OEA/Ser.G
CP/doc. 3687/03
29 January 2003
Original: Spanish
REPORT OF THE GENERAL
SECRETARIAT OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ON THE
DIVERSION OF NICARAGUAN ARMS TO THE
UNITED DEFENSE FORCES OF COLOMBIA
January 6, 2003
NOTE:
This edition of the General
Secretariat's Report on the Diversion of Nicaraguan Arms to the United Self Defense
Forces of Colombia does not contain Annexes III through VII. In all other respects this edition is
identical to the complete report.
Report of
the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States on the Diversion
of Nicaraguan Arms to the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia
January 6, 2003
INDEX
1.
Executive Summary
1. Summary
2. Recommendations
2.
Report
I. Background
II. Principal Actors in the Arms Diversion
III. The Chain of Events
IV. Analysis
V. Legal Commentary
VI. Application of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, (CIFTA)
VII. Issues Requiring Further Investigation
VIII. Conclusions
3.
Annexes
I. Documented Chronology of the Chain of Events
II. List of all Actors
III. Sworn Statements
IV. Documents Related to the Supposed Purchase Order
V. Supporting Documents
VI. Application of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission's (CICAD) Model Regulations
VII. CICAD Model Regulations
1.
Executive Summary:
I. Summary
In October 1999, a series of events began which resulted in the illegal
diversion of 3000 AK47s and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition from Nicaraguan
government stocks to the Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a terrorist organization in Colombia. The diversion was made possible by negligent
actions on the part of various government officials and private companies, and
the willful and criminal actions of several private arms merchants.
The original, legitimate, transaction was to be a trade between the
Nicaraguan National Police and a private Guatemalan arms dealership, Grupo de Representaciones Internationales (GIR
S.A.). The Nicaraguan Army introduced
GIR S.A. to the police. GIR S.A.
offered the police a quantity of new Israeli manufactured pistols and mini-uzis
in return for five thousand surplus AK47s and 2.5 million rounds of
ammunition. This was an attractive
arrangement for the police since it was a cashless transaction and would
provide the police with arms more suitable for police work.
GIR S.A. shopped for a buyer
for the police arms and settled on Shimon Yelinek, an Israeli arms merchant
based in Panama. Yelinek claimed to be
representing the Panamanian National Police, and during the negotiations presented
GIR S.A. and Nicaraguan officials with a Panamanian Police purchase order,
which has been proven to be a forgery.
Neither GIR S.A. nor any Nicaraguan official ever questioned the
purchase order or attempted to verify that Panama had in fact offered to buy
the weapons.
Yelinek inspected the police weapons some months after the deal was
made, and after Nicaraguan authorities had given permission for the
transaction. He declared them to be
unserviceable and unsatisfactory. This
threatened the transaction. GIR S.A.
and the Nicaraguan Army solved the problem by arranging a swap of 5000 surplus
police AK47s for 3117 serviceable weapons in the Nicaraguan Army
inventory. GIR S.A. delivered the
Israeli arms to the police and the Nicaraguan Army took over responsibility for
delivering the AK47s. Although the
parameters of the transaction changed, no new authority was requested from
responsible Nicaraguan agencies.
Yelinek identified a Panamanian maritime company, Trafalgar Maritime
Inc., to pick up the arms in Nicaragua and take them to Panama. The arms were transported by the army to the
port of El Rama, Nicaragua, and were loaded aboard the company’s only ship, the
Otterloo, which declared for Panama.
Instead, the Otterloo sailed directly to Turbo, Colombia where the arms
were delivered to the AUC. The Captain
of the ship disappeared shortly thereafter, and the maritime company was
dissolved several months later. The
Otterloo was sold to a Colombian citizen.
Immediately after the shipment left Nicaragua, GIR S.A. began to
organize another sale to Yelinek from the Nicaraguan Army, using the same
purchase order, this time for an additional five thousand AK47s and 17 million
rounds of ammunition. Prices were
exchanged between the three, Yelinek made a down payment, and the deal was
under way.
When the diversion of the initial shipment became known, the
intelligence services of Colombia, Nicaragua and Panama agreed to organize a
“sting” operation, ostensibly to track this second shipment and identify those
responsible for the first diversion. This
plan fell apart fairly quickly when GIR S.A. found out that it was in play and
canceled the shipment.
The OAS investigative team believes that:
1.
Shimon Yelinek
is likely guilty of fraud and of violating Colombian anti-terrorism laws, and
possibly Panamanian anti-terrorism laws, among others. An associate Marco Shrem, appears complicit in these activities, but to an
unknown degree.
2.
The owner of the Otterloo, the ship which
transported the arms to Colombia, is apparently guilty of conspiring with Yelinek
to provide the AUC with arms and of violating Colombian, and possibly
Panamanian, anti-terrorism and other laws.
3.
The captain of
the ship which transported the arms to Colombia, along with his first mate, may
have been cognizant of, and a participant in, the arms diversion organized by
Yelinek.
4.
Although the
Investigative Team found no evidence that Ori Zoller and Uzi Kissilevich, the
owner and general manager of of GIR S.A., respectively, were co-conspirators in
the arms diversion, their failure to make any attempt to verify the actual
destination for the arms contributed to the diversion.
5.
The Government
of Nicaragua failed to comply with a number of provisions of the Inter-American
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking in Weapons,
Munitions, Explosives and Related Materials (CIFTA), to which it is a
party. Nicaraguan authorities are
guilty of professional negligence with their failure to verify whether the
Panamanian National Police was indeed the true end-user in the arms exchange.
6.
There appears
to be no involvement of Panamanian authorities in the exchange of arms, or
their diversion.
7.
Colombia is the
victim of the arms diversion. However
several Colombian customs agents were likely accomplices of, or were bribed by,
the AUC in order to allow the Otterloo to land its cargo of arms and ammunition
in the port of Turbo.
II. Recommendations:
The OAS Investigative Team presents below a number of recommendations
to strengthen the existing Inter-American arms control regime and prevent
diversions of this type from occurring in the future.
Recommendation 1: The governments of Colombia, Nicaragua, and Panama should vigorously
pursue investigations into possible criminal conduct on the part of any and all
persons involved in this case, and should seek the collaboration of other
governments including Canada,
Guatemala, Israel, Mexico, and the United States of America in the
investigation and prosecution of these possible crimes. These efforts should include attempts to resolve the unanswered questions
presented in section VII of this report.
Recommendation 2: The
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking
in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, (CIFTA), is,
and should remain, the primary multilateral hemispheric tool to prevent the
illicit manufacturing and trafficking in arms and ammunition. All member states of the Organization who
have not done so should sign and ratify the Convention. The Consultative Committee of CIFTA should
spearhead an effort to ensure full implementation of the Convention and to
promote its full adoption.
Recommendation 3: With regard to full implementation of the Convention, particular
emphasis should be placed on the
provisions of paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Convention, requiring evidence
of the pre-issuance of the necessary import licenses or authorizations before
any shipments of firearms are released for export. Articles VIII, and X, should also be paid particular
attention. Member states should
consider applying the CICAD Model Regulations to facilitate implementation of
the CIFTA Convention.
Recommendation 4:
OAS member states should consider establishing surplus arms destruction
programs. OAS member and observer
states should provide financial and technical
assistance for such surplus arms destruction.
Recommendation 5:
Persons engaged in the import, export and in-transit movement of
firearms, or as dealers, or carriers and/or shippers of firearms, should be
registered by national governments in order to do business in each country in
which they have an office, and in each
country in which a transaction takes place.
Member states should not engage in business activities with any
non-registered broker.
Recommendation 6:
All member states should review their national legislation and
administrative practices for the exportation of firearms and establish a legal
regime sufficient to exert meaningful control over the inventory and export of
firearms.
Recommendation 7: Harmonized
import certificates should be used by all member countries. Electronic formats
of the certificates should be developed so that the information can be readily
shared with other countries involved in a transaction.[1] Additionally, harmonized export and
in-transit documents should be developed and used by all member states to
regulate the importation, export and transit of arms and ammunition and related
materials.
The OAS Investigative Team limited its work
to the specific mandate it was given.
However the investigation revealed serious issues which the Team
strongly recommends be investigated by governments (see page 34).
2.
Report
of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States on the
Diversion of Nicaraguan Arms to the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia
I.
Background:
A. Request for an Investigation:
On May 8, 2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
Colombia, Nicaragua and Panama, Guillermo Fernandez de Soto, Norman Caldera C.
and José Miguel Alemán, respectively, wrote to OAS Secretary General César
Gaviria. The Ministers requested that
the General Secretariat of the Organization conduct an investigation into the
circumstances surrounding the export of an official shipment of arms and
ammunition which originated in Nicaragua in November 2001, and was subsequently
diverted to the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC). The letter is contained in Annex V of this report, as document
No. 17, for reference.
The Ministers requested that the Secretary General
investigate the events and report to their respective governments setting out
the facts drawn from the investigation, together with conclusions and
recommendations for suggested mechanisms and procedures designed to prevent the
recurrence of similar situations in the future.
Given the importance of this joint request in the
post-September 11, 2001 environment, the Secretary General responded by
appointing Ambassador Morris D. Busby as his Special Representative to lead the
investigation[2].
B. Investigative Task:
The general task of the investigation was to determine how
an official arms transfer between the Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) and a
firearms brokerage company located in Guatemala, Grupo de Representaciones Internacionales, (GIR S.A.), led to the
diversion of the Nicaraguan arms to the port of Turbo, Colombia, where the arms
subsequently came into the hands of the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia
(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia,
AUC), a paramilitary group considered a terrorist organization. It had been represented to the responsible
Nicaraguan authorities that the arms were being sold and shipped to the
Panamanian National Police.
The Investigative Team undertook the following specific
tasks:
1.
To determine the
actual facts of the case and prepare a complete chronology of all events
pertinent to the diversion;
2.
To develop
information on possible violations of national law and make appropriate
recommendations to the governments for follow-on investigation and/or action;
3.
To ascertain
whether any of the governments involved failed to adhere to their relevant
international obligations, and;
4.
To make
appropriate recommendations to avoid a recurrence of similar situations in the
future.
C. Methodology:
On May 28 and 29, 2002, the three governments requesting
the investigation each submitted to the General Secretariat a report on their
findings related to the arms diversion.
These reports contained facts of the case developed during their
internal investigations, and also copies of original documentation. Based on an extensive review of this
documentation, the investigating team requested additional information from the
three governments on July 15, 2002, which the governments provided in late
July.
Members of the Investigative Team traveled to Nicaragua,
Guatemala and Panama, to obtain
additional information and documentation, and to interview government officials
and private individuals with direct knowledge of the case.
In Guatemala, the team met with the owner and the general
manager of the firm Grupo de
Representaciones Internacionales, (GIR S.A.), Messrs. Ori Zoller and Uzi
Kissilevich. GIR S.A. was the broker
that put together the deal.
In Nicaragua, the team met with the Foreign Minister, the
Minister of Defense, the current and
former Ministers of Government (Ministro
de Gobernación), the current and former Chiefs of Police, the Contralor General de la República, the
Chief of the Nicaraguan Army, the Inspector General of the army, several other
civilian, police and military officials, and with representatives of the
Nicaraguan shipping company, Agencia Vassali which handled the loading of the
arms onto the Otterloo for ultimate transport to Colombia.
In Panama, the team met with the Foreign Minister; the
Minister of Government and Justice (Ministro
de Gobierno y Justicia); the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Executive Secretary of the Security Council
(Secretario Ejecutivo del Consejo de
Seguridad); the Chief of the Panamanian National Police; the prosecutor (Fiscal) responsible for the case in
Panama; Marco Shrem, one of two private individuals located in Panama who were
involved in the transaction; Gustavo Padilla, a Panamanian lawyer who
incorporated Trafalgar Maritime Inc.; Yariela Brown, the Secretary of Trafalgar
Maritime Inc.; Carlos Aguilar, the first mate of the ship Otterloo, whose
registered owner is Trafalgar Inc., and other people with knowledge of the
case. The Investigative Team made
several unsuccessful attempts to interview the other private individual located
in Panama who was involved in the arms diversion, Shimon Yelinek. These attempts were made through Yelinek's
lawyers following his arrest by Panamanian authorities in November, 2002. Table 1 (below) contains a complete list of
individuals interviewed or contacted by the Investigative Team.
The Investigative Team did not travel to Colombia, rather,
requests for information from the Government of Colombia were made through that
country’s Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the OAS, Humberto de la Calle
Lombana, and through contacts with knowledgeable individuals.
