REPORT ON FACILITATION EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN VENEZUELA

I. Introduction

On April 13, 2002, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States condemned the alteration of the constitutional order in Venezuela and the unfortunate acts of violence that had led to the loss of human lives, called for the normalization of democratic institutions, and sent a mission headed by the OAS Secretary General to investigate the facts and to promote such measures as necessary for re-establishing the constitutional order.

On April 18, 2002, the Secretary General presented a report on his visit. On that day, in a special session, the General Assembly of the OAS, by means of Resolution AG/RES. 1 (XXIX-E/02), agreed to provide OAS support and help as required by the Government of Venezuela to consolidate its democratic process.

As well, Declaration AG/DEC.28 (XXXII-O/02) reiterated the offer of support and assistance, and Resolution CP/RES.821 (1329/02) welcomed the initiative of the Government of Venezuela to promote and conduct a process of dialogue with the participation of all sectors in the country and with the support of the international community, and encouraged the Government and all sectors of the opposition, as well as social sectors and institutions in Venezuela, to strive, through dialogue and strict adherence to the Constitution of the Republic, to achieve the national reconciliation that both the Venezuelan people and the international community yearn for.

In June 2002, in Barbados, the General Assembly, by means of its Declaration on Democracy in Venezuela, reiterated its support for the national dialogue convoked by President Chávez, and its offer to cooperate in that dialogue, within the context of the Democratic Charter of the OAS.

In July, after the visit by former United States President Jimmy Carter to Venezuela, the OAS, the UNDP and the Carter Center, pursuant to Resolution AG/RES.1 (XXIX-E/02), began to explore ways in which the three organizations might facilitate dialogue between the government and the opposition.

II. Invitation

The Government of Venezuela and sectors of the opposition, represented by the umbrella group Coordinación Democrática, invited the OAS, the Carter Center and the UNDP to participate in the process of seeking solutions to the situation facing the country. In a letter sent by the Vice President of the Republic, José Vicente Rangel, to the Secretary General of the OAS, César Gaviria, the Government of Venezuela expressed its willingness to seek a mutually agreed mechanism for rapprochement between the government, the representatives of the various opposition groups, and other segments of Venezuelan society, which would include the appointment of one or more persons versed in international affairs to facilitate dialogue and the quest for democratic agreements within the framework of the country’s Constitution. Similarly, in a letter addressed to the OAS Secretary General, opposition sectors in Venezuela, grouped together under the name “Coordinadora Democrática de Venezuela” [Democratic Focal Point of Venezuela], expressed their satisfaction with the proposal that the OAS, the UNDP, and the Carter Center should help to facilitate national dialogue. (See annexes).

III. Design and conduct of the preparatory missions

In response to these invitations, the OAS, the UNDP and the Carter Center established a joint working group, known as the Tripartite Mission, which proceeded to draw up a strategy for bringing the parties together to explore and establish conditions that would facilitate a process of rapprochement, dialogue and negotiation in Venezuela.

First Tripartite Mission

Between Sept. 8 and 13, 2002, the international Tripartite Mission, consisting of Fernando Jaramillo (OAS), Elena Martínez (UNDP) and Jennifer McCoy of the Carter Center, visited Venezuela to help government and opposition representatives in the search and design of mechanisms that would be mutually acceptable to them, for dealing with substantive issues of interest to the parties.

The international mission held meetings with the President of the Republic, Hugo Chávez, with the President of the Venezuelan Bishops' Conference, Mgr Balthazar Porras, with Members of the Coordinación Democrática, owners of the communication media, leaders of Fedecámaras business association, leaders of the CTV labor confederation, official and opposition deputies, and leaders of the National Assembly, among other national players.

The Tripartite Mission made significant progress during these efforts. In particular, it secured the willingness of all players to engage in dialogue; the government and the opposition made progress in preparing a Declaration of Principles for Peace and Democracy; the government and the opposition concurred on some of the substantive issues to be resolved; and other issues that could be part of a broader agenda were identified.

Mission of the Secretary General

Between Oct. 2 and 4, 2002, the Secretary General of the OAS, César Gaviria, in response to an invitation from the Venezuelan Chief of State, Hugo Chávez, visited the country with a view to encouraging the government and the opposition to draw up a common agenda for dialogue that would allow them jointly to seek solutions to the country's crisis.

As a result of the Secretary General's efforts, a few days later the government and the Coordinación Democrática signed the Declaration of Principles for Peace and Democracy in Venezuela, in which they stressed that Venezuela's problems can and must be resolved by Venezuelan themselves, within the framework of the Constitution and the laws of Venezuela; they reiterated their full commitment to democratic principles and prompt justice; they repudiated resort to violence; they recognized the need to seek ways to strengthen the democratic coexistence of the Venezuelan people and to punish any disruption of the rules governing it; they declared their readiness to launch sincere discussions among all sectors in order to find acceptable solutions to the political conflicts that were destabilizing the country; they reiterated their appeal for support and assistance by the Working Group consisting of representatives of the OAS, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Carter Center (TCC). They promised to cooperate with the Working Group in order to explore the preparatory phases for implementing an observable and verifiable process of agreements for achieving, through a consensus-based mechanism, political solutions consistent with the constitutional framework, and they reaffirmed their conviction that Venezuela and the Venezuelan people will be able to the overcome the current situation in a peaceful and democratic way, ensuring thereby the rule of law and the dignity of all citizens.

In October 2002, the Venezuelan political scene was marked by a number of events, including two marches (one in support of the President of the Republic, and the other against him), a “civic strike” (the third in the last 12 months), and a rebellion by a group of military personnel who declared themselves in "legitimate disobedience" and gathered in the Plaza Altamira square. At the same time efforts continued for collecting the signatures needed to request the CNE to call a referendum.

