidelines for future regional cooperation that stimulates controlled, orderly and safe migration and that promotes migrants as political, economic, cultural and innovative actors fundamental to the stimulation of human and economic development, in both the societies of origin and destination. However, it is difficult to assess whether the Migration and Development Program has contributed to the achievement of such outcomes due to the output-oriented nature of this project, as well as the absence of monitoring. For this reason, an effectiveness rating of "**Moderate-Low**" was assigned to this project.

⁷² Consultant's report p.125

Project 3.4.1: Inter-American Collaborative Networks Program

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate

Outputs

The main objective of the Inter-American Collaborative Networks Program (IACNP) was to establish a mechanism for strengthening existing collaborative networks and developing new networks in new priority areas, as established by OAS mandates and specific sectoral needs.⁷³ The IACNP has sought to build capacity, strengthen public institutions, share information and build consensus for stronger development policies. Eleven networks were supported throughout the CP (see Exhibit 6.2) and various activities and outputs were completed under each network (see CP Final Report to CIDA).

Exhibit 6.2 Inter-American Collaborative Networks Program

IACNP
INDM – Inter-American Network for Disaster Mitigation
ECPA – Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas
IASJN – Inter-American Scientific Journalism Network
Culture in Development: an Inter-American Information Network
Network Based Capacity Building on Social Protection Strategies in the Caribbean
RIAL – Inter-American Network for Labor Administration
Early Childhood Education Network
STEN – Small Tourism Enterprise
ITEN – Inter-American Teacher Education Network
Cooperanet – Inter-American Cooperation Network
RIAC – Inter-American Competitiveness Network

Outcomes

The document *Inter-American Collaborative Networks: Lessons Learned*,⁷⁴ produced by the Executive Secretariat for Integral Development (SEDI), provides examples of how OAS support has contributed to: i) strengthening capacity and collaboration among organizations, ii) helping agenda setting and disseminating relevant knowledge for policymaking, iii) fostering ownership among members and stakeholders, and finally iv) creating new horizontal cooperation projects and initiatives to improve national strategies and coordinated frameworks in key development areas. However, the diversity, complexity, and ample scope of work and outreach of those networks, coupled with the absence of monitoring and follow-up mechanisms, make it difficult to assess the extent to which CP support contributed to these results. In the case of the newly developed networks, it is considered that the CP contributed to achieving the results. Subsequently, an effectiveness rating of “**Moderate**” was assigned to this project.

According to the lessons learned document and interviews with OAS staff, the IACNP has contributed to strengthening participating Member States’ organizations by providing them with technical assistance and capacity building. For instance, the Network Based Capacity Building on Social Protection Strategies in the Caribbean has probably contributed to improving organizational capacity by providing ongoing training and technical assistance on social protection in the region. Each participating Caribbean country developed

⁷³ Inter-American Collaborative Networks: lessons learned. P.4

⁷⁴ The Inter-American Collaborative Networks: lessons learned.pdf

a national work plan outlining how the knowledge acquired during training would be applied and incorporated into its institutional operations. In addition, according to the report, surveys were used by the RIAL to determine how its activities improved the capacity of participating organizations. Data from the survey showed that as a result of participating in the network, Member States had “*greater knowledge and additional tools in Ministries for the fulfillment of their functions, development of new products, services, or programs, creation of Ministry areas, offices, or units, review, modification and/or improvement of programs in execution, design, modification and/or improvement of internal processes, design or improvement of training activities for officials, reform of the regulatory or legislative framework, enhanced capacity to identify cooperation priorities and needs, greater communication and cooperation between each Ministry and its peers within the region.*”⁷⁵ The report also highlights how the networks have encouraged collaboration and partnerships among OAS Member States’ policy makers and key development stakeholders. For instance, the ITEN – Inter-American Teacher Education Network “... *built partnerships with organizations from different sectors for project collaboration, resulting in useful resources for its members, facilitation of shared programs, and enhanced communication across sectors. Partners include the University of Pennsylvania’s Executive Leadership Program, the International Education and Resource Network, the World Bank, Teachers Without Borders, Fundación Telefónica, the Program for Revitalization of Education in Latin America and the Caribbean (PREAL), and CARICOM.*”⁷⁶

The IACNP provided space for regional dialogue and agenda-setting on key development topics. The Inter-American Scientific Journalism Network (IASJN) hosted regional seminars for knowledge exchange among key players in different sectors and to connect members from different countries. An important initial outcome observed was the establishment by attendees of seminars of their own country-level workshops on scientific journalism in four countries: Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Colombia. Another example is the establishment of linked energy innovation centers by participating Member States and the newly established Mexican Energy Efficiency Working Group, all with the purpose of sharing experiences and relative strengths among participating members and stakeholders. In addition, as a result of the support to the Early Education Childhood Network, the Caribbean Work Group agreed to consult other Caribbean countries so that a consolidated and appropriate strategy for the needs of the sub-region could be established.⁷⁷ The countries recommended increasing the budget and carrying out specific advocacy actions with the Heads of State and Government; monitoring the quality and content of information in communications regarding early childhood development. Four objectives for carrying out campaigns were proposed. Similarly, the Latin American Work Group proposed to develop a communications strategy with the objective of positioning early childhood in the political agenda.

The IACNP also supported community building by setting and disseminating norms and standards, encouraging participation, and increasing trust among members. For instance, OAS support to the Inter-American Competitiveness Network has contributed to increase the number of participants in the Americas Competitiveness Forum from 37 to 89, as well as the number of Member States represented, which increased from 23 to 30 between 2009 and 2011. The number of Ministers participating at the Meeting of Ministers of Economy, Industry, Finance and Trade, an event associated with the Americas Competitiveness Forum, also increased from 15 in 2009 to 18 in 2011. This greater involvement of Member States and institutions is reflected in the Member States’ interest in hosting the annual meeting of the network and the Americas Competitiveness Forum. Colombia will host the initiative in 2012, Panama in 2013, and at least three countries have expressed interest in being the host country in 2014. In addition, usage of the website, Observatory of Competitiveness in the Americas (www.RiacNet.org), increased considerably – from 2,777 monthly visits in May 2010 when it was launched, to more than 70,000 in

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ FINAL _Informe OEA de REDES de Comunicacion_lima 2008_ESP 14nov (3)

November 2011. The IACNP also supported the establishment of the Voluntary Contribution Fund whereby Member States became financial contributors to the Inter-American Network for Labor Administration, thereby ensuring its sustainability.

The IACNP also fostered the creation of new horizontal cooperation initiatives to improve national strategies and coordinated frameworks in key development areas. A good example is the Early Flood Warning System's Regional Platform for the Central American Isthmus and the Dominican Republic, developed through the Inter-American Network for Disaster Mitigation. This online database was developed in collaboration with the national emergency systems and national hydrometeorological institutes of eight participating countries. Furthermore, as a result of training received through the Network Based Capacity Building on Social Protection Strategies in the Caribbean, three countries have designed and started implementing local initiatives that were inspired by the knowledge acquired from their experience in the network. The programs are: Koudemain Ste. Lucie (St. Lucia), Bridge Jamaica (Jamaica) and RISE-UP (Trinidad and Tobago). Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname are at various stages of designing programs at national level to incorporate the lessons learned from the network. Additionally, the mechanism for knowledge exchange provided to over 105 small hotel owners in 13 different member countries through the Small Tourism Enterprise Network led to the creation of a new initiative in Central America and the Andean region of South America by enabling the Central American Small Tourism Enterprise (STEN) to share its experience with two other sub-regional networks. Similarly, as mentioned in the New Trade Development project, the participation of Trinidad and Tobago in RIAC helped it launch its new Competitiveness and Innovation Council in January 2011. Finally, Member States that participated in the *Culture in Development: an Inter-American Information Network* highlighted the importance of promoting horizontal cooperation such as bilateral technical missions to share experiences and improve the design and the implementation of new public policies. Although bilateral cooperation missions were organized among Member States, the Evaluation Team could not identify what happened as a result of those missions.

6.5 Program IV: Gender Equality and Vulnerable Groups

Finding 7: The overall effectiveness of Program IV is Moderate-High. The projects under this program contributed to integrating gender and inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and Afro-descendants as crosscutting themes in GS/OAS programming and in some Member State organizations.

Program IV aimed at providing support for gender mainstreaming efforts within the OAS and Member States, as well as promoting social inclusion and more equitable access to OAS activities for vulnerable groups (including indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants). The overall performance of the Program is rated “**Moderate-High**”.

Project 4.1: Incorporation of gender analysis and gender equity and equality as crosscutting topics and objectives in all OAS programs

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate-High

This project aimed to support the institutionalization of gender equality and women's rights in the work of the OAS through the development of capacity and the creation of concrete reporting mechanisms.⁷⁸ It was comprised of four distinct projects executed by the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM) and one by the Department of Planning and Evaluation (DPE).

⁷⁸ CP Final Report p.155

Outputs

Building capacity on Gender

As a first step of the subprogram, a training needs assessment on gender equity and equality was conducted with OAS staff to identify gaps in knowledge and opportunities for capacity development. According to OAS staff, the needs assessment also served to determine the extent to which OAS Secretariats and Departments had integrated gender in their strategic and operational planning and program cycle. It allowed identifying persistent barriers to the full integration of gender issues, as well as good practices, in adopting a gender perspective. Based on the results of the needs assessment, a training workshop was developed and a guide for the integration of a gender perspective in policies, programs and projects in the OAS was prepared and published by the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO). To address the gaps identified, OAS developed four training workshops with OAS staff from Human Resources, Public Security, Effective Public Management (civil service and civil registry), and Economic Development, Trade and Tourism. In addition, a more in-depth workshop was organized with “gender facilitators” from different OAS departments, designated by their Department head as the “focal point” for gender issues.⁷⁹

Development of gender indicators

The main output of this project, which was carried out by the Department of Planning and Evaluation, was the development of a module on gender indicators and its inclusion in the Handbook on Mainstreaming Gender Equality in the OAS Project Cycle.

Development of an Online Course

Through this project, a virtual course on gender mainstreaming in projects and policies was developed based on the manual prepared for the workshops, as well as the above-mentioned manual on incorporating gender in OAS projects, prepared by the DPE. According to the Subprogram Manager, the course modules, with associated evaluation module and guide for tutors, have been developed and should be accessible on the Educational Portal of the Americas in 2012. The course will be offered to all OAS staff and interested individuals from the Member States.

Development of Online Systems

To foster dialogue and exchange of information on gender mainstreaming in OAS work among the workshops participants and staff members, the CIM established a virtual space “OAS Gender Community of Practice”. OAS staff are expecting to be able to launch both tools, the virtual space, and the virtual course towards the end of April 2012, using the same virtual platform.

Ministerial Meetings

This component’s main activity was the Ministerial meeting held by CIM on women and political participation and women and security in the 21st century. It also conducted a classification of OAS mandates according to gender equality concerns and identified gaps in order to orient future policy and advocacy work, and did follow-up work on specific priorities and gender-responsive language to the Summit Implementation Review Group.

⁷⁹ Secretariat of External Relations (1), Executive Secretariat for Integral Development (5), Secretariat for Political Affairs (3), Secretariat for Administration and Finance (3), Secretariat for Legal Affairs (1), Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (7), Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (1). Also, staff of the Inter-American Commission of Telecommunications (2), the Inter-American Commission of Ports (1), and the Summit Secretariat for the Americas (1) participated in this activity.

