"The Time to Support the Peaceful Restoration of Democracy and Aristide to Haiti is Now"

Remarks of Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi
Before the OAS Permanent Council
February 24, 1993

Mr. Chairman, this week marks precisely one year since the signing of the Washington Protocols on Haiti.

-- Yesterday, February 23, was the anniversary of the "Protocol between Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Parliamentary Negotiating Committee to Find a Permanent Solution to the Haitian Crisis" which was signed by President Aristide and the Presidents of both Houses of Haiti's Parliament and witnessed by a Delegation of the Parliamentary Commission, a Delegation of President Aristide, and a Delegation representing OEA-DEMOC.

-- Tomorrow, February 25, will be the anniversary of the "Protocol of Agreement Between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Rene Theodore, the Prime Minister Designate, Under the Auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS)," a document signed for the OAS by our Secretary General, Ambassador Joao Clemente Baena Soares.

I mention this anniversary not to bemoan a lost opportunity -- though an opportunity it was, and though its loss has been felt by the people of Haiti and the international community as well as by President Aristide. But we cannot dwell on the past. We must draw on the past, including our failures, for lessons to ensure that we succeed this time. And the key lesson of the Washington Protocols is that it is not enough to reach agreement. It is just as important to implement the solution with political resolve and momentum.

And political resolve and momentum are what we need now to turn the breakthrough achieved by the new-found cooperation between the OAS and the UN into a restoration of Haiti to its rightful place among free nations, with dignity for its people and the democratic form of government called for by its constitution.

Let me start by acknowledging that we are off to a running start. The OAS and UN have moved quickly to take advantage of the breakthrough achieved by Special Envoy Dante Caputo. Sixty or more civilian observers are on the ground in Haiti. Within days of the arrival of a new 40-person contingent on February 14, teams of observers began to move beyond the capital, thus ending the enforced immobility that had plagued the first group of observers since September.
We congratulate OAS Secretary General Baena Soares and his staff, who have put 56 observers on the ground in record time. We trust that, once its survey is complete and the necessary authorizations are obtained from the General Assembly, the United Nations will act with similar dispatch.

We must, in the weeks ahead, keep up the pace of implementation. Political will and momentum will be critical, and if you will indulge me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to highlight four cardinal points: objectives, coordination, flexibility and resources.

**Objectives**

It is worth recalling that our fundamental objective in Haiti is to reverse a violent and unconstitutional action by nonviolent and collective means. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected the President of the Republic in accordance with the laws of Haiti by two thirds of the voting citizens. There is no provision for a coup d'etat in the Constitution of Haiti -- or of any other member state of the OAS. No political negotiations can overlook this fundamental reality.

Last Friday, Maria Luisa Aspiazu of EFE, one of the best journalists covering this Organization and a friend of many here including myself, filed a story which suggests that some people think President Aristide's return is impossible and that the objective of negotiations should be the holding of new elections.

The quotes reported to this effect did not come from a U.S. government official -- in fact, it seems none of the U.S. officials invited were able to leave their official duties to attend this private event. Moreover, not only did the quotes not come from U.S. officials, they did not even come from U.S. citizens.

But because the article was datelined Atlanta and because it reported on a conference convened and presided over by a former President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, the story created a sensation in the corridors of the OAS. Is this the real U.S. objective? To find a way of belatedly validating the 1991 coup d'etat?

This is arrant nonsense. Let me say to you with all the authority I can muster, and in the name of my government, that these views do not represent the policy of the United States. From the time of the September 30 coup we have been as one with other members of this Organization in seeking the return of President Aristide to Haiti.
The United States is the country that has provided President Aristide with both refuge and protection by the same Secret Service that protects the President of the United States. There can be no solution to the crisis that does not include the elected President's return to legitimate authority.

Coordination

My second point is that the multilateral efforts now underway offer the best prospects for President Aristide's return and a sustainable democratic process in Haiti.

Today, we are engaged in ways we were not a year ago when the Washington Protocol was signed. Both the OAS and the UN are involved. Mechanisms must be developed to generate the confidence necessary to make a solution possible -- and, sustainable.

The underlying institutional weaknesses that made the coup d'etat possible in the first place must be addressed. Haitians participating in negotiation of a settlement must find that progress will be met with an easing of punitive measures. Those who still believe that the status quo is acceptable must find to the contrary that it is a dead end.

Let me outline very roughly how the process might unfold. This view is rooted in our ministerial resolutions and in our common commitment in the OAS to Haiti's return to democracy.

In operational terms, the rapid dispatch of observers will ensure a country-wide international presence at the earliest possible date. This is important for the protection of human rights. It is also important for creating a environment conducive to political negotiations leading to a resolution of the crisis.

For the fact is that the observer presence is one element of a wider process -- one that includes political negotiations, technical assistance for institution building and, ultimately, economic reconstruction. These are not, in our view, independent elements. They are closely related to each other and to the overall purposes of our solidarity engagement in Haiti.

Within the next month we should expect an observer presence of about 200 individuals based in all 9 departments of Haiti. Their presence should help create an environment which makes it possible for Haitians across the political spectrum to exercise their human rights with less fear of intimidation and violence. Human rights, including civil and political rights, are a necessary part of any national dialogue leading to a political settlement.
As the observers begin to operate -- and remember, one lesson of Haiti is that momentum is essential -- teams of technical experts should make assessments of what will be required in the way of technical assistance and advisory services in order to help Haitians to undertake the long and demanding process of developing institutions essential to a functioning democracy. In our view, technical assistance for institution building is more than an incentive for an acceptable political outcome. It is also a necessary concomitant of the effort to support an outcome which has a chance of enduring.

As observation and exploratory activities proceed, we expect Special Envoy Caputo to begin to facilitate negotiations among the various sectors of Haiti aimed at agreement on a government which meets constitutional requirements, including President Aristide's resumption of legitimate authority.

We believe the observer presence and technical support have value as confidence building measures as much after as before any settlement of a political nature.

Through this whole process, and in each of its elements, both the UN and the OAS must be engaged. Any operational difficulties which joint operations may entail are far outweighed by the practical symbolism of a joint undertaking.

**Flexibility.** Progress in the negotiations must be matched by flexibility. That two international organizations are engaged adds to the complexity of the undertakings, and to how best to relate progress toward a political solution to determinations about when and to what degree punitive measures can be eased -- or reinstituted if commitments are not kept.

Regardless of the complexity, we must prepare seriously to consider, when political circumstances -- by which I mean progress in a political solution as defined above -- warrant, the actual delivery of technical assistance and ultimately the launching of concerted efforts for the economic development and reconstruction of Haiti.

As progress occurs, the United States, for its part, will continue to adjust its trade embargo and other measures affecting Haiti in support of resolution MRE/RES 2/91. An exemption to assure the provision of basic foodstuffs: rice and beans, has been allowed since the inception of the embargo. Since then, U.S. regulations have been amended:

-- in February 1992 modifications to allow for continued operation of the assembly sector in Haiti, which prior to the coup employed some 32,000 persons, and now employs only about 8000.
-- in September 1992 to permit corn, cornflour, milk and tallow; and

-- in January 1993 to permit school supplies, and generators, under specific license, to assure continued power supplies to hospitals and charitable institutions.

The United States has closely monitored the provision of goods sent to Haiti as humanitarian donations. A change in license review procedures in mid-December, to assure the bona fides of donation recipients, has resulted in a substantial drop in shipments, and a greater assurance that bona fide humanitarian donations reach their intended recipients.

Since the establishment of the committee to monitor compliance with the Embargo, the United States has maintained an information system on goods arriving in Haiti in apparent contravention of the embargo and has kept the committee informed of information as we receive it. In June, we enacted a provision excluding vessels which had traded with Haiti from entering U.S. ports unless licensed by the Department of the Treasury. These licenses were granted only upon a showing by the vessel that trade with Haiti was permitted under US and OAS measures.

We will continue these policies of coordination and cooperation with the OAS and the UN as the negotiations in Haiti develop. We will, of course, give close attention to the ministerial resolutions, and particularly to the emphasis on control over financial, arms, and petroleum products, as called for in MRE/RES 4/92 of December, 1992.

Resources

The multilateral effort we have undertaken will require substantial ongoing support. For practical and symbolic reasons, all of our countries must contribute to this effort.

The United States government has thus far provided $2 million dollars to the OAS for the civilian presence in Haiti. During the coming week, we expect to complete the transfer of another $5 million dollars: $1 million to the UN and $4 million to the OAS. To ensure there are no gaps created by lack of funding, we are now identifying an additional $5 million for transfer in the weeks ahead.

But the United States cannot finance these operations alone. Other member and observer states must help ensure that resources -- most especially funds -- are adequate to the task and available on a timely, ongoing basis.

Only generous and timely support from all countries will signal to all Haitians that the inter-American community and the international community are serious about helping Haiti resolve its crisis.