The Investigative Team was able to reconstruct the facts
surrounding the transfer of arms from Nicaragua to Colombia based on
information provided by the countries, and other information collected during
meetings with government officials and others.
The investigation also sought, and received, information from the
governments of Belize, Guatemala, Israel, Mexico, and the United States of
America.
Table1: Persons Contacted or Interviewed by the
Investigative Team
Belize:
Colombia:
United States
of America:
Guatemala:
Israel:
México:
Nicaragua:
Panamá:
|
II. Principal Actors in the Arms Diversion:
The following persons had substantive roles in the arms
transaction:
In Guatemala:
§
Ori
Zoller: An Israeli citizen and owner of GIR S.A., a firearms dealership and
brokerage
agency established in Guatemala in 1996, and a representative of Israeli
Military Industries (IMI). Zoller was formerly a member of the Israeli
Army’s special forces, and an intelligence officer. He was the broker who organized and managed the transfer of the
NNP firearms.
§
Uzi Kissilevich: An Israeli citizen and partner of Zoller’s
in GIR S.A., also formerly a member of
the Israeli military. He serves as GIR
S.A.’s general manager and was also involved in the NNP firearms transfer.
In
Nicaragua:
§
General Roberto
Calderón Meza: Inspector General of the
Nicaraguan Army and formerly its Chief of Logistics. Over the years, General
Calderón allegedly had a number of business dealings with Zoller. Calderón
became involved in the present case through his relationship with Zoller. He was instrumental in providing Nicaraguan
Army firearms to the NNP when the firearms that the NNP was planning to
transfer were found to be unsatisfactory to the ultimate buyer.
§
Major Alvaro
Rivas Castillo: Major of the Nicaraguan
Army, and Aide de Camp of General Calderón.
He took responsibility for logistics and the actual export of the
firearms that are the subject of the investigation.
§
René
Herrera: Nicaraguan Minister of
Government (Gobernación) until
September 30, 2000. Ex-Minister Herrera
approved the terms of the transfer of the NNP firearms to GIR S.A. Herrera also requested Nicaragua’s Comptroller
General (Contraloría General) to exempt this firearms transaction
from Nicaragua’s Law governing State Contracts (Ley de Contrataciones del Estado).
Herrera personally briefed the then United States Ambassador to
Nicaragua on the terms of the original arms deal – describing it as a sale of
antiquated arms to a broker for re-sale to collectors in the United States.
§
Commissioner
Francisco Montealegre: Chief of Police
from September 1996 to September 6, 2001. Montealegre concluded the initial
arms exchange contract with Zoller.
§
Edwin Cordero
Ardilla: Present Chief of the NNP. He became involved in the firearms transfer
following Montealgre’s retirement and saw it through to final completion.
In
Panama :
§
Shimon
Yelinek: Actual purchaser of the
Nicaraguan firearms, through GIR S.A., purportedly for the PNP. He is an Israeli citizen.
§
Marco
Shrem: A business associate of
Yelinek. Shrem put Yelinek in contact
with Zoller, collaborated with Yelinek
in the purchase of the Nicaraguan firearms through Zoller, and attempted to
buy/sell additional arms though Zoller.
He is a Peruvian citizen.
§
Miguel Onattopp
Ferriz: General Manager and owner of Trafalgar Martime Inc., the company
identified as the registered owner of the Otterloo. The Otterloo loaded the arms in El Rama, Nicaragua, and
transported them to Colombia. Miguel
Onattopp Ferriz is a Mexican citizen.
§
Jesús
Iturrios Maciel: Captain of the
Otterloo at the time of the diversion, employed by Trafalgar Maritime Inc. He is a Mexican citizen.
Annex II contains a complete listing of
all of the natural and legal persons and other entities involved in the case.
III. The
Chain of Events:
The chain of events of the case can be broken down into the following
four phases:
§
The first
phase, from October 1999 to June 2000, begins when the Chief of the NNP,
Commissioner Francisco Montealegre, aware that his police force has
insufficient and inappropriate firearms and a lack of financial resources to
acquire new ones, is introduced to Ori Zoller of GIR S.A. by the Inspector
General of Nicaragua’s army, General Roberto Calderón. A proposed arms transfer was conceived
whereby the NNP would provide a quantity of AK47 firearms to the broker Zoller,
and in exchange, Zoller would provide the NNP with more suitable firearms
(pistols and mini-Uzis). During this
stage, the necessary approvals within the Nicaraguan Government were sought and
obtained, and a formal contract to effect the exchange was entered into between
the NNP and Zoller’s GIR S.A.
§
The second
phase occurred between July 2000 and July 2001, when Zoller identified a buyer
for the Nicaraguan arms, Shimon Yelinek and his associates. A shipping company was established in
Panama, Trafalgar Maritime Inc., apparently for the purpose of transporting the
arms to the AUC in Colombia. It was
during this stage that the arms diversion appears to have been planned.
§
During the
third phase, between July 4, 2001 and November 3, 2001, there was a flurry of
activity, beginning when Yelinek inspected the NNP arms being offered for sale
by Zoller and determined that their condition was not adequate for the
transaction to proceed. In an attempt
to salvage the transaction, Zoller and
General Calderón entered into an agreement whereby the Nicaraguan Army offered
to exchange the unacceptable NNP arms for better quality ones in the army’s
possession. This was also the period
when the final logistical arrangements and customs and export procedures were
executed, and culminated with the arms and ammunition being exported from
Nicaragua and diverted to Colombia.
§
The
fourth and final phase took place from late November 2001 to February
2002, when preparations were made to
purchase a second shipment of arms from Nicaragua, again ostensibly for the
Panamanian Police. The intelligence
services of Colombia, Panama, and Nicaragua, through a tri-national operation,
proposed by the Nicaraguan Armny, attempted to put together a “sting”,
supposedly to uncover those responsible for the diversion.
Narrative Summary of the Chain of Events:
The narrative presented below was reconstructed from interviews and
documents obtained by the Investigative Team.
A documented chronology of events is presented in Annex I which provides
additional details regarding the events surrounding the diversion, and the
persons, institutions, and businesses involved.
Phase I:
The
Nicaraguan National Police, a force consisting of approximately 7000 police
officers, has only about half the number of side-arms necessary to equip every
officer. This has forced the police to
issue AK47 assault rifles to many officers, these arms being plentiful as they
were left over from Nicaragua’s civil war.
The Police leadership recognizes that AK47s are not appropriate for a
police force.
In 1999, General Roberto Calderón, the Inspector General of the
Nicaraguan Army, introduced the Chief of the NNP, Commissioner Francisco
Montealegre, to Ori Zoller, the owner of GIR S.A. Zoller and Calderón had a prior business relationship, as GIR
S.A. had sold arms and equipment to the Nicaraguan military in the past. In the fall of 1999, Zoller presented
Montealegre with a proposal to obtain suitable side arms which would not
require the NNP to pay cash for the arms.
Zoller
and Montealegre worked out an exchange, whereby GIR S.A. would provide the NNP
with new side arms (465 Jericho pistols and 100 Uzi-submachineguns) in exchange
for aging surplus police AK47s, ammunition and bayonets (initially, 5000 AK47s,
2.5 million rounds of ammunition, and 6000 bayonets).
Between February and the end of May, 2000, various bureaucratic
procedures were undertaken within the Nicaraguan Government to obtain approval
for the exchange of arms. The exchange
was approved by the Minister of Gobernación,
who has responsibility for the NNP; it was also approved by the President of
the Republic (as mentioned in a February 3, 2000 letter from the Minister of Gobernación, see document No. 156 in
Annex V). An exemption to the state
purchases Law, to allow for a “sole source” transaction of the arms, was
approved by the Comptroller General on May 22. The Minister of Gobernación
also informed the United States Embassy in Managua of the possible exchange, as
Zoller originally indicated he would sell the AK47s as collectors items to a
broker in the United States, Century International Arms.
While these internal procedures were being followed, Montealegre and
Zoller formalized the agreement by jointly signing a letter of intent,
outlining the terms under which the exchange was to be made. Once the various approvals were obtained for
the exchange, Zoller and Montealegre signed a formal contract on June 2,
2000. Among other clauses in the
contract was a requirement for Zoller to produce an end-user certificate for
the Nicaraguan arms to be exported.
Meanwhile, in order to make the maximum cash profit on the exchange,
Zoller was searching for buyers for
the military equipment. He found three
potential buyers for the arms: 1) Brian
Sucher, of Century International Arms Inc., based in Miami, Florida; 2) Pedro Bello, another Miami-based arms
broker; and 3) Shimon Yelinek, an
Israeli citizen residing in Panama.
Shimon Yelinek was introduced to Zoller by Marco Shrem, another
resident of Panama, and an associate of Yelinek. Zoller’s business partner, Uzi Kissilevich, had been informed by
Haim Geri, an advisor to Century International Arms Inc. and former
representative of Israeli Military Industries in Colombia, that Marco Shrem was
seeking to purchase AK47s. Once
Kissilevich contacted Shrem, and the latter introduced Yelinek, it was only a
short time before Zoller and Yelinek reached a deal, as the latter apparently
offered Zoller the best price for the Nicaraguan arms and ammunition.
Yelinek and Shrem purported to be acting as brokers or middlemen for
the Panamanian National Police, which was allegedly the entity ultimately
interested in purchasing the arms and ammunition[3]. Yelinek, Shrem, Zoller, and Yelinek’s
brother in law, Haviv Aviad, traveled to Nicaragua on April 28, 2000, to
inspect the arms that the Nicaraguan National Police was to provide as part of
the exchange. On May 18, Zoller
traveled to Panama to meet Yelinek and Shrem.
Yelinek agreed to purchase 2500 AK47s (later increased to 3000) and 2.5
million rounds of ammunition (later increased to 5 million rounds). Zoller agreed to have the NNP arms
reconditioned and crated, a task which was contracted to the NNP and associates
of General Calderón. That same day,
Zoller instructed Kissilevich to fax to Panama GIR S.A.’s bank account
information so Yelinek could make a down-payment for the arms purchase. On June 16, $75,000 was deposited in GIR
S.A.’s account, via wire transfer. The
total value of the Zoller-Yelinek deal was approximately $575,000.
Over the next several months, Yelinek and Shrem solicited additional
price quotes from GIR S.A. for firearms, missiles and other kinds of military
equipment. At the same time, GIR S.A.
sent a series of reminders and instructions to Yelinek as to how to send
wire-transfers to GIR S.A.’s bank account.
On May 15, 2001, Yelinek met Zoller at his offices in Guatemala City,
where he provided Zoller with an alleged Panamanian Police purchase order[4],
which specified a much larger quantify of arms and ammunition. The purchase order included language which
could allow the order to be used simultaneously as an end-user certificate.
Yelinek
inspected the NNP arms in Nicaragua a second time (this time in the presence of
Uzi Kissilevich, Zoller’s associate) on July 4, 2001. As a result of this inspection, at some point in July or August
of 2001, Yelinek indicated to GIR S.A. that the police arms were of poor
quality and did not meet his requirements.
Zoller quickly corrected this problem by making a side deal with the
army through General Calderón, whereby the army agreed to accept the NNP’s 5000
old AK47s, in return for 3117 new AK47s in the possession of the army. As a result, these new army weapons would
then be the arms exchanged with GIR S.A. under the original contract signed between
the NNP and GIR S.A. In a further
modification of the original deal, the Nicaraguan Army also agreed to provide
an additional 2.5 million bullets and 3000 additional bayonets; GIR S.A. agreed
to provide the army with a number of bullet-proof vests. Zoller also hired Haim Geri to train the
police on their new weapons.
Two
side-deals were also arranged by Zoller.
One hundred fifteen of the guns supplied by the Nicaraguan Army, were to
be sold to the Guatemalan Military.
Nine thousand bayonets were to be sold to Century International Arms,
Inc, in Miami. From the perspective of
laws on international arms trafficking, both of these two side-deals appear to
be legitimate.
Virtually at the same time, on July 11, 2001, a Mexican National,
Miguel Onattopp Ferriz, reportedly a Captain in the Mexican Merchant Marine,
established a new shipping company in Panama City, Trafalgar Maritime Inc.,
through a Panamanian lawyer, Gustavo Padilla.
The company’s only ship, the Otterloo, had been purchased from Dutch owners
in early July 2001, and was given a provisional Panamanian ship’s license on
July 24.
All
of the arrangements necessary to export the arms and ammunition were
coordinated between the Nicaraguan Army, which undertook this role on behalf of
the NNP, GIR S.A.’s shipping agent, Guatemala-based Leonel Cordon, a shipping
agent in Nicaragua, Agencia Vassali S.A., and a customs broker, hired by the
police, Agencia Aduanera Canales Aguilar.