Outcomes

All OAS staff members interviewed noted that the project encouraged OAS efforts to advance gender mainstreaming within the OAS's policies and programs. It reinforced gender mainstreaming as a priority issue within the work of the organization. A greater willingness on the part of OAS departments to incorporate gender dimensions and objectives into project documents, as well as a greater demand from OAS staff for technical support have been observed. Additionally, a Task Force on the Professional Situation of and Opportunities for Women in the OAS was created within the Staff Association. According to OAS staff, this Task Force, which lobbies for an increase in the number of women in senior management positions in the OAS, as well as the adoption of work-life balance policies such as flexible work hours and paternity leave, can be seen as a direct outcome of the OAS Gender Program. Based on the project's contribution to advance gender mainstreaming within OAS's policies and programming, we assigned an effectiveness rating of **“Moderate-High”**.

Several departments have approached the CIM Permanent Secretariat requesting technical support and expressing their interest in working on collaborative projects and other efforts. These include the Department of Public Security; Department of Economic Development, Trade and Tourism; Summits of the Americas Secretariat; Department of Special Legal Programs; Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation, Inter-American Children's Institute; and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Similarly, a higher than usual number of OAS departments and entities responded to the CIM request on the implementation of the Inter-American Program on the Promotion on Women's Human Rights and Gender Equity and Equality (IAP), which reflects the increased importance that has been given to this mandate by OAS senior management. The Executive Secretary of the CIM also highlighted that several ministerial meetings are integrating at different degrees a gender perspective and rights-based approach within their agendas, which is reflected in their declarations and plans of action (including the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor, the Meeting of Ministers of Public Security, the Meeting of High Authorities on Competitiveness, among others). Similarly, the CIM Strategic Plan 2011-2016 includes among its areas of actions, the institutionalization of a rights-based and gender equality approach.

Project 4.2: Strengthening of women's rights and promotion of gender equality Phase I- Advancement of gender equality within a decent work framework

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate-High

Outputs

As noted in the CP Final Report, this project was jointly designed by the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM) and the Department of Social Development and Employment (DSDE) to support the implementation of the “Strategic Guidelines for Advancing Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination with a Decent Work Framework,” adopted by the XV Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor (2007). The project aimed to contribute to strengthening the institutional capacity of OAS Member States, through their Ministries of Labor, to effectively mainstream gender in their policies and programs on decent work.

In this project, four sub-regional workshops were conducted in 2010 on strategic planning, which included a gender perspective, for government officers of the Ministries of Labor and their counterparts in the national mechanisms of women (NMW) or Ministries of Women Affairs.⁸⁰ A report was produced for each workshop as well as a follow-up report on the methodology implemented, steps taken by the Ministries of Labor and NMW as a result of the workshops' findings and recommendations, good practices and lessons learned.

⁸⁰ Caribbean (Guyana, April 2010), Central America, Mexico and the Dominican Republic (El Salvador, May 2010), the Southern Cone countries (Paraguay, September 2010) and the Andean countries (Ecuador, October 2010).

Additionally, a study “Advancing Gender Equality in the Context of Decent Work” was prepared by the CIM with the support of DSDE and the International Labor Organization (ILO) for the purpose of the Inter-Ministerial Dialogue contemplated between the ministries of both sectors (labor and women affairs), that took place on 1 November 2011 within the XVII Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor in El Salvador.

Outcomes

According to OAS staff members, the four sub-regional workshops contributed to improving the participating Member States to advance gender mainstreaming in the Ministries of Labor towards achieving decent work. It also encouraged and strengthened inter-sectoral cooperation at the national and sub-regional levels. Additionally, it established an informal focal point network through the gender and labor technical officers trained. Finally, it strengthened the cooperation on gender between CIM, OAS and ILO. Based on the project’s contribution to advance gender mainstreaming within OAS’s policies and programming, we assigned an effectiveness rating of “**Moderate-High**”.

Participating countries have expressed the importance of having a follow-up phase for this project, which can continue to be promoted under the auspices of CIM/OAS, the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor (IACML) and its RIAL network. Almost all of these Member States requested support, ranging from modest requests (e.g., for additional training manuals and other documentation or frameworks for evaluating the impact of gender-responsive labor policies) to more ambitious proposals, such as support for establishing gender units or divisions within Ministries of Labor. In order to assess the workshops’ quality, a questionnaire was circulated to the Ministries of Labor in order to identify specific needs (in terms of information, capacity-building, accountability, etc.) related to the implementation of what was learned during the workshops. At the time of writing, the results of these questionnaires are being compiled into a report that will later guide the formulation of a project proposal that aims to build on the gains made by the current project.

Project 4.3: Strengthening Capacity of Law-Enforcement Officials, Judges, Prosecutors in the Caribbean to Prevent and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP), especially Women and Children

Effectiveness Rating: High

As noted in the CP Final Report, this project was designed to prevent and combat trafficking in persons (TIP) by increasing awareness and strengthening the capacity of police, prosecutors and judges from the English-speaking Caribbean Member States. It also promoted information exchange among participating countries and cooperation among Caribbean law enforcement agencies.

Outputs

As a first step, a tool-kit was developed to train law enforcement officials, judges and prosecutors in Caribbean countries. The tool-kit comprised training materials, modules, and curricula for “train-the-trainers”, a pocket-book guide and training videos about criminal investigation procedures, all with the purpose of strengthening the capacity of officials in enforcing laws against human trafficking (police officers, migration officials, customs officers, judges, and prosecutors). In addition to implementing the training activities in the selected Central American countries, the Department of Public Security (DPS) with the participation of the ministries of national security, convened in each country a high-level meeting with representatives from the chiefs of police offices, police academies, immigration and/or custom offices, prosecutors’ offices and courts. These high-level national meetings permitted the DPS to formally present the training materials to government representatives and provided an opportunity for the DPS to promote the tool-kit’s inclusion in the training curricula of police academies and/or training centers that address security issues. Through those meetings, over 100 focal points were also identified to promote cooperation and information exchange on trafficking in persons and/or the prevention, identification and protection of

potential victims through networking among the participating countries. The DPS distributed this networking list of government officials from the law enforcement and judicial sectors to Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, and the Dominican Republic) to encourage collaboration and communication efforts between the Caribbean and Central America.

Outcomes

Among the initial outcomes that have taken place as a result of the training seminars, the Government of the Dominican Republic has formally expressed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DSAC/DAM 15719, June 17, 2011) its interest in reproducing the materials as training tools to support additional training activities organized by the offices of the Attorney General, Immigration and Judicial System:

Es importante resaltar, que los textos y material audiovisual utilizados en esta capacitación y facilitados por la OEA a este Ministerio serán reproducidos como herramientas de trabajo en otras capacitaciones que se desarrollen para continuar formando al personal de las áreas del Ministerio Público, Migración y Sistema Judicial del país.

[...] los mismos han sido utilizados en el Programa de Capacitación y Actualización Consular de la Escuela Diplomática y Consular del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores para formar e instruir al personal del servicio exterior. En tal sentido, el Gobierno de la República Dominicana ha realizado un aproximado de 10 capacitaciones desde el año 2008 a la fecha, entrenando a más de 400 funcionarios consulares y diplomáticos [...]

En ese mismo orden, dichos materiales fueron solicitados por los funcionarios consulares en Saint Marteen, Curazao, Haití, Jamaica y Puerto Rico [...].⁸¹

Similarly, the Office of the Vice-President of Guatemala, in a note dated 7 November 2011 (SVET-VP-285-11) expressed interest in receiving additional training for law enforcement and immigration officers: “*Por lo que por medio de la presente, solicitamos su valioso apoyo para saber si es posible que la OEA, venga a impartir esta capacitación a Guatemala en la primera o segunda semana del mes de diciembre, de igual forma necesitamos conocer los pasos a seguir y los requerimientos para que dicha capacitación se pueda llevar a cabo*”.⁸²

Suriname also proposed the incorporation of the OAS training manual in the curriculum for the training of their police officers, immigration officers, labor inspectors and customs officers⁸³ and requested OAS assistance to translate the material to Dutch and help in conducting the training. Similarly, Saint-Vincent and the Grenadines expressed in an official communication to the project coordinator, that its Police Department has incorporated aspects of Human Trafficking in their Police Training School’s curriculum, as well as established a focal point on the issue.⁸⁴

According to OAS staff, the training most probably contributed to the incorporation of a legal framework in the juridical systems of some countries, such as Antigua and Barbuda, and the Bahamas. In the case of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the training directly contributed to the establishment of a legal framework process in relation to TIP. Moreover, the country has ratified the convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime (2000), and the protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime (2000).⁸⁵

⁸¹ Oficio OEA0001.prf

⁸² CARTA OEA.doc

⁸³ Proposals Train.Sem 27-28 April.pdf

⁸⁴ St.Vincent HL Meet.Annex 2.pdf

⁸⁵ Ibid

Because the identified outcomes achieved are directly related to strengthening capacity of English-speaking Caribbean Member States institutions in preventing and combating TIP, we assigned an effectiveness rating of “**Moderate-High**”.

6.6 Program V: OAS Institutional Strengthening/Capacity Building

Finding 8: The overall effectiveness of Program V is rated Moderate-Low. Crucial activities and outputs were partially implemented, which limited the extent to which the projects achieved results.

Program V aimed at strengthening and modernizing GS/OAS in the areas of strategic planning, financial and human resource management, results-based management and communications. The overall performance of the Program is “**Moderate-Low**”.

Project 5.1: Development and upgrading of effective tools for management and human resources practices leading to the implementation of IPSAS

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate-Low

Outputs

In its effort to improve efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, equity and accountability in the management of the General Secretariat of the OAS, the Secretariat of Administration and Finance (SAF) developed and upgraded tools for Management and Human Resources practices.⁸⁶ The first component of this project was the simplification of contracting mechanisms through the harmonization and standardization of contracting processes for human resources. The main outputs were the drafting of three contract types (single, staff and performance), the development of a matrix of current types of contracts and their associated benefits, as well as the development of a comparative analysis based on benchmarking of benefit packages with other international organizations (UN, IDB and World Bank).

To develop a Single HR Hiring System, SAF conducted benchmarking with the same international organizations to review their hiring processes and instruments. It also drafted a new workflow of processes and a new automated process for recruitment and selection of candidates, and mapped all HR processes for the employee life cycle phases.

In addition, the SAF implemented a Position Control System including Standardized Job Descriptions (SJD) and templates defined for each grade within the Professional and General Services categories. Hence, the SAF now has positions created, position code segments assigned, position hierarchy completed and control transactions tested in the HR Test Instance. A proposal for a Post Classification Policy and a proposal for Standardized Job Titles (SJT) Policy under UN classification standards were also completed. Standardized requirements for every position are now in place and SAF is training the OAS departments to use them.

Finally, three pilot projects were designed and implemented to test the Standardized Jobs Descriptions and titles. The results were analyzed in order to implement improvements in the SJD and SJT.

Outcomes

Because the activities and outputs were partially implemented, the extent to which the project has achieved results is relatively low. For this reason, we assigned an effectiveness rating of “**Moderate-Low**” to this project. The SAF staff noted that the organization now has an informatics system in place, allowing better control of information and generating better reports to inform the organization on its performance, thus

⁸⁶ CP Final Report p178

increasing its accountability to Member States. In addition, 90 per cent of staff members now have objectives in the system⁸⁷ and will be evaluated this year; for the first time the system will allow evaluation results to be linked to salary increase.

However, Missions to the OAS generally indicated a lack of transparency in the financial information presented by the General Secretariat (including to the Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Affairs [CAAP]) and were not aware of the specifics of the CP. This may be due to the fact that the CP was primarily supply-driven, and did not invite expressions of interest from Member States; and/or may reflect a lack of communications expertise on the part of the GS, as some GS officials stated that the information is always submitted to the CAAP.