On October 22, 2002, the OAS Secretary General announced his next visited Venezuela (to begin October 27) and declared that "recent events in Venezuela have underscored the persistent and deep polarization in that country and the urgent need to move from an environment of confrontation to a framework of direct negotiation between the government and the opposition. It is imperative that Venezuelans address the current problems within the constitutional order and the rule of law, through the democratic mechanisms available under the Constitution.” The Secretary General also noted that "the peaceful nature of the recent marches held both by the opposition and by the government, and of the October 21 labor strike, is a clear sign of progress toward a solution reached by consensus. These events demonstrated that Venezuelan society is capable of channeling its differences democratically and that violence is not an inevitable result of dissent." As "another positive sign", he pointed to the fact that the government and the opposition sectors have signed the Declaration of Principles for Peace and Democracy in Venezuela, presented in September by the joint Mission of the OAS, the Carter Center and the UNDP.

The Secretary General announced the presentation of specific proposals for working on the three issues already accepted for discussion between the parties (the strengthening of the electoral system, the investigation of the events of the previous April 11 and the need to disarm civilian populations), as well as a structure and an agenda for undertaking a debate on the critical issues that continue to divide Venezuelan society.

At the regular session of the OAS Permanent Council, the political situation in Venezuela was discussed. The Secretary General reported on his activities. He referred to the Declaration of Principles, indicated that the political problems must be resolved in the framework of the Constitution and the laws, and highlighted the importance of total commitment to democratic principles and prompt justice, as well as the repudiation of acts of violence. He noted that the agreed issues included strengthening the electoral system, the need to support the process of investigation into the events of April, and disarmament. For purposes of supporting the facilitation project in Venezuela, the General Secretariat, through the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy and its Special Program for the Promotion of Dialogue and Conflict Resolution, designed a proposal containing the objectives and functioning of these components.^{^[1]}^/ The Venezuelan ambassador to the OAS, Jorge Valero, asked for the Organization's help in resolving his country's situation.

A group of Venezuelan soldiers issued a communiqué calling for a barracks revolt and civil disobedience, and demanding the resignation of President Chávez. The Secretary General noted that such attitudes and demands are a betrayal of the constitutional loyalty that officers of the Armed Forces owe the president of the Republic, Hugo Chávez. He added that they also go against Article 4 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which provides that one of the "essential elements" of democracy is "the constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted civilian authority and respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and sectors of society”. That obligation extends to all members of those institutions and sectors. The Secretary General called upon all the opposition forces in Venezuela, civil society and other leading figures in Venezuelan public life, to confine themselves to democratic, peaceful and constitutional means for negotiating their differences with the government of Venezuela.

In the face of the statement by officers of the FAN, the Coordinación Democrática declared that fundamental responsibility for events of this kind must lie exclusively with the government, and that the situation had deteriorated to intolerable limits through the persecution of officers who did not support the government, and they demanded again that the President resign and that the people be allowed to express their will. They confirmed their rejection of any solution that would imply a coup or a “self-coup”, and they demanded that the National Assembly and the Supreme Court of Justice should fulfill their duties. They reiterated their willingness to resolve the crisis by democratic means, by consulting the people, and they noted the contribution that international agencies could make in this regard.

Mission of the Secretary General (II)

Between October 27 and November 1, 2002, the OAS Secretary General continued his facilitation efforts in Venezuela.

As he had indicated, the Secretary General presented to both parties a proposal outlining a process that would combine the assessments and recommendations made by the Tripartite Mission and the parties, and proposed some general guidelines for a process of rapprochement, dialogue and negotiation among the principal opposition forces and the Venezuelan government.

As the principal objective, he proposed facilitating the process of dialogue and negotiation between the Venezuelan government and representatives of the Coordinación Democrática, by establishing a Working Forum (Mesa) for Dialogue and Negotiation. That Forum should be given a mandate of approximately one month (until December 4), after which it could be extended by agreement of the parties. It would be conducted by an international facilitator, and supported by a specialized technical team with expertise in negotiation and dispute settlement, through the international agencies that make up the Tripartite Group.

The specific objectives were to discuss the electoral route as a mechanism of resolving the current political impasse; to discuss additional issues of interest to be placed on a working agenda, including actions and initiatives that the government and the opposition might take in order to establish a minimum degree of mutual trust, and to encourage the parties to reach concrete and measurable agreements for moving forward on the selected issues, and to evaluate the feasibility of continuing this effort.

A first round of efforts at consensus building was sponsored by the Tripartite Mission, during which the Government of Venezuela and the opposition, through the principal members of the Coordinación Democrática, agreed: (a) to accept the Declaration of Principles for Peace and Democracy in Venezuela as the general framework for a commitment to a process of cooperation and negotiation; (b) to begin a dialogue without preconditions; and (c) to identify certain key issues as points for the negotiating agenda.

For the next phase of rapprochement between the parties, and with a view to moving ahead swiftly with a process for dialogue and negotiation, the OAS Secretary General would act as international facilitator.

The government would appoint six representatives to the Forum. Similarly, the Coordinación Democrática was asked to appoint six representatives of its own to the Forum.

The international facilitator and the delegates of both parties would work to establish the Forum on Negotiation and Agreement as quickly as possible.

In this facilitation process, representatives of the Forum would need to: (a) ratify a specific agenda; (b) define a timetable, mechanisms and specific procedures for the functioning of the Forum; (c) define rules of the game both for its internal negotiations and for dealing with society and the international community; (d) agree on a communications strategy for handling the media and transmitting the results achieved in the facilitation and negotiation process. As well, it was suggested that thought be given to a publicity campaign on the progress of the Forum, led by the Tripartite Group; (e) to consider establishment of supplementary working forums in order to make concrete proposals to the principal Forum.

It was decided to monitor implementation of the accords reached, as agreed by the parties during the negotiation, following a timetable established for them. To this end, it was agreed to work closely with the National Assembly to ratify the commitment of the parties to back the accords reached. The role of the Tripartite Mission would conclude with implementation of the accords from the Forum.

An international facilitator would be responsible for guiding the political accords of the Working Forum for Dialogue and Negotiation. The Tripartite Mission, consisting of senior representatives of the OAS, the UNDP and the Carter Center, would support the role of its three component agencies, by observing, verifying and serving as guarantors for the negotiating process, and in monitoring the agreements. An operations team[2] would provide technical support for the work of the Forum.

It was proposed that the headquarters of the Forum for Negotiation and Agreement in Venezuela should be established in the premises of the Conference of Venezuelan Bishops.

The proposal established the following key criteria for facilitation: (a) the problems of Venezuela can and must be resolved only by Venezuelans, within the framework of the country’s political constitution and legislation, as has been reiterated on various occasions both by the government and by the opposition; (b) negotiations must be pursued from the viewpoint that the national interest must prevail over sectoral interests, and on the basis of the Declaration of Principles for Peace and Democracy in Venezuela, signed by the government and by the Coordinación Democrática; (c) the facilitation body should have some room for procedural maneuver in carrying out its functions, within a framework of legality, ethics and transparency. In this respect, it will act proactively, with the prior consent of the parties and with attention to their inputs; (d) the international community, through the Tripartite Mission, will have an active part in the process, embracing three basic rules: (i) providing political support to the international facilitator for the Forum on Negotiation and Agreements, with the help of an operational team; (ii) observing, verifying and/or guaranteeing the rules of the game, the negotiating process, and compliance with any agreements reached, through mechanisms agreed with the parties; and (iii) helping to communicate progress in the Forum for Negotiation and Agreement, at both the hemispheric and the international level.

The international facilitator and the Tripartite Mission, as well as the operations team, would observe the following principles at all times: (a) respect, understood as institutional conduct that in practice ensures absolute recognition of the dignity of individuals, their organizations and their viewpoints and proposals for building the future of Venezuela; (b) impartiality, implying a commitment to assure groups or sectors involved in the issues that the facilitating processes will have clear rules and that they will apply equally to everyone; (c) transparency, which ensures that the deliberations will take place before the eyes of the Venezuelan nation so that the citizens will in the end be the principal overseers as well as the primary beneficiaries of the dialogue process. The international facilitator, through the Tripartite Mission, would provide regular reports on developments in the dialogue and would respect confidentiality when so agreed by the parties; (d) aggregation, in the sense of creating conditions that will foster the inclusion of all sectors of Venezuelan society in the deliberative process, so that the dialogue, as an instrument for addressing conflicts, will be pursued through and at all levels and in all organizations of society. This is a fundamental factor for achieving good governance in the country; (e) authenticity, which implies that in its design and its conduct, the dialogue must at all times take account of the opinion of the national counterparts as well as the reality of Venezuela. This criterion presupposes recognition that it is the Venezuelans themselves who alone have the right to interpret their reality and to take the most appropriate measures for constructing their own future.

The facilitation efforts of the Secretary General produced agreements between the government and the Coordinación Democrática on certain minimum operating aspects that would serve as the basis for the work of the Forum on Negotiation and Agreement:

· The role of the international facilitator for the Forum would be fulfilled by the OAS Secretary General, Cesar Gaviria.

· The Forum would consist of six representatives of each of the two parties.

· Representatives of the government and of Coordinación Democrática should be appointed by administrative or political act as appropriate.

· The OAS, the Carter Center and the UNDP, in accordance with their respective mandates, would provide technical support to the facilitator in his task.

· The Venezuelan Conference of Bishops would be asked to provide the headquarters site.

· The facilitator will have sole responsibility as "official spokesman" to the public on developments and progress in the Forum. Each party would be free to express its views, explicitly accepting that those views do not commit the Forum, but are a reflection of their own opinion.

· The Forum would seek agreements for resolving the crisis in the country through the electoral route, and would also try to agree on the following issues: strengthening the electoral system, disarming the civilian population, and the installation and functioning of the Truth Commission.

· At the first meeting, the parties would work with the facilitator to define procedures and the order and sequencing of sessions and to prepare rules for the functioning of the Forum.

· The establishment of supplementary working forums was proposed, with delegates from both parties, to prepare proposals and specific recommendations on the agenda issues for submission to the main Forum.

· The OAS, the Carter Center and the UNDP, in accordance with their respective mandates, would serve as guarantors of the process in order to ensure fulfillment of the agreements.

· If any of the agreements reached through this process should require consideration by the National Assembly, a suitable mechanism would be found, with prior agreement among the parties, so that the Legislature would consider them promptly and act in accordance with its constitutional attributes.

The agreements referred to between the government and the Coordinación Democrática were formalized through preparation of a document entitled "Operational Synthesis of the Forum for Negotiation and Agreement".

IV. The domestic context before the establishment of the Forum

It is important to consider the political context that existed before the Forum was established. At midmorning on Nov. 4, an opposition delegation, led by the Primera Justicia movement, delivered more than 2 million signatures to the National Electoral Council (CEN), demanding a referendum. In the afternoon the National Guard launched teargas to disperse the president's followers. In the center of the city there were a number of confrontations, in which more than 20 people were wounded by gunshot and more than 70 persons suffered from asphyxiation or were hit by flying objects.

At about 6 PM, people wearing masks destroyed that façade of the Confederation of Workers of Venezuela, CTV, and vehicles that were parked nearby.

On Nov. 6, alleging fraud in the collection of the signatures, the leader of the MVR parliamentary faction, Cilia Flores, asked the CNE to appoint representatives from her political group to be present at the verification and checking of the signatures against the REP and the National Identify Registry.

The president of the Confederation of Workers of Venezuela (CTV), Carlos Ortega, met with the OAS Secretary General to notify him that the labor organization had decided to call an indefinite strike. Nevertheless, he revealed that the Forum could be established on the following afternoon.

Mohammed Merhi decided to suspend his peaceful but extreme protest. After a conversation with the OAS Secretary General, the father of the youngest victim of the events of April 11 was persuaded to suspend his hunger strike, which he had pursued for nine days and which was putting in his life at risk. Mehri declared his confidence that the mediating role of César Gaviria, by establishing the forums for dialogue on creating a commission to investigate the events of April, would bring justice to Venezuela sooner or later.

President Chávez demanded "regularization of the juridical situation of members of the National Electoral Council" before the Supreme Court in the appeal that he lodged with the Constitutional Chamber, with the assistance of the Attorney General, in which he requested a ruling on the unconstitutionality of several articles of the Organic Law on the Electoral Power. The brief argued that officials of the CNE "must continue to exercise their duties, in order to prevent an institutional vacuum", which would preclude the possibility that the CNE might be left headless, as opposition deputies were complaining. The first vice president of the CNE, Alfredo Avella, asserted that the appeal presented by the President of the Republic would not hold up the process of calling a referendum, because the CNE is governed by the Law on Suffrage and not by the Law on the Electoral Power.

Brig. General Vidal Rigoberto Martinez invited his comrades in arms to back an indefinite strike, reiterating that the soldiers mustered in the square would only leave when President Hugo Chávez resigned. He explained that the work stoppage would be "civilian and military".

On Nov. 7, President Chávez insisted that it would be a “constitutional fraud" if the National Electoral Council were to call a referendum to revoke his mandate, at the request of opposition voters. "The people who brought those signatures to the CNE a few days ago”, he said, “are now trying to remove me by means of constitutional fraud", which he considered to be part of an "ongoing coup". The Executive Vice President, José Vicente Rangel, warned that although the Supreme Court had denied the unconstitutionality of the Organic Law on the Electoral Power, as argued by the government, the Executive was confident that the Constitutional Chamber would declare it unconstitutional to call for a referendum on the mandate of a popularly elected position, such as that of President of the Republic, as demanded by the opposition.

The National Assembly, in plenary session with the votes of the official party, accepted the resignation of two of the members of the CNE, Roberto Ruiz and Vicente González, in an effort to create "a vacuum of power" in that body. The debate over the dismissals was requested by the MCV at a meeting on Thursday afternoon, just hours after the Supreme Court of Justice had dismissed the appeal of unconstitutionality against several articles of the Law on the Electoral Power.

The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice would be responsible for appointing new authorities to the National Electoral Council (CNE) if an institutional vacuum were to arise because the National Assembly had failed to fulfill his mandate under the Constitution, as was established in a ruling by the Constitutional Chamber that unanimously dismissed the appeal brought by President Chávez to have several articles of the Organic Law on the Electoral Power declared unconstitutional.

In this context, the parties agreed to begin negotiations on Nov. 8, 2002, and to appoint their respective representatives for that process. It was agreed that the site of the discussions would be the San José Seminary, located in the town of the El Hatillo. Although this was not put in writing, the Coordinación Democrática set a deadline of December 4, 2002, for the discussions.

The Government of Venezuela, by means of a formal note, appointed José Vicente Rangel (Vice President of the Republic), Roy Chaderton (Minister of External Relations), Aristóbulo Isturiz (Minister of Education, Culture and Sports), María Cristina Iglesias (Minister of Labor), Ronald Blanco (Governor of the State of Táchira), Nicolás Maduro (Deputy in the National Assemblyl) and Jorge Valero (Venezuela’s Ambassador to the OAS, as Advisor) as its representatives. For its part, Coordinadora Democrática –also by formal note- named Timoteo Zambrano (Alianza Bravo Pueblo), Américo Martín (Non-Governmental Organizations), Alejandro Armas (Deputy in the National Assembly), Eduardo Lapi (Governor of the State of Yaracuy), Manuel Cova (Secretary General of the Central de Trabajadores de Venezuela), Rafael Alfonso (member of Fedecámaras) and Juan M. Raffalli (Primero Justicia, as Advisor).

On Dec. 16, after more than five weeks of meetings in the context of the Forum, the Permanent Council approved Resolution CP/Res. 833 (1348/02) providing its backing for Venezuela's democratic institutions and the facilitation efforts of the OAS Secretary General.

A month later, the OAS Secretary General reported that a group of countries known as "Group of Friends” for Venezuela, consisting of Brazil, Chile, Spain, Mexico, Portugal and the United States, would lend their support for continuing the negotiations in Venezuela. This group of countries met for the first time on Jan. 24, 2003, in Washington, where it was agreed that a delegation consisting of Deputy Foreign Ministers and other senior officials of the six countries would visit Caracas the following week. The Group of Friends has met three times since then, once in Caracas on Jan. 31, a second time in Brasilia on March 10, and the third time in Caracas on May 9.

V. Summary of the Facilitation Process

To understand the process that has unfolded over the last six months it is necessary to review some of its most relevant elements. It is clear that the role played by the Secretary General was that of facilitator, and he said so on repeated occasions. For its part, the government also placed great stress on the fact that the Secretary General was invited to Venezuela exclusively in this capacity. The proposals that were presented were made at the request of the two parties. Following is a brief summary of the facilitation process, highlighting the most important developments.

Before this entire process began, in the particular case of the OAS, it was essential to secure an invitation from the Government of Venezuela, and this was communicated in the form of a letter from Vice President Rangel. On the other hand, the opposition, represented by the Coordinación Democrática, also sent a direct invitation to the OAS to facilitate dialogue between the parties. As the framework for the negotiating process, a document entitled "Operational Synthesis" was prepared jointly with the parties, and they signed it on Nov. 7, 2002, after a lengthy process of intermediation. That document is important, because the parties committed themselves to cast the negotiations in those terms, and many of the issues covered in other papers issued from the Forum had their basis in that document.

The Forum for Negotiation and Agreement was installed on Nov. 8, 2002. Since then, a number of factors have affected its functioning. For example, in December 2002, the Metropolitan Police intervened on behalf of the government, and the opposition reacted by calling a general strike. This strike became an indefinite stoppage and it was joined by a portion of the oil industry, represented by the PDVSA. In December and through the following months, the Forum devoted itself exclusively to dealing with this situation. Indeed, right up until the early morning of December 2, just a few hours before the strike called by the opposition was to begin, the Forum continued working to find an agreement that could forestall it. In the end this effort failed, but both parties showed a willingness to reach an agreement.

Once the strike began, the two parties took to the streets to express their disagreement publicly, and this created an explosive and dangerous atmosphere in the country. The resumption of meetings of the Forum at this moment served to provide a permanent and open channel of communication, which avoided many confrontations. At this time, the proceedings of the Forum were disrupted again by the events of the Plaza Altamira, in which three people died. Until then, the parties had been using the Forum as a mechanism for avoiding street clashes resulting from this situation. Only a few of the goals set forth in the Operational Synthesis had been covered, and those only partially. The government conditioned its return to the Forum on a lifting of the strike, but because of the events at Plaza Altamira, the Forum met once again in plenary to try to rein in the escalating violence in the streets.

As of January, efforts began with the parties to dismantle the strike. This effort encountered a great obstacle in the sharp differences with which each party viewed the situation. The government argued that there was no need to deal with this issue and that there was in fact no strike, but simply an effort at sabotage in the oil industry. The opposition, for its part, maintained its determination to keep most of the country’s businesses and industries closed

Once the strike situation was normalized, the Forum began to work on an accord to ban violence. The parties also requested the facilitation office to submit a proposal for establishing a Truth Commission. That proposal was presented to the parties. The Coordinadora accepted in its entirety. On February 18, 2003, the “Declaration against Violence and for Peace and Democracy" was signed by the two parties in a formal ceremony chaired by the Secretary General, the Vice President of the Republic and other members of the Forum.

Following this first agreement signed by the Forum, the process was again disrupted by events. The president of Fedecámaras, the country’s principal business association, was arrested and held on the orders of a judge. Arrest warrants were also issued against certain directors of PDVSA and against Carlos Ortega, president of the Venezuelan Confederation of Workers (CTV). All of these people were accused of having promoted the strike, and of having thereby violated various provisions of the criminal code. In the wake of this incident, the Forum began work on one of its key objectives, which was to find a way to resolve the country's crisis by the electoral route, as called for in the Operational Synthesis. It was in this context, and in an effort to give a boost to the Forum, since the parties could find no common ground for discussion, that President Jimmy Carter presented two proposals. The first had to do with the possibility of a constitutional amendment in order to move the timing of elections forward; the other had to do with holding a recall referendum, with agreements on the time and manner of conducting it. With this proposal, the Forum took on a very different dynamic and the parties focused on discussing the issue of an electoral outcome. Both parties presented their comments on President Carter's proposal, and on the basis of those inputs we began the work that has brought us to where we are now.

The government maintained its position on the recall referendum as the only solution, and the Coordinación Democrática accepted both of President Carter's proposals, coming down finally in favor of the recall referendum. After lengthy discussions of their views on the recall referendum, the two parties requested the facilitators to produce a working document that would combine the different visions of this issue. The facilitation office thereupon presented the parties with the document, "Procedural Issues on the Recall Referendum for Discussion in the Forum for Negotiation and Agreement". The two parties accepted the document and agreed to begin work on an accord based on that document. To give it the shape of an accord, it was decided to incorporate several points that had been discussed in the Forum and had already been agreed by the parties in previous months. These points referred to good governance, the political and electoral climate, violence, respect for differing ideas, among other things. The parties were very close to reaching an agreement. On this point it was decided to set up a working group, so that it could present the Forum with wording that might be acceptable to both parties. This working group produced no results, but the Forum decided to meet again in plenary. At the meetings of the Forum, which began again on April 8, 2003, work began on the basic document prepared by the facilitation office. After three days of work, and with dazzling clarity, the two parties expressed their concurrence with a text, and this served as the basis for an accord. It was also understood that the two parties would put the Forum accord for consideration by their senior bodies, so that it could be formally signed. It was also explained that the parties were not obliged to sign if they did not approve it, but that this would be the final document, and if it was approved it was not to be subject to changes. The representatives of the two parties at the Forum were fully in agreement with publishing the contents of the document, which constituted at pre-accord.

On April 24, the government presented a new version of the pre-accord document that the Forum had prepared on April 11, 2003, with new wording, which included changes of form and others that the opposition considered to be changes of substance. From what we understand, the government position was that the final accord must be submitted for approval by the social and political forces supporting the government, and it was as a result of those consultations that the revised wording had emerged. Essentially, the argument was that the document must in no way suggest that the government might fail to observe precepts that were enshrined in law and in the Constitution, and that it was therefore unnecessary to reiterate them.

For its part, the opposition argued that it was essential that the document's wording should retain mention of article 184 of the Suffrage and Political Participation Law, which stipulates a term of 90 days for holding a referendum once the required signatures have been received by the CNE. They also insisted on an express commitment by both parties not to change the rules governing the referendum process. Another essential point for the opposition was that there must be clear reference to the effect that international agencies were prepared to provide the required technical assistance with respect to elections and also to disarming the population. As well, for the Coordinación Democrática it was very important to maintain mention of the role of the OAS, the Carter Center and the UNDP as guarantors, on the basis of the Operational Synthesis.

On May 8 and 9, the third meeting of the Secretary General's "Group of Friends” was held in Caracas. After meeting with the OAS Secretary General, representatives of the Carter Center and the UNDP, the Vice Chancellors and senior authorities issued a communiqué in which they supported the facilitation efforts of the Secretary General and urged the parties to reach an accord that would put an end to the crisis. The facilitator agreed with the parties to work on a new text based on the version approved at the Forum on April 11, and on the version presented by the government on April 24. The new version of the text was consulted and sent to the parties. On May 23, the government announced its intention to accept that text and to sign the accord; on May 27 the Coordinación Democrática did the same. On May 29 the accord was signed in Caracas, in the presence of the OAS Secretary General and the representatives of the Carter Center and the UNDP.

The text of the accord is proof that, however great their political differences may be, the things that unite Venezuelans are far greater than those that separate them. As of now, everyone, on an equal footing, is obliged to uphold the precepts set forth in the agreement in defense of the constitutional system; respect for the rule of law; acceptance of the constitutional components of nationality that require social and political coexistence on the part of all; and the search for participatory, pluralistic, vigorous and genuinely representative democracy.

For the OAS it is particularly important that the government and the opposition have both recognized the hemispheric commitment known as the Democratic Charter, which embodies the values that unite us all, establishes the right of our peoples to live in a democracy, and the obligation of all, government and citizens alike, to promote and defend it. Signature of this accord is a clear demonstration of respect for those principles and of the determination to make them prevail. The agreement also recognizes the principles enshrined in the OAS Charter and in the American Convention on Human Rights which, together with the Democratic Charter, generate the body of legal and political obligations that comprise and govern the inter-American system.

Section 12 contains the principal achievement of the agreement. Undoubtedly, the possible application of Article 72, should these constitutional requirements be met according to the National Electoral Council, represents the peaceful, democratic, electoral and constitutional solution that we have so intensely searched for in the Forum for Negotiation and Agreement. The agreement reached by the parties is the solution referred to in resolution 833 of the OAS Permanent Council, which we have all invoked as being necessary and indispensable during this period of intense turbulence, sweeping change, and major discord in the country’s institutional life.

OEA/Ser.P

AG/doc.9 (XXIX-E/02)

18 de abril de 2002

Original: español

INFORME DEL SECRETARIO GENERAL DE LA OEA, CÉSAR GAVIRIA,
EN CUMPLIMIENTO DE LA RESOLUCIÓN CP/RES.811(1315/02)

SITUACIÓN EN VENEZUELA

Me corresponde como Secretario General de la OEA rendir en este periodo extraordinario de sesiones de la Asamblea General el informe que dispuso nuestro Consejo Permanente mediante resolución CP/RES.811(1315/02) en desarrollo del Artículo 20 de la Carta Democrática. En dicha resolución se me ordenó investigar los hechos ocurridos el 11 y 12 de abril, y emprender las gestiones necesarias, incluidos los buenos oficios, para promover la más pronta normalización de la institucionalidad democrática.

Tan pronto los Presidentes del Grupo de Río concluyeron su reunión en Costa Rica el pasado viernes 12 de abril, fui informado de sus decisiones tanto por el Presidente Miguel Angel Rodríguez como por su Canciller Roberto Rojas. Con ellos tuve la oportunidad de intercambiar opiniones a lo largo del día y con la Presidenta de nuestro Consejo, la Embajadora Margarita Escobar, estuvimos atentos a sus deliberaciones. Al finalizar dicha reunión procedimos a hacer algunas consultas con el fin de dar cumplimiento a la solicitud presentada por el Grupo de Río, en el sentido de reunir lo antes posible el Consejo Permanente. Los Presidentes también me pidieron que tomara contacto con la realidad política de Venezuela a través de los medios que considerara mas adecuados.

Es conveniente señalar que el grupo de Río consideró la renuncia del Presidente Chávez como un hecho cumplido, así como también la destitución del vicepresidente y de su gabinete, por lo cual no se solicitó su restitución como parte de las acciones necesarias para defender el orden constitucional.

En sesiones informales y privadas el viernes en la noche y el sábado anteriores, bajo la acertada dirección de la Embajadora Margarita Escobar, el Consejo examinó la situación en Venezuela, condenó la alteración del orden constitucional y los lamentables hechos de violencia, y expresó su solidaridad con el pueblo de ese país. En la mañana del sábado, el que se autodenominaba presidente del gobierno de transición, llamó a la OEA para informar que se había alterado el orden constitucional y para hacer algunas otras afirmaciones que estaban contenidas en un mensaje que fue circulado a las delegaciones. También dijo que se querían hacer representar en la reunión por un funcionario de la misión de Venezuela y que luego enviarían cartas credenciales. Todo ello se puso en conocimiento de las misiones. Yo le expresé a él que al dia siguiente viajaría a Caracas con el mandato que me diera el Consejo Permanente.

El Secretario General, según lo autorizó el Consejo Permanente, se hizo acompañar de las embajadoras Margarita Escobar, Presidente del Consejo Permanente, y Lisa Shoman, Representante de Belice y vocera del CARICOM. Algunos de los embajadores del Grupo de Río no me pudieron acompañar por la rapidez con la que se tuvo que desplegar la misión. Las embajadoras me han dado apoyo y consejos muy valiosos, pero debo aclarar que todo lo afirmado por mí, en reuniones privadas o ante los medios de comunicación en dicha misión, así como el contenido de este informe, son de mi exclusiva responsabilidad.

Ustedes sabrán comprender la dificultad de rendir un informe sobre los hechos. No obstante, me he propuesto hacer una presentación sucinta sobre los antecedentes de lo ocurrido entre 11 al 13 de abril, la cual de ninguna manera puede interpretarse como una justificación de la alteración del orden constitucional. Es apenas un contexto en el cual se dieron los sucesos trágicos del 11 de abril.

En la muy difícil coyuntura que han vivido las instituciones democráticas de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, juzgué también oportuno mirar aspectos de la vida institucional del país en relación con disposiciones de la Carta Democrática.

Tendría que comenzar por decir que es necesario señalar, por lo menos hasta que no se demuestre lo contrario, que los organizadores de la manifestación convocada por la oposición política y muchas organizaciones sociales en los días precedentes y en el propio 11 de Abril, son diferentes de quienes usurparon el poder, detuvieron al Presidente Chávez y trataron de instaurar lo que llamaron un gobierno provisional, cuyo ejercicio del mando encontró un amplio y generalizado rechazo no solo por su origen fáctico, sino además por las decisiones que tomó y que significaban el cierre de los organismos elegidos popularmente, la intervención del poder judicial y de todos los organismos del llamado “poder moral”, y en la práctica la derogatoria de la Constitución y de muchos de los actos realizados bajo su desarrollo.

Podemos afirmar que el gobierno que estaba apenas en la fase de instauración, sin ninguna legitimidad democrática, fue fruto de decisiones tomadas por los militares. En carta, que fue del conocimiento de los miembros del Consejo Permanente, quien presidía lo que se auto calificó como gobierno provisional expresamente reconoció la ruptura constitucional.

Para fortuna de las instituciones democráticas de Venezuela, esa alteración del orden constitucional fue revertida por la reacción de buena parte de la oficialidad de las Fuerzas Armadas y por una vigorosa respuesta ciudadana, tanto de defensores como de opositores del gobierno del Presidente Chávez.

Como parte de la responsabilidad que ustedes me encomendaron, me reuní con un amplio grupo de voceros de algunas de las principales instituciones del país como el Presidente Hugo Chávez y su canciller; la mesa directiva de la Asamblea Nacional; El Fiscal General de la Nación, el Contralor, el Defensor del Pueblo y el Presidente del Tribunal Superior. Igualmente me reuní con el Cardenal y los representantes de la Conferencia Episcopal; algunos grupos de la sociedad civil; con representantes de algunos de los principales diarios, cadenas de televisión y radiales; con la Central de Trabajadores de Venezuela; los miembros de los partidos de Oposición en la Asamblea Nacional; y con otras personalidades que llevaron documentos en los que fijaban posición sobre los hechos ocurridos e interpretaban a su juicio la realidad Venezolana.

Señores Cancilleres:

De las conversaciones con los diferentes sectores quisiera resaltar lo siguiente: El Presidente de la Republica en todas sus alocuciones ha hablado de reflexionar, de rectificar, de enmendar. Aseguró “que no habría ánimos revanchistas, ni persecuciones, ni abusos”. Ha dicho que lo ocurrido representa una “inmensa lección”; “que se debe hacer una profunda reflexión”; que hay que actuar ahora con “calma y cordura”; que es necesario “corregir lo que sea necesario corregir”; “restablecer el dialogo”.

Habló también de la “unidad respetando las diferencias” y señaló que como un primer paso convocaría el Consejo Federal de Gobierno para que sirva de epicentro para el diálogo con todos los sectores y para alcanzar el mayor consenso posible en materia económica, social y política. También señaló que el Presidente designado de PDVSA, como la junta por él designada, habían renunciado, con lo cual se puso fin al asunto que dio origen a las últimas jornadas de protesta.

Aunque una buena cantidad de personeros de instituciones ajenas al gobierno han aceptado la llamada del Presidente al diálogo, aun después de los fatídicos hechos del 11 y 12 de abril, existe una excesiva polarización no solo de los protagonistas naturales de la política, como lo son el gobierno, los partidos y las bancadas de oposición, sino de casi todas las organizaciones laborales, empresariales, de la sociedad civil, los representantes de algunos de los otros poderes del Estado y los medios de comunicación. Esa excesiva polarización tiene connotaciones de intolerancia que en la práctica impiden el diálogo democrático y la búsqueda de acuerdos que permitan cierto entendimiento para mantener la paz social. Pareciera prevalecer el convencimiento según el cual es inevitable una renovada confrontación entre amigos y contradictores del gobierno, lo que podría desembocar en mayor protesta social.

Quiero igualmente señalar una práctica peligrosa de deliberación en la Fuerzas Armadas, que determina que muchos protagonistas de la vida pública vivan atentos a lo que los oficiales de las distintas armas opinan del acontecer político, incluidas las ordenes de su Comandante en Jefe, el Presidente Constitucional de la República. Muchos buscan fundamentos para tal forma de deliberación en un artículo de la Constitución.

Los sectores de oposición y otros protagonistas de la vida social toman de diferentes maneras distancia de las normas constitucionales. En particular expresan inquietudes sobre la separación e independencia de los poderes públicos y la falta de contrapesos, como que sus titulares fueron escogidos por las mayorías que imperaron en la Asamblea. Los diputados de oposición llaman la atención sobre una reciente providencia del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia que señaló que el período presidencial comenzó a partir del mes de enero del 2002.

Después de los acontecimientos que ya hemos mencionado se han incrementado las denuncias de violación de los derechos humanos, de intimidación, de vandalismo y saqueos, de pérdidas de vidas y personas heridas. Esto ha ocurrido antes, durante y después de la reciente crisis. Nosotros enviamos estas denuncias a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y, en algunos casos, a la Relatoría para la Libertad de Expresión.

Esta Misión recibió numerosas quejas sobre la responsabilidad en estos hechos de los Círculos Bolivarianos, grupos de ciudadanos u organizaciones de base que apoyan el proyecto político del Presidente. Muchos sectores los responsabilizan de violaciones a los derechos humanos, de actos de intimidación y de saqueos.

Los representantes de los dueños de los medios de comunicación y un grupo de periodistas consideran que los Círculos Bolivarianos son la mayor amenaza a la libertad de prensa y expresión. Varios de estos casos se han puesto en conocimiento de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y del Relator para la libertad de Expresión. Haría bien el gobierno en trabajar en estos aspectos y disipar muchas de las graves preocupaciones que han surgido.

Los representantes de las cadenas de televisión se quejan de la manera abrupta como se interrumpieron las señales de los canales de televisión privados abusando según ellos de la Ley Orgánica de Telecomunicaciones. Esto produjo una sistemática suspensión de su programación con largas intervenciones del Presidente y de otros funcionarios del poder ejecutivo en los días previos al 11 de abril. Reclaman también que el gobierno, según lo recomienda la CIDH, haga “una condena categórica a las agresiones de las que han sido objeto los trabajadores de comunicación social”.

Por otra parte las autoridades que representan los poderes del Estado señalaron la falta de objetividad de algunos medios para informar sobre los sucesos que condujeron a la restauración del orden constitucional. Algunos medios han registrado esa preocupación o queja sobre lo acontecido, y han dado explicaciones que no soy llamado a calificar como satisfactorias o no, así como no lo soy de la validez de las quejas referidas.

Los miembros de los partidos de oposición en la Asamblea Nacional consideran conculcados sus derechos como minorías. Llamaron la atención sobre el uso de los mecanismos de la ley habilitante. Esta es una vieja disposición en las Constituciones de Venezuela que da al ejecutivo un gran poder legislativo. El gobierno del Presidente Chávez hizo uso amplio de tales facultades, y ello ha demostrado la gran resistencia que genera la aprobación de normas sin el proceso de transacciones que se da en el debate parlamentario y sin la discusión pública que se daría en la Asamblea.

La Central de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) planteó la imperiosa necesidad de que el poder ejecutivo acepte la escogencia de sus directivos conforme al resultado de la elección convocada por iniciativa del propio gobierno nacional. Esta Central y sus directivos tienen el reconocimiento de la OIT, y ese reclamo se puede también mirar a la luz del artículo 10 de la Carta Democrática. Los directivos de la CTV también reclaman la convocatoria del diálogo Tripartito.

Por estas consideraciones, en las reuniones con los diferentes sectores señalé acciones que a mi juicio se deben acometer con urgencia para evitar ulteriores expresiones de descontento que pudieran dar origen a la repetición de los trágicos sucesos del 11 y 12 de abril. En todo caso es importante que hoy se reiteren algunos de los considerandos y dispositivos de la resolución del Consejo, sobre todo en lo referente a la condena de cualquier quebrantamiento del orden constitucional y de los violentos sucesos que llevaron a la muerte de un número apreciable de personas.

La OEA, sus países miembros, el resto de la Comunidad Internacional y algunas organizaciones como la Iglesia Católica a través de la Conferencia Episcopal podrían prestar su concurso para propiciar el diálogo y asegurar que estos hechos no se vuelvan a repetir.

Quisiera resaltar además algunas acciones que se deben tomar para desactivar algunos de los más graves conflictos, recuperar la gobernabilidad, ganar estabilidad política y propiciar la recuperación económica.

Es fundamental que todos los sectores de la sociedad, por lo menos la totalidad de los que he citado, busquen mecanismos o acuerdos que permitan hacer del respeto a la Constitución la base fundamental y el marco de acción para todos los protagonistas de la vida pública venezolana.

Es indispensable un acuerdo para que el artículo 350 de la Constitución no se interprete como un derecho general a la rebelión. Tal interpretación puede llevar a más y peores actos de violencia. Todos deben poner de su parte para un acuerdo en tal sentido.

Es esencial que gobierno, oposición, fuerzas sociales, organizaciones de derechos humanos y medios de comunicación, se comprometan a rechazar toda forma de deliberación de la fuerza pública y respalden la aplicación de los códigos militares que sancionan tales conductas. También es esencial que se abandone la interpretación según la cual el citado artículo de la Constitución puede servir de base a la conducta de oficiales de distintas armas. Quisiera reiterar que si no se avanza en tal sentido se podría dar pie a que se presenten nuevos actos de insubordinación contra la autoridad civil. Esta Asamblea debería ser categórica al señalar la subordinación constitucional de todas las instituciones del Estado a la autoridad civil legalmente constituida, tal como lo señala el artículo cuarto de la Carta Democrática.

Existe la imperiosa necesidad de acudir solo a los medios pacíficos. El estado, sin que sobre ello pueda haber la menor duda, debe mantener el monopolio del uso legítimo de la fuerza. Se deben investigar las denuncias según las cuales hay sectores que están poniendo en peligro ese componente esencial de la seguridad pública. En todo caso cualquier uso de las armas debe hacerse bajo autorización y dentro de la normatividad acordada o dispuesta por las Fuerzas Armadas.

Es muy importante para la democracia venezolana que la investigación sobre el desenlace trágico de las manifestaciones del 11 de abril se realice de manera que sus conclusiones sean aceptadas por todos, y que los responsables reciban todo el peso de la ley. Lo que señalo no debería interpretarse como un menoscabo de los poderes legítimamente constituidos. Con un buen grado de voluntad política podría conseguirse tal resultado. En todo caso hay que aprender de lo ocurrido porque cuando se dan manifestaciones de varios centenares de miles de personas los riesgos son enