Statement of Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi
U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS
OAS Permanent Council Special Session
on the Coup Attempt in Venezuela
February 4, 1992

The United States is proud to cosponsor the Resolution before the Permanent Council because it reflects precisely the views and the policy of the U.S. Government (see "Support for the Democratic Government of Venezuela," Permanent Council Resolution 576, February 4).

The United States condemns the attempted coup. When word of the coup attempt reached us, President Bush immediately called (Venezuelan) President (Carlos Andres) Perez. At 2:30 a.m., President Bush offered President Perez our support. President Perez asked only for a public statement, which the State Department issued immediately. As he left the White House for Florida at dawn, President Bush referred to President Perez as "one of the great democratic leaders in our hemisphere" and condemned the "outrageous, illegal military coup (attempt)."

Allow me to make four brief comments about why this coup should be unequivocally condemned. First, after 34 years of uninterrupted democratic processes in Venezuela, the coup attempt is particularly surprising because it can only be seen as an attack against democracy.

Second, the coup attempt was not just aimed against the democratic process. It included an attempt to assassinate President Carlos Andres Perez himself. He has been, and is, one of the leaders of Latin America -- there are others as well -- who has shown the most commitment to developing and advancing democratic doctrine in the hemisphere. I am proud to have considered him a friend for almost 20 years.

Third, the Venezuelan people did not support this coup attempt. In fact, most Venezuelan military honored their uniforms; this is one reason the coup attempt failed.

Lastly, let me note that there are some 25,000 U.S. citizens living and working productively in Venezuela. All are safe and physically unaffected by the violence.

Let me now explain why we believe it is so important that today's resolution also reaffirms the Commitment to Democracy and Resolution 1080 adopted at the OAS General Assembly in Santiago, Chile, in June of 1991. I quote directly the basic words from Resolution 1080 that identify the "trigger" for our collective response:

"... any event giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states ..."

Fortunately, such an interruption did not materialize in Venezuela. But the question of the depth and strength of our commitment to democracy is very much on people's minds. I received a call this morning from a newsman in Haiti who observed, "Venezuela shows that defending democracy is complicated. Perhaps you and the OAS would do well to forget about it."
I repeated to him what I have said to those who question or criticize our actions in defense of the constitutional order in Haiti: "Coups are not an acceptable way of resolving political differences."

Our reaffirmation today of Resolution 1080 is thus a direct response to concerns held by members of our community. Yet behind that concern lies a deeper issue. The issue is one of articulating, consolidating, and defending democratic orders throughout the hemisphere. This general issue is at the heart of the Americas. It defines our collective effort to shape the future we seek.

Since the onset of the coup attempt this morning, my Mission has not had the opportunity to consult extensively with other Missions here. But in discussions within our own government two categories of actions by which Resolution 1080 might be strengthened have been suggested: one is immediately operational and even administrative in nature; the other is more long term, and involves juridical instruments, institutions, and habits.

First, we need to strengthen the Secretary General and his staff. It is clear that the demands placed by the member states on the Secretariat of a renewed OAS committed to democratic solidarity are enormous.

-- We should, at the General Assembly in The Bahamas this May, give our Secretary General the authority to hire the professional and support staff he needs to serve the member states.

-- We need to help in the development and organization of the Democracy Unit, so that it can increase its access to professional, academic and other democratic entities, as provided in the guidelines approved in December by this Council.

-- We should work for the strongest possible relationships between our individual country Missions to the OAS, the Permanent Council, the Secretariat, and the relevant entities of the Inter-American System, particularly the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

-- And finally, we must all join to support the establishment and development of OEA-DEMOC, the civilian mission in Haiti. OEA-DEMOC must be ready and available to begin work, so that if its presence is blocked the onus will be on those who refuse, not on those who offer to help.

These suggestions are in some ways minor, many could even be said to reflect little more than sound administrative practice. There are broader and more difficult issues however.

The second category of actions to strengthen our cooperation in defense of democracy has to do with juridical instruments, incentives, and institutional habits.

-- We need to look at the OAS Charter and our other juridical instruments and see how they might be strengthened to perfect our coordination so that we can work more credibly together to support democracy in the hemisphere.

-- We need to act on the mandate in paragraph 3 of Resolution 1080, which charged this Council with devising a set of proposals to serve as incentives to preserve and strengthen democratic systems.

-- We need to change some of our institutional habits and lack of communication. In particular, I believe we must recognize the willingness of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) to support the OAS Working Group on Security and lend its professional expertise to the OAS.

-- We should recognize that IADB's willingness reflects a developing professional ethos supportive of the lead role of civilian authorities on policy matters. The ambiguities in the relationship between the IADB and the OAS are a residue of the past. It is time now to relegate the ambiguities to the past and develop more effective working relationships in keeping with democracy.

(more)
My concluding point addresses spirit, style and approach. How are we as a community of democratic nations to work together to make the changes necessary to strengthen our support for democracy?

Some of those who favor reforming the Charter and our institutional relationships to reflect our new democratic commitments have too often kept quiet, fearing they might be accused by some of "imposition" -- of presuming to impose unilateral or partial models of democracy.

Events in Haiti and today in Venezuela suggest that undue caution and silence, however, can also lead to "imposition" -- by small armed minorities of their will over that of the people.

Patience, consultation, no vetoes, and "no impositions" should be the hallmarks of a strengthened approach to defending democracy. In the words of the outstanding Americanist, the Peruvian Victor Raul de la Torre, our goal should be "panamericanismo democratico sin imperio."

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"The OAS and Democracy"
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by the
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Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi
during its
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