Project 5.2: Strengthening of RBM systems for strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation

Effectiveness Rating: Moderate-Low

Output

This subprogram's main objective was the institutionalization of Results-Based Management within the GS/OAS by developing the capacity of relevant staff members and implementing reporting mechanisms. Functions such as strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation were addressed by the DPE to develop and establish a harmonized RBM system. The mechanisms to record and monitor activities were standardized and strengthened to meet internal and external needs and requirements. To support the institutionalization of RBM principles throughout the departments and secretariats, OAS staff in charge of project management and resources administration were trained as part of the CP implementation, based on newly-developed material. In addition, the OAS purchased integrated management software that supports RBM; however, it has not been exploited to its full potential. An exercise in priority setting was also carried out with the Member States for mandate classification and control.

Outcome

At the time of writing, the RBM system is still under development. However, most outputs were not implemented throughout the CP due to diverging reporting expectations between CIDA and OAS (as explained in chapter 9. An initial decision was taken to not require CP-financed projects to be submitted to the CEP nor monitored using the IPEP, which may explain why there are no project concept notes, ex-ante project documents, and little in the way of reporting on results. Budget cuts of almost 50 per cent as well as the delay in disbursements (which made the funds unavailable during the first year of the CP) hindered the implementation and use of the newly developed RBM system under the CP. For this reason, we assigned an effectiveness rating of “**Moderate-Low**”.

Project 5.3.1: Development and systematization of a communications strategy

Effectiveness Rating: Low

Outputs

This project involved the development and systematization of an OAS communications strategy by developing and implementing communications outreach branding tools and a web content management system. To support the development of the OAS communications strategy, guidelines for the GS/ OAS were developed and implemented. The design and production of OAS communication tools (programmatic, internal communications and newsletter) were streamlined and standardized to OAS organizational guidelines. In addition, many activities and products were produced to highlight the organization's successes for its 100th anniversary. For instance, the Secretary General Annual Report was published and

⁸⁷ The objectives of staff members of national offices have not yet been entered in the system.

an event organized. A communications strategy was also designed for the CIM. National Office websites were developed and social media websites were dedicated (and are updated daily) to the OAS, and training on website maintenance was delivered to relevant staff.

A Content Management System that automatically links content in the entire OAS website was designed and customized for the organization but was not implemented. With external support, a “look and feel” initiative was developed to harmonize the OAS’ organizational image. Subsequently, guidelines and web governance (established through an Executive Order) now provide guidance on the organization’s institutional image. Finally, a new organizational website was launched in four official languages, and other OAS websites were updated and redesigned according to the institutional image guidelines.

Outcome

According to OAS staff, this project contributed to the “branding” of the OAS and to some extent helped increase the organization’s outreach. Unfortunately, due to a leadership change during the CP’s implementation, the extent to which the desired initial outcomes were achieved has not met expectations. Apparently the new leadership was less committed to the project than the previous one.

As of January 2012, the Strategic Communications Department has been eliminated. The activities and functions have been reassigned to other departments and the Secretariat of External Relations now runs the main webpage. Unfortunately, there is still much to be done to harmonize and standardize the OAS’s institutional image and fully implement its communications strategy. With little internal capacity, resources, and the Content Management System not implemented, there is little chance that initial outcomes will be achieved in the future. For all these reasons, we assigned an effectiveness rating of “**Low**” to this intervention.

7. Appropriateness of CP Design

7.1 Overview

Appropriateness of CP design is closely linked to the context in which the Plan came to life and had a trickle-down effect on the evaluability of the CP's overall performance.

Over the past 15-20 years, development practitioners have come to refer to the “three Qs” – quality at entry, quality of supervision, and quality of results – as keys to the development impact of programs and projects.

Quality at entry refers to quality of project design, and in recent years development agencies have amassed significant statistical evidence that project design matters greatly. For example, statistical analyses carried out by the World Bank's independent evaluation office (Operations Evaluation Department – OED) of information collected over a number of years indicated that a well-designed project has a significantly higher likelihood (88 per cent) of attaining its expected outcomes than a poorly designed one (40 per cent).

Exhibit 7.1 provides an analysis of the CP design in terms of the elements generally considered in determining the quality of design of an intervention. As there were no project documents on which to base this analysis, the Evaluation Team based its assessment on stakeholder interviews and a review of documents gathered during the data collection process. The sections that follow describe some aspects of these elements in greater detail.

Exhibit 7.1 Summary Analysis of the Design of the CP

Design Element	Analysis
Strategic relevance and approach	See section 7.2. Except for Program 1, which supports core functions of the GS, there is no clear link between the expected outcomes of the CP programs and the strategic goals of the OAS, since there is no specification of the latter.
Program rationale	At the program level, the “problems” that constituted the CP's raison d'être were surely identified in the course of the ongoing dialogue between CIDA and the General Secretariat. Nonetheless, the lack of specificity of the CP's outcomes makes it unclear whether those “problems” would be addressed adequately through the CP's design. At the project level, for most CP-financed projects, there is no (clear) statement of the problem(s) to be addressed.
Sequencing and complementarities among outputs and outcomes	Given the general nature of the CP's stated outcomes, it is uncertain or even doubtful that all necessary elements and/or outputs required to achieve them were included in the CP's projects.
Funding arrangement	The funding arrangement selected for the CP – that of an unaccountable grant, as opposed to a more cumbersome specific contribution agreement – implied a risk due to the incipient reorganization and administrative reforms begun by the Secretary General just prior to Plan inception. Yet it is evident that there were few, if any, risk management measures taken by CIDA, at least in terms of CP design specification. (See Finding 10)
Utilization of lessons learned	Most of the CP-financed projects were based on on-going activities of the General Secretariat, some being a continuation and others representing a considerable expansion. Although there is no documentation explicitly identifying lessons learned, there is some evidence that lessons were reflected in the design of the CP.
Stakeholder consultation and ownership by beneficiaries	In general, the CP was supply-driven (see Finding 9 below). Missions to the OAS that were interviewed had little knowledge of the details of the CP, other than when a CP-financed project benefitted the corresponding country.
Partnership arrangements with other donors	Several CP-financed projects made use of complementarity arrangements with the OAS's other development partners, but it is uncertain whether this was done systematically to encourage synergies and sustainability.
Technical rationale	There was no clear “technical rationale” for the approach proposed.

Design Element	Analysis
Performance assessment of beneficiary organizations	With the possible exception of project 2.4.1 (Bolivia), analyses of the institutional capacity of beneficiary agencies and plans for addressing any shortcomings in them are nonexistent.
Evaluability ⁸⁸	Inadequate effort was made to specify CP outputs and outcomes, and they cannot be unambiguously ascertained at the time of CP completion.
Provision for data collection and processing for M&E	No provisions were made for data collection, processing and utilization.
Clear specification of roles of agencies engaged in implementation	The implementation responsibilities of beneficiary agencies or units were not clearly identified.
Provisions to ensure sustainability of benefits	The design of the CP did not contain features aimed at ensuring its sustainability.
Risk (assumptions) identification and management	The CP did not identify assumptions/risks, nor provide measures to mitigate important risks that could be mitigated, and failed to provide an indication of the risks that could not be mitigated.

7.2 Program Strategy and Logic

Finding 9: There are significant limitations to the CP design due to the lack of an overarching theory of change and the absence of an overall strategy, rationale and explicit program intervention logic that clearly explains how CP programming is intended to contribute to results (immediate, intermediate and final outcomes).

Theory of Change and Program Logic

The CP lacks a blueprint of the building blocks required to achieve its long-term goals – often referred to as a ‘theory of change’ that depicts the causal links from inputs to activities, outputs, and culminating in outcomes.⁸⁹ Without a plausible theory or chain of results, it is difficult if not impossible to attribute any results to the CP.

Immediate Outcomes⁹⁰

The LFA Logic Model approved by CIDA on 4 December 2008 (shown in Exhibit 7.2) makes little sense as a logic model, mainly because the Immediate Outcomes are not achievable “immediately,” and are also absent any indicators or targets. For example:

- **Immediate Outcome 3** related to Program III: Efficient and sustainable integral development achieved through capacity building of human resources and strengthened public institutions in OAS Member States.

⁸⁸ Evaluability: Logical or results framework that include: (a) a clear definition of the project’s expected outputs, with indicators and targets that are measurable; and (b) a clear definition of the project’s expected outcomes, with indicators, baselines and targets that are measurable.

⁸⁹ ActKnowledge and Aspen Institute. 2003. Theory of Change. Roundtable on Community Change. <http://www.theoryofchange.org/>.

⁹⁰ CIDA defines immediate outcome as a change that is directly attributable to the outputs of an organization, policy, program, or initiative. In terms of time frame and level, these are short-term outcomes, and are usually at the level of an increase in skills, awareness, access or ability among beneficiaries. (See CIDA’s Business Process RoadMap.)

This "immediate outcome" was supposed to be achieved originally with an investment of approximately CAD 5.5 million, largely in training, development of websites, and collaborative networks – a result that cannot be attributed to such a small investment.⁹¹

In addition, the wording of this immediate outcome is faulty, because the use of “achieved through” reflects results at two and possibly three levels – capacity building of human resources, leading to strengthened public institutions, in turn leading to efficient and sustainable integral development.

- **Immediate Outcome 1:** Reinforced political role of the OAS and a strengthened and productive Summit of the Americas Process (SOA).

The first part of Immediate Outcome 1 – “reinforced political role of the OAS” – to be achieved with an investment of CAD 3.7 million does not seem attainable immediately and would not be attributed to the CP. In light of external events such as the establishment of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008 and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC) in December 2011 – both of which pointedly exclude Canada and the United States – perhaps this outcome should have at best specified a North-South political role for the OAS.⁹² But even if the investment is to *contribute* to this “immediate outcome,” how is it to be measured?

Also included in Immediate Outcome 1 is the Summit of the Americas (SOA) process, which appears to be highly valued by OAS Member States and has received substantial technical support from the General Secretariat with the addition of CP resources. At the time of writing however, achieving this part of the outcome (productive SOA process) is debatable because of the issue of whether Cuba should be invited to attend.

Describing results in a Logical Framework can be difficult as it implies demonstrating that the beneficiaries’ behaviours changed as a result of the CP. To address this limitation, one project, the “*Development and implementation of judicial reform to promote access to justice and legal assistance to disadvantaged groups*” redefined its planned outputs, outcomes and indicators at midterm, in order to be able to demonstrate the progress achieved. The documents provided to the Evaluation Team did in fact show how the project could demonstrate results by country, as well as by outcome.

Intermediate and Final Outcomes

In other parts of the Logical Framework, the so-called Intermediate Outcomes appear to be mainly restatements of the Immediate Outcomes rather than longer term outcomes. The Final Outcome is unrealistic and, by referencing reduced poverty, is largely unrelated to the results chain up to the Intermediate Outcomes.

⁹¹ Phrased another way, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to specify an adequate indicator for this “immediate outcome,” unless only a few selected government agencies were targeted.

⁹² See, for example, Michael Shifter, “The Shifting Landscape of Latin American Regionalism” in *Current History*, February 2012, pp. 56-61.

Exhibit 7.2 LFA Logic Model approved by CIDA on 4 December 2008

Final Outcome – Improved democratic governance and reduced poverty and inequity in the Americas.				
Intermediate Outcomes				
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The OAS is an effective interlocutor for democracy promotion in the hemisphere and to advance the hemispheric agenda. 2. Enhanced democratic governance and more effective development programming in OAS Member States. 3. Efficient, effective, transparent, equitable and accountable management and governance of the OAS General Secretariat. 				
Immediate Outcomes				
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reinforced political role of the OAS and a strengthened and productive Summit of the Americas Process (SOA). 2. Enhanced democratic processes and effective and sustainable expansion of the political, civil and social aspects of citizenship in OAS Member States. 3. Efficient and sustainable integral development achieved through capacity building of human resources and strengthened public institutions in OAS Member States. 4. Gender equality is integrated as a crosscutting theme in the OAS General Secretariat and OAS programming; and consideration is given to the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and Afro-descendants issues in OAS programming. 5. OAS General Secretariat is strengthened and modernized in the areas of strategic planning, financial management, results-based management and communications. 				
Main Outputs				
Outputs from the five OAS Programs will be used to align and achieve results on the Intermediate and Immediate Outcomes. For instance, results in programming to combat trafficking in persons would be in Outcome 2; anti-corruption could be in both Program 2 and 3; ministerial dialogue and follow-up in Program 1 and 3; support to public institution and capacity building in Program 2 and 3, etc.				
<p>Linked to Immediate Outcome 1</p> <p>Enhanced OAS capacity for engagement on substantive, critical and/or urgent political topics.</p> <p>Coherence between and among OAS policy dialogue opportunities i.e. Summit, Ministerial, General Assembly.</p> <p>Increased provision of technical support, coordination, information exchange, reporting and monitoring related to the Summit Process (SOA)</p> <p>Processes and frameworks put in place to facilitate effective participation and engagement of stakeholders including civil society.</p> <p>(Program 1, 3, 4, 5)</p>	<p>Linked to Immediate Outcome 2</p> <p>Framework and fora developed to identify democratic gaps, opportunities, priorities.</p> <p>Initiatives developed and implemented to increase government transparency and accountability.</p> <p>Initiatives developed and implemented to expand citizenship.</p> <p>(Program 1, 2, 3, 4)</p>	<p>Linked to Immediate Outcome 3</p> <p>Training material, courses, seminars, workshops developed and delivered to stakeholders in OAS Member States in support of reducing poverty and inequity in OAS Member States.</p> <p>(Program 1, 3, 4, 5)</p>	<p>Linked to Immediate Outcome 4</p> <p>Gender analysis tools and training activities are developed and applied, including gender sensitive results indicators, guidelines and accountability mechanisms.</p> <p>Mechanisms are developed to facilitate inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and Afro-descendent issues.</p> <p>(All Programs)</p>	<p>Linked to Immediate Outcome 5</p> <p>Development and upgrading of effective tools for management and human resources practices leading to the implementation of international standards.</p> <p>Results-based management (RBM) systems (including strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation) strengthened and implemented.</p> <p>OAS-wide communication strategy and outreach programs developed and implemented.</p> <p>Information security systems updated to international standards.</p> <p>(All Programs)</p>

CP Relevance to Organizational Strategy

The General Secretariat does not have a formal, written, organizational strategy for the conduct of its activities, though a priority-setting exercise was conducted with Member States to support the orientation of the organization. The Deloitte & Touche Management Study (November 2003), the Due Diligence Report prepared by Kenneth Dye (June 2006), and the Consultancy to review the Organization of American States-CIDA Working Relationship prepared by Cowater International (November 2006) highlighted the lack of a systematic strategic planning process (organizational culture of results-based management) and results/performance orientation. Thus, the GS/OAS is unable to demonstrate its results achievements and its capacity to plan and manage for results to its stakeholders, whether Member States or donors (see side bar).

While one can understand how the political nature of the OAS makes agreement difficult on such an overall organization strategy, at the technical and project level, the absence of a strategy for the General Secretariat and especially for its offices, secretariats and departments is problematic, as it prevents projects from being anchored to specific organizational objectives and targets, and for the various projects undertaken in the CP to complement each other in pursuit of specific objectives. The absence of a driving strategy for projects also has several potential implications, notably the difficulty of selecting projects that support the OAS's core areas of business, avoid duplications and/or redundancy with activities of other agencies, align staff competencies and expertise with projects on hand and, therefore, permit efficiency gains.

Deloitte & Touche Management Study – Major Themes⁹³

The organization's mission, objectives, and priorities are not clear.

The OAS' mission, strategic objectives, and priorities are not clearly defined, and not clearly understood by the Member States and General Secretariat managers and staff. Many of the individuals interviewed have a general view about the mission and priorities, but also stated that insufficient clarity is damaging the organization's focus and effectiveness. Many pointed to the lack of prioritization among mandates as a prime example. As one Member State representative said: "if everything is a priority then nothing is a priority."

There is no systematic strategic planning process to guide the organization.

There is no strategic planning process in place to identify the Organization's most critical objectives and priorities, and to allocate resources to those priorities in a rational, systematic, and disciplined manner. Nearly every manager and staff member interviewed stated that the allocation of resources (budget and staff) at the General Secretariat is not linked to the organization's priorities. Instead, most said that resources are allocated by historic tradition and political strength.

Consultancy to review the Organization of American States-CIDA working Relationship – OAS Challenges⁹⁴

Lack of Strategic Framework

Development programs should be based on a strategic plan established for the organization as a whole and for the individual secretariats. At this time strategic plans are virtually non-existent and the ones in place are not results oriented so, however many projects are generated and approved, the programming is not coordinated and fails to form a coherent whole. Project development would be more aligned with OAS objectives if the projects fell within a program framework set out in a strategic plan including a well-conceived and focused results statement rather than, as tends to happen at present, responding to donor priorities.

Lack of Results/Performance Orientation

Evaluation of projects is absent at the OAS. Important lessons to be learned and shared are unavailable because no evaluation of activities is carried out. Even more critically, results achieved at project level cannot be rolled up to show or measure cumulative performance at the program, unit, and organizational levels.

⁹³ OAS Final Part I v2.ppt. p.9.

⁹⁴ Consultancy to review the Organization of American States-CIDA working Relationship.p.4

7.3 Funding Arrangements

Finding 10: The funding arrangement selected for the CP – that of an unaccountable grant – implied taking a risk that was not properly managed.⁹⁵

Prior to the CP, the Secretary General had embarked on a reorganization and reform of the General Secretariat that, among other features, led to the establishment of the DPE, as well as two related mechanisms – the CEP project evaluation mechanism (2005) and the IPEP monitoring instrument (2008) – to begin the process of institutionalizing results-based management and MfDR. These were somewhat new and relatively untested at the time the CP was agreed to by the parties, but interviews at both CIDA and the GS failed to answer two questions that, depending on the responses, might have helped mitigate the results-based management risk involved in the approval of a grant:

- 5) From CIDA’s standpoint, even though it was to be grant funding, should CIDA have suggested that the various CP-funded “projects” be held to the same accountability, quality, monitoring and reporting requirements embodied by the CEP and the IPEP for other GS projects? Had CIDA suggested this, it probably would have led to improvements in the design of the various CP-financed interventions, even though these mechanisms may not have been sufficiently tested at the time.
- 6) From the General Secretariat’s standpoint, to the extent there was at the time genuine interest in building a results-based management or MfDR “culture” through the above-mentioned mechanisms, even if there was no requirement from CIDA to do so, why not require the CP-financed “projects” to be submitted to the CEP and to adhere to the IPEP-based monitoring requirements, thereby contributing to the implementation and strengthening of results-based management at the General Secretariat?

The due diligence-related risk had been clearly identified in Kenneth M. Dye’s Due Diligence Report of June 2006:

“Until the OAS completes its reorganization and administrative reforms, CIDA can continue to use the cumbersome contribution agreements or take the risk of using grants. Using unaccountable grants will not satisfy all the Treasury Board due diligence requirements at this time, but as a practical solution, the risk is low. Given that contribution agreements are a burden on both CIDA and the OAS, I think it is acceptable to use grants over the next few years given that Latin America is a priority for Canada, the Secretary General is vigorously addressing the administrative issues....”

While the Dye report refers mainly to financial and accounting issues, there were obvious results-related risks stemming from the non-existent or weak design of the CP. Moreover, it became clear through interviews that while the assumption could have been valid that an OAS staff member identified might be held responsible for ensuring proper accounting of the use of CP funding, this individual apparently had no instructions in regard to, nor was he in a position to implement, results-based processes that should have been brought to bear in the implementation of the CP.

Moreover, the Cowater Report (November 2006) stated as follows:

“Taking into account the options identified, the proposed approach would entail frontloading support for OAS institutional strengthening, since such support would enhance the ability of the OAS to meet a number of core conditions for a more strategic institutional partnership including capacity for strategic planning, results-based management and performance

⁹⁵ See Kenneth M. Dye, “Consultancy to Review the Organization of American States-CIDA Working Relationship – Due Diligence Report,” June 30, 2006.

measurement, as well as improved financial management and accounting systems. CIDA would provide highly targeted programmatic funding for democratic governance on a multi-year grant basis. Until such time as it is possible to provide an unqualified due diligence report, grants would be conditional on annual assessments of progress with the OAS institutional reform and strengthening processes.”⁹⁶

The above recommendation would have meant starting implementation of the CP mainly with Program V – OAS Strengthening/Capacity Building – but in fact, as will be shown later in this report, Program V was started late and some of the funding intended for it was reduced and transferred to other Programs.

⁹⁶ Cowater International Inc., “Consultancy to Review the Organization of American States-CIDA Working Relationship,” November 2006, p. vii.

8. Sustainability of the Effects of the Cooperation Plan

This chapter addresses the sustainability of CP results.

Finding 11: The sustainability of individual interventions varies among the five CP programs examined; those that supported the OAS political role and the Summit of the Americas process, as well as those that involved capacity development, had greater likelihood of being sustained.

CP interventions used diverse strategies to improve the likelihood of continued long-term benefits. The in-depth review of sampled projects shows that some interventions have a greater likelihood of sustaining results over time. Generally, most results achieved by Program I are likely to be sustainable over time, as they support the OAS's core political functions. Similarly, results achieved in projects aimed at strengthening OAS systems and internal capacity (Programs IV and V) should be sustainable if the strategies, systems, tools, processes, etc. are fully implemented and maintained. In the case of Programs II and III, it is considered that both show moderate sustainability.

Sustainability of Various Approaches

One type of intervention found throughout the CP and OAS work is the use of forums and/or open dialogues to bring together regional stakeholders and address key development issues related to democracy, governance, trade, human rights, etc. In some cases, this type of intervention was effective in achieving sustainable results (see sidebar).

Most of the interventions reviewed were focused on capacity development, technical assistance and transfer of knowledge to selected stakeholders through capacity strengthening activities, sometimes coupled with other outputs. This strategy led to sustainable results in some cases, as many beneficiaries of those capacity strengthening efforts have in turn fostered change within their organizations or institutional environment. Interventions that have achieved sustainable results are shown in the sidebar. In addition, the assistance provided to the collaborative networks led to some sustainable results (see outcomes in section 6.3).

Based on interviews and document review, it is evident that the GS/OAS has not yet internalized and systematized some key practices that are prerequisites to sustainability of development interventions (e.g., stakeholder participation, ownership, resource utilization, institutionalizing change, etc.). However, it is beginning to bring key stakeholders on board, sometimes before starting an intervention. In interventions where the

New Trade Development / Caribbean Economic Outlook project

The facilitation of political dialogue through the Meeting of the Steering Committee of the newly created Inter-American Competitiveness Network on Caribbean Competitiveness Authorities contributed to the establishment of competitiveness organizations in Trinidad & Tobago and Saint Lucia and the strengthening of similar organizations in Belize and Suriname.

Examples of interventions that achieved some sustainable results

Inter-American Government Procurement Network (IGPN) / Municipal Transparency and Efficiency (MuNet)

Development and implementation of judicial reform to promote access to justice and legal assistance to disadvantaged groups

Inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information

New Trade Developments in the Framework of Sub-Regional Integration Fora

CARICOM-Canada Negotiations

Capacity building in LAC

New Trade Development / Marginalized Groups

Strengthening Capacity of Law-Enforcement Officials, Judges, Prosecutors in the Caribbean to Prevent and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP), especially Women and Children

GS/OAS encouraged beneficiaries' involvement from the start, establishing a sense of ownership at policy and practitioner level, the sustainability of results tends to be higher. Similarly, interventions where agreements were signed with beneficiary organizations, such as in the development and implementation of judicial reform to promote access to justice and legal assistance to disadvantaged groups, also tend to have improved sustainability of results.