By
the end of October, 2001, GIR S.A. had virtually fulfilled its side of the
bargain with the NNP, providing all but five of the side-arms stipulated in the
original contract with the police. By
the middle of the month, Yelinek had wire-transferred to GIR S.A. approximately
$550,000, which was only $25,000 short of the total owed. The logistical aspects had also largely been
arranged, and the arms and ammunition were ready to be exported. On October 19, 2001, Yelinek informed Zoller
that the arms and ammunition were to be transported on a Panamanian-flagged vessel,
the Otterloo, owned by Panamanian-based Trafalgar Maritime Inc, whose
representative was Miguel Onattopp Ferriz.
On October 22, 2001, Police Commissioner Edwin Cordero Ardilla notified
the Contraloría General of the
quantitative change in the arrangement with GIR S.A., and also the army-police
arms exchange.
The
Otterloo sailed from Veracruz, Mexico, on October 15. Before sailing, the captain of the Otterloo, Iturrios
Maciel, provided Mexican authorities
with a signed Bill of Lading in which he stipulated that his ship was
transporting 9 containers of plastic balls to Panama. The Otterloo arrived at the Nicaraguan port of El Rama on
November 26. After a delay of several
days, on November 2, 2001, the Otterloo was loaded with 14 containers of arms
and ammunition. The Otterloo’s captain
signed a ship manifest and a Bill of Lading stating that the ship had been
loaded with the 14 containers and that the ship’s destination was the port of
Colón, Panama. The Otterloo left
Nicaragua on November 3, 2001.
On
November 5, 2001, the Otterloo arrived at the port of Turbo, on Colombia’s
Caribbean coast, without ever having stopped in Panama. The ship was unloaded two days later by a
Colombian shipping company called Banadex S.A., at the request of a shipping
agent Turbana Ltd. The Otterloo sailed
for Baranquilla on November 9, where the Captain, Jesus Iturrios Maciel
disembarked, stating he was ill, and disappeared. After a series of other stops, the Otterloo returned to Panama.
In
April 2002 Trafalgar Maritime, Inc. was dissolved and the Otterloo was sold to
a Colombian citizen, Edgar Enrique Aaron Villalba (see document No. 11, Annex
III). The Investigative Team was
informed that the new owner may have registered the ship in Belize. However, the Government of Belize has not
been able to find the vessel in its registry, the International Merchant Marine
Registry of Belize.
A final footnote to this arms diversion was
provided by the leader of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, Carlos Castaño,
On June 30, 2002, in an interview granted to Colombia’s newspaper, El Tiempo,
he answered a question about the Otterloo,
and said “This is the greatest achievement by the AUC so far. Through Central America, five shipments, 13
thousand rifles”, (see document No. 14a in Annex V).
Phase IV
Almost
immediately after the Otterloo unloaded its cargo in Turbo, a second, larger
arms sale began to be organized by Zoller, at the request of Yelinek, also
allegedly for the Panamanian National Police.
On November 21, Zoller sent a fax to the Nicaraguan Army, explaining
that the PNP wished to purchase an additional 5000 AK47s and 17 million rounds
of ammunition. He attached a copy of
the same Panamanian purchase order, dated February 10, 2000. Zoller began making arrangements with his
shipping agent to purchase 23 containers for this second shipment of arms. A January 3, 2002, fax from Kissilevich to
Leonel Cordon informed Cordon that the containers should be sent to the
Nicaraguan Army in Managua, and that the contact person was General Calderon’s
aide, Major Rivas. On January 11,
2002, the Nicaraguan Army issued a bill for $980,000 addressed to the PNP. On January 16, 2002, Yelinek wire-transfered
$50,000 to GIR S.A’s account as a down-payment.
Towards
the end of January, 2002, Colombian authorities became aware that the AUC had
received the Nicaraguan arms, and informed the Panamanian Naval Intelligence
Service, who in turn informed the Nicaraguan Army on January 30, 2002. This put into motion a three-nation effort
on the part of Colombian, Panamanian and Nicaraguan intelligence services[5]. Representatives of the three services met in
Managua in early February, and on February 6, signed an agreement called
“Operation Triangle” (Operación Triangulo),
described as a “sting” operation to catch the arms traffickers, utilizing the
second deal being organized by Zoller (See Annex V, document No. 24). The NNP
was not informed by the Nicaraguan Army that the arms they had exchanged had
been diverted to Colombia, nor were they included in Operación Triangulo.
Zoller,
in an interview with the Investigative Team, said that on or about February 15,
2002, he decided to stop the second deal when General Calderón informed him of
Operación Triangulo. He notified Julio
Solis of Agencia Vassali as well as
his own agent, Leonel Cordon, that he no longer needed the containers. General Calderón told the OAS Investigating
Team that Zoller knew nothing about Operación
Triangulo.
IV.
Analysis:
Although it was not the purpose of this investigation to uncover
wrongdoing on the part of any specific individual, governments may wish to
probe further into the facts to determine if their national laws have been
violated. The following provides the
Investigative Team’s own perspective.
As
a general comment, the Team would note that although a great deal of interest
and attention to detail is evident in the movement of the firearms out of
Nicaragua, Zoller, Kissilevich and the others involved readily accepted the
bogus Panamanian purchase order, and displayed a complete lack of interest as
to where the arms were ultimately going.
There is no record of any communications between GIR S.A. and the
Panamanian Police Force or any other Panamanian authority. Nothing in the
evidence indicates that Zoller, Kissilevich, or any of the many Nicaraguan
officials involved ever attempted to verify whether the purchase order provided
by Yelinek was legitimate. As well, to rely on this one purchase order,
unsupported by any other documentation
throughout this complex transaction, and to utilize this one document as
determinative of the identity of the end-user, is unprofessional and not
credible. This matter becomes even more
damning considering that a second, larger, shipment was planned for the same
alleged customer immediately on the heels of the first shipment. Again, no efforts were made by anyone
involved to contact Panamanian authorities, even though it is difficult to
understand why the Panamanian Police Force would purchase upwards of 8000 AK47s
and 22 million rounds of ammunition when the entire force consists of only
13,000 officers, including administrative staff, and when the NNP leadership
had recognized that AK47s were unfit for police work.
(1) The
brokers and shippers
Messrs.
Zoller and Kissilevich of GIR S.A. in Guatemala, Yelinek and Shrem in Panama,
Onattopp Ferriz, the owner of the shipping company Trafalgar Maritime Inc., and
Iturrios Maciel, the captain of the Otterloo, are the persons most closely
linked to the diversion.
Yelinek,
situated in Panama, appears consistently at the heart of the matter. He provided Zoller with the Panamanian
purchase order on which the sale of the Nicaraguan firearms was based. He
inspected the NNP arms,
pronounced them unfit and with Zoller set in train the substitution of
army firearms. Yelinek paid GIR S.A. for the arms and provided GIR S.A. the
name of the Otterloo, communicated the particulars about the company that owned
it, and the name of its legal representative. Yelinek departed Panama in April
2002, shortly after the diversion became public, and reappeared only in
mid-November 2002, when he was arrested by Panamanian authorities on suspicion
of arms trafficking. His abrupt
departure from Panama following the publicizing of the original diversion seems
to indicate that he did not wish to be present to be investigated in any
possible proceeding. At the time this
report was published, Yelinek was still in Panamanian custody.
Onatopp
Ferriz established Trafalgar Maritime Inc. in early July 2001, purchased the
Otterloo, registered it in Panama and obtained its provisional Certificate of
Navigation from the Panamanian authorities.
Coincident with the timing of Yelinek’s departure from Panama, the
offices of Trafalgar closed in April 2002.
Onatopp Ferriz also disappeared from Panama around the same time.
The
captain of the Otterloo, Iturrios Maciel, signed the cargo manifest and Bill of
Lading, both of which falsely indicate that the final destination of the arms
was the port of Colón, Panama. Iturrios
Maciel also signed the Acta de Salida form of Nicaragua’s Ministerio de
Gobernación, again falsely declaring his departure to Colón and stating the
same destination to the Nicaraguan navy.
Two days later, confirmation of the Otterloo’s arrival at Turbo,
Colombia was evidenced by Iturrios’ signature on a Colombian Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad
form. The Otterloo then proceeded to
Barranquilla where Iturrios disembarked and disappeared.
Ori
Zoller and Uzi Kissilevich coordinated of all the activities associated with
the sale of the Nicaraguan arms. They
put all of the deals together and had on-going contacts with many Nicaraguan
officials including NNP Commissioner Montealegre, his successor, Commissioner
Cordero, their subordinates, with General Calderón, Major Rivas and other army
officers. In addition GIR S.A. seems to have had undue influence over internal
Nicaraguan aspects of the transfer considering that they are civilians and
foreigners. They were the link to
Shrem, Yelinek, Haim Geri and others, and had extensive dealings involving this
and other potential firearms transactions, as well as proposed arms
transactions after the diversion. They
accepted the fraudulent Panamanian Police purchase order from Yelinek and
provided it to Nicaraguan authorities for both the original deal, as well as
the potential second arms sale. For
experienced arms brokers, at best, Zoller and Kissilevich exhibited negligence
and perhaps willful blindness over this part of the transaction.
(a) The
NNP and Nicaraguan Civilian Authorities
The initial proposed exchange of the NNP’s obsolete weapons
to Zoller in exchange for new ones appears to have been conducted in a
transparent fashion. NNP Commissioner Montealegre’s January 2000 correspondence
to Minister Herrera seeking his approval of the letter of intent to effect the
exchange with GIR S.A,. and the need to obtain an end-use certificate as a part
of the transaction are evidence of this.
Herrera also told Commissioner Montealegre of the need to submit the
proposal to the Contaloría. This was
required because the acquisition of the new arms from GIR S. A. was considered a government purchase which,
pursuant to Article 3 (k) of the Ley de Contrataciones del Estado
required that an open bidding competition be held.
Subsequently Montealegre and Minister Herrera asked the Contraloría
to grant an exemption from the usual bidding processes ordinarily required for
government purchases. Initially, the Contraloría
found deficiencies in the application which it challenged. However, these were specific technical
points: failure to cite the value of the (obsolete) Nicaraguan arms being
traded, failure to cite the bonafides of GIR S.A., and failure to show the
Government of Israel’s approval of the sale of IMI firearms (through GIR S.A.).
The basis of the proposal itself was not questioned, and after reviewing the
NNP reply, a “Cédula de Notificación” that granted the exemption was issued in
May 2000 under the general criteria of “reasons of urgency, security or others
in the public interest”. The Contraloría further
stated that the exemption was granted to permit formalization of the agreement
with GIR S.A. and to avoid having the firearms fall into the hands of
terrorists and drug-traffickers. This
process appears to be in accordance with established internal procedures.
Although
the Contraloría requested that the
Government of Israel’s approval of the transaction be obtained (given that the
Government of Israel is the owner of Israeli Military Industries, IMI), no
effort was made by Commissioner Montealegre of Minister Herrera to comply with
this request. Instead, the contract
signed by Zoller and Montealegre simply included a statement explaining that
the transaction was one between the Nicaraguan National Police and a commercial
entity, and not a government to government transaction, and therefore, it was
not possible to obtain approval from the government of Israel.
When
Yelinek inspected the NNP arms for a second time, and informed GIR S.A. that
the arms were unsatisfactory, General Calderón, apparently with no other
authorization, made the army’s firearms available as a substitute. The substitution is simply noted in an Acta
de Entrega documenting the transfer of the army’s firearms to the NNP. In late October NNP Commissioner Francisco
Bautista Lara wrote to the Nicaraguan Ministry of Finance requesting a change
in the official records of the NNP’s firearms inventory. The Ministry of Finance promptly replied to
Lara that the records of the firearms holdings of the NNP had been
adjusted. The ministry also indicated,
in a separate communication to NNP Deputy Chief Commissioner Cordero Ardilla,
that the export transaction had been approved.
Although there is no firm evidence that the army acted illegally, it is
not clear under what authority General Calderón exchanged army firearms for NNP
firearms, much less trading
serviceable, or new, AK47s for reportedly useless ones.
Again, although the original contract was
drastically changed from what the Contraloría
approved, it appears legal since Nicaraguan law states that the NNP has the
authority to approve the export of firearms, (Art. 76 (e) of Decree 26-96, the Reglamento de la Ley de la Policia Nacional
de Nicaragua, 1996), and the army was arguably acting in this case for the
NNP. Therefore, while there is a system
of controls in place and an adherence to certain Nicaraguan legal regulations
is required, there are significant weaknesses in Nicaraguan law.
