Proliferation of Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in the Americas: An Assessment of Key Analytical and Policy Issues

José M. Salazar-Xirinachs

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Secretary General
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Assistant Secretary General
Luigi Einaudi

October 2002

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Proliferation of Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in the Americas: An Assessment of Key Analytical and Policy Issues*

José M. Salazar-Xirinachs**

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ABSTRACT

This article provides an overview of the realities and reasons for proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in Latin America and the Caribbean, and then proceeds to assess the evidence from the region as regards the following key analytical and policy issues raised by proliferation: Has trade diversion been a serious problem in the RTAs and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) engaged by Latin American and Caribbean countries? Have RTAs been able to make more progress in liberalization than multilateral negotiations, or allowed member countries to integrate more deeply? Has proliferation in Latin America diverted attention away from multilateral negotiations? What problems have been created by overlaps between RTAs and how significant these problems have been? Have RTAs contributed to domestic policy reform and, if so, how? What has been the role of macro and micro-economic policies in RTAs? Finally, the paper summarizes the main conclusions and challenges posed by proliferation of RTAs in Latin America.

I. INTRODUCTION

Latin America has been one of the most active regions in the world in the recent proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) among members of the WTO. The region has used multiple paths to trade policy reform and the enlargement of its markets: unilateral liberalization, multilateral engagement in the WTO, sub-regional and bilateral trade agreements. The region is also facing important challenges in the next stage of competitive insertion in the international economic system. Given its long experience with old type RTAs and the reactivation of regionalism under new principles in the 1990s, Latin America is a source of important evidence and lessons, particularly for other regions such as Asia-Pacific where trade agreements are beginning to proliferate (Scollay and Gilbert, 2001; Dutta, 1999).

This article provides an overview of the realities and reasons for proliferation of RTAs in Latin America and the Caribbean, and then proceeds to assess the evidence from the region as regards the following key analytical and policy issues raised by proliferation: Has trade diversion been a serious problem in the RTAs and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) engaged by Latin American and Caribbean countries? Have RTAs been able to make more progress in liberalization than multilateral negotiations, or allowed member countries to integrate more deeply? Has proliferation in Latin America diverted attention away from multilateral negotiations? What problems have been created by overlaps between RTAs and how significant these problems have been? Have RTAs contributed to domestic policy reform and, if so, how? What has been the role of macro and micro-economic policies in RTAs? Finally, the paper summarizes the main conclusions and challenges posed by proliferation of RTAs in Latin America.
II. PROLIFERATION AND DIVERSITY OF RTAs IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

As Table 1 shows, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of trade agreements negotiated by Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries in the last ten years with other countries in the Western Hemisphere as well as with countries outside the Hemisphere.

Table 1. Customs Unions and Free Trade Agreements in the Western Hemisphere

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Signed</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1. CACM (Central American Common Market)</td>
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<td>1961c</td>
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<td>2. Andean Community</td>
<td>1969a</td>
<td>1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market)b</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) e</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Group of Three (Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela)</td>
<td>1994f</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Canada-Chile</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Central America-Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1998a</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Chile-Mexico</td>
<td>1998b</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. CARICOM-Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1998c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Central America-Chile</td>
<td>1999d</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Andean Community-MERCOSUR</td>
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<td>In negotiation</td>
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<td>14. Central America - Panama</td>
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<td>In negotiation</td>
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<td>15. CA-4 – Canada</td>
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<td>In negotiation</td>
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<td>16. Chile-United States</td>
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<td>In negotiation</td>
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<td>17. Mexico-Ecuador</td>
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<td>18. Mexico-Panama</td>
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<td>In negotiation</td>
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<td>19. Mexico-Peru</td>
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<td>In negotiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Mexico-Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td></td>
<td>In negotiation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Throughout this paper the term Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) is used to include bilateral, plurilateral and regional agreements, including customs unions (CUs) and free trade agreements (FTAs). Where necessary, the relevant distinctions are made in the text.
### AGREEMENTS WITH COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE HEMISPHERE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Signed</th>
<th>Entered into force</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Canada-Israel</td>
<td>....</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>Mexico-European Union</td>
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<td>Mexico-Israel</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA-Vietnam</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA-Jordan</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico-EFTA</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada-EFTA</td>
<td>In negotiation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada-Singapore</td>
<td>In negotiation</td>
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<td>Chile-European Union</td>
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<td>Chile-South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile-EFTA</td>
<td>In negotiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA-Singapore</td>
<td>In negotiation</td>
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<td>MERCOSUR-European Union</td>
<td>In negotiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR-South Africa</td>
<td>In negotiation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico-Singapore</td>
<td>In negotiation</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Source

### Notes
a. With the signing of the Trujillo Protocol in 1996 and the Sucre Protocol in 1997, the five Andean countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela—restructured and revitalized their regional integration efforts under the name Andean Community.
b. The members of the Caribbean Community are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Montserrat (an overseas territory of the United Kingdom). The Bahamas is an associate member but not a full member of the Common Market. Haiti will become the fifteenth member of CARICOM once its deposits its instruments of accession with the group’s secretary general. The British Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands count as associate members of CARICOM.
d. The members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
e. Before signing NAFTA, Canada and the United States had concluded the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 1989.
f. Chapters III (national treatment and market access for goods), IV (automotive sector), V (Sec. A) (agricultural sector), VI (rules of origin), VIII (safeguards), IX (unfair practices in international trade), XVI (state enterprises), and XVIII (intellectual property) do not apply between Colombia and Venezuela. See Article 103 (1) of the agreement.
g. This agreement applies bilaterally between each Central American country and the Dominican Republic. In October 2001, it entered into force between El Salvador and the Dominican Republic.
h. On September 22, 1991, Chile and Mexico had signed a free trade agreement within the framework of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI).
i. A protocol to implement the agreement was signed on April 28, 2000.
j. This agreement applies bilaterally between each Central American country and Chile. The Chile-Costa Rica bilateral agreement will enter into force on February 15, 2002.

The Table classifies agreements into Customs Unions and Free Trade Agreements. There are four Customs Unions in the Americas: the Central American Common Market (CACM) created in 1961, the Andean Community created in 1969, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) created in 1973 and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) created in 1991. The former three, originally created under the old inward-looking strategy of industrialization, were significantly restructured and re-launched in the 1990s with a much lower Common External Tariff and new and deeper disciplines, while MERCOSUR was conceived under principles of “open regionalism” since its inception.

As regards FTAs, starting with Mexico’s participation in NAFTA, created in 1994, there was an explosion in the negotiation of FTAs by LAC countries following more or less closely the NAFTA model. These so-called “new generation” agreements include, besides liberalization of trade in goods, new sectors such as services and agriculture, and new areas of discipline such as investment, competition policy, Intellectual Property Rights, and dispute settlement mechanisms. LAC countries have negotiated 12 FTAs among themselves since 1990 and are in the process of negotiating 8 more. One of the most notable developments in this new picture is the fact that since 1998 the 34 countries of the Western Hemisphere (with the exception of Cuba) have been formally negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

Countries in the Western Hemisphere also have been negotiating new generation agreements with other countries outside the hemisphere. Five of these agreements were completed in the last 3 years: Canada-Israel, Mexico-European Union, Mexico-Israel, USA-Jordan and Mexico-EFTA. And other nine are under negotiation: Canada-EFTA, Canada-Singapore, Chile-European Union, Chile-South Korea, USA-Singapore, Mercosur-EU, Mercosur-South Africa and Mexico-Singapore.

The new agreements in the Americas embody much more than trade barrier reduction at the border for goods. There is an important diversity in terms of the additional disciplines included as well as in institutional arrangements. The main distinction to be made is between Customs Unions, on the one hand and FTAs, on the other. As mentioned, customs unions have been progressively deepened during the 1990s by the inclusion of disciplines in services, investment, intellectual property and technical standards. Each custom union has specific characteristics and a history, which is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze.

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2 Note that the table does not include non-reciprocal trade agreements of which there are five in the Americas: the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Andean Trade Preference Act, CARIBCAN and the agreements between CARICOM and Venezuela and CARICOM and Colombia. It also does not include the “partial scope” agreements negotiated under the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI). For an analysis of the non-reciprocal agreements in the Western Hemisphere see Steinfatt (2001).

3 For a history, characteristics and recent evolution of these agreements see Salazar-Xirinachs, Wetter, Steinfatt and Ivascanu (2001).
The Free Trade Agreements negotiated in the 1990s present important similarities, partly due to the fact that most of them have been modeled on the NAFTA in terms of their structure, scope and coverage. Table 2 presents an overview of the main chapters and disciplines in nine of these agreements. However, even among these agreements there are important differences. For instance, only some of them include significant disciplines in financial services, government procurement, competition policy and air transportation. While most included the telecommunication sector, this is not the case in Costa Rica-Mexico and Central America-Dominican Republic.

FTAs in LAC have also been a fertile ground for experimentation both in traditional disciplines and in linking trade and non-trade objectives. For instance, the Canada-Chile agreement eliminates the use of anti-Dumping among the parties. Several agreements have moved beyond the GATT/WTO into such areas as environment and labor standards. NAFTA contains two side-agreements on labor and environmental cooperation that envisage the possibility of trade sanctions. The Canada-Chile FTA also includes side agreements in these areas, but eliminates the possibility of sanctions and instead introduces a system of monetary fines in case of violations. The recently concluded Canada-Costa Rica FTA also includes side agreements but does not include sanctions nor monetary fines, only transparency and a series of institutional instances for cooperative actions.

MERCOSUR incorporates a “democratic clause” that has at least once been used quite successfully to exercise pressure on Paraguay when the constitutional order was about to be permanently broken in that country. There are ongoing discussions in the context of the Summit of the Americas process as to how to strengthen the democratic provisions in the Inter-American system, including possible cross-reference to the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
III. **WHY HAVE RTAS PROLIFERATED IN LATIN AMERICA?**

As Wilfred Ethier has pointed out there is a notable absence of research on the fundamental question of why the new regionalism has emerged.\(^4\) As a practical matter a wide range of considerations enter when countries seek to negotiate RTAs. In LAC countries, as in countries around the world, objectives include: market access; investment attraction; strengthening domestic policy reform and positive signaling to investors; increased bargaining power vis-à-vis third countries (a particularly strong motivation in the case of MERCOSUR); political, security or strategic linkage objectives (an important motivation from the US perspective in the negotiation of the FTAA); and the actual or potential use of regional agreements for tactical purposes by countries seeking to achieve multilateral objectives.

A brief historical perspective might contribute to understand the specificities, significance and nature of modern regionalism for Latin America. The idea of integration has deep roots in the region’s political, economic and intellectual culture. Dreams and projects of economic and political integration have been a constant in Latin American history since colonial times. In fact, right at the birth of the new Latin American republics and their independence from Spain and Portugal in the early 1800s, the leader of the Andean Countries’ independence, Simon Bolivar, had the most ambitious of these dreams: to create a Pan-American Union based on democracy and the rule of law. Even though Bolivar saw his dream collapse during his own lifetime by the assertion of local interests and nationalistic forces, ideas of political integration and common destiny continue to appeal to Latin Americans and to reappear intermittently in different contexts up to the present. A tradition of political thinking favorable to integration interacts in complex ways with the new regionalism in Latin America, however, today there are more basic economic and strategic rationales guiding the process.\(^5\)

Perhaps the most fundamental reason for the new regionalism in Latin America is that it is consistent and helps to consolidate the market-oriented policy reforms and the countries’ participation in the world economy. Again, it helps to place the policy reform process in historical perspective. During the 19th century Latin America developed strong economic links with Europe and the United States based mostly on the export of primary commodities in agriculture and mining. National systems of infrastructure were built to serve the needs of this export-import trade, which meant railways and roads from main cities to ports, and little physical integration between countries.

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\(^5\) An original analysis of the role of culture in shaping Latin American policies and institutions and its relationships with the United States is Harrison (1997).
Table 2  Main Chapters in NAFTA-Type Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective/General Definition</th>
<th>NAFTA - Mexico</th>
<th>Costa Rica - Mexico</th>
<th>Mexico - Nicaragua</th>
<th>Mexico - Northern Triangle</th>
<th>Group of Three</th>
<th>Bolivia-Mexico</th>
<th>Canada-Chile</th>
<th>Chile-Mexico</th>
<th>Central America-Dominican Republic</th>
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a. Most agreements also include a preamble.
b. There is a chapter on automobiles in this agreement.
c. Energy is covered under market access in most free trade agreements.
d. Agriculture and sanitary and phytosanitary measures are in two separate chapters.
e. The chapter covers sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Agriculture is covered under market access.
f. Eighteen months after the entry into force of the Mexico-Northern Triangle free trade agreement, parties must start negotiating an agreement on government procurement. In the case of the Chile-Mexico, parties must do so one year after the entry into force.
g. The investment rules are those of the bilateral investment treaties signed by each Central American country with Chile. Article 10.02 states that Parties may at any time decide –but must within two years of the entry into force of the agreement analyze the possibility-to broaden the coverage of these rules.
h. Chile and Mexico agree to start negotiations on financial services no later than June 30, 1999.
i. Chile and Mexico agree to start negotiations on the elimination of antidumping one year after the entry into force of their free trade agreement.
j. Parties exempt each other from the application of antidumping duties when a tariff on a good reaches zero or on January 1, 2003, whichever comes first.
k. The issue of the administration of the agreement is addressed in the section on dispute settlement in NAFTA and in the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement.

During the first half of the 20th century the medium sized Latin American countries began experiencing a significant degree of industrialization. But it was after the Second World War that Latin American governments adopted a more proactive developmental approach and set out to pursue policies of industrialization behind high tariffs and inspired by faith in the ability of government policies to secure growth and improve social conditions. Economic and physical integration was seen as an essential ingredient of this strategy in order to expand the limited size of the national markets, and this led to the creation of the Central American Common Market, the Caribbean Community and the Andean Community in the 1960s and early 70s.

The pursuit of industrialization and economic integration policies was provided a strong rationale by a number of young economists led by Raul Prebisch and linked to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). During the three decades following its creation in 1948 ECLAC provided conceptual and institutional support to the growing consensus in Latin America about the importance of industrialization and economic integration. Latin America entered the post-World War II era with great optimism. Foreign Direct Investment in import substitution and basic industries was assigned, and in fact played, a major role as a source of growth for most Latin American economies during this period.

However, after the first oil shock of 1973 the development model followed by Latin America became increasingly unsustainable, as the growth dynamics came up against the limited size of the domestic markets, a growing percentage of capital accumulation was financed with foreign borrowing, the state enterprise sector grew disproportionately, and a maze of distortions and regulations stifled private initiatives.

The 1982 debt crisis and its impacts and the contrast with the policies and performance by East Asian economies, played an important role in reshaping policy views in Latin America. As the 1980s unfolded, country after country, often under pressure from International Financial Institutions, but also actively led by a new generation of local political leaders, adopted a new vision of economic policy based on market forces, international competition and a more limited role for the state in economic affairs.

In the 1990s, the reform process intensified and generalized. In the trade front most countries not only deepened their unilateral liberalization measures, but also engaged in a three-tiered trade strategy: those that were not already members joined the GATT-WTO and participated actively in the Uruguay Round (1986-94), they revitalized sub-regional agreements under new principles and also proactively engaged in bilateral Free Trade Agreements.

The shift by the US towards regionalism and the initiative by Mexico to join the US and Canada in the NAFTA posed a major challenge to Latin American countries. The rationale for old-type integration envisaged benefits of trade liberalization with countries in similar levels of

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6 For a brief history of the role of ECLAC see Rosemary Thorp (1998).
development, but high costs for the relatively less developed partners when they joined with larger, more competitive economies. Mexico’s move turned this view on its head. A new cost-benefit logic of linking up with the largest and most competitive markets in the world emerged. In fact, one of the defining characteristics of the new regionalism is that it typically involves small countries linking up with larger countries. (Ethier, 1998).

Despite the fact that unilateral liberalization and successive rounds of multilateral tariff-reduction have reduced global and regional tariffs substantially, the proliferation of RTAs in Latin America suggests that countries see significant advantages in them. What are these? The new logic for regionalism in Latin America is based on a number of interrelated factors.

First and foremost, it is related with the new global production paradigm where reduced transport and communications costs have made global coordination possible for multinational companies, and has opened new opportunities for comparative advantage by developing countries. As Wilfred Ethier (1998), Robert Lawrence (1997) and others have argued, the instrumental role of the new regional integration is dramatically different from that of the old schemes. Agreement design and rules are more focused on being functional for attracting investment, rather than on the traditional export expansion motive; on reforming domestic regulations and rules with a view to facilitate the participation of the sub-region in the global organization of production and to facilitate region-wide sourcing. From this perspective RTAs are means by which countries, particularly small countries, try to develop a competitive edge over others to attract FDI. One of Mexico’s objectives not just in joining NAFTA but also in being the hub of a complex tissue of bilateral agreements can be understood in term of this “investment logic”. A very similar path of negotiating numerous bilateral agreements has been followed by Chile and can be explained in the same terms.

In some respects, the motivations of smaller economies and of larger emerging markets differ. Several smaller economies tend to give priority to signaling and to ensure continuing market access to develop their role as export and services platforms for larger markets. For instance, Costa Rica was a pioneer in Central America and the Caribbean in negotiating with Mexico (1995), then with Chile (2000) and recently with Canada (2001), as well as having a proactive role in the FTAA negotiations. At the same time the country has had an aggressive investment attraction strategy. These and other fundamental factors of the investment climate explain its recent success in attracting major world-class investments from high technology companies. In large emerging

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8 The point is important because it has also been argued that to the extent that the New Regionalism in Latin America and elsewhere is significantly about these deeper aspects of integration, the traditional analysis of costs and benefits of RTAs, which focus mainly on barriers at the border, while ignoring differences in national institutions and domestic regulations, is seriously deficient.

9 Perroni and Whalley (1996) observe that several of the recently negotiated RTAs contain significantly fewer concessions by the large countries to smaller countries than vice versa. Yet, it is small countries that have sought them and see themselves as the main beneficiaries. The authors explain this apparent paradox by interpreting such agreements as insurance arrangements for smaller economies, which partially protects them against uncertainty in market access. Some of these agreements appear to produce little or no benefit relative to the status quo for smaller countries, but if they are evaluated relative to a post-retaliation tariff equilibrium, the value of these agreements to
markets, such as MERCOSUR, the interest of investors is not mainly production for export, but the benefits and competitive advantages of domestic presence to increase market share. Thus, for different reasons large regional blocs allow member countries to increase their magnets for international investment.

The investment-driven logic of the new regionalism also helps to understand why the recent vintage of RTAs contemplate new disciplines and deeper integration in aspects such as investment, services, product and production process standards, competition policy and other disciplines. Agreement design takes into account the need to facilitate the development of regional production systems and international outsourcing. This is one of the reasons why Latin American and Caribbean countries have been deepening arrangements such as the CACM, CARICOM, the Andean Community and MERCOSUR, and why new bilateral agreements include disciplines in all these areas.

But the new regionalism does not have exclusively an economic rationale, it also has a political and strategic one. How this applies depends on the precise grouping of countries. The key original rationale for MERCOSUR was closely related to the objective of diffusing long-standing tensions between Argentina and Brazil and fostering better relations between the two countries. MERCOSUR is also based on much more than a desire to liberalize trade. It is part of a vision to assert the role of Brazil and the other partners in the Western Hemisphere and as global players. In Central America, some intellectuals and political leaders have tried to steer the process beyond economic integration and towards a more political project. Although this has not happened, the force of this tradition is one of the reasons why the region has a relatively heavy infrastructure of integration institutions including a Parliament and a Central American Court of Justice.

The efforts to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas have strong political, strategic and security dimensions. The FTAA was conceived from the beginning as part of a broader effort of rapprochement and interdependence in the context of the Summit of the Americas process. The new agenda of hemispheric cooperation promoted by this process includes areas that go from the protection of democracy and human rights to the fight against corruption and drug trafficking, and from hemispheric infrastructure to sustainable development and labor issues. The future FTAA members are also already parties to the set of principles, rules and legal and diplomatic instruments of the Inter-American System and the Organization of American States. It is likely that one of the effects of the tragic events of September 11 will be to strengthen the link between small economies is large because they help preserve existing access to larger foreign markets. This logic helps to explain why, even though they enjoy a quite satisfactory degree of access to the US market based on GSP and the Caribbean Basin Initiatives, the Central American countries are interested and eager to negotiate a reciprocal FTA with the United States.

10 For recent statements of MERCOSUR’s trade objectives see Celso Lafer (2001) and Rubens Barbosa (2001) and for an American perspective on Brazil’s trade policy see Henry Kissinger (2001).
geopolitical and security considerations and the prosperity components of the Summit of the Americas agenda, in particular, trade policy.

In short, the proliferation of bilateral and RTAs in Latin America, and its diversity in terms of coverage and institutional arrangements, is linked to a complex interaction of economic, political and security objectives. First, it is grounded in the decisive shift in development and trade policy towards outward looking, market friendly policies, where integration into larger markets and Foreign Direct Investment are seen as the keys to higher growth. Second, in terms of sequencing, the typical pattern has been for countries to first engage in unilateral liberalization and in joining the GATT/WTO as part of the process of economic reform. Unilateral liberalization was then taken further in the direction of deeper integration with the neighboring countries. From this perspective, as Ethier (1998) has argued, national liberalization (both unilateral and that generated by the multilateral system) has promoted the revitalization of regionalism in Latin America. Bilateral agreements and RTAs have also induced additional liberalization.

Third, the fact that national competitive strategies are based to an important degree on the attraction of FDI provides a new logic to sub-regional integration efforts and to the role of trade agreements in the global repositioning of countries. In a number of smaller economies in LAC, a strong motivation to engage in bilateral and other RTAs, particularly with larger and relatively more developed countries, has been to develop a competitive edge in attracting investment. Finally, there are also important political and strategic rationales for the LAC countries engagement in RTAs that depend on the specific groupings and level of aggregation of countries.

IV. ANALYTICAL AND POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY PROLIFERATION

Proliferation of RTAs raise numerous analytical and policy issues. This section reviews some of the existing evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) as regards the following key questions:

- Has trade diversion been a serious problem in the RTAs and FTAs engaged by Latin American and Caribbean countries?
- Have RTAs been able to make more progress in liberalization than multilateral negotiations, or allowed member countries to integrate more deeply?
- Has proliferation in Latin America diverted attention away from multilateral negotiations?
- What problems have been created by overlaps between RTAs and how significant these problems have been?
- Have RTAs contributed to domestic policy reform and, if so, how?
- What has been the role of macro and micro-economic policies in RTAs?
- Finally, how can proliferation be harnessed and oriented so that it maximizes its role as a building block for a more open trading system?
1. Has trade diversion been a problem in Latin America?

The rough orders of magnitude of trade flows in the main RTAs in Latin America in the 1990s provide a first approximation to the issue of trade diversion and creation. Of course raw data is of limited value because it does not control for the impact on trade flows of other concurrent shocks and economic changes. But it is revealing of some important trends.

Figure 1 presents the absolute numbers and the rates of growth of intra-regional imports and extra-regional imports for the period 1990 to 1999, for the Western Hemisphere as a whole, for LAC as a group and for the four main RTAs: Andean Community, MERCOSUR, Central American Common Market and CARICOM. The typical behavior observed in this period is an impressive expansion in both trade within the group and also in imports from the rest of the world, suggesting that there is no evidence of trade diversion or that if any, trade diversion was overwhelmingly dominated by dynamic effects. Extra-regional imports in all cases increased by more than 7% annually in the Andean Community and CARICOM and by more than 11% annually in the case of the CACM and MERCOSUR during these ten years, and typically around much higher trade volumes than intra-regional flows. The following sections review the evidence emerging from studies in the different sub-regions.

**Mercosur**

In Mercosur, a study that attracted a great deal of attention was by Alexander Yeats in 1997. The study concluded that Mercosur had resulted in a significant amount of trade diversion and that much of the increase in trade between Mercosur countries was in the “wrong” products, that is, in capital-intensive products. However, these results were questioned by a number of other researchers. A paper by Nigel Nagarajan (1998) observes that in focusing on exports, Yeats’s analysis failed to capture the importance of growing imports from third countries. Using the same Index of Regional Orientation, adapted to imports, Nagarajan finds that only in a few products there seems to be trade diversion, and that even for these products, there has been an impressive increase in imports from third countries. Given the upper-middle income ranking of Mercosur countries, the notion that Mercosur countries should be exporting labour-intensive products, rather than the mix of capital-intensive products found in reality, is also questioned. Nagarajan also notes that over the period 1988 and 1996, EU exports to Argentina and Brazil grew by annual average rates of 19 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively, suggesting that the formation of Mercosur does not seem to have seriously constrained EU exports to the region.

A more recent study by Estevadeordal, Goto and Saez (2000) also finds no evidence of trade diversion and argues that Mercosur is not just a traditional RTA but a case in New Regionalism, where preferential liberalization is accompanied by aggressive unilateral trade reform by its members, leading to trade expansion and improved welfare for both members and non-members.
Figure 1. Rates of Growth Intra Regional and Extra Regional Imports: Western Hemisphere, Latin America and Sub Regions. 1990 – 1999
Proliferation of Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in the Americas

OAS Trade Unit Studies
Thus, there is no clear evidence of trade diversion in MERCOSUR, and even for the few products where trade diversion has occurred, the increasing multilateral openness of MERCOSUR coupled with the dynamic effects greatly outweigh any static welfare losses. It could be argued, however, that it is inappropriate to pass definite judgement on MERCOSUR, or on other agreements in Latin America, as the newer agreements have data for only a few years and they are still evolving or in transition towards freer trade.