Some CP interventions supported the development of tools, studies and reports to inform and raise awareness among Member States and different stakeholders on regional issues. In the sample of interventions reviewed, this approach had limited results when not supported by outreach mechanisms and/or capacity strengthening activities or technical assistance. Furthermore, the supply-driven nature and the broad approach of these interventions might also limit the continuation of benefits compared to more

focussed and demand-driven interventions. Therefore, the sustainability of interventions such as the Our Democracy Project and the Migration and Development Program is more likely to be low.

MuNet

While carrying out MuNet, the OAS ensured the ownership and interest of participating governments in helping municipalities by requiring a commitment of USD 100,000 per municipality and a team set up to support the intervention's implementation.

Development and implementation of judicial reform to promote access to justice and legal assistance to disadvantaged groups

The results achieved under this project are sustainable because the universities have pledged to continue the activities with their own resources.

Factors that inhibited sustainability

The CP design as presently conceived hinders the extent to which the interventions can be sustained over time. The CP includes multiple small-scale initiatives implemented across a multitude of areas or sectors without necessarily focusing on the OAS' competitive advantage, such as those included in Program I (Policy Dialogue, Summit of the Americas, and emerging priorities) and Program II (electoral systems, observation and registry and human rights and judicial reform). While the GS/OAS makes good efforts to partner with government counterparts or other key stakeholders and establish good practices, interviews and document review have highlighted GS/OAS' limited capacity to achieve clear, expected and sustainable results. This reflects the organization's difficulty in developing an intervention logic that identifies links to upstream and institutionalized results at the policy and practitioner levels. Consequently, most interventions have largely been limited to building the skills and understanding of individuals rather than achieving higher organizational results or institutionalizing change. Even if it is not within the power of the CP on its own to bring about substantial change, it would have been useful to undertake more analysis and develop outcomes with clear indicators that could realistically be achieved and sustained over time. This is related to the lack of an overarching strategy that defines the ultimately desired capacity development outcomes of the OAS's work in the region (see Chapter 7).

In reviewing the sampled CP interventions, it is evident that other factors also hinder the sustainability of results over time. For example, one factor is the lack of planning for ongoing funding. Many projects would not have been implemented were it not for CIDA's funding of the Cooperation Plan, and now that the CP has been completed, many interventions have stopped or have been put on hold, waiting for additional resources. Some Project Managers were hired specifically to coordinate the different initiatives, but future funding is not guaranteed for all these initiatives in a context where CIDA now has different priorities. If the interventions cannot be sustained by the forthcoming CP, sustainability will become a real problem. Another related issue is the extent to which the GS/OAS will be able to address the expectations of Member States that some CP projects might have created.

9. Efficiency of the Cooperation Plan

9.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an assessment of the appropriateness of resource utilization, value for money, and implementation management of the CP interventions reviewed.

Efficiency: How economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.

OECD DAC Glossary

The Evaluation Team could not conduct an in-depth review of the efficiency of each CP intervention – first because it was limited to data collection at the GS/OAS level, and also due to the lack of a basis for assessment and evaluability issues. Consequently, it used financial statements to assess the appropriateness of resource utilization and used financial information provided by project managers on the total cost of each output to assess the value for money of the projects.

9.2 Appropriateness of Resource Utilization

Finding 12: During the CP, sound financial practices were applied to most activities and outputs. However, some major changes in the appropriation of funds for some CP programs and projects limited the effectiveness of some interventions.

Interviews with OAS staff show evidence of sound financial management. With very few exceptions, most activities and outputs were completed within budget, and some interventions were efficient despite delays or management changes (see sidebar).

The majority of OAS staff interviewed noted that CP implementation was hindered by delays in CP disbursements that resulted in funds not being available during the first year of the CP. These delays do not seem to have affected the extent to which results were achieved, except in the project “Strengthening of RBM systems for strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation,” where the delay limited the extent to which results were achieved.

Development and implementation of judicial reform to promote access to justice and legal assistance to disadvantaged groups

When the project was transferred to the DSDE in March 2010, it had organized a workshop at the offices of the OAS, and had prepared, negotiated and signed cooperation agreements with the National University of Asunción (UNA) and the University of El Salvador (UES). The project had not yet begun specific activities with the universities.

By 2011 the project had caught up on implementation; it had activities in four countries and had achieved a good number of initial outcomes, indicating that this intervention was managed efficiently.⁹⁷

However, some significant changes in the planned budgets of some CP programs and projects were cited as a reason that not all expected outputs were achieved. For example, Program I received an additional CAD one million and both Program III and V lost approximately CAD 1.5 million. Exhibit 9.1 shows the original, modified, and final appropriations of the five CP programs, based on the financial statements from 10 July 2008 (inception), 31 August 2009, and 30 June 2011. Furthermore, as shown in Exhibit 9.2, the allotment among projects also changed significantly in some cases.

⁹⁷ An amount of approximately USD 40,000 had already been spent when the DSDE took over the project in March 2010.

Exhibit 9.1 Changes in the Appropriation of Funds to CP Programs

Program	Original Appropriation (CAD)	Original Appropriation (USD)	Reprogramming (USD)	Modified Appropriation 31 August 2009 (USD)	Final Appropriation (CAD)	Difference (CAD)
I	2,500,000	2,251,287	9 90,566	3,241,854	3,438,497	938,497
II	7,000,000	6,303,604	(21,062)	6,282,542	7,033,221	33,221
III	5,500,000	4,952,832	(913,482)	4,039,350	4,015,865	(1,484,135)
IV	1,500,000	1,350,772	2 70,154	1,620,927	1,657,128	157,128
V	3,500,000	3,151,802	(720,412)	2,431,390	1,928,178	(1,571,822)
Total	20,000,000	18,010,297	-394,236	17,616,063	18,072,889	-355,289

Exhibit 9.2 Changes in the Appropriation of Funds to CP Projects

Project	Financial statement ⁹⁸ (31 August 2009)		Financial statement ⁹⁹ (30 June 2011)		Difference (CAD)
	Line item included under the project	Modified Appropriation 31 August 2009 (CAD)	Line item included in the project	Final Appropriation 30 June 2011 (CAD)	
1.1 Support OAS engagement on substantive, critical, and/or urgent topics in the Hemisphere	P1-T1-S1-A1 & (A2) P1-T1-S2-A1 & (A2)	400,000	P1-T1-S1-A1 P1-T1-S1-A1	684,835	284,835
1.2 Support the OAS in its role as Technical Secretariat to the Summit	PI-2	900,000	PI-2	899,999	-
1.4 Development and implementation of mechanisms for strengthening civil society participation in decision making process	PI-4	600,000	PI-4	599,950	50
2.1.1 Our Democracy Project	P2-T1-S1 (OSG)	900,000	P2-T1-S1 (OSG)	1,008,041	108,041
2.2.1 Inter-American Government Procurement Network (IGPN) / Municipal Transparency and Efficiency (MuNet)	P2-T2-S2-A1 & (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) P2-T2-S3-A1 & (A2) (A3)	980,629	P2-T2-S2-A5 P2-T2-S3-A3	600,051	(380,578)

⁹⁸ SF-CIDA08-06 AUGUST31-09.pdf

⁹⁹ OASCIDA Financials063011.pdf

Project	Financial statement ⁹⁸ (31 August 2009)		Financial statement ⁹⁹ (30 June 2011)		Difference (CAD)
	Line item included under the project	Modified Appropriation 31 August 2009 (CAD)	Line item included in the project	Final Appropriation 30 June 2011 (CAD)	
2.3.2 Development and implementation of Judicial reform programs to promote access to justice and legal assistance to disadvantaged groups.	P2-T3-A2	512,000	P2-T3-A2	505,774	(6,226)
2.4.1 Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights	P2-T4-S1-A1 & (A2) (A3)	874,918	P2-T4-S1-A3	2,193,094	1,318,176
2.4.2 Inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information	P2-T4-S2-A1 & (A2)	170,000	P2-T4-S2-A1	199,999	29,999
3.1 New trade developments in the framework of sub-regional integration fora	P3-T1-A1 & (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)	1,000,000	P3-T1-A1 & (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)	998,737	(1,263)
3.2 LC-IAPM-Migration Policies, Legislation and Requirements (Legal Database on Migration Law) / IAPM- Management, Administration & Coordination of the Inter-American Program on Migration	P3-T2-S1-A1 & (A2) (A3) P3-T2-S2-A1 & (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)	1,041,000	P3-T2-S1-A1 & (A2)	1,008,397	(32,603)
3.4.1 Inter American Collaborative networks Program	P3-T4-A1 & (A2) (A3)	1,500,000	P3-T4-A1 & (A2)	1,507,623	7,623
4.1 Incorporation of gender analysis and gender equity and equality as crosscutting topics and objectives in all OAS programs	P4-T1-A1 & (A2) (A3) (A4)	200,000	P4-T1-A1 & (A3) (A4) (A5) P4-T1-A2-1	293,683	93,683
4.2 Strengthening of women's rights and promotion of gender equality Phase I- Advancement of gender equality within a decent work framework	P4-T2-S1-A1 & (A2) (A3) P4-T2-S2-A1 & (A2) (A3) (A4)	600,000	P4-T2-S1-A1 & (A2)	589,679	(10,321)
4.3 Strengthening Capacity of Law-enforcement Officials, judges and prosecutors in the Caribbean to identify and combat trafficking in persons, especially women and children	P4-T3-A1 & (A2) (A3) (A4)	600,000	P4-T3-A1 & (A2) (A3) (A4)	592,896	(7,104)
5.1 Development and upgrading of effective tools for Management and human resources practices leading to the implementation of IPSAS	P5-T1-A1	900,000	P5-T1-A1	616,037	(283,963)
5.2 Strengthening of RBM systems for strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation	P5-T2-A1	400,000	P5-T2-A1	398,599	(1,401)
5.3.1 Development and systematization of a communication strategy and outreach of the Organization	P5-T3-A1 & (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)	600,001	P5-T3-A1 & (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)	643,149	43,148

The most striking changes were the additional CAD 1.3 million to Project 2.4.1 (Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights) and CAD 284,835 to Project 1.1 (Support OAS' engagement in substantive, critical, and/or urgent topics in the Hemisphere). Some other important changes were withdrawals of CAD 380,578 for Project 2.2.1 (IGPN and MuNet) and CAD 283,963 for Project 5.1 (Development and upgrading of effective tools for management and human resources practices leading to the implementation of IPSAS).

The reasons and decision-making process that led to the reallocation of CP resources among the different interventions are not clear. GS/OAS Senior Management commented that Program and Project Managers could request authorization from the Chief of Staff, who, according to the grant arrangement, could authorize changes in budget allocations. However, the specific reasons for the reallocation of CP resources remain unclear.

For example, Program V, which had been recommended to be "front-loaded," presumably in view of its importance, had its original appropriation (CAD 3,500,000) reduced by almost 25 per cent during the first year and by 45 per cent (to CAD 1,571,822) by the end of the CP. One interviewee stated that the amount made available from the CP to complete project 5.2 was probably half of what was required. In order to cope with the limited budget and delayed disbursement, management was forced to downsize the project by eliminating the strategic planning component and reducing training activities.

The increase of CAD 1.3 million allocated to Project 2.4.1 bringing its allotment to CAD 2,193,094 (representing 11 per cent of the CP) could also be questioned on the basis of the number of Member States that it actually benefitted. As noted in the Effectiveness section, most activities in this project were carried out to support Bolivia in improving public management (some initial activities were carried out in El Salvador and Paraguay) and few initial outcomes were identified as a result of those outputs.

9.3 Value for Money

Finding 13: The value for money varied among the five programs. Programs I and IV are generally considered good value for money, while the interventions in other programs varied from good to low.

Generally, to achieve good value for money (VFM) an intervention must perform economically, efficiently and effectively in its use of resources, operations, and pursuit of its objectives (results). To assess whether an intervention achieved VFM, the Evaluation Team considered the outcome to expenditure ratio, which relates to the question: "What value did the organization obtain for its investment?"

The Evaluation Team considered each of the five programs separately to determine whether the identified outcomes achieved represent good value for the amount expended. Due to the severe limitations of this evaluation in terms of the availability of information, the Evaluation Team used financial information (total cost per output including other and in-kind contributions) provided by the managers in charge of each project.¹⁰⁰

Program I

All the interventions reviewed under Program I, whether they supported OAS engagement on substantive, critical and/or urgent topics in the Hemisphere, or its role as Technical Secretariat to the Summit, appear to have achieved good value for money. With the addition of US\$623,233 from the CP, the GS/OAS was able to respond quickly and effectively in the seven cases in which it was called upon to provide assistance in situations that affected the legitimate exercise of power or jeopardized the democratic

¹⁰⁰ The amounts provided by the Managers may differ from those found in the financial statement.

process in Member States. In addition, with the addition of US\$826,423 the GS/OAS was efficient and effective in assuming its leading role in establishing the hemispheric agenda, further institutionalizing the SOA, and following up on compliance with the mandates that came out of the Summits process from Mar del Plata (2005) to Port of Spain (2009).

Program II

The interventions reviewed under Program II vary considerably in terms of budget, types of interventions, objectives, and type of beneficiaries. In Program II, three out of five interventions reviewed represent good value for money.

The Inter-American Government Procurement Network / Municipal Transparency and Efficiency project was developed and implemented with a total budget of approximately US\$ 1,950,000 of which approximately US\$ 760,000 was provided through the CP. In the MuNet cases, important initial outcomes were identified in various Member States (140 municipalities were directly supported by MuNet). In addition, the initiative developed its own technology package (which includes a portal, a tool to manage procurement, a tool to put basic services online, a tool for online complaints and online municipal councils) and acquired IP rights in every Member States, therefore making it sustainable and relatively easy to scale-up without investing much more. In the case of IGPN, new resources were leveraged, partnerships developed and a new demand for training generated. Considering that both initiatives have contributed to their objectives, it is evident that this project has achieved good value (qualitatively and quantitatively) with a relatively small budget.

The Development and Implementation of Judicial Reform project can also be considered as an intervention that achieved good value for money. A total of US\$ 574,105 (including a contribution of US\$ 26,000 from IDB) was spent to develop and implement this intervention. By strengthening legal offices, signing agreements with universities and even scaling-up the initiative by implementing decentralized legal aid clinics and involving other local agencies, it is evident that this intervention pushed the agenda of access to justice and the protection of persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, workers, consumers, and women.

Similarly, the Inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information project and its Guide for implementation represents good value for money, as important initial outcomes were identified (see section 6.2). This intervention was carried out with a total budget of US\$ 148,838.

On the other hand, the Our Democracy and the Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights projects showed a lower level of results achieved at a higher cost. The Building Capacity in Public Administration to Foster Rights project, which achieved most of its results in Bolivia (far less for El Salvador and Paraguay) was developed and implemented by the CP at a total cost of US\$ 1,471,741. Approximately half of this amount was spent in organizing and conducting diagnosis within participating countries (missions involving 12 experts) and preparing associated documents and project proposals. Moreover, part of this amount (US\$ 154,628) was spent on providing 166 laptops and associated training to the Plurinational Legislative Assembly of Bolivia. However, as mentioned in the effectiveness section, there is no information that the intervention in Bolivia conducted a thorough analysis of the country's legislative processes and performance, or of the problems to be addressed, to warrant the investment in computer hardware, especially considering that the intervention was mainly focused on the executive branch of the Bolivian Government. Better use of this amount might have been made by financing one of the project proposals that was prepared following the mission. If the projects were to receive funding in the future, this project's effectiveness rating would be higher. This intervention was designed to provide participating Member States with outputs only (e.g., project proposals, frameworks, guides, workshops, etc.). In the absence of mechanisms to assist beneficiaries in achieving higher level results, very few outcomes were identified as a result of these various outputs, which questions the VFM achieved by this intervention.

For similar reasons, the value for money of the Our Democracy project is also questionable, although it received considerable attention and praise from Member States and from different stakeholders. Producing a report and pushing forward the necessary dialogue on such a vast subject makes it almost impossible to associate outcomes (other than initial outcomes) to the intervention. The project was executed at a total cost of US\$ 1,008,041.

Program III

The interventions under Program III varied in terms of value for money. Whereas the New Trade Developments and the Collaborative Networks projects seem to have achieved respectively good and moderate value for money, the data gathered on the Migration and Development Program leads us to question the VFM achieved by the project.

The New Trade Developments project had a total cost of approximately US\$ 2,215,000, of which US\$ 805,000, was provided by the CP, US\$ 1,080,000 by partners, and US\$ 330,000 by the GS/OAS (including US\$ 240,000 of in-kind contributions). Considering that for each component of this project, resources were used productively (i.e., most outputs were produced on time and within budget and additional financial partners were found) and various initial outcomes were identified, this intervention can be considered as having achieved good value for money.

The Collaborative Networks project had an execution cost of US\$ 1,395,739 which was spent to produce approximately 41 knowledge and information exchange products and 42 online courses and/or virtual forums. The initiative was mainly output oriented, although the documentation reviewed identified some initial outcomes for each supported or newly created network. The VFM of this intervention is considered moderate.

In the Migration and Development Program, various outputs were achieved at a total cost of approximately US\$ 732,000. Since no solid initial outcome was identified during the evaluation, the VFM of this intervention is considered low.

Program IV

All three interventions reviewed under Program IV are considered good value for money, as all of them reportedly achieved important initial outcomes at low cost.

- Incorporation of gender analysis and gender equity and equality as crosscutting topics and objectives in all OAS programs: US\$ 269,674;
- Strengthening of women's rights and promotion of gender equality: US\$ 589,679;
- Strengthening Capacity of Law-Enforcement Officials, Judges, Prosecutors in the Caribbean to Prevent and Combat Trafficking in Persons: US\$ 543,381.

Program V

At the time of writing, the three interventions reviewed under Program V were only partially implemented and had not yet achieved their expected initial outcomes; therefore the value for money is considered to be low. However, given that those interventions involve the implementation of strategies, systems and processes, if they were to be completed in the near future, the value would probably increase, as their implementation would likely result in achieving the initial outcomes.

10. Management of the Cooperation Plan

10.1 Management Structure

Finding 14: The fragmented management structure of the CP led to coordination problems and management inefficiency.

There is evidence that OAS and CIDA collaborated in designing the Cooperation Plan to make it as relevant as possible given both OAS' and CIDA's internal policies and procedures, priorities, resources and institutional cultures. However, the actual implementation of the CP was highly fragmented, and conducted by 10 different OAS Secretariats and Departments, which led to problems with coordination and efficiency.

While it should have been possible to aggregate the projects into "sub-programs" under each program, the multiplicity of individual "projects" (38) is striking. This was evident in the financial documents received, and was also apparent in the discussions with staff working in the various programs.

This fragmentation was also one of the major themes of the Deloitte & Touche Management Study conducted in 2003 (see sidebar).

Many of the OAS staff interviewed, including senior management, highlighted efficiency issues related to the OAS and CP structure. To foster exchange among interventions and among OAS departments, CP interventions were spread out among 10 different OAS Departments and Secretariats. This approach hindered sound management, supervision, communications and reporting – Program Managers and associated Project Managers were frequently working under different OAS Secretariats and different interventions in each CP Program were not always united in cohesive action geared towards the same goal. This highly fragmented approach led to increased transactions costs, including considerable time spent on inter-departmental coordination, and led to management-related inefficiencies.

One senior level OAS official emphasized that there were management-related inefficiencies, since not all staff working on a given project were supervised adequately as there was no specific individual or group responsible for managing and reporting. A telling example comes in the context of reporting. In some cases, although the CP interventions had been conducted, practically nothing was reported. On the other hand, some interventions, such as the New Trade Development and the Collaborative Networks, provided detailed documentation on the results of the interventions, identifying what had been achieved to date, the lessons learned, and the recommendations going forward. Unfortunately, this level of reporting was not the norm, as evidenced in interviews with CIDA managers and the Evaluation Team's document review. This suggests that the GS/OAS does not have (or did not use) the capacity and structure in place to gather data on results and report on them.

Major theme from the Deloitte & Touche Study¹⁰¹

The organizational structure is fragmented and roles and responsibilities are not clear.

The General Secretariat is organized and operates more like a consortium of independent elements than an efficient, coordinated organization. Lines of authority and accountability are unclear, and there is no Chief Executive Officer or Chief Operating Officer to provide overall management guidance and coordination across the organization. The Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General positions have evolved to focus primarily "externally" on political and member-state matters. These external affairs are clearly important, but no one has delegated authority to lead the various elements "internally". As a result, there is limited coordination and communication among the various departments and service areas, and there are competing interests and redundant functions throughout the organization.

¹⁰¹ OAS Final Part I v2.ppt

Another example of a structural/communications nature is the above-mentioned multiplicity of projects. While the financial statements present the CP as a combination of 72 distinct interventions, an evaluation prepared for the CIDA Evaluation Directorate identified 35 individual interventions. The Evaluation Team raised this issue with the DPE. Subsequently, a review of the CP-financed intervention was made and 38 distinct projects were identified (as some of the 72 interventions were activities of the same project).

Finally, as noted in the relevance section, it is questionable whether resource allocations among the various CP Programs matched some strategic criteria, such as the OAS's competitive advantage, areas of expertise of staff, or the demand for services of the Member States. This was also reflected in the Deloitte & Touche Management Study¹⁰² as well as in the 2006 Dye Due Diligence Report. As a result of not having an effective, organization-wide strategic planning process, resource allocations do not always reflect OAS priorities, and funds that should be supporting high priorities are sometimes siphoned away to support lower priorities.

10.2 Reporting

CIDA's Reporting Requirements

CIDA's Business Process RoadMap¹⁰⁴ produced by the Grants, Contributions and Contracting Management Division of CIDA's Chief Financial Officer Branch specifies the reporting requirements for all grant recipients. Strictly speaking, a grant recipient does not have to account for the funds provided; however, as a matter of policy all grant and contribution recipients are required to report on the progress and results achieved at either the project or program level. The sidebar shows CIDA reporting requirements for all grants. CIDA managers drew attention to the specifics of this grant arrangement. The CP, being bilateral money given to a multilateral organization, has more restrictions than other grants in terms of reporting on results at the organizational level and at the level of Member States. In this context, the OAS is required to submit progress reports on an annual basis, but this did not happen due to misunderstandings of reporting expectations, as discussed below.

CIDA's Reporting Requirements¹⁰³

Having made the decision to fund an organization through grants, strictly speaking, under Treasury Board regulations, CIDA does not need a detailed report on grant expenditures. However, because CIDA is accountable to Parliament and Canadian taxpayers for the money it spends, CIDA requires a report from the organization on results achieved and money spent. Normally this would be the organization's standard annual report.

In the case of grants, reports are to be provided on an annual basis; in the case of contributions, quarterly reporting is required. For those organizations operating on a calendar year basis, the funded organization's reports are due within 3 months after the end of their calendar year - by March 31st - with one exception: programs or projects lasting 12 months or less require that the report be submitted 3 months after the end of the program or project.

Finding 15: Differences in OAS and CIDA expectations and miscommunication regarding reporting requirements led to inadequate reporting on the results of the Cooperation Plan.

During negotiations for the CP, CIDA assumed the OAS would use results-based processes to manage the CP (see section 7.3). However, probably due to miscommunication and misunderstanding of the reporting requirements for grant arrangements (respectively from CIDA and GS¹⁰⁵) the GS did not use RBM

¹⁰² OAS Final Part I v2.ppt

¹⁰³ Ibid. p.61

¹⁰⁴ [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/RoadMap%202010/\\$file/V2-2010_RoadMap_Update_Program_English.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/RoadMap%202010/$file/V2-2010_RoadMap_Update_Program_English.pdf)

¹⁰⁵ During this period, CIDA was going through major reforming of its business processes.

principles and tools to design, implement, manage, or monitor the CP. Prior to the commencement of the CP, RBM training was provided to OAS managers. It is not clear if or how the training addressed CIDA reporting requirements, but a CIDA officer admitted they should have put more emphasis on these.

Nevertheless, when CIDA asked for a midterm report on CP results, the OAS report did not meet CIDA's requirements. The GS report was mainly focused on completed activities and some related outputs rather than initial outcomes. The performance management sheets provided to CIDA included activities but no information regarding achievements to date, indicators, or completed outputs. During the interviews at CIDA, managers assessed the level and quality of CP reporting as inadequate.¹⁰⁶ The absence of planning and design documents, weak reporting against results, and the lack of project monitoring were mentioned as important factors that hindered the OAS' ability to report on results in an effective manner.

10.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

Finding 16: The GS/OAS did not monitor the CP results. The GS/OAS's CEP evaluation mechanism and IPEP monitoring system were at an inception stage at the time the CP went into effect and were not applied to CP-financed activities.

Since the Cowater Report was published in 2007, the OAS has moved forward in developing its internal mechanisms and monitoring systems. However, the concerns and issues about OAS internal management that were raised by the 2003 Deloitte & Touche management study, the 2006 Due Diligence Report by Kenneth Dye, and the 2007 Cowater Report, remain relevant after the completion of the CP (see section 7.2).

In early 2005, the Office of the Secretary General led a restructuring that included the establishment of a "projects culture" spearheaded by the Department of Planning and Evaluation (DPE). This transformation included the requirement that all proposed projects, prior to approval, be submitted for review by an Evaluation Committee (CEP) that had been established formally in January 2006. DPE led the effort to ensure that project design and monitoring were results-based, through staff training in the use of instruments such as the logical framework for project design, and, in 2008, began the process of institutionalization of a results-based monitoring instrument (IPEP) to be applied regularly.¹⁰⁷

Surprisingly, it was decided that this requirement and monitoring instrument would not be applied to the Cooperation Plan. Consequently, the Plan and its projects do not have clear outcomes or outcome indicators and targets, nor were periodic reports submitted.

The OAS Final Report captured the above when indicating that "[r]esults monitoring of the Cooperation Plan was not a systematic exercise. There was only one mid-term institutional report since the beginning of the program in 2008. By then, the program had suffered several changes that were not captured and reported previously."¹⁰⁸

Finding 17: There was a general lack of post-activity follow-up and evaluation, especially significant in regard to training activities and websites, for management purposes as well as to determine the extent to which these activities might have benefitted government agencies.

In addition to the absence of monitoring the CP, there was a notable lack of post-activity follow-up and evaluation, most conspicuously in regard to training activities and CP-financed websites.

¹⁰⁶ Their judgement was based on the mid-term report only. At the time interviews were carried out at CIDA, the Managers had not yet received the CP Final Report.

¹⁰⁷ Interestingly, use of the IPEP began in 2008 in connection with projects financed by the Spanish Fund.

¹⁰⁸ OAS, Final Report, p. 37.

Many of the CP-financed projects included training activities, and the OAS Final Report indicates that a total of 5,091 persons received training.

While it was not possible, given time limitations, to estimate the total CP funding devoted to training activities, it was undoubtedly significant. Yet there was very little follow-up of either trainees themselves or of the organizations would presumably benefit from these training activities. In fact, other than first-level evaluations by the trainees – degree of satisfaction with the training received – there was no evaluation to measure the extent of learning that might have taken place, or any systematic effort to determine the extent to which trainees were using newly-learned skills on the job.

Another item that absorbed a significant amount of CP funding was websites (although we have not been able to calculate a total amount). However, in the CP-financed websites reviewed, website analytics were not used to manage the websites,¹⁰⁹ nor were the websites set up to take advantage of tools that track usage, so as to facilitate making appropriate adjustments. Most CP-financed websites did not seem to be planned as part of a strategic communications plan, and were not linked to or disseminated through other social media.

¹⁰⁹ The Evaluation Team requested this information, but project managers had not been gathering this information for the continued development of the websites.

11. Conclusions and Recommendations

11.1 Overview

In this final chapter of the report, the key evaluation findings are reformulated as overarching conclusions. The chapter also provides a set of forward-looking recommendations for GS/OAS, the evaluation client, with direct implications for other stakeholders, particularly OAS management and CIDA.

11.2 Conclusions

CP Context

The OAS/CIDA Cooperation Plan 2008-2011 aimed to advance democratic governance and more effective development programming in OAS Member States. The grant supported five overall program areas:

- The promotion of policy dialogue and Summit/Ministerial follow-up to reinforce the OAS as the principle multilateral forum in the Western Hemisphere and consolidate the Summit of the Americas process into the leading body for defining the agenda of the Inter-American system.
- The strengthening of sustainable democratic governance in the Americas to provide programming directed at the public sector institutions and civil society organizations of Member States in areas such as the modernization of the state, e-government, development of civil registries, judicial reform, anti-corruption mechanisms, and public administration including public oversight and transparency systems.
- The strengthening of organizations for development to provide programming directed at public sector institutions and civil society organizations of Member States that target human resources and organizational capacity building, the implementation of sound public policies and sustainable, efficient, effective and accountable programs to their citizens. This involved programming in areas such as disaster mitigation, social development, education, energy, the media, migration, trade and corporate social responsibility.
- The promotion of gender equality and vulnerable groups to provide programming to support gender mainstreaming efforts with the OAS' policies and programs, as well as to support the social inclusion and more equitable access for vulnerable groups, including indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants.
- OAS organizational strengthening to further consolidate GS/OAS efforts in areas such as strategic planning, project management, results-based management and reporting, financial modernization and human resources management.

The three-year initiative officially ended in June 2011, but CIDA granted a few months administrative extension to complete on-going activities. Financial support for the Plan amounted to CAD 20 million in voluntary funding.

The CP was created and evolved in a Hemispheric context characterized by increased attention to democratic governance on the one hand, and widespread acknowledgement of political and socioeconomic advancements on the other. The internal context at the GS/OAS was shaped by important events following the restructuring led by the Office of the Secretary General, the establishment of a “projects culture” spearheaded by the Department of Planning and Evaluation, the establishment of the CEP, and the commencement of the process of institutionalization of a results-based monitoring instrument (IPEP).

CP Performance

The evaluation's overall assessment of the CP is positive regarding its relevance and effectiveness; it is also positive for the GS/OAS to the extent that there is now a commitment to move towards institutionalizing results-based management and MfDR as the GS/OAS realizes that an RBM approach should have been taken (as suggested in the *CP Final Report*). The assessment is also positive regarding the efforts directed at the public sector and civil society organizations of Member States in e-government, judicial reform, anti-corruption mechanisms, and public administration including oversight and transparency systems. Furthermore, the evaluation noted that the majority of stakeholders consider the CP as having contributed significantly to promoting policy dialogue and Summit/Ministerial follow-up, as well as promoting gender equality and vulnerable groups. Whether the CP's effects will contribute to lasting changes in the Member States and the GS/OAS remains uncertain and will depend on future interventions.

The CP's existence has helped increase democratic governance and capacity building activities in the targeted sectors, with most activities being integrated into or linked to other existing or planned GS/OAS work. While the CP has contributed to building an evidence base for the empowerment of Member States' organizations (e.g., by broadening the pool of existing data, knowledge, and tools), more remains to be done, especially in transforming individual knowledge products created under the CP into evidence and applications that can be widely used and supporting the Member States in implementing them – promoting a sort of “demonstration effect.” Moreover, while the CP has helped to shift the OAS' organizational culture concerning RBM and MfDR, more needs to be done before the OAS can overcome its culture as a “political organization.” Also, the OAS's organizational capacity in applying RBM and MfDR principles still requires considerable strengthening.

The CP design was inappropriate given the lack of an overarching theory of change and the absence of an overall strategy, rationale and explicit program intervention logic. Factors limiting the CP's ability to realize its potential, especially regarding systematic tracking and reporting on results, have been noted.

Overall, the evaluation concludes that due to an inappropriate design and the absence of monitoring and evaluation complemented by systematic follow-up action, some of the CP's achievements will probably not have significant and lasting impact in the Member States.

11.3 Recommendations

Introduction

While the evaluation was a summative exercise, the Evaluation Team was asked to develop forward-looking recommendations to inform the GS/OAS's future work. Our recommendations are, accordingly, grouped into three areas:

- 1) Recommendations on GS/OAS follow-up actions;
- 2) Recommendations to the GS/OAS regarding the design of future efforts, addressing key factors likely to influence the sustainability of a future CP's effects and its longer term impacts; and
- 3) Recommendations on CIDA follow-up actions.

This section incorporates a review of key documents and interviews outlining GS/OAS's and CIDA's current thoughts on future directions, in particular the future Cooperation Plan under negotiation. Additionally, the 2003 Deloitte & Touche Management Study, the 2006 Due Diligence Report, and the 2007 Cowater Report were also considered as most of their findings and recommendations regarding human resources management, financial management, results-based management, monitoring and evaluation, reporting, and internal communication remain relevant as of early 2012. The recommendations below support or complement some of the core directions outlined by those documents and interviews, but focus on issues flowing from the CP evaluation findings.

GS/OAS Follow-Up

Recommendation 1: The GS/OAS should facilitate building a strategic partnership with donors by establishing an internal monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Findings 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 16

The three main donors (United States of America, Canada and Spain) each have their own priorities and interests. Voluntary contribution as a funding structure tends to increase stress on the Organization, due to different reporting requirements, which contribute to its inefficiency. In a context where the GS/OAS cannot or will not streamline its cumbersome number of priorities and mandates, the final choice as to what should and will be financed is left to donors. The establishment of an internal monitoring and evaluation mechanism, if it meets donors' basic requirements and information needs, can help reduce the workload.

Recommendation 2: The GS/OAS should develop a short-term strategic plan, including a rationale and explicit program or project intervention logic that clearly explains how OAS programming is intended to contribute to results (immediate, intermediate and final outcomes). Findings 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 17

The Deloitte & Touche Management Study (November 2003), the Due Diligence Report prepared by Kenneth Dye (June 2006), and the Consultancy to review the Organization of American States-CIDA Working Relationship prepared by Cowater International (November 2006) highlighted that such a strategic plan was required. Moreover, interviews with Missions to the OAS suggest that there would be receptivity to, and support for, an effort to develop a short-term strategic plan for the GS (not necessarily for the OAS) but this will necessarily be a function of the type of dialogue established for this purpose between the Missions and the Office of the Secretary General.

The strategic planning would be based on a streamlining exercise of OAS's priorities and mandates, conducted through extensive dialogue amongst GS/OAS and its Member States, a process that apparently has begun. Such a short-term (e.g., 2-3 years) strategic plan, with realistic priorities given the OAS's financial realities, would provide the different Secretariats and Departments with guidance to establish their respective strategic plans, allowing the Organization to concentrate its development work around shared priorities, limiting the multiplicity of projects and improving the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of its work. Based on this strategic planning process, GS/OAS should develop its overarching theory of change, overall strategy, rationale and explicit program intervention logic that clearly explains how OAS programming is intended to contribute to results (immediate, intermediate and final outcomes).

Recommendation 3: The GS/OAS should structure a centralized overall CP management system to clarify lines of responsibility and supervision and reduce transaction costs. Findings 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16

The OAS should consider implementing a more centralized management system for its programmatic work. This would enable better coordination of internal operations across departments. This more centralized management would also be responsible and accountable for providing the OAS Departments with programmatic guidance, managing donor relations (including coordinating fundraising and reporting), and ensuring that all projects respect internal control mechanisms in place as well as RBM and MfDR principles. OAS Departments would liaise with this centralized management to plan, design, implement and manage any development intervention. This would require continuing training of GS/OAS staff in project design and management, if possible by instituting some type of testing and certification. Senior management should also receive this training.

To facilitate the establishment of a strategic partnership with CIDA, the GS/OAS should designate a focal point for managing all external relations with the donor inside this centralized management.

Design of Future Efforts

Recommendation 4: The GS/OAS should front-load RBM/MfDR and strengthen DPE as the RBM/MfDR focal point. RBM/MfDR principles should be applied to any future CP from inception (see CIDA Process Roadmap 2010)

Installing RBM/MfDR cannot be grass roots-led; rather, it needs to be championed at the very top level of the GS, namely by the SG himself. Moreover, it cannot simply depend on mid-level champions or resource persons; senior management needs to be trained and thoroughly involved in this process. Staff training needs to be strengthened, but it should be emphasized that senior management at the GS – who are normally loathe to admit that they require training – also requires training, including perhaps in-service training at other multilateral organizations which are proficient in RBM. Additionally, the following should be considered:

- Developing a proper Logic Model as a general guide, but with a performance management framework or logical framework – this Logic Model should clearly express the intervention's logic and the specific "problems" to be addressed;
- Requiring all initiatives financed to be programmed as projects, each with complete logical or results framework and preliminary implementation plans;
- Requiring all initiatives financed to be examined rigorously by internal technical committees (perhaps a peer reviewer for each) and by the CEP prior to consideration for approval;
- Requiring all approved projects to submit quarterly IPEPs, properly documented;
- Requiring all IPEPs to be examined critically by internal technical committees – annual reports would be based on the corresponding quarterly IPEPs;
- Enabling CEP with authority to withhold disbursements from projects for which timely and complete IPEPs are not filed;
- Requiring all project documents to contain a detailed and updated description of activities of other development partners in each project's sphere of action, including a discussion of possible synergies and complementarities; and
- Actively exploring possibilities of promoting South-South cooperation.

Recommendation 5: Within CIDA's general guidelines governing a new CP, the GS/OAS should prioritize "successful" lines of action conducted under the first CP. Findings 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13

Within the framework of its aid effectiveness agenda and to sharpen the focus of Canada's international assistance, the Government of Canada has established three priority themes to guide CIDA's work: increasing food security, securing the future of children and youth, and stimulating sustainable economic growth. These priorities are supported by three crosscutting themes:

- Increasing environmental sustainability,
- Promoting equality between women and men, and
- Helping to strengthen governance institutions and practices.

The GS/OAS should develop the new CP by focusing on and prioritizing "successful" lines of action conducted under the first CP that are relevant given these priorities and crosscutting themes. Additionally, the GS/OAS should, whenever possible, emphasize and concentrate its work on the Organization's own strengths and comparative advantages.

Recommendation 6: The GS/OAS should find appropriate mechanisms to encourage a more demand-based approach to project selection. Findings 1 and 9

Such mechanisms would allow Member States and participating organizations to contribute to the project design phase, thus ensuring that the development intervention is built and managed according to their specific needs and contexts. Establishing ownership at policy and practitioner level by involving beneficiaries from the commencement of a development intervention will increase the chances that its results are sustained over time.

Recommendation 7: The GS/OAS should rethink all CP-financed capacity building and technical assistance activities – including approaches designed to effectively strengthen targeted agencies and organizations – by moving away from individual-focused activities to agency-focused training. Follow-up activities should be incorporated in every capacity building activity conducted by the GS/OAS. Finding 17

Because the GS/OAS uses capacity building as one of its main development thrusts, it should ensure that agencies/individuals selected for capacity building activities are in position to apply the skills imparted. Furthermore, OAS Managers should make specific provisions for conducting follow-up of training activities to measure the increase in skills, awareness, access or ability among recipients (immediate outcome, through testing) and how this increase has contributed to improving organizational capacity and performance (intermediate outcome). Therefore, each participant in training activities should be systematically evaluated before and after training, and monitored closely to see how far he has been able to use the skills / knowledge gained (as suggested in the Kirkpatrick evaluation model).¹¹⁰ The longer term outcome would take the form of sustainable change in beneficiary organizations.

Recommendation 8: The GS/OAS should continue developing its communications strategy and prioritize the streamlining and upgrading of websites and collaborative networks that have clearly shown effectiveness and eliminate those that have not. Finding 17

Due to the cumbersome number of websites and networks developed by the Organization, it should adopt an approach based on a clear, specific communications strategy (and Missions to the OAS should be prioritized in the communications strategy). Now that the activities and functions of the former Strategic Communications Department have been reassigned to other departments and the Secretariat of External Relations, the latter should be responsible and accountable for allowing and supervising the establishment of all new communication tools, for implementing and managing the communications strategy, as well as

¹¹⁰ The four levels of Kirkpatrick's evaluation model essentially measure:

1. Response - what participants thought and felt about training (satisfaction)
2. Learning - increase in knowledge and / or resulting skills, and changing the attitudes of participants
3. Behavior - the transfer of knowledge, skills and / or attitudes of the work training activity (changes in behavior at work due to the training activity)
4. Results - the effects of training at the organizational level or in the environment (can be monetary, based on performance, etc.).

Donald L. Kirkpatrick and James D. Kirkpatrick, *Evaluating Training Programs* (4th edition) San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2006.

for applying pertinent management tools (e.g., Google Analytics) to each website. Moreover, the GS/OAS should consider incorporating a CP information page on the GS intranet, updated frequently and regularly. This recommendation implies that all websites should be subject to centralized oversight.

Recommendation 9: Provision of equipment in/through a CP-financed OAS project should be appropriately justified as necessary to address problems within the project's specific purview and to achieve or contribute to specific project outcomes. Findings 12 and 13

The provision of equipment in/through a CP-financed project should not exceed a small percentage (e.g., 10 per cent) of the total cost of the project, determined during the design phase. Furthermore, it should be examined separately and specifically approved by the CEP to ensure that it will achieve or contribute to the intervention's outcomes. Such a decision should also be subject to the Organization's formal rules of procurement.

CIDA Follow-up

Recommendation 10: CIDA should provide consistent oversight of any future CP. Findings 1, 3, 9, 10, 15, 16

To foster and strengthen the OAS-CIDA strategic partnership, CIDA should be consistently supporting and accompanying the GS/OAS in all CP management phases. Strategic planning exercises could be supported by CIDA to help GS/OAS in linking departmental planning to overarching strategic planning. This would allow the generation of strategic plans with greater focus, coherence, and results-oriented actions under the main programming activities of the CP. Ideally, CIDA should have on-site staff to provide ongoing support to GS/OAS management, ensure that RBM and MfDR principles are applied, and ensure that reporting requirements are met.

Appendix I List of Findings

- Finding 1: Given its external and internal contexts, the CP's mix of five programmatic areas was appropriate and relevant in addressing key governance issues in the region, as well as the priorities of both CIDA and the OAS.
- Finding 2: Several factors hampered the extent to which the sampled interventions could demonstrate achieved results (the absence of an overarching results framework or performance measurement framework, the lack of monitoring, and the output-oriented nature of the projects, among others).
- Finding 3: While all five CP programs made progress in carrying out planned activities and producing outputs, evidence of outcome achievement remains anecdotal – due to the absence of outcome results statements, outcome indicators, and proper monitoring and follow-up.
- Finding 4: The overall effectiveness of Program I is high, reflecting the high priorities accorded to it by the Member States. Important initial outcomes were identified as a result of the activities carried out under this program.
- Finding 5: The overall effectiveness of Program II is Moderate. While some projects achieved important initial outcomes, others demonstrated poor/moderate outcomes.
- Finding 6: The overall effectiveness of Program III is Moderate due to the significant variance in its projects' apparent outcome results.
- Finding 7: The overall effectiveness of Program IV is Moderate-High. The projects under this program contributed to integrating gender and inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and Afro-descendants as crosscutting themes in GS/OAS programming and in some Member State organizations.
- Finding 8: The overall effectiveness of Program V is rated Moderate-Low. Crucial activities and outputs were partially implemented, which limited the extent to which the projects achieved results.
- Finding 9: There are significant limitations to the CP design due to the lack of an overarching theory of change and the absence of an overall strategy, rationale and explicit program intervention logic that clearly explains how CP programming is intended to contribute to results (immediate, intermediate and final outcomes).
- Finding 10: The funding arrangement selected for the CP – that of an unaccountable grant – implied taking a risk that was not properly managed.
- Finding 11: The sustainability of individual interventions varies among the five CP programs examined; those that supported the OAS political role and the Summit of the Americas process, as well as those that involved capacity development, had greater likelihood of being sustained.
- Finding 12: During the CP, sound financial practices were applied to most activities and outputs. However, some major changes in the appropriation of funds for some CP programs and projects limited the effectiveness of some interventions.

- Finding 13: The value for money varied among the five programs. Programs I and IV are generally considered good value for money, while the interventions in other programs varied from good to low.
- Finding 14: The fragmented management structure of the CP led to coordination problems and management inefficiency.
- Finding 15: Differences in OAS and CIDA expectations and miscommunication regarding reporting requirements led to inadequate reporting on the results of the Cooperation Plan.
- Finding 16: The GS/OAS did not monitor the CP results. The GS/OAS's CEP evaluation mechanism and IPEP monitoring system were at an inception stage at the time the CP went into effect and were not applied to CP-financed activities.
- Finding 17: There was a general lack of post-activity follow-up and evaluation, especially significant in regard to training activities and websites, for management purposes as well as to determine the extent to which these activities might have benefitted government agencies.

Appendix II List of Recommendations

- Recommendation 1: The GS/OAS should facilitate building a strategic partnership with donors by establishing an internal monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Findings 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 16
- Recommendation 2: The GS/OAS should develop a short-term strategic plan, including a rationale and explicit program or project intervention logic that clearly explains how OAS programming is intended to contribute to results (immediate, intermediate and final outcomes). Findings 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 17
- Recommendation 3: The GS/OAS should structure a centralized overall CP management system to clarify lines of responsibility and supervision and reduce transaction costs. Findings 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16
- Recommendation 4: The GS/OAS should front-load RBM/MfDR and strengthen DPE as the RBM/MfDR focal point. RBM/MfDR principles should be applied to any future CP from inception (see CIDA Process Roadmap 2010)
- Recommendation 5: Within CIDA's general guidelines governing a new CP, the GS/OAS should prioritize "successful" lines of action conducted under the first CP. Findings 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13
- Recommendation 6: The GS/OAS should find appropriate mechanisms to encourage a more demand-based approach to project selection. Findings 1 and 9
- Recommendation 7: The GS/OAS should rethink all CP-financed capacity building and technical assistance activities – including approaches designed to effectively strengthen targeted agencies and organizations – by moving away from individual-focused activities to agency-focused training. Follow-up activities should be incorporated in every capacity building activity conducted by the GS/OAS. Finding 17
- Recommendation 8: The GS/OAS should continue developing its communications strategy and prioritize the streamlining and upgrading of websites and collaborative networks that have clearly shown effectiveness and eliminate those that have not. Finding 17
- Recommendation 9: Provision of equipment in/through a CP-financed OAS project should be appropriately justified as necessary to address problems within the project's specific purview and to achieve or contribute to specific project outcomes. Findings 12 and 13
- Recommendation 10: CIDA should provide consistent oversight of any future CP. Findings 1, 3, 9, 10, 15, 16