(c) Private
Nicaraguan Entities
In
October of 2001 when the export transaction was brought to the attention of
(then) Minister of Gobernación, Ing.
Marenco Cardenal, he requested the Director of the Nicaraguan Center for Export Administration, CETREX, (Centro de Trámites de Exportación de
Nicaragua) to take the necessary steps to have the arms exported. The
CETREX Export Form was completed by Agencia Canales Aguilar documenting the
shipment of the arms to the PNP at the port of Colón, Panama.
Agencia
Canales Aguilar is a private enterprise not a government agency, but it appears
that the government depended on it to ensure the security of an international
movement of firearms. Apparently
Canales Aguilar was acting under the authority of the Nicaraguan Police, by
means of powers granted it by a “power of attorney” signed before a notary on October 30, 2001, by
Commissioner Bautista Lara under authority granted him by Commissioner Edwin
Cordero. This document contains
important deviations in the specifications of where, and how many, arms and
ammunition were to be exported when compared with the actual quantities
exported (see document No. 60 in Annex V).
On
November 2, 2001 a Nicaraguan Customs Form documenting shipment of the arms to
the PNP, as well as a ship manifest and Bill of Lading were filed. These last documents are on Agencia Vassali
stationery, another private company whose role and authority in the arms
transaction is not fully
explained. They documented that the
arms and ammunition were being sent to the Panamanian Police, and were
certified by the Otterloo’s Captain, Iturrios Maciel.
There are a number of Nicaraguan government mechanisms applicable to
arms export, which in fact were applied to the export of this shipment of
firearms. These however do not meet the
Government of Nicaragua's responsibilities under the CIFTA Convention. In the last analysis the existing Nicaraguan
mechanisms are clearly inadequate since their application was incapable of
preventing the diversion.
(3) The Panamanian Authorities
The
Government of Panama does not appear to have been involved in the
transaction. Panama factors only
because the Panamanian National Police Force is identified as the purchaser of
the arms and ammunition on the purchase order provided by Yelinek. Panama has consistently denounced the
purchase order as a fake. How and from
what source the purchase order came into Yelinek’s possession is not known.
Other
than the purchase order, there is no other paper or statement that links the
Panamanian Police Force to the transaction.
All recorded communications coming from
inside Panama flow from Yelinek to Zoller or Kissilevich, never from the
Panamanian Police Force and, it might be added, never to any of the Nicaraguan
authorities.
The registration of the Otterloo and the establishment of Trafalgar
Maritime Inc. occur in Panama. While
this reflects the country’s liberal commercial and maritime practices, those
events are not indicative of any role by government authorities in the
diversion nor did they contribute materially to what happened.
(4) Colombia
What
actually occurred at Turbo remains a mystery.
It is clear that the Otterloo made port in Turbo based on the signing by
its captain, Iturrios Maciel, of a Departamento
Administrativo de Seguridad Seccional Antioquia, Puerto Operativo Turbo
form. But beyond that, all that is known is that the guns somehow found
their way to the AUC. This would have meant that someone in Colombia,
associated with Yelinek, Onattopp Ferriz or possibly even the Otterloo Captain,
Iturrios Maciel was ultimately
responsible for the illegal importation of the arms onto Colombian soil.
A
number of national laws appear to have been broken. Yelinek appears to have committed a fraud in passing off a false
Panamanian Police purchase order for the firearms. This would constitute an offence under Panamanian law, and, to
the extent that the fraudulent purchase order was accepted by Nicaraguan
authorities, a contravention of Nicaraguan law as well. More importantly,
Yelinek’s actions together with those of Onattopp Ferriz and Captain Iturrios
Maciel of the Otterloo constituted part of a conspiracy to fraudulently export
firearms from Nicaragua and to import them into Colombia.
Likewise, Iturrios Maciel committed fraud under Nicaraguan and perhaps
Panamanian law when he falsely certified the destination of the firearms on the
manifest and on the Bill of Lading and then went to a different
destination. If Iturrios was acting
under the direction of the Otterloo’s owner, Onattopp Ferriz, would also be
guilty of fraud and of violating Panamanian, Nicaraguan and Colombian laws.
The importation of firearms into Panama is
controlled by Article 307 of the Constitution of 1972 (as amended by
legislative Acts of 1983 and 1994); by Article 1 of Decree No. 2 of 1991, and;
by Article 11 of Decree No. 354 of 1948.
The Constitution provides that only the government may possess military
weapons and products. Executive permission is required for their manufacture,
importation and export. It further provides that the government will define
arms not considered to be non-military, and regulate their importation,
manufacture and use.
Under Panamanian law, the Ministry of Government
and Justice (Gobierno y Justicia) can
authorize natural or legal persons to engage in the business of importing
firearms and ammunition for hunting, sport and personal defense (which does not
include the types of firearms that were being exported from Nicaragua). All requests to import firearms and
ammunition must be made to the Minister of Gobierno
y Justicia, and a certified copy (copia
autenticada) of a permit approved by the Ministry of Gobierno y Justicia is required for the merchandise to be released
from customs storage, as is evidence of the payment of duties.
Clearly, importation into Panama of the types
and quantities of firearms in this case required considerably more than a
purchase order. Presumably Zoller and
Kissilvich, as established arms dealers in the region, would have knowledge of
these requirements and could have questioned the purchase order provided by
Yelinek. The same, perhaps, can also be said of the Nicaraguan
authorities in this case.
Colombian law was violated because, among other
reasons, under Colombia’s Constitution and applicable law, only the Government
may introduce or manufacture firearms, ammunition and explosives. The fact that the arms ended up in the
hands of the AUC could also mean that in addition to committing a smuggling
offence, Yelinek, Iturrios, Onattopp Ferriz, and possibly Zoller and his
associates, may have also committed an offence against Colombia’s
anti-terrorism laws, as well as the laws of other countries which sanction
assistance to terrorist groups.
The
applicable Nicaraguan law appears to be Art. 76 (e) of Decree 26-96 which
states that the NNP has responsibility for authorizing the export of firearms.
This perhaps explains why other approvals to authorize export of the firearms
were not sought, since the NNP has the primary authority.
Independently of whether laws were broken, the adequacy of Nicaraguan
laws and the extent to which Nicaraguan national practices are effective for
controlling movements of firearms is open to serious question. The fact that there is no clear evidence
that laws were broken in this case by Nicaraguan authorities, and yet the
diversion took place, is strong testimony that the laws and practices are
seriously inadequate.
VI. Application of the Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives and Other Related Materials, (CIFTA)
Two
of the principal countries involved in this case, Nicaragua and Panama, have
ratified the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of
and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, (CIFTA). Adherence to the Convention and application
of its provisions to national practices would have made the diversion far more
difficult, if not prevented it outright.
(a) Illicit Trafficking
The key element of illicit trafficking is the
absence of authorization by any other State Party involved in the international
movement of firearms. In this particular case, even though Panama was allegedly
the recipient State, there was no authorization, nor were there any attempts to
verify that Panama had indeed authorized any arms purchase.
(b) Import and Export
Provisions[6]
In the case of Nicaragua, the provisions of the
Convention that address exports of
firearms were not applied. Articles VIII, IX, and X of the Convention
call for the application of effective and secure measures to prevent illicit
trafficking of firearms.
Key among these is Article IX, entitled Export,
Import and In-Transit Licenses or Authorizations, which in paragraph 3.
provides as follows: “3. States Parties before releasing
shipments of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials for
export shall ensure that the importing and in-transit countries have issued the
necessary licenses or authorizations.”
In a broader sense, Paragraph 1 of Article IX
calls for the States Parties to “establish
or maintain an effective system of export, import and international transit
licenses or authorizations for transfers of firearms”, while Article VIII,
Security Measures, requires the States Parties, “in an effort to eliminate loss or diversion, [...] undertake to adopt
the necessary measures to ensure the security of firearms and ammunition
imported into, exported from or in transit through their respective territories.”
A particular security measure is called for in Article X which calls for the “strengthening of controls at export
points.”
While
the Nicaraguan authorities apparently exercised a measure of control over a
number of internal steps concerning the export of the arms, the absence of any
contact between officials in Nicaragua and Panama to confirm the legitimacy of
the transaction is a glaring deficiency.
The Convention requires that before shipments are released, the
authorities responsible for the exportation must be satisfied that the
receiving country has authorized the importation. A purchase order alone, even had it been legitimate, cannot serve
as the sole and sufficient authority upon which Nicaraguan officials could
authorize the export. Under Nicaraguan
law, the responsibility to ensure compliance would appear to lie with the
entity ultimately responsible for approving the export, in this case, the
NNP. By failing to confirm the
legitimacy of the purchase order with their Panamanian counterparts, the
Nicaraguan National Police, although perhaps adhering to national practice,
violated the Convention.
As with Article IX, the Nicaraguan government’s
adherence to Articles VIII and X, which require controls over the security of
the exported firearms is questionable.
(c )
Exchange of Relevant Information
The exchange of relevant information between States Parties called for
under Article XIII of the Convention was plainly lacking. There is no
indication that Nicaraguan authorities ever attempted to verify from Panamanian
authorities that there was an import license for the arms it was proposing to
export. The authorities involved took
on faith that the firearms would go to the stated destination, based upon
fraudulent information provided third-hand by Yelinek.
An exchange of information on the matters referred to in clause 1. (a)
of Article XIII about “authorized
producers, dealers, importers, exporters and, wherever possible carriers, of
firearms …” would have been helpful to authorities in determining whether
business should be carried on with such individuals as Yelinek and Shrem,
Zoller and Kissilevich.
VII.
Issues Requiring Further Investigation:
The OAS Investigation Team reviewed all available documentation in this
case and conducted exhaustive interviews.
However, the Organization of American States has no police powers, and
although the Team requested certain information from several governments,
investigators and prosecutors are understandably reluctant, and in some cases
barred by national laws, to share evidentiary information. As a result, it is the Team's opinion that the following areas
require follow-on criminal investigations by national governments:
One such occasion occurred on January 5,
2001, when GIR S.A. sent a fax to Calderón, listing arms and ammunition,
including twin and four barrel anti-aircraft guns, surface to air missiles,
rocket propelled grenades, anti-tank "launchers" and small arms, with
quantities and prices (see document No. 121 in Annex V). The document was a request from Zoller for
the sale of Nicaraguan Army equipment, at the prices and quantities listed by
Zoller. The Investigative Team has been
able to link this list of arms to a request from a Lebanese arms broker, Samih
Osailly currently in custody in Europe and under investigation by several
nations for ties to Al-Queda. He was at
the time working for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone,
under an arms-for-diamonds arrangement[7]. This broker sought to purchase arms and
ammunition from Shimon Yelinek, who in turn sent the list of arms and
ammunition to Zoller, who forwarded the list to General Calderón.
While the Investigative Team did not uncover
any evidence to suggest that the
Nicaraguan Army acted on Zoller's request of January 5, 2001; this fact,
plus the dealings relating to the second arms shipment allegedly to the PNP
organized in the fall of 2001 and early 2002, suggest that international arms
brokers repeatedly saw Nicaragua as a potential source of weapons of war for illegal
purposes.
VIII. Conclusions:
1.
It appears that
Shimon Yelinek committed fraud by providing a forged purchase order from the
Panamanian National Police to serve as an end-user certificate for the arms
exchange. As the purchaser of the arms,
he also apparently planned and organized an illegal arms diversion for the
United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, a group considered a terrorist
organization. Yelinek is also likely
guilty of violating Colombian anti-terrorism laws, and possibly Panamanian
anti-terrorism laws, among others.
Marco Shrem appears complicit in these activities, but to an unknown
degree.
2.
Miguel Onattopp
Ferriz established Trafalgar Maritime Inc. in July 2001 as a front company for
the purpose of transporting arms to the AUC.
It appears that he was engaged in criminal activity and was conspiring
with Yelinek to provide the AUC with arms, thus violating Colombian, and
possibly Panamanian anti-terrorism, and other laws.
3.
Captain
Iturrios Maciel provided Mexican authorities with a signed Bill of Lading in
which he deliberately and wrongly stipulated Panama as the destination of 9
containers of plastic balls. He also
provided Nicaraguan authorities with a signed Bill of Lading and ship manifest
in which he deliberately and wrongly stipulated Panama as the destination of
his ship and its cargo of arms.
Iturrios Maciel, along with his first mate, Carlos Aguilar, may have
been cognizant of, and participants in the arms diversion. Iturrios Maciel is also apparently
criminally complicit in providing arms and ammunition to a terrorist
organization, and of violating Colombian anti-terrorism and other laws.
4.