**Andean Community**

Fewer studies are available in the case of the Andean Community. Miguel Rodriguez (1999) applies some simple tests to both the Andean Community and MERCOSUR and concludes that far from suffering as a consequence of these two RTAs, the outside world has continued to enjoy increased market access to both the MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. This study also analyses the issue of how the formation of the Andean Community and MERCOSUR affected the height of the preexisting tariffs against third countries. It shows that the average level of the CET of both MERCOSUR and the Andean Community in 1998 was lower than the average level of the tariff schedules of each member country in the year preceding the implementation of the agreements. Juan Jose Echavarria (1998) focuses on the Colombia-Venezuela trade flows, which concentrate 70 percent of intra-Andean trade, and finds that trade creation dominated over trade diversion.

**NAFTA**

A recent survey of studies on NAFTA by Mary Burfisher, Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder (2001) shows that virtually all the studies on NAFTA show trade creation greatly exceeding trade diversion. Anne Krueger (1999) examined data at the three-digit SITC level, and finds few sectors in which imports of any NAFTA country from the rest of the world fell while rising within NAFTA. She concludes that “changes in trade flows to date do not give much support to the view that NAFTA might be seriously trade diverting”.

While this might be said on the aggregate, this is not to say that NAFTA did not have impacts in trade and investment flows with non-members in specific sectors. For instance, the potential growth of investment and exports in the textile and apparel sector in Central American and Caribbean countries was negatively affected by NAFTA. As table 3 shows, after a period of rapid growth in market share in the US, in the early 1990s, this market share stabilized or diminished in some cases for Central American and Caribbean countries, while Mexico’s market share increased drastically. This situation was recently put on a “NAFTA parity” basis with Mexico with the approval and enactment of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act of 2000.12

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12 For an analysis of the impact and opportunities of the CBTPA of 2000 on Caribbean Basin economies see Leon and Salazar-Xirinachs (2001).
Table 3. Selected Countries: Market Share on Apparel Imports in the United States.

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Source: Gitli and Arce (2000), based on data from the US Department of Commerce.

Box. Intra-regional and extra-regional trade flows in the 1990s

Intra-Mercosur imports increased fourfold from 4 billion in 1990 to 15.5 billion in 1999, an annual rate of growth of 15%. Imports from the rest of the world into Mercosur were multiplied by a factor of 2.5 from 25 billion in 1990 to 64 billion in 1999, an annual rate of growth of 11.1%.

Intra-Andean imports grew at a rate of 15% per annum between 1990 and 1999, in absolute terms a fourfold increase from 1.1 billion to 4.1 billion. But imports from the rest of the world into the Andean Community grew at a significant annual rate of 7.6%, and doubled in ten years from 16 billion to 31 billion.

Intra-regional imports in the CACM grew from 650 million dollars to 2.5 billion at the end of the decade, an annual growth of 16%, while imports from the rest of the world grew at an annual rate of 11.5% almost tripling from 5.8 billion to almost 16 billion.

Caricom’s intra-regional imports grew from 469 million to 937 million, an annual rate of growth of 10.4%, while imports from the rest of the world grew at an annual rate of 8%.

Intra-NAFTA imports grew at an annual rate of 10.8% from 227 billion in 1990 to 569 billion in 1999, while imports from the rest of the world almost doubled from 450 billion to 810 billion, an annual rate of growth of 7%.

For the total Western Hemisphere the pattern of intra regional versus extra regional trade flows is similar. Intra-hemispheric imports grew at 10.1% (from 300 billion to 720 billion) while imports from the rest of the world into the Western Hemisphere grew at 7%, almost doubling from 442 billion to 810 billion.

For Latin America and the Caribbean as a group, both intra-LAC imports and imports from outside of LAC grew at a very similar rate of 11%, however, trade volumes for extra-regional trade were much higher. While intra-LAC imports were multiplied by a factor of three from 16 billion to 44 billion, imports from outside of LAC were multiplied by a factor of 2.5 and grew from 95 billion to 246 billion.

2. Have the RTAs Liberalized Faster or Deeper?

Does the evidence from LAC support the argument that regional agreements have a capacity to liberalize beyond what can be accomplished multilaterally and to achieve “deep” integration?

As regards trade in goods, one of the characteristics of most of the new RTAs in LAC is that, following in many respects the NAFTA model, they contain tariff phase-out programs based on preprogrammed schedules at the outset, which are relatively quick, automatic and nearly universal. This contrasts quite sharply with the laborious step-by-step development of positive lists that characterized most of the old style trade agreements in the region. In most agreements, the base rate for the liberalization program coincide with the MFN applied rates. (Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2000). It is estimated that more than 80 percent of all trade conducted in the hemisphere is now conducted under the framework of one liberalizing agreement or another. (Mackay, Robert and Plank-Brumback, 2001). Two recent studies show that most programs among LAC countries will eliminate tariffs for almost all products by 2006 and that most of the bilateral trade in these agreements becomes fully liberalized, in terms of tariffs, in a ten year period (Devlin and Estevadeordal 2000; Rodriguez Gigena 2000).

These studies also show that the list of exceptions has been significantly reduced and at present represents between 5% and 10% of bilateral trade. In the case of Mercosur, the main exceptions to the liberalization schedule are autos and sugar that are covered under special regimes. In Central America, the list of exceptions has been reduced to three products (roasted coffee, alcoholic beverages and petroleum products). In the Andean Community, trade has been totally liberalized among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, and since 1997 Peru joined the FTA under a tariff reduction schedule that would lead to free trade in goods by 2005.

Thus the RTAs in LAC have indeed shown a capacity to liberalize faster than at the multilateral level and to include nearly universal coverage of trade liberalization in industrial goods. However, there are some areas of weakness in the market access picture under the new RTAs: first, they have also introduced selective procedures and discretionary application of rules of origin (see section 4.4 below). Second, nearly all the agreements fail to adequately cover the agricultural sector. Exceptions for agriculture reflect the particular sensitivities of each participating country.

“Deep integration” and positive rule making behind the border is a central defining feature of the New Regionalism in LAC. Deep integration involves aspects such as investment, services, product and production process standards, and mutual recognition issues. There is very scarce empirical research in Latin America on these questions. A recent paper by Sherry Stephenson examines what has been done by members of regional trading arrangements in the Western Hemisphere to promote stronger disciplines for domestic regulation and recognition agreements in the area of trade in services. The paper compares the disciplines on domestic regulation contained in four sub-regional agreements in the Western Hemisphere –NAFTA, the Andean Community, MERCOSUR and CARICOM- to those contained in GATS Article VI on domestic
regulation, and a similar comparison is done in the area of recognition of qualifications for foreign service providers with GATS Article VII.

The hypothesis addressed by the paper is that because members have similar preferences and face fewer costs when designing more detailed common rules on services trade than in the multilateral context, one might expect to find more detailed disciplines on non-discriminatory regulatory measures affecting trade at the sub-regional than at the multilateral level. With respect to domestic regulation, the analysis provides mixed results, in the sense that while some RTAs adopt principles that have a higher degree of generality than those of the GATS, other RTAs, most notably NAFTA and MERCOSUR, apply more stringent disciplines than GATS. With respect to recognition the analysis shows that the sub-regional integration schemes examined do go beyond GATS in encouraging or requiring the formation of recognition agreements.

These conclusions, however, relate to the nature of the disciplines contained in the agreements, not to the actual progress in changing national legislation or enforcement. It can also be argued that it is too early to assess the impact of services disciplines in the RTAs in Latin America because the new commitments and disciplines in these areas entered into force only very recently.

As explained in section 2, FTAs in LAC have also been a fertile ground for experimentation both in traditional disciplines and in linking trade and non-trade objectives. For instance, the Canada-Chile agreement substitutes safeguards for antidumping. In doing so, the agreement seeks to reduce the onerous economic costs associated with the use of antidumping as a policy instrument to address the market disruptions resulting from sudden import surges. Such costs result not only from the decline in imports that follows the imposition of antidumping duties (Messerlin 1989, Prusa 1999), but also from the threat that antidumping investigations pose to exporters (Finger 1993). Safeguards are generally considered to be a less costly import relief mechanism than antidumping duties, because they "force" governments to address the domestic factors that may be hindering the competitiveness of the industry affected by increased quantities of imported goods, rather than simply assigning the blame for an industry's hardships to the exporters from another country (Tavares, Macario, and Steinfatt 2001). Institutional experiments such as these might, over time, percolate through to multilateral trade negotiations, shifting the focus of the WTO agenda towards more cost-efficient mechanisms.

Trade negotiations in the Americas support the view that RTAs play a role in expanding the liberal trade order by allowing a smaller group of countries to reach agreement on a larger number of issues. The FTAA negotiations include three areas that are not fully integrated in multilateral negotiations: investment, competition policy and government procurement. Treatment of these issues in the FTAA might provide important lessons as to how these issues might play out in the new WTO Round.  

13 Also significant is the fact that as an objective for the FTAA negotiations countries agreed to eliminate agricultural export subsidies affecting trade in the hemisphere. And in the Toronto Ministerial Meeting held in November 1999,
3. Has Attention Been Diverted Away From Multilateral Negotiations?

Is there evidence in LAC countries for the argument that their proactive pursuit of regionalism in the 1990s has been to the detriment of their commitment or attention to multilateral negotiations? There seems to be no evidence of this, in fact the opposite seems to be the case. One piece of evidence is related to the increased participation of LAC countries in the GATS after the Uruguay Round. Twenty LAC countries participated and made specific commitments in the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, and all of these but Brazil also committed to adopt in whole or in part the Reference Paper on Pro-Competitive Regulatory Principles.

Similarly, seventeen LAC countries submitted improved schedules in the Financial Services Agreement that entered into force in January 1999. LAC countries also made numerous submissions on services and other issues during the months preceding the Seattle WTO Ministerial Meeting. They have also been quite engaged in both the services and agricultural negotiations since early 2000. From February 2000 to the present LAC countries have made 12 out of a total of 45 proposals in the agricultural negotiations. And in the services negotiations they have presented 16 out of a total of 110 proposals. This is a good track record of participation taking into account that the number of proposals presented by other key countries is 16 by the European Union, 15 by Canada, 15 by the United States, 11 by Australia, 11 by Switzerland, 7 by Korea, 5 by New Zealand and 3 by Japan. Finally, most LAC countries supported the launching of a new multilateral round in Doha.

Renewed doubts about a potential “distraction effect” have been raised in relation to the negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). As a practical matter, concurrent WTO and FTAA negotiations can easily stretch the resources of even the largest countries. It is not difficult in a Small Economy to reach the level of “negotiation fatigue” or “overload.” However, it can be argued that rather than a diversion of attention and energy from the new round, regional negotiations by LAC countries, particularly the FTAA negotiations, have generated important positive externalities and learning effects that benefit engagement in the multilateral system. And there is a positive angle to concurrent FTAA and WTO negotiations.

First, as an established practice, many bilateral and sub-regional meetings are organized on the margins of the FTAA meetings not only for consultations on the subject matter of the meeting itself, but for other bilateral consultations and negotiations. Consultations on a WTO Round could also be organized on the margins of FTAA meetings. For small economies this might be a cost-effective system of gathering information, pooling resources and developing their own positions.

one month before the Seattle Ministerial, they further agreed to work toward reaching agreement in the WTO on eliminating agricultural exports subsidies.
Second, there is substantial overlap of issues between the WTO and the FTAA talks and this defines a complex interaction in substantive issues. But this also means that the FTAA exercise has already contributed with a lot of preparatory work, including very complete and comprehensive hemispheric databases, inventories of national legislation, as well as progress in understanding and negotiating substantive issues. Therefore, concurrent negotiations might not require too much additional preparatory work.

Third, the FTAA has also generated a significant amount of additional trade-related technical assistance from a variety of sources. Several international and hemispheric organizations have increased their trade related technical assistance activities, and the same is true of bilateral aid agencies. But perhaps the most important element is that, as Sydney Weintraub found out from a series of interviews: “participation in the FTAA negotiation process itself has been the most valuable teacher” (Weintraub, 1999, p 5). For a number of countries this is the first opportunity they have had to participate in the negotiation of a modern, state-of-the-art, free trade agreement. Then, both because of its “learning-by-negotiating-effects”, and because of the increased technical assistance it has generated, the FTAA has already strengthened and will continue to strengthen the readiness of countries in this Hemisphere to negotiate in the new Round.

Finally, an additional positive externality of the FTAA into the WTO is the fact that it has contributed to focus attention and to generate additional pressure towards timely implementation of WTO commitments. For many countries in the Hemisphere, the Uruguay Round commitments constitute the first set of demanding external trade obligations in their history. And it is now well understood that in many areas implementation is about creating infrastructure and institutional capacities. As a result of the FTAA experience and the associated technical assistance efforts, many countries will be better placed to implement their existing obligations. Participation in the FTAA could also increase the sense of ownership of the rules that is important for effective implementation.

4. Overlapping Agreements and Spaghetti Bowls

What problems have been created by overlaps between RTAs? How significant have these problems been? To what extent has there been a spaghetti bowl problem in Latin America? This section focuses on two areas: rules of origin and dispute resolution.

a. Rules of Origin

Preferential rules of origin are the sine qua non of RTAs that do not involve the harmonization of tariffs among their members. Rules of origin ensure that third countries do not unduly benefit from the preferential treatment that members of a RTA grant to one another. In the absence of rules of origin, third countries could act as free-riders by simply deflecting trade, that is, by exporting a particular product to the member of the RTA with the lowest tariff and subsequently selling the product throughout the RTA without facing the trade restrictions that would otherwise apply to third countries trying to access these markets. Accordingly, the larger the tariff differential between members of a RTA, the greater the incentives that third countries have
to deflect trade, and therefore, the higher the degree of restrictiveness of the RTA’s rules of origin. In contrast, whenever the tariff differential between members of a RTA is small, rules of origin will tend to be less stringent or even non-existent.

Besides being tools to avoid free-riding, rules of origin are also potent instruments to protect domestic producers from import competition and to attract foreign direct investment. Krishna and Krueger (1995) have shown how the existence of rules of origin could afford protection to suppliers of intermediate goods located within a RTA, as producers faced with restrictive rules of origin and the prospect of benefiting from preferential tariffs turn away from low-cost, foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs and toward high-cost suppliers located within the RTA. At the same time, a restrictive origin scheme might provide foreign suppliers of intermediate goods with an incentive to relocate their production facilities to the lower-cost country participating in a RTA, even though the new location might result in higher production costs.

Protection afforded to domestic producers by rules of origin will usually come at a high cost, however. For one, the operation and administration of origin schemes requires significant resources, especially in light of the growing internationalization of production, which is making it increasingly difficult for customs authorities to determine the “nationality” of a good. Likewise, private economic actors will face higher costs as a result of seeking to comply with rules of origin. More importantly, certain rules of origin can cause trade and investment diversion and may, under certain circumstances, introduce monopoly or monopsony (James 1997).

From a theoretical perspective, then, two opposing forces, both driven by the progressive decline of most-favored-nation tariffs in the context of unilateral trade liberalization and successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, will determine the significance of rules of origin in the future. On the one hand, lower and more homogeneous tariffs among members of a RTA will erode the scope for trade deflection and therefore, the significance of origin schemes as mechanisms to prevent free-riders from enjoying the benefits derived from membership in a RTA. On the other hand, lower tariffs are likely to lead to increased calls for protection, which in turn might foster the formulation of increasingly complex and protective origin schemes, usually based on a value added approach. Depending on which of these two forces predominates, rules of origin might well accelerate the transformation of the world trading system into a “spaghetti-bowl

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14 Rules of origin in the Americas are based on one of two approaches: value added and tariff shift. The implications of adopting each approach are highlighted in Mackay, Robert, and Plank-Brumback (2001):

“[The value added approach] generally defines a maximum percentage of third country processing or components that can be included for a good to qualify for preferential tariff treatment. This approach suffers from severe limitations because it is highly dependent on fluctuations in a wide range of factors that determine the prices and cost of a good. It is also administratively very burdensome for customs administrations that must audit the cost of these materials because accounting methods vary widely throughout the world. Moreover, low-wage countries are at a disadvantage when using this method because they must use a higher percentage of originating components to qualify for the preferences.

The ‘tariff shift’ model requires a determination that a party has modified a good or product enough to change its classification in the [Harmonized System], thus making it eligible for preferential tariff treatment. This method is not without problems. It does not always ensure that there will be a substantial transformation in the production of a good.”

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with a multitude of tariffs and quotas applying to particular products, all depending on administratively defined and inherently arbitrary definitions of the product’s ‘nationality’ (Bhagwati, 1997). “The systemic effect is to generate a world of preferences with all its well known consequences, which increases transactions costs and facilitates protectionism” (Bhagwati, 1998, p 1139).

Empirical evidence on the specific impact of rules of origin in Latin America and the Caribbean, while scarce and inconclusive, points to the use of rules of origin in the hemisphere not only as tools to prevent trade-deflection, but also as protectionist instruments that allow countries to pursue certain strategic objectives. In a recent attempt to explain the structure of NAFTA’s origin scheme, for example, Estevadeordal (1999) found that sectors with more restrictive rules of origin were also those with longer phase-out periods for tariff liberalization. This result suggests that NAFTA’s rules of origin are primarily used as policy instruments to afford protection. With respect to origin schemes in the rest of the hemisphere, Garay and Cornejo (1999) have pointed out that a majority of free trade areas “have not tended to use rules of origin to compensate for the differences in member countries’ national tariffs vis-à-vis third countries in order to prevent trade deflection; instead their design appears to have been more in response to different strategic goals.”

There exists also anecdotal evidence on the effects of rules of origin, particularly on investment patterns. Moran (1999), for example, notes that many of the domestic-content rules in NAFTA successfully diverted investment to North America. As specific examples, Moran cites the cases of AT&T, Fujitsu, and Ericsson in the field of telecommunication equipment, and Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Zenith, Sony, and Samsung in the area of consumer electronics as examples of companies that shifted part of their investments from Asia to North America following the entry into force of NAFTA.

A central, open question in the debate about the impact of rules of origin on multilateral trade liberalization is the possible role of regional trade agreements in reducing the spaghetti-bowl effect of different origin schemes embedded in RTAs. The negotiations toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) open the possibility for designing a new institutional structure that reduces the costs associated with the web of rules of origin existing in the hemisphere. The construction of such an institutional structure, however, will have to overcome numerous hurdles, notably the large differences existing between the origin schemes in force in the hemisphere. Perhaps a first step in the direction of a new structure on rules of origin in the context of the FTAA could consist of agreeing on a set of principles aimed at enhancing the transparency and predictability of hemispheric origin regimes. For example, countries could agree to minimize the number of criteria for determining origin, or develop specific disciplines to make the process of origin certification more transparent. Such measures could be complemented by voluntary efforts on the part of members of an RTA to move towards more homogenous tariff structures vis-à-vis third countries, thus reducing the incentives for trade deflection. As shown above, rules of origin have the potential of turning world trade into a spaghetti bowl. At the same time, however, they are intrinsic parts of a majority of RTAs and as such, they are here to stay. The relevant question,
therefore, is how to minimize their trade- and investment-distorting effects. The current FTAA negotiations offer a unique opportunity to find innovative answers to this question.

b. Dispute resolution

In the area of dispute resolution, proliferation of bilateral and sub-regional agreements poses serious potential risks to judicial cohesion and judicial economy in the resolution of trade disputes. This is especially so when similar substantive provisions are replicated in the several agreements as in NAFTA and NAFTA-like agreements. The issue can best be illustrated with a hypothetical example. Take country A that has bilateral trade agreements with countries B and C, respectively. Countries B and C consider that country A is violating an obligation under their respective agreement, which reads the same in both, as a result of the same country A measure. Each agreement contains dispute settlement provisions to deal with disputes that arise under that agreement. Each agreement is discrete, as is its dispute settlement mechanism. Under most systems, the decision to pursue recourse to a neutral body to resolve a legal dispute lies with the complaining party that chooses its defendant and defines the scope of the legal inquiry. Assume that countries B and C both decide to seek the establishment of a panel, which is provided under their respective agreements. Already there is a loss of judicial economy as lawyers would call it, or efficiency, as economists might label it, since overlapping agreements have generated two separate processes with ensuing costs for all concerned because not everyone involved in the dispute is together to resolve it.

This situation might turn worse if it is assumed that the panel in the A-B dispute concludes that there is a violation and that the panel in the A-C concludes there is not. This would be a worst-case scenario of lack of judicial cohesion, however, honest jurists may disagree. It is not altogether implausible, since some agreements provide for rosters composed exclusively of nationals of the parties while others provide for non-nationals, and perhaps this different composition may affect how panels view the matter.

If the A-B agreement is NAFTA or Canada-Chile, and if the parties cannot agree on how to resolve the dispute within thirty days, country B may automatically retaliate against A. Country A can only dispute whether the level of B's retaliation is "manifestly excessive" but the retaliatory measure may continue while its amount is litigated. Country C of course has no right to retaliate and continues to feel the adverse effect of the country A measure. Assume the A-C agreement has a choice of forum provision as do NAFTA and NAFTA-like agreements, whereby a complaining party may choose whether to pursue a claim either under the agreement or the WTO, and C's decision on forum, once initiated, is exclusive to the other. C is thus barred from requesting a panel under the DSU. Assume, however, that C decides to bring the dispute to the DSU anyway. Can A refuse dispute settlement under the DSU on the grounds that the matter was litigated already under A-C agreement? It would not appear that A could do so without violating its obligations under the DSU. One could imagine a WTO panel on the A-C dispute going on while A sues C under the A-C agreement for breach of the choice of forum provisions. But what if C
argues that its case under the WTO is based on a different cause of action or different grounds than available under AC?

As this example illustrates, proliferation of bilateral and RTAs pose systemic risks and rather than facilitating the resolution of disputes, might make dispute resolution more complex and costly. How to reduce these risks and costs is an open question and one of the major challenges posed by proliferation. Most of the NAFTA-like agreements in LAC are very new and even those that are older have not had much activity in terms of dispute settlement. So the complications suggested by the example are more theoretical possibilities than a matter of historical record. On the other hand, there might be some positive aspects in the proliferation of dispute settlement systems, in particular, it might reduce some of the burden on the WTO and expand the institutional capacity to cope with a rapidly expanding case load of trade disputes.

5. Have RTAs Contributed to Domestic Policy Reforms and How?

As suggested in section 3, LAC countries have engaged in the new RTAs to pursue a number of different objectives and see these agreements as an important instrument for development. RTAs contribute with domestic policy reform in a number of ways.

**a. Commitment mechanisms**

First, as frequently pointed out in the literature, RTAs allow countries to “lock-in” reforms, both in trade and non-trade areas, and therefore function as good commitment mechanisms enhancing the credibility of policy reform and sending positive signals to global markets. This issue was recently reviewed by the World Bank report on Trade Blocks (2000) that concludes that in the trade area, RTAs have indeed worked well as commitment mechanisms in practice. The impact of NAFTA in locking-in not only a broad range of economic reforms but democracy has been widely recognized. NAFTA was instrumental in determining the policy response of both the Mexican and the US governments to the 1995 peso crisis. Mexico maintained the reforms and increased its credibility as a location for international investment, and the US response demonstrated that NAFTA meant more than just trade policy. MERCOSUR has been instrumental in creating interdependencies that reduce historical rivalries and promote cooperation. It also helped to discipline the economic response of its members to the 1998-99 financial instability. The democratic clause of MERCOSUR was effectively and successfully used at least once during the Paraguayan political crisis.

Of course, how effective RTAs can be as commitment mechanisms depends on the value of belonging to the group and on the credibility of the threat of action if rules are broken. So not all RTAs are equally effective in this sense. From this perspective, the FTAA, by allowing Latin America to link up with the US and other industrialized nations, will probably be a particularly effective commitment mechanism for most countries in Latin America both for a broad range of

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15 Fernandez (1997) contains a useful analysis of the conditions under which a regional agreement will enhance the credibility of policy reform.
economic policies and in other non-trade but related areas, and this provides the FTAA with a strategic value that has been widely recognized.
b. Price effects

A second type of positive link between RTAs and domestic reforms occurs to the extent that RTAs accelerate domestic reforms that reduce price distortions because countries can no longer maintain substantial price differentials when they open up their economies. In other words, RTAs put pressure on countries to eliminate domestic distortions that are incompatible with free trade, and in this sense they serve as building blocks towards multilateral liberalization. A clear example of this in Latin America is the impact of the FTA between Central America and the Dominican Republic in the latter. Free trade with Central America has forced a national debate in the Dominican Republic about the need to rationalize the whole tariff structure. Producer lobbies in the Dominican Republic successfully pressed the government to reduce tariffs on intermediate goods, so that local firms can compete with Central American imports.

c. Political economy effects

A third type of positive influence of RTAs on domestic policy reform, for which there is a fair amount of anecdotal evidence, is that these agreements have induced positive behavioral changes in the traditionally rent-seeking behavior by the business communities. In many countries, the prospect and the reality of increased import competition has led the local business communities to be more interested in reducing domestic distortions in transportation costs, the costs of telephone calls, electricity rates, and interest rates that hinder their ability to compete with firms from countries with which FTAs have been entered. Again, these are pressures to eliminate domestic distortions that are incompatible with free trade, whether regional or global. Of course, the interaction of RTAs with local interest groups is complex. There are also instances where negotiation of RTAs in LAC has been resisted and used by some political leaders and/or NGOs as part of a more general anti-globalization, anti-American or anti-“Washington consensus” discourse.

6. Role of Macro and Micro-Economic Policies in Regional Agreements

Technological obsolescence leading to competitive disparities, exchange rate instability and fiscal imbalances are well known obstacles to regional integration projects. The first obstacle engenders protectionist pressures that usually lead to antidumping actions, exception lists, safeguards and other mechanisms that delay the trade liberalization process. Exchange rate instability undermines confidence in international transactions based on long term contracts, which are the main source of steady intra-industry trade flows, raises the uncertainty of business strategies focused on the regular use of imported inputs and frustrates the restructuring initiatives that would allow industrial modernization. Fiscal imbalances impose restrictions on governments’ capacity for economic reform, partly because in many economies, particularly in smaller ones, trade taxes constitute a relatively large proportion of total fiscal income, and partly because they create difficulties to appropriately finance social investment, which is in turn essential to legitimate further trade liberalization and economic adjustment. Thus the interaction of macro and micro-economic policies with RTAs raises some of the most important analytical and policy issues confronting countries in their regional economic integration efforts, and Latin America has a rich experience in this area. As regards exchange rate regimes, for instance, several regimes coexist
ranging from the Chilean and Costa Rican heterodoxies, to the Brazilian float, Argentina’s convertibility and dollarization in Ecuador and El Salvador.\textsuperscript{16}

Membership in a RTA exacerbates the weight of external constraints, making it more difficult for countries to act "defensively" against shocks originating in other RTA members and to deal with their own macroeconomic disequilibria.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, because in a RTA tariff cuts are deeper and irreversible in contrast with unilateral trade liberalization, the need for fiscal restructuring to replace foregone trade revenues is also more pressing. To the extent that intra-regional trade flows grow within a RTA, the issue of the costs and benefits of some degree of macroeconomic policy coordination emerges. And in this respect, the influence of monetary union in Europe has also had a strong influence.

In the FTAA, the presence of a dominant trading partner places particular constraints on macroeconomic management. While the United States coordinates some aspects of its macroeconomic policy with other members of the Group of Seven, which jointly account for about 80\% of world trade, the United States could not realistically be expected to assume similar commitments with countries in Latin America. The difference in incentives for macroeconomic policy coordination reflects the fundamental asymmetry between the United States and Latin American countries in terms of economic size, openness and reciprocal importance as trading partners. In general, larger, less open countries are under less pressure to coordinate macroeconomic policy than their smaller, more open trading partners. Moreover, the incentive to harmonize macroeconomic policies with particular trading partners is a function of the relative importance of trade flows. On all these grounds Latin America would have far more interest in policy coordination than the United States. It seems reasonable to argue that in the FTAA Latin American countries will be “policy takers” in the sense that they would need to accommodate their policies with whatever U.S. policy happens to be, rather than expect any strong version of policy coordination.

In the absence of coordinating or compensatory mechanisms, and given the vulnerability to external shocks and contagion effects, from time to time these countries are likely to be confronted with unpleasant financial instability episodes that underline the fiscal constraints to further trade liberalization and economic integration. These and other concerns led several Latin American countries in the last few years to seriously consider whether to embark on a dollarization of their economies. Indeed, by 1999-2000 the monetary debate in the hemisphere seemed to be on the verge of a paradigm change in favor of dollarization. However, the Argentinian meltdown of 2001 under the currency board system will probably lead to some reassessment of the costs and benefits of dollarization, and to a reassertion of the need for sound fiscal and financial policies.


\textsuperscript{17} MERCOSUR provides one of the clearest examples of how different macroeconomic rules can undermine regional integration efforts. See Fanelli (2001).
The issue of policy harmonization has also been discussed within sub-regional groups (MERCOSUR, Andean Community, Central America, CARICOM). To the extent that within each of the sub-regional groups intra-group trade remains low relative to total trade, so too are the incentives for macroeconomic policy coordination within the group. Yet, the less policy convergence there is, the more difficult it will be for intra-group trade to develop. Ultimately, therefore, to maximize benefits of RTAs this vicious circle will have to be broken and macroeconomic policies will need some degree of convergence. Needless to say, there is no consensus in the economic literature as to the optimal exchange rate and monetary policy regime or about the desirable level of macroeconomic policy coordination that a country should aim for in a regional trade agreement.

In Latin America, the failure to reform the fiscal structure has been, for many decades, a common trait of the region's economies, where the aspirations for economic development have amplified the demands upon public resources, and compounded the restricted size of the tax base. Not by chance, import substituting industrialization strategies had a long-lived popularity in the region, since they generated innumerable stratagems for circumventing the fiscal challenge. Even today, years after abandoning import substitution policies, and despite severe fiscal adjustment programs that have included privatization, public sector restructuring and trade reforms, some Latin American and Caribbean countries are still far from the contemporary standards of public finance management. The problem is compounded by the fact that trade taxes constitute a relatively large proportion of total fiscal income in many Latin American economies. Thus resistance to further trade liberalization and integration into larger markets may come not only from technological obsolescence and perceived competitive threats, but from governments that find it difficult to modernize tax systems to meet both the demands for social investment and the need to finance the fiscal cost of further trade liberalization. In the FTAA process this issue has received some attention in the Advisory Group on Smaller Economies. However, despite its critical importance for hemispheric integration, it is an area that has been left entirely as a matter of internal national coordination between trade and finance authorities, and has not, at least to date, been brought within the scope of formal hemispheric cooperation efforts.

7. **Multilateralism vs Regionalism: A False Dilemma?**

From a pragmatic point of view the regionalism versus multilateralism controversy is, to a certain point, built on a false dilemma. Not because RTAs cannot create trade diversion, they clearly can do this; not because one would neglect that RTAs can create a “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon that could hinder rather than facilitate business, they can clearly also do this; and not because in the limit one could not imagine scenarios of the world going down a path of RTAs while neglecting or diverting resources and political capital away from the multilateral system, which could be a very negative path and welfare reducing indeed.

It is a false dilemma for three fundamental reasons. First, because there are many plausible trajectories where pursuing a multiple-track strategy, multilateral, regional and bilateral, might get countries to free trade quicker than relying just on one track. In what is called in the literature the “dynamic time-path” question, there is evidence of patterns of mutually reinforcing interdependence where the pursuit of regionalism, triggers or induces the pursuit of
multilateralism. In addition, the multilateral system is far from being as quick and efficient as is sometimes portrayed. It is slow to achieve results, and it is weak in a number of fundamental areas. Still, it is the major achievement in the area of global governance of the 20th century and must be protected and strengthened.

Second, the evidence from Latin America shows that these countries did not adopt the new regionalism instead of or as an alternative to multilateralism. The typical sequence was that countries first engaged in unilateral liberalization as part of the process of economic reform in the 1980s and early 1990s. The new regionalism was a consequence of this process of reform. Countries also participated actively in the Uruguay Round, and it was in the climate of protracted negotiations and uncertainty about the results of the round that they simultaneously engaged in the revitalization of their customs unions and in the negotiation of FTAs. Also, the evidence reviewed in this paper from LAC does not support the view that the new bilateral and RTAs negotiated in the region have been seriously trade diverting.

Finally, it can be argued that it might even be counterproductive to portray regionalism and multilateralism as mutually exclusive alternatives, because in practice governments will most likely continue to pursue both simultaneously. In fact, in Doha RTAs obtained increased legitimacy. Paragraph 4 of the Ministerial Declaration recognizes “that RTAs can play an important role in promoting the liberalization and expansion of trade and in fostering development”.

So if RTAs are here to stay, the useful questions for research are for instance: How regionalism can be harnessed and oriented so that it maximizes its role as a building block for a more open world trading system? How RTAs can achieve faster and deeper results in areas where the multilateral system is slow, frustrating or shallow? Given the failure of the GATT/WTO mechanisms for examining consistency of RTAs with the conditions of Article XXIV of GATT and Article V of GATS, how to strengthen or reform these articles and these mechanisms to bring more discipline and more WTO consistency in RTAs? Dealing with these questions is however beyond the scope of this paper. However, in this regard it is worth noting that in Doha Ministers agreed “to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements. The negotiations shall take into account the developmental aspects of regional trade agreements” (Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 29).

18 Many trade experts have argued that the creation of the EEC led directly to the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds. Others point out to the 1982 shift to regionalism by the US as having been instrumental in persuading the EU and developing countries to launch a new Round. The WTO (1995) argues that the failed Brussels Ministerial in December 1990 and the spread of regional integration agreements after 1990 were major factors in eliciting the concessions needed to conclude the Uruguay Round. During 2001 many seem concerned that the new Bush Administration would give priority to the FTAA and not to the new round, and this acted as an additional incentive for the repeated European and Japanese calls for a new round.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND CHALLENGES

1. Explaining Proliferation

LAC countries have pursued a multiplicity of objectives in negotiating RTAs: market access; investment attraction; strengthening domestic policy reform; positive signaling to investors; increased bargaining power vis-à-vis third countries; political, security or strategic linkage objectives; and the use of regional agreements for tactical purposes in seeking to achieve multilateral objectives. The hallmark of the new regionalism in the region is, however, the interest to link up with the United States and Canada, the larger and most developed economies in the hemisphere. From this perspective, RTAs are an instrument by which economies, particularly smaller ones, compete to improve their investment climate and attracting FDI. Political and strategic rationales have also guided the LAC countries’ engagement in RTAs, with variations depending on the specific groupings and level of aggregation of countries.

2. Trade diversion/creation

A review of the existing studies on trade creation and diversion in the different agreements in LAC suggests that there is no evidence of trade diversion or that if any, trade diversion was overwhelmingly dominated by dynamic effects. The typical behavior observed in this period is an impressive expansion in both trade within the group and in imports from the rest of the world. This is to an important extent due to the fact that RTAs have occurred simultaneously with very significant unilateral trade liberalization.

3. Similarity and diversity in agreements

There is important diversity in the agreements in LAC in terms of disciplines and institutional arrangements. There are four customs unions and almost 20 Free Trade Agreements in force or under negotiation between countries in the Americas, plus twelve negotiated or under negotiation with countries outside the hemisphere. The FTAs negotiated in the 1990s present important similarities associated with the fact that most of them were modeled on the NAFTA in terms of their structure, scope and coverage. However, even among them there are some significant differences. The combination of different strategic and economic rationales in each case has ensured that not all agreements are created equal, and that pragmatism has been a key component of the LAC experience.

4. Extent of liberalization

The evidence from RTAs in LAC suggests that these agreements have indeed shown a capacity to liberalize faster than at the multilateral level and to include nearly universal coverage of trade liberalization in industrial goods. Most programs among LAC countries will eliminate tariffs for almost all products by 2006 and most of the bilateral trade in these agreements becomes fully liberalized in terms of tariffs, in a ten-year period. One weakness in this market access picture is
that nearly all the agreements fail to adequately cover the agricultural sector. Exceptions for agriculture reflect the particular sensitivities of each participating country.

5. Rules of Origin

Another weakness of the new RTAs is that they have introduced selective procedures and discretionary application of rules of origin. Several studies suggest an important degree of use of rules of origin not just to avoid trade deflection, but for protectionist and strategic goals. There is also evidence of use of rules of origin to influence investment patterns. One lesson to draw in this area seems to be that as an intrinsic part of most RTAs, rules of origin are here to stay and that the relevant question is how to minimize their trade and investment-distorting effect. A useful hypothesis is that a broader plurilateral agreement such as the FTAA offers an opportunity to “clean up” to some extent the spaghetti bowl effect of different origin schemes in the Americas.

6. Dispute Resolution

In the area of dispute resolution, proliferation of bilateral and sub-regional agreements poses serious potential risks to judicial cohesion and judicial economy in the resolution of trade disputes. Dispute resolution could become more complex and costly. How to reduce these risks and costs is one of the major challenges posed by proliferation. On the other hand, there might be some positive aspects in the proliferation of dispute settlement systems, in particular, it might reduce some of the burden on the WTO and expand the institutional capacity to cope with a rapidly expanding case-load of trade disputes.

7. Depth of integration

There is very scarce empirical research in Latin America on the question of the extent that RTAs have promoted deep integration beyond what has been achieved at the multilateral level. In the area of domestic regulation in services sectors one study provides mixed results: while some RTAs adopt more general principles than GATS, other RTAs, most notably NAFTA and MERCOSUR, apply more stringent disciplines than GATS. With respect to mutual recognition a number of RTAs do go beyond GATS in encouraging the formation of recognition agreements. These conclusions relate to the nature of the disciplines in the agreements, not to the actual progress in changing national legislation or enforcement. Most of the new RTAs in LAC do expand the liberal trade order in that they include areas that are not fully integrated in multilateral negotiations: investment, competition policy and government procurement.

8. Innovation, experimentation and linkage issues

FTAs in the Western Hemisphere have been a fertile ground for innovation and experimentation, both in traditional disciplines and in linking trade and non-trade objectives. For instance, the Canada-Chile agreement eliminates the use of anti-Dumping among the parties. Several agreements have moved beyond the GATT/WTO into such areas as environment and labor standards, some using a sanctions approach, others monetary fines to punish violators,
others based strictly on cooperation in these areas. LAC countries almost unanimously reject a trade sanctions-approach to labor and environmental concerns. As regards the trade-democracy nexus, MERCOSUR incorporates a “democratic clause”, and there are ongoing discussions as to how to strengthen the democratic provisions in the Inter-American system, including possible cross-reference to the Free Trade Area of the Americas. There seems to be a growing consensus in the Americas to strengthen the trade-democracy nexus. It is likely that one of the effects of the tragic events of September 11 will be to strengthen the link between geopolitical and security considerations on the one hand, and the trade and prosperity components of the Inter-American system, on the other.

9. Distraction from multilateral negotiations

This paper argued that there is no evidence in LAC that the proactive pursuit of regionalism in the 1990s has been to the detriment of the countries’ commitment or attention to multilateral negotiations. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. Concrete evidence of increased participation in the WTO process by LAC countries in the 1990s was presented. An attempt was made to explain this apparent paradox by arguing that regional engagement has generated positive externalities and learning effects that benefit engagement in the multilateral system.

10. RTA contribution to domestic policy reform

RTAs contribute with domestic policy reform in a number of ways: by acting as commitment mechanisms enhancing the credibility of policy reform and sending positive signals to global markets, particularly when the agreement includes a larger, relatively more developed country that acts as enforcer; by putting pressure on countries to eliminate domestic price distortions that are incompatible with free trade; and by inducing positive behavioral changes in the traditionally rent-seeking behavior of business communities.

11. Macro- and Micro- Economic Policies and RTAs

Competitive disparities, exchange rate instability and fiscal imbalances are well known obstacles to regional integration projects that pose important policy issues. To the extent that intra-regional trade flows grow within a RTA, the issue of the costs and benefits of macroeconomic policy coordination emerges. Resistance to further trade liberalization and regional integration may come not only from technological obsolescence and perceived competitive threats, but from governments that find it difficult to modernize tax systems to meet both the demands for social investment and the need to finance the fiscal cost of further trade liberalization.

12. What to do about proliferation?

Although the academic controversy on multilateralism versus regionalism has provided many useful insights, an understanding of the economic, political and historic contexts of trade policy strongly suggests that governments will most likely continue to pursue both simultaneously, and that RTAs are here to stay. They have too many benefits and attractions for governments to
stop engaging in them. The appropriate and pragmatic response is rather to orient and discipline this proliferation, partly through reinforced multilateral procedures but also through other means, in order to reduce the opportunities for discrimination and to maximize their role as building blocks for a more open trading system.
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OAS TRADE UNIT STUDIES SERIES*


*These publications may be found on the Trade Unit web page at http://www.sice.oas.org/Tunit/ tunite.asp.


The Organization of American States

The Organization of American States (OAS) is the world's oldest regional organization, dating back to the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington, D.C., from October 1889 to April 1890. The establishment of the International Union of American Republics was approved at that meeting on April 14, 1890. The OAS Charter was signed in Bogotá in 1948 and entered into force in December 1951. Subsequently, the Charter was amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, signed in 1967, which entered into force in February 1970; by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, signed in 1985, which entered into force in November 1988; by the Protocol of Managua, signed in 1993, which entered into force in January 29, 1996; and by the Protocol of Washington, signed in 1992, which entered into force on September 25, 1997. The OAS currently has 35 Member States. In addition, the Organization has granted Permanent Observer status to 48 States, as well as to the European Union.

The basic purposes of the OAS are as follows: to strengthen peace and security in the Hemisphere; to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention; to prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States; to provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression; to seek the solution of political, juridical and economic problems that may arise among them; to promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social and cultural development, and to achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the Member States.

MEMBER STATES: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas (Commonwealth of), Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica (Commonwealth of), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

PERMANENT OBSERVERS: Algeria, Angola, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Yemen.