Although the
Investigative Team found no evidence that Ori Zoller and Uzi Kissilevich were
co-conspirators in the arms diversion, their failure to make any attempt to
verify the actual destination for the arms, not only for one, but for two
shipments to the same customer, contributed to the diversion. At the least they appear guilty of serious
neglect and their actions will lead to the loss of life in Colombia. As well, their association with Yelinek and
his attempts to locate arms for the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
should be investigated to determine if they are criminally liable.
5.
The Government
of Nicaragua failed to comply with a number of provisions of the CIFTA
convention. Nicaraguan authorities are
guilty of professional negligence and with violating the CIFTA convention with
their failure to verify whether the Panamanian National Police were indeed the
true end-users in the arms exchange.
One telephone call could have prevented the entire arms diversion. The involvement of the Nicaraguan Army in
the first arms deal appears to be legitimate, even if negligent, not least of
which because the exchange was to benefit another part of the Nicaraguan State
(the Police) but because the transaction with Zoller was essentially
cashless. However, the same cannot be
said about the army's involvement in the second arms shipment. Here it appears that senior officers in the
army acted criminally in their plan to sell state goods in return for almost
one million U.S. dollars, without the knowledge of Nicaragua's civilian
authorities, using a purchase order that was unlikely to be legitimate and
which was almost two years old.
6.
There appears
to be no involvement of Panamanian authorities in the exchange of arms, or
their diversion. The issue of where the
forged purchase order originated remains unresolved.
7.
Colombia is the
victim of the arms diversion. However
several Colombian customs agents were likely accomplices of, or were bribed by,
the AUC in order to allow the Otterloo to land its cargo of arms and ammunition
in the port of Turbo.
ANNEX I
Documented
Chronology of the Chain of Events
The
entire chain of events has been reconstructed based on documentary and other
evidence:
·
On October 26,
1999, GIR S.A. sent Commissioner Montealegre a fax, stipulating the conditions
and terms for an arms exchange: Three
million 7.62 x 39 caliber bullets; 6000 Kalashnikov AK47 assault rifles; 24,000
AK47 magazines; and 6000 AK47 bayonets – in exchange for – 500 9mm Jericho
pistols and accessories, and 100 9mm Mini-Uzi machine pistols and accessories,
both manufactured by IMI. [See doc. No. 177, Annex V].
·
On November 2,
1999, another fax was sent by GIR S.A., signed by Kissilevich, the Director
General of the company, outlining the same terms for the exchange, but this
time assigning a monetary value to the arms to be exchanged. The NNP arms, ammunition and accessories
were valued at $261,000; and the IMI arms and accessories were valued at
$264,000. [See doc. No. 176, Annex V].
·
On November 4,
1999, Uzi Kissilevich sent a fax to Century International Arms, an arms company
based in Fairfax, Vermont and Miami, Florida, to the attention of Haim Geri.
Kissilevich informed Geri that NNP Commissioner Montealegre agreed to
sell the arms, ammunition and accessories.
He also informed Geri that they were attempting to identify arms which
were not of Russian manufacture and forwarded some prices for the goods
established by Montealegre (saying that Montealegre complained the original
prices for the goods were too low). Kissilevich
asked Geri to keep in mind that “tanto la mercaderia, como su empaque, se
encuentran en perfecto estado”. [See
doc. No. 175, Annex V].
·
On November 11,
1999 – Haim Geri sent an e-mail to
Kissilevich asking him to send a price quote for 2000 new AK47s to Marco
Shrem, located in Panama, adding Shrem’s fax number (507-217-6023 and 507
215-2306) and telling Kissilevich to say that he was sending the fax at the
request of Geri. [See doc. No. 173, Annex V]
·
On November 12,
1999 Kissilevich sent Shrem the quote for 2000 new AK47s. [See doc. No. 172,
171, Annex V].
·
On December 2,
1999, Century International Arms Inc. sent Ori Zoller a fax signed by Brian
Sucher, in which Century agreed to purchase the 3 million 7.62 x 39 caliber
bullets; 2000 AK47 assault rifles; 24,000 AK47 magazines; and 6000 AK47
bayonets; provided such goods were in very good condition, and were importable
into the United States. [See doc. No. 170, Annex V].
·
On December 3,
1999, Zoller sent a fax to Commissioner Montealegre, thanking him for his
courtesy during Zoller’s visit to Nicaragua, and once again, outlining the
goods to be exchanged: 3 million 7.62 x
39 caliber bullets; 6000 AK47s assault rifles; 24,000 AK47 magazines; and 6000
AK47 bayonets – in return for 600 9mm Jericho pistols and accessories, and 100
9mm Mini-Uzi machine pistols and accessories. [See doc. No. 168, Annex V].
On
the same day, GIR S.A. sent an un-signed draft end-user certificate letter to
Marco Shrem’s fax number in Panama. [See doc. No. 169, Annex V].
§
On
December 20, 2000, GIR S.A. sent an “invoice”, really a note offering goods at
a certain price, to Pedro Bello, President of “Armamentos Inc.”, with offices
in West Palm Beach, FL, offering for sale the 3 million 7.62 x 39 caliber
bullets; 6000 AK47s assault rifles; 24,000 AK47 magazines; and 6000 AK47
bayonets. [See doc. No. 166, Annex V]. The same day, Bello wrote back asking for
clarification as to whether GIR S.A. was offering 3 million rounds of
ammunition, or 300,000 thousand. [See doc. No. 167, Annex V]. Kissilevich later
confirmed that it was 3 million. [See doc. No. 165, Annex V].
§
On
January 14, 2000, Zoller and Kissilevich sent a fax to Marco Shrem in Panama,
regarding his travel to Nicaragua to inspect the arms – the inspection was
scheduled to take place on January 18. [See doc. No. 162, Annex V].
§
Also
on January 14, 2000, GIR S.A. sent Commissioner Luis Muñoz Morales, Chief of
General Administration of the NNP, a corrected draft version of the letter of
intent outlining the terms of the exchange between GIR S.A. and the NNP. The quantity of NNP equipment was changed in
the revision: from 3 million rounds of ammunition to 2.5 million rounds, from
6000 AK47s to 5000 AK47s; and the AK47 magazines were dropped from the
deal. In exchange, GIR S.A. would then
provide the NNP with 450 Jericho pistols and 100 Mini-Uzis [See doc. No. 163,
Annex V]. These changes were confirmed in a fax from GIR S.A. to Commissioner
Montealegre sent January 19, 2000. [See doc. No. 161, Annex V].
§
On
or about January 18, 2000, Zoller inspected the arms in Nicaragua, possibly
along with Marco Shrem. [See doc. No. 2, Annex III].
§
On
January 21, 2000, Pedro Bello wrote to Kissilevich, asking him for the new
quantity of items ready to be sold, along with the date he could go and inspect
the goods. He lamented that an earlier
inspection was not possible and stated that he had buyers ready to see the
goods. [See doc. No. 160, Annex V].
·
On January 27,
2000 Commissioner Muñoz wrote to Commissioner Montealegre, forwarding him the
draft letter of intent, explaining that GIR S.A. had accepted the NNP’s last
changes [presumably a change in the number of Jericho pistols the police was to
receive, 465 instead of 450 [See doc. No. 159, Annex V]. [See note of March 2,
2000 below].
·
The same day,
Commissioner Montealegre wrote to Minister René Herrera, Ministro de Gobernación, who had oversight of the National Police,
sending him the draft letter of intent for the exchange of arms with
GIR.SA. Montealegre said he intended to
sign the letter of intent, adding that he would include a clause in the letter
which would require GIR S.A. to provide an end-user certificate for the arms
exchanged by the NNP. [See doc. No. 158, Annex V].
·
On February 1,
2000, Montealegre wrote again to Minister Herrera, and asked that Herrera give
him written permission to execute the exchange, request approval from the
Contraloría General, and sign the letter of intent. [See doc. No. 157, Annex
V].
·
On February, 3,
2000, Minister Herrera replied to Montealegre and approved the exchange of
arms. Herrera mentioned that the
Nicaraguan Presidency, and the US Embassy in Managua had been informed about
the exchange of armament. He further
mentioned that the exchange should be
submitted to the Controlaría General for approval. [This latter point was
made because government purchases are subject to article 3 (k) of Law 323, Ley de Contrataciones del Estado, which
requires that purchases be made by open bid competition. In order to effect the exchange with GIR
S.A., a waiver of the bidding process would have to be granted by the
Controlaría.] [See doc. No. 156, Annex V].
·
On March 1,
2000, Minister Herrera wrote to Guillermo Arguello Poessy, the Contralor General of Nicaragua,
requesting his help in obtaining the waiver from the Contraloría for the transaction in question. [See doc. No. 155,
Annex V].
·
On March 2,
2000, GIR S.A. sent a fax to
Montealegre, with the final changes to the terms of the exchange, i.e. 465
Jericho pistols, instead of 450. [See doc. No. 154, Annex V].
·
On March 3,
2000, Kissilevich sent Montealegre a fax which contained Ori Zoller’s travel
information for a visit to Managua, to take place on March 6, 2000. [See doc.
No. 153, Annex V].
·
On March 8,
2000, Commissioner Montealegre and Ori Zoller, signed a “Convenio de Intención de Recambio de Armamento” – a letter of
intent establishing the terms of reference for the eventual exchange. The terms in the notice made the exchange
subject to approval by the Ministry of Gobernación,
and by the Contraloría General. Under the term, GIR S.A. was required to
produce an end-user certificate for the weaponry. [See doc. No. 152, Annex V].
·
On April 4,
2000, in a note to Herrera, Arguello informed him that the Contraloría could
not approve the exemption to the bidding process until additional information
regarding the exchange was provided.
Arguello requested information on the quantity and value of the arms to
be exchanged and also mentioned that the exemption request lacked the
“documentos inherentes a la legalidad de esta Empresa [GIR S.A.], su
denominación, domicilio, constitución, debida autorización del Estado Israelí,
y otras consideraciones pertinentes a la delicada operación propuesta.” and
mentioned that these should also be provided. [See doc. No. 150, Annex V].
·
On the same
day, Pedro Bello, wrote to Zoller and Kissilevich saying that GIR S.A. had not
produced the much talked-about inventory [of arms] in Managua, and that they
should call when they had something firm. [See doc. No. 151, Annex V].
·
On April 28,
Zoller sent Commissioner Muñoz a draft end-user certificate, which the NNP was
supposed to sign and send to Amiram Maor, Director of Marketing for Latin
America, of IMI, certifying the end-use for 500 Jericho pistols. [See doc. No.
148, Annex V].
·
Also on April
28, 2000, Shrem and Yelineck met Zoller in Managua to inspect the NNP’s
inventory. [Interview with Zoller and Shrem].
·
On May 2, 2000,
Kissilevich sent Commissioner Muñoz another note outlining the latest terms of
the change. The number of Jericho
pistols had then been increased to 500.
The rest of the terms remained unchanged: Jerichos, plus 100 uzis, in exchange for 2.5 million rounds, 5000
AK47s and 6000 bayonets – the transaction was valued by Kissilevich to be worth
$250,000. [See doc. No. 147, Annex V].
·
On May 4, 2000,
Montealegre sent Arguello some documents in an attempt to address Arguello’s
concerns outlined in his April 4 letter to Herrera. Montealegre did not address the question of Zoller’s “debida autorización del Estado Israeli”
– Montealegre further qualified the NNP’s arms as obsolete, and hence of no
monetary value. [See doc. No. 144, Annex V].
On the same day, Zoller wrote to Commissioner
Muñoz, providing him with a detailed breakdown of the costs of the IMI
equipment GIR S.A. was going to provide to the NNP. The total cost was $242,000. [See doc. No. 145, Annex V].
·
On May 12,
2000, Heriberto Correa Guerrero, Director of Contrataciones Administrativas del Estado, of the Contraloría General, wrote to
Commissioner Muñoz, requesting the
quantity and unit value of the NNP items to be exchanged. He also asked for an explanation as to what
GIR S.A. would do with the exchanged
AK47s. [See doc. No. 143, Annex V].
·
On May 15,
2000, Montealegre replied to Correa Guerrero’s letter, but directly to
Contralor Arguello, giving the unit cost of the AK47s and the ammunition. Montealegre did not say how GIR S.A. was to
use the arms, but instead stated that the letter of intent established that the
deal could only take place with the approval of the Minister of Gobernacion,
the Contraloria, and once GIR S.A. produced an end-user certificate [See doc.
No. 142, Annex V].
·
On or about May
18, 2000, Zoller traveled to Panama to conclude the sale of 2500 AK47s (later
3000) and 5 million rounds of ammunition to Shimon Yelinek. Once the deal was concluded, Kissilevich
(from Guatemala) sent Zoller a fax to his hotel room in Panama, with
information on how Yelinek could send a wire transfer to GIR S.A.’s bank
account (Westrust Bank Ltd, account 40692-9) [Interview with Zoller]. This was so that Yelinek could send GIR S.A.
a down payment. [See doc. No. 141, Annex V].
·
On May 22,
2000, the Contraloría General issued
a “Cédula de Notificación”, essentially a resolution, approving the Ministry of
Gobernación request for an exception
to the bid competition requirement for government purchases. The Cédula mentioned that this exemption was
being granted so that the Contract between the NNP and GIR S.A. could be
formalized. [See doc. No. 140, Annex V].
The
Cédula clearly stated that the appropriate government authorities must ensure
that all necessary measures were taken to ensure that the exchange of arms was
done in accordance with applicable international conventions and laws. The Cédula also recommended that any final
Contract on the exchange of arms should include a provision stating the
Government of Israel’s agreement/approval.
On
the same day, Kissilevich sent Shrem, in Panama, information on an aircraft
that GIR S.A, had for sale. [See doc. No. 139, Annex V].
·
On
May 31, 2000, Kissilevich sent Commissioner Montealegre a fax, requesting a
copy of the contract to be signed between GIR S.A. and the NNP so that Zoller
could review it prior to traveling to Nicaragua on June 1, 2000 (traveling to
sign the contract). Kissilevich
attached two letters, one from Amiram Maor, Deputy Vice-President of marketing
for of Israeli Military Industries, IMI, certifying that GIR S.A. was IMI’s
sole representative for any agreement with the NNP; the other from Gabriel
Bernstein, Director of Marketing for Latin America of IMI, detailing the
warranty that comes with the IMI arms to be supplied by GIR S.A. [See doc. No.
138, Annex V].
·
On June 2,
2000, Montealegre, and Zoller, signed a Contract for the exchange of arms, “Contrato de Permuta de Armamento y
Municiones”. In respect of the
Contraloría’s suggestion that certification be obtained from the Israeli
Government, the Contract stated that it was not a Contract between two
governments (Nicaragua and Israel) and therefore, it was not possible to obtain
a certification from the Israeli Government.
The Contract was an exchange of 2.5 million 7.62 x 39 caliber bullets;
5000 AK47s assault rifles; and 6000 AK47 bayonets – in return for 465 9mm
Jericho pistols and accessories, and 100 9mm mini-uzi machine pistols and
accessories. [See doc. No. 137, Annex V].
§
On June 6,
Zoller sent Shrem in Panama, information on military trucks for sale. [See doc.
No. 135, Annex V].
§
On June 7,
Zoller sent Shrem information on how to send a wire transfer to GIR S.A’s
Westrust bank account number 010063264, sub account 40692-9 - through Barclay’s
Bank in Miami Fl, explaining that the transfer that Shrem attempted to do one
week before did not go through. [See doc. No. 136, Annex V].
§
On June 16,
$74,972 was deposited in GIR S.A.’s account as a down-payment for the purchase
of 2500 AK47s and 5 million rounds of ammunition by Yelinek. [See doc. No. 133,
Annex V].
§
On September
20, 2000, Montealegre wrote to Zoller, explaining that the NNP had not received
any of the 465 Jericho pistols stipulated in the contract – and he threatened
to cancel the contract unless Zoller informed him when the pistols were to be
delivered. [See doc. No. 129, Annex V].
On September 27, Kissilevich replied, explaining that they were doing
their best to send the pistols. [See doc. No. 128, Annex V]. On September 29, Montealegre wrote back
asking GIR S.A. to tell him when the pistols will be delivered – or he would
cancel the contract. [See doc. No. 126, Annex V]. On October 2, 2000, Kissilevich wrote to Gabriel Bernstein,
giving him the NNP address in Managua to which the Jericho pistols should be
sent. [See doc. No. 125, Annex V].
§
On October 2,
2000, $50,000 was deposited by Yelinek in GIR S.A.’s bank account. [Interview
with Zoller].
·
On January 2,
2001, Yelinek sent Zoller an e-mail, saying that “our friend in Africa” wants
an urgent price quote on the following items, and whether he has them in stock:
600 AK47s; 200 rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPG7); 400 grenade
launchers; 6 twin-barrel and 4 four-barrel anti-aircraft guns, 6000
hand-grenades and 50 anti-tank grenade launchers; plus attendant ammunition.
[See doc. No. 123, Annex V].
·
On January 3,
2001, Yelinek sent another e-mail to Zoller – saying “This is the start price
list that I send to my contact. He
already told me that it expensive. I
reply that if he take it all we will make discount for him. Please check item no 3-7-8-11-14-15 [grenade
launchers, anti-tank grenade launchers, 60 mm launchers, 2000 grenades, 200
anti-tank rockets, 800 60 mm rockets] if you have in stock and prices. Please do not travel to your man before I
will receive the green light that the money is ready in my contact’s hand and
the end-user certificate is ready also.
Send me by e-mail of fax under what name – or to whom to need the
paper”. The same e-mail contains a
forwarded e-mail from Yelinek to the person in Africa, identified only as
Guy/Alfa, saying that “the country in
this area have (sic) everything in stock in good condition” and that “we can
arrange as well the transport to your place”. [See doc. No. 122, Annex V].
·
On January 5,
2001, Eugenia de Leon, a secretary working at GIR S.A., sent a fax to General
Calderon of the Nicaraguan Army, attaching a list of arms and ammunition, along
with prices. The list of arms and
ammunition corresponded to the list of equipment requested in Yelinek’s e-mail
of January 2, 2001. [See doc. No. 121, Annex V].
·
On January 12,
2001, Ibrahim Bah, received a handwritten list of arms and ammunition, with
prices. [See doc. No. 120b, Annex V].
·
On January 16,
2001, GIR S.A. sent a fax to Yelinek at phone number 305-937-0806 in Miami,
attaching a draft end-user certificate, addressed to Mr. Sergey Ladigin, Director de Departamento Regional de la
America Latina de la Empresa Estatal Unitar Rosoboronexport.
(“ROSOBORONEXPORT” Federal State Unitary Enterprise a specialized agency
responsible for Russian arms export). [See doc. No. 120, Annex V].
·
On January 16,
2001, Yelinek sent a hand-written copy of the January 16, 2001 draft end-user
certificate (above) to Ibrahim Bah.
[See doc. No. 120a, Annex V].
·
On February 1,
2001, Zoller sent Yelinek a fax, with the details of how to send a
wire-transfer to GIR S.A.’s bank account (the Westrust Bank account). [See doc.
No. 118, Annex V].
·
On February 9,
2001, Kissilevich sent Yelinek a fax, with the technical specifications of AK47
assault rifles and ammunition, and the details of how they were packed. [See
doc. No. 117, Annex V].
·
On March 5,
2001, Zoller sent Yelinek a fax, with the details of how to send a
wire-transfer to GIR S.A.’s bank account (the Westrust Bank account). [See doc.
No. 114, Annex V].
·
On March 6,
2001, $100,000 was deposited in GIR S.A.’s bank account via wire transfer from
Discount Bank and Trust Company, Geneva, Switzerland; through Citibank, New
York. [See doc. No. 113, Annex V].
·
According to
sworn statements given by Zoller, on May 10, 2001, [See doc. No. 2, Annex III],
Yelinek met Zoller in Guatemala City, where he gave the former a purchase order
from the Panamanian National Police, dated February 10, 2000. [See doc. No. 1,
Annex IV]. The Order was for the
purchase of 10,000 AK47s (AKM), 15 million rounds of ammunition, 1,000 machine
guns (PKMS), 1,000 rocket propelled grenades (RPG7), 1000 Dragonov rifles, 10
million rounds of ammunition for PKMS, 10,000 RPG7 grenades, and 500 Jericho pistols”. A fax from Zoller to the Hotel Quinta Real
(where Zoller also had his offices) sent on May 15, asked the Hotel to send him
the bill for Yelinek’s stay in the hotel. [See doc. No. 112, Annex V].
·
According to a
statement made by Gustavo Leonardo Padilla Martinez (the lawyer for Trafalgar
Martime Inc.) to the Panamanian National Police [Interview with Padilla],
Miguel Onattopp Ferriz purchased the ship Otterloo from Holland in early July,
2001.
·
On July 2,
2001, Kissilevich sent Yelinek a fax, informing him of Zoller’s trip to
Manauga, scheduled for July 4, 2001. [See doc. No. 110, Annex V].
·
On July 3,
2001, Kissilevich sent another fax to Yelinek, informing him that Zoller could
not travel, and that he, Kissilevich, would travel to Managua on July 4, 2001,
instead. He also asked Yelinek for his
arrival time in Manauga, so that he could pick him up at the airport. [See doc.
No. 109, Annex V].
·
On July 3,
2001, $10,450 was deposited in GIR S.A.’s bank account. [Interview with
Zoller].
·
On or about
July 4, 2001, Kissilevich and Yelinek visited the NNP Armory, to inspect the
AK47s.
·
On July 6,
2001, Kissilevich sent Yelinek a fax with the name and contact information of
GIR S.A.’s shipping agent, who would be responsible for shipping the
containers. The agent was
Leonel Cordon, Ave. 6-26 Zona 09. oficina 702, Guatemala Ciudad, 502-334-7070. [See doc. No. 108, Annex V].
·
On July 11,
2001, lawyer Gustavo Padilla filed papers to have Trafalgar Maritime Inc.,
established as a company in Panama.
Miguel Onattott (sic) Ferriz was stipulated as the President of the
Company. The company was legally
established the same day. [See doc. No. 107a, Annex V].
·
On July 24,
2001, the Panamanian Ministerio de
Hacienda y Tesoro, granted a Provisional Certificate of Navigation to the
Otterloo. [See doc. No. 106, Annex V].
·
On September 6,
2001, Commissioner General Francisco Montealegre, retired as head of NNP –
Francisco Bautista Lara became new Chief of Police.
·
On September
18, 2001, Zoller wrote to José Antonio López Dolmuz, Deputy Administrative
Chief of the NNP, informing him that he authorized “cedo” the Nicaraguan Army to remove from the NNP’s warehouse, 2.5 M
munitions, 5000 AK47s, and 6000 bayonets. [See doc. No. 103, Annex V].
·
On 26 September
2001, the Chief of the army’s Logistical branch, Col. Ramón Calderón Vindell,
wrote to Melby González, the NNP’s Chief of General Administration, to inform
her that he had assigned Lt. Col. Uriel Moreno Corea, Chief of the Military’s
Technical Section, to receive the NNP’s 5000 AK47s. He quoted Zoller’s September 18 note. [See doc. No. 102, Annex
V].
Also
on September 26, Zoller sent a fax to his shipping agent, Leonel Cordon,
informing him that title to the containers to be used to export the NNP arms
should be given to the Ministerio de
Gobierno y Justicia, Policía Nacional, Republica de Panamá. [See doc. No.
101, Annex V].
·
On September
28, 2001, Kissilevich sent Yelinek a fax, providing him the serial numbers of
the containers which were to be used to export the Nicaraguan arms. [See doc.
No. 98, Annex V].
§
On
the same day, Zoller sent Nicaraguan Army Major Alvaro Rivas, responsible for
the logistical aspects of exporting the arms from Nicaragua, a fax in which he
informed Major Rivas that the containers should not be loaded with more than 13
tons or 26,000 pounds. [See doc. No. 99, Annex V].
§
Also
on September 28, Kissilevich sent General Calderon a fax, providing an
accounting of a transaction in which the army sold to GIR S.A. 2.5 million
rounds of AK47 ammunition worth $112,000, agreed to exchange the 5000 old NNP
AK47s, for 3117 new AK47s for a fee of $20,000, and sold 300
ammunition-carrying vests worth $15,000 – in return for 500 bullet-proof vests
and accessories from GIR S.A., valued at $185,620. Kissilevich informed Calderon that the army owed GIR S.A. $68,120
for the balance of the transaction, and attached information on how to send a
wire-transfer to GIR S.A.’s account. [See doc. No. 100, Annex V].
§
On October 1,
2001, (retransmitted on the 12th and 19th) – Kissilevich sent Commissioner
Gonzalez a fax informing her that GIR S.A. was sending the NNP 100 Jericho
pistols [See doc. No. 96, Annex V]. He
added that in order to deliver the remaining 5 pistols (for a total of 465) he
needed the NNP to send IMI an end-user certificate [See doc. No. 95, Annex
V]. He sent the NNP a draft.
Also on October 1, Leonel Cordon informed
Kissilevich by e-mail that 4 of the containers to be used to export the arms
from Nicaragua had to be replaced. He
sent Kisslevich a new list of serial numbers for the containers that were to be
used. There were 12 containers. This
information was then faxed to Yelinek. [See doc. No. 94, Annex V].
§
On October 2,
2001, Kissilevich sent Major Rivas the same fax that was sent to General
Calderon on September 28. He
retransmitted the Fax on October 8. [See doc. No. 93, Annex V].
§
On October 9,
2001, Kissilevich sent Yelinek a fax with a price list for 10,000 uniforms and
boots. [See doc. No. 90, Annex V].
·
On October 10,
2001, Col. Carlos Gilberto Chavarría Hernandez, Chief of Guatemala’s Military
Industry, certified that 115 AK47s were to be purchased from GIR S.A. for the
exclusive use of Guatemala’s Military Industry. [See doc. No. 89, Annex V].
§
On October 12,
Major Rivas sent Zoller an e-mail, explaining that they were working towards
October 18, and hence, needed the 12 trucks to carry the containers on the
morning of October 17. He added that it
was imperative that he received the end-user certificate by the morning of
October 15. [See doc. No. 86, Annex V].
§
On October 13,
the Captain of the ship Otterloo, Jesus Fernando Iturrios Maciel, signed a ship
manifest in the port of Veracruz, Mexico, stating that his ship was carrying 9
containers of plastic balls, and that he was sailing to Panama. [See doc. No.
85, Annex V].
·
On October 15,
2001, $99,775 was deposited in GIR S.A.’s bank account via wire transfer from a
certain Kolel Shomrei Aahomot by way of the Mercantile Discount Bank Ltd, Tel
Aviv, Israel. [See doc. No. 84, Annex V].
·
On October 16,
2001, $212,265 was deposited in GIR S.A.’s bank account via wire transfer from
S.H and A. Diamonds Ltd, by way of Chase [bank] in New York. [See doc. No. 83,
Annex V].
·
On October 17,
2001, Colonel Ramon Calderon Vindell and Commissioner Melby Gonzalez, by way of
an Acta de Entrega – document the
army handing-over 3,117 AK47s and 2.5 million bullets to the NNP. [See doc. No.
80, Annex V]. In another document, with
the same date, Col. Calderon certified that the AK47s were made before 1986. [See
doc. No. 81, Annex V].
·
On the same
day, GIR S.A. sent a Fedex package to Major Rivas, apparently containing the
end-user certificate, which took the form of an alleged Panamanian National
Police Purchase Order, dated February 10, 2000. [See doc. No. 82, Annex V].
·
On October 18,
2001, Kissilevich sent Yelinek an e-mail, attaching an account balance, which
showed that Yelinek owed GIR S.A. approximately $25,000. [See doc. No. 79,
Annex V].
·
Also on October
18, 2001, the Nicaraguan Army wire transferred $68,120 to GIR S.A.’s bank
account in Miami [See doc. No. 78, Annex V] – this was the amount owned on the
side-deal for the bullet-proof vests and the commission for exchanging the arms
with the NNP.
·
On October 19,
2001, GIR S.A. forwarded a note from Yelinek to their shipping agent, Leonel
Cordon. The note from Yelinek contained
the name of the ship (Otterloo), and the company name (Trafalgar Maritime Inc),
also identifying the company’s legal representative as a certain Captain
Onattopp Ferriz. [See doc. No. 76, Annex V].
·
Also on October
19, Major Rivas sent an e-mail to Kissilevich in which he asked for (1) a new
end-user certificate for the AK47s which were going to the Guatemalan Army, and
the end-user certificate he had was only for 115 guns, and 117 were to be
shipped; (2) the name of the port of embarkation and the port where the “large
package” was to be unloaded; and, (3) similar information for the bayonets.
[See doc. No. 77, Annex V].
GIR
S.A. apparently replied that only 115 guns were going to Guatemala, and
therefore the end-user certificate that the army had would serve; and they also
provided the address for Century Arms. [See doc. No. 77, Annex V].
In relation to the “large package” GIR S.A. informed that the address was
Captain Onatto Frizz [stet – Miguel Onattopp Ferriz] P.O. box 873276, Zona 7,
Panama, Republica de Panamá. [See doc. No. 77, Annex V].
·
On October 22,
2001, First Commissioner Edwin Cordero Ardilla, notified the Contraloría General (acting Contralor,
Francisco Ramírez Torres), of a quantitative change in the arrangement with
GIRSA. He informed that 3,117 AK47s
instead of 5,000 AK47s and 5 million rounds of ammunition, instead of 2.5
million rounds were to be exchanged. He
further explained that the change was necessary as the original 5,000 guns did
not meet GIR S.A.’s technical requirements, and therefore an exchange with the
army would solve the problem. He
further informed that the corresponding inventories kept by Bienes del Estado, were to reflect the
exchange. [See doc. No. 75, Annex V].
·
On October 24,
2001, General Commissioner Francisco Bautista Lara, wrote to the Minister of
Finance, Esteban Duque Estrada, requesting that the paper inventory of arms of
the NNP be adjusted to reflect the receipt, from the army, of 3,117 AK47s, and
then the exchange of those arms, under the GIR S.A. contract. Changes were also made to stocks of
munitions and bayonets. [See doc. No. 72, Annex V].
·
On October 25,
2001, the Director of Government Accounting, of the Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Luis Bravo Henriquez,
certified that the corresponding changes in the paper inventories of the
Ministry had been made. He then wrote 3 separate letters, all dated October 25,
2001, informing Commissioner Bautista Lara, of the changes to the inventories.
[See doc. No. 67, Annex V].
·
On October 25,
2001, the new Minister of Gobernación, Ing. José Marenco Cardenal, wrote to
Jorge Molina Lacayo, the Director of the Centro
de Trámites de Exportación del Estado de Nicaragua (CETREX), copied to new
National Police Commissioner, Edwin Cordero Ardilla, and requested that he take
the necessary steps to export the arms and munitions; [See doc. No. 68, Annex
V].
The
Minister also wrote directly to Commissioner Cordero to inform him that he had
authorized the export of the arms. [See doc. No. 69, Annex V].
·
On October 26,
2001, Otterloo arrived in El Rama, Nicaragua. [See doc. No. 63, Annex V].
·
On October 30,
2001, Brian Sucher, Executive VP of Century Arms, certified his company’s
importation of the Bayonets into the United States. [See doc. No. 61, Annex V].
§
Also
that day, Nicaraguan Army Major Ramiro Martinez Rivera left Managua, leading a
convoy of trucks from Managua to the port of El Rama, where it arrived the next
day, October 31. [See doc. No. 50, Annex V].
·
On October 31,
2001, Acting Contralor, Francisco Ramírez Torres, replied to Commissioner
Bautista Lara, informing the latter that the NNP could make purchases of items
for exclusive police work “sin ajustarse
a los procedimientos ordinarios de la Ley”. Ramírez Torres informed the
Commissioner that he must, however, send a copy of the contract to the
Contraloría, within 10 days of its signature, “para su debida fiscalización”. [See doc. No. 57, Annex V].
§
On
November 1, 2001, the Agencia Aduanera Canales Aguilar filled-out an export
form, documenting the export of 115 AK47s from the Managua airport to the
Ministry of National Defense in Guatemala. [See doc. No. 54, Annex V].
·
On
November 2, 2001, following a delay of two days, the 14 containers (Note: there
were 14 containers: 10 containers with ammunition, 4 with AK47 assault rifles)
were loaded by Agencia Vassali onto the Otterloo. The Otterloo first had to unload 9 containers (allegedly
containing plastic balls) it had on its deck, loaded the 14 arms containers
into its hold, then re-loaded the 9 containers on its deck. [See doc. No. 6,
Annex V].
·
Also
on November 2, 2001, a CETREX Export Form was filled-out by Agencia Canales
Aguilar, and it documented the export of arms and ammunition to the Panamanian
National Police, at the port of Colon, Panama. [See doc. No. 53, Annex V]. A
Nicaraguan custom form similarly documented the shipment to the PNP. [See doc.
No. 53, Annex V].
Two
other documents were also filled-out - the Otterloo’s ship manifest (on Agencia
Vassalli stationary) [See doc. No. 53, Annex V] and a Bill of Lading, [See doc.
No. 53, Annex V], both dated November 2, 2001.
They also documented the arms and ammunition, including the serial
numbers of the containers that contain the goods). The manifest and the Bill of Lading were certified by the
Otterloo’s Captain (Master), Jesus Iturrios Maciel, and indicated that the
final destination was the Panamanian National Police.
·
On
November 3, 2001, the Captain of the Otterloo, Iturrios Maciel, signed an Acta de Salida, a form from the
Nicaraguan Ministerio de Gobernacion,
indicating his imminent departure to the port of Colón, Panama. [See doc. No.
52, Annex V] The Nicaraguan Navy
documented the Ottlerloo sailing out of the port of El Bluff, with the declared
destination being the port of Colón, Panama. [See doc. No. 52, Annex V].
·
On November 5,
2001, the Otterloo arrived at the port of Turbo, as documented by a form of the
Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad,
Seccional Antioquia, Puesto Operativco Turbo, which was signed by the
Captain of the Otterloo, as well as by a Colombian customs official. [See doc.
No. 51, Annex V]. On November 7, the
shipment of arms and ammunition was unloaded by a shipping company called Banadex
S.A., at the request of a the shipping agent Turbana Ltd, and the AUC took
possession of the weaponry [see doc. 14a, Annex V]. The Otterloo then sailed for Baranquilla on November 9. [See
docs. Nos. 51 and 25, Annex V].
·
On November 9,
2001, GIR S.A. sent Yelinek a fax outlining the entire transaction on the sale
of equipment and related shipping costs, and detailing payments received from
Yelinek. The entire cost of the
operation amounted to $603,805, of which GIR S.A. had received $547,642 from
Yelinek - GIR S.A. was owed $ 56,343. [See doc. No. 45, Annex V].
·
Also on
November 9, the Agencia Aduanera Canales Aguilar completed the required export
documents for exporting 9000 AK47 bayonets to Century Arms in Miami, by way of
Puerto Cortes, Honduras. [See doc. No. 46, Annex V].
§
On November 21,
Ori Zoller sent a fax to the Nicaraguan Army (tel: 505-228-7605), explaining
that the Panamanian National Police wished to purchase a second consignment of
arms and ammunition: 17 million rounds
of ammunition of two different types, along with 5000 AK47s. Zoller outlined how payment was to be made
for the purchase of such equipment, and he attached the February 10, 2000
purchase order which he characterized as “debidamente
firmada y sellada por el Ministerio de Gobierno y Justicia, Policia Nacional de
Panamá”. [See doc. No. 42, Annex V].
·
On December 4,
2001, Zoller’s bank account received two wire transfers. The first, for $6,475, from a certain Stein
Svi, by way of the Mercantile Discount Bank Ltd, Tel Aviv, Israel [See doc. No.
40, Annex V]; the second, for $49,568 from a certain Chaim Mann, by way of the
First International Bank of Israel, Ltd. Tel Aviv, Israel. [See doc. No. 41,
Annex V].
·
On December 13,
2001, the Otterloo returned to Puerto Colón, Panama, after having traveled from
Baranquilla, Colombia (on November 9), to ports in Venezuela and Suriname. [See
doc. No. 25, Annex V].
·
On December 14,
2001, GIR S.A. sent a fax to Yelinek in which the prices were shown for a list
of military hardware, which included 5000 AK47s, 10 million rounds of
ammunition, 100 PKMS machine guns, 50 rocket propelled grenades RPG7, and 1000
grenades for RPG7. [See doc. No. 39, Annex V].
·
On January 2,
2002, GIR S.A. sent Yelinek a fax, providing pricing for the purchase of 24
containers, and transportation and customs costs. [See doc. No. 38, Annex V]
·
On January 3,
2002, Kissilevich sent a fax to his shipping agent, Leonel Cordon, giving him
the address to which the containers should be sent (Comando de Apoyo Logístico, in Managua), and the contact person,
Major Rivas of the Nicaraguan Army. [See doc. No. 34, Annex V].
·
Also on January
3, 2002, Kissilevich apparently sent Major Rivas a copy of the Panamanian
purchase order, describing it as the “Certificado
de Usuario Final correspondiente a la mercaderia solicitada”. [See doc. No.
37, Annex V].
·
On January 8,
2002, Kissilevich sent a fax to Major Rivas, explaining that he was sending him
a list of serial numbers for “ten more containers”. [See doc. No. 32, Annex V].
·
On January 11,
2002, the Jefe de la Dirección de
Financias del Ejercito de Nicaragua, Coronel Miguel Guzman Bolaños, issued
a bill for $980,000, addressed to the Panamanian National Police, but sent only
to Zoller, for 17 million rounds of ammunition, and 5000 AK47s. [See doc. No. 31,
Annex V].
·
On January 16,
2002, $50,000 was wire-transferred to GIR S.A.’s Westrust Bank account from a
Bank in Israel. [See doc. No. 29, Annex V].
·
On January 23,
Julio Solis, of Agencia Vassali in Nicaragua, sent an e-mail to GIR S.A.’s
shipping agent in Guatemala, Leonel Cordon, informing him that 23 containers
were available for immediate purchase. [See doc. No. 28, Annex V].
·
On January 30,
2002, Ovidio Escudero, Chief of Naval Intelligence of the Panamanian Navy, sent
a fax to Captain Manuel S. Mora Ortiz of the Nicaraguan Navy, asking him for
any information he may have regarding the ship Otterloo. Escudero added that the Ship was suspected
of transporting armament to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC). [See doc. No. 27, Annex V].
The
next day, Mora replied to Escudero, explaining that the Otterloo had sailed
from Nicaragua on November 2, 2001, loaded with 3000 AK47s and 5 million
bullet, which had been sent to the Panamanian National Police. [See doc. No.
26, Annex V].
§
On February 6, 2002, el Teniente
Coronel, Wilson Laverde, Jefe de la Unidad Antiterrorista de la Policía
Nacional de Colombia; Elmer E. Acuña del Consejo de Seguridad Publica y Defensa
Nacional de Panamá; el Mayor Francisco León Rodríguez, Jefe del
Departamento de Contra Inteligencia del Ejercito de Nicaragua, y el
Sub-Comisionado Arnulfo Escobar, de la Policía Nacional de Panamá, signed a
document called “Propuesta de Trabajo para el Desarrollo de la Operación
Triangulo”. [See doc. No. 24, Annex V].
§
On February 15,
2002, GIR S.A. sent a fax to Julio Solis, informing him that they no longer
wanted the 23 containers that were for sale.
GIR S.A. sent a copy of this fax to their shipping agent, Leonel Cordón.
[See doc. No. 22, Annex V].
§
On March 5,
2002 during a meeting of Chiefs of Police in Bolivia, Carlos Barés, Chief of
the Panamanian National Police, asked Edwin Cordero, by then the Chief of the
Nicaraguan National Police, for an explanation regarding the export of
Nicaraguan arms, allegedly to Panama.
Cordero later testified that up until March 5, he had no knowledge of
Operacion Triangulo, nor that the Nicaraguan arms had been diverted to
Colombia. [Interview with Cordero].
§
On March 8,
2002, Barés and Cordero met in
Panama to review the facts of the case. [Interviews with Cordero and Barés].
§
On March 19,
2002, Shimon Yelinek sent Ori Zoller an e-mail, saying “I am sorry for the
delay, I am doing my best to comply, I have some delay, on Friday, I will call
you. Try to hold the pressure”. [See
doc. No. 20, Annex V].
§
On April 21,
2002, the Colombian newspaper, “El Tiempo” published a story regarding the
diversion of the Nicaraguan Arms.
§
April 30, 2002,
Trafalgar Maritime Inc.’s Office closed permanently for business, and they gave
up their office lease on May 1, 2002. [See doc. No. 13, Annex III].
§
On May 8, 2002,
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Nicaragua and Panama, requested
that the OAS conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the
arms diversion. [See doc. No. 17, Annex V].
§
On June 14,
2002, the Otterloo was sold to Enrique Aaron Villalba, Colombian citizen, by
Julio Matute, Panamanian citizen, and at this point the legal representative of
Trafalgar Maritime Inc. The ship was
sold for $125,000, of which only $100,000 changed hands. [See doc. No. 11,
Annex III].
·
On June 28,
2002, Trafalgar Maritime Inc., was formally dissolved by the lawyer Gustavo
Padilla. [See doc. No. 11a, Annex V].
List of All Actors
NAME
|
TITLE
|
|
|
|
|
ACAL |
Canales Aguilar Compañía Limitada (ACAL) – Customs agency in the name
of Augusto Canales Meléndez. |
|
Acuña, Elmer E. |
Council for the Public Security and National Defense of Panama. Signatory of the document “Operación
Triángulo”. |
|
Aguilar, Carlos |
Panamanian citizen. Second
Officer of the merchant ship Otterloo. Later became its Captain. |
|
Argűello Poessy, Guillermo |
President of the Superior Council, Office of the Comptroller General of
the Republic of Nicaragua (Consejo
Superior de la Contraloría General de la República de Nicaragua). |
|
Aviad, Haviv |
Brother in law, and business associate of Shimon Yelinek. |
|
Bah, Ibrahim |
Principal provider
of arms and diamond dealer for the United Revolutionary Front (RUF) of Sierra
Leone. |
|
Banadex S.A. |
Colombian shipping company that unloaded the Otterloo’s containers in
Turbo, Colombia. |
|
Bautista Lara, Francisco |
Deputy Chief of the Nicaraguan National Police. |
|
Barés, Carlos |
Chief, National Police of Panama. |
|
Bello, Pedro |
President, "Armamentos Inc.," a firearms sales company in
West Palm Beach, FL, USA. |
|
Berenstein, Gabriel |
Marketing Manager, Israeli Military Industries, Ltd. (IMI). |
|
Bravo Henríquez, Luis |
Director General, Government Accounting Department, Ministry of the
Treasury and Public Credit. |
|
Calderón Vindell, Col. Ramón |
Chief, Logistics Department, Nicaraguan Army. |
|
Calderón, General Roberto |
Inspector General of the Nicaraguan Army. |
|
Canales, Augusto |
Owner of ACAL, legal representative of the Nicaraguan National Police
during firearms exports customs procedures. |
|
Carrión, General |
Commander-in-Chief, Nicaraguan Army. |
|
Cordero Ardilla, Edwin |
First Commissioner, Director General, Nicaraguan National Police, as of September 2001. |
|
Cordón, Leonel |
Owner of Tramocaribe (Guatemala), the shipping company contracted by
GIR S.A. to coordinate transportation of the arms. |
|
Correa Guerrero, Heriberto |
Deputy Director General, State Procurement and Tenders of Nicaragua. |
|
Chavaría Hernández, Col. Carlos Gilberto |
Head, Guatemalan Military Industries, which purchased 115 AK-47 from
GIR S.A. |
|
de León, Eugenia |
Secretary, GIR S.A. |
|
Díaz Lazo, Melba |
Nicaraguan customs agent. |
|
Duque Estrada, Esteban |
Minister of the Treasury and Public Credit. |
|
Escobar, Arnulfo |
Deputy Chief of Police, National Police of Panama. Signatory of the
Operación Triángulo document. |
|
Escudero, Ovidio |
Chief, Department of Naval Intelligence, Ministry of the Interior and
Justice of Panama. |
|
Ferriz, Miguel Onattopp |
Manager/Owner,
Trafalgar Maritime International Inc.,
the company under whose name the Otterloo was registered. |
|
Gehri, Haim |
Former IMI trader in Colombia.
Is now a consultant for Century International Arms in Miami. |
|
GIR S.A. |
Grupo Representaciones Internacionales, S.A., firearms sales Company.
Address: Prolongación
Boulevard, Los Próceres, Zona 15, Kilómetro 9, Carretera a El Salvador, Área Comercial Hotel Quinta Real. |
|
González, Melby |
Chief, General Administration Division, Nicaraguan National Police. |
|
Guzmán Bolaños, Miguel |
Chief, Finance Department, Nicaraguan Army. |
|
Herrera Zúñiga, René |
Minister of Government of Nicaragua until September 30, 2000. |
|
Iturrios Macial, Jesús |
Captain/Master of the Otterloo. |
|
Jiménez, Jaime |
General Manager, Transportes Intermodal, a company contracted to
transport the arms from Managua to Puerto El Rama. |
|
Kissilevich, Uzi |
General Manager of GIR S.A. |
|
Ladigin, Sergey |
Director, Latin American Regional Department, Federal State Unitary
Enterprise “Rosoboronexport,” a specialized agency handling Russian firearms
exports. |
|
Laverde, Wilson (Lt. Colonel) |
Chief, Anti-terrorist Unit, National Police of Colombia. |
|
López Dolmuz, José Antonio |
Deputy Administrative Chief, Nicaraguan National Police. |
|
Maor, Amiram |
Deputy Vice President and Marketing Director for Latin America,
Military Industries of Israel, Ltd. (IMI). |
|
Marenco Cardenal, José |
Minister of Government of Nicaragua from October 1, 2000 until the
change of government (January 10, 2002). |
|
Martínez Rivera, Ramiro |
First Officer, Military Technical Office of Nicaragua, responsible for
accompanying the firearms from Managua to Puerto del Rama. |
|
Molina Lacayo, Jorge |
Director, Exports Processing Center (CETREX). |
|
Montealegre Callejas, Francisco (Franco) |
First Commissioner, Chief of Nicaraguan National Police until
September, 2001. |
|
Mora Ortiz, Captain Manuel S. |
Naval Forces of Nicaragua. |
|
Moreno Corea, Lieutenant Colonel Uriel |
Chief, Military Technical Office. |
|
Muñoz Morales, Luis |
Chief, General Administration Division, Nicaraguan National Police. |
|
Osailly, Samih |
Lebanese arms
dealer who works for Ibrahim Bah. |
|
Padilla Martínez, Gustavo Leonardo |
Attorney who established the company Trafalgar Maritime International,
Inc. |
|
Ramírez Torres, Francisco |
Acting President and later President of the Superior Council, Office of
the Comptroller General of the Republic of Nicaragua. |
|
Rivas Castillo, Álvaro (Major) |
General Roberto Calderón's Assistant (Aide de Camp). |
|
Rodríguez, Francisco León (Major) |
Chief, Department of Counterintelligence, Nicaraguan Army. |
|
Rojas Arrollo, Santiago |
National Taxation and Customs Department (DIAN), Colombia. |
|
Shrem, Marcos |
Peruvian businessman, resident in Panama, associate of Shimon Yelinek. |
|
Solís, Julio |
Employee of Agencia Vassali, a Nicaraguan transportation and shipping
company. |
|
Sucher, Brian |
Vice President, Century Arms. |
|
Trafalgar Maritime Inc. |
Transportation company under whose name the ship Otterloo was
registered. |
|
Vasalli S.A., Agencia "AVASA" |
Agencia Vassalli, S.A. "AVASA" loaded the firearms onto the
Otterloo in Puerto del Rama, Nicaragua. |
|
Shimon Yelinek |
Israeli businessman resident in Panama. Allegedly bought Nicaraguan firearms and ammunition. |
|
Zoller, Ori |
Owner of GIR S.A., a firearms sales company with headquarters in
Guatemala. |
|
CP10739E03
[1] It should be noted that this recommendation and others referring to the exchange of information among countries is subject to the confidentiality provisions set out in Article XII of the Convention.
[2] Ambassador Busby led an OAS Investigative Team composed of Christopher Hernández-Roy, Advisor to the Assistant Secretary General, serving as Ambassador Busby's Deputy; Michael Sullivan, Principal Attorney of the Department of Legal Affairs; Jimena Duque, Security Specialist, Office of the Assistant Secretary General; Sergio Caramagna, Director of the Office of the General Secretariat in Nicaragua; and Hernan Hurtado, Director of the Office of the General Secretariat in Panama.
[3] Yelinek, in a affidavit sworn on July 1, 2002, before a notary public in Tel Aviv, Israel, denies that he concluded any business dealings with Zoller (see document No. 1 in Annex III). However, the Investigative Team has concrete documentation which shows this is untrue.
[4] The Investigative Team is satisfied that the alleged Panamanian Purchase Order is a forgery. The document seems to have been created from a true blank purchase order form, but the signatures on the document have apparently been forged, and there are other irregularities as well. See Annex IV for information and analysis on the alleged purchase order, provided by the Government of Panama.
[5] The army is responsible for Nicaraguan intelligence.
[6] General references to legal measures applying to the terms “import” and “export” in relation to firearms throughout this report are also intended to apply, as appropriate, to in-transit movements through countries. Transit has not been referred to expressly, because the case did not have an in-transit component.
[7] Sierra Leone is under a United Nations arms embargo. Samih Osailly has been arrested by Belgian authorities and remained in custody at the time this report was published. In addition to alleged ties to Al-Queda, he is suspected of connections to the bombings of US Embassies in east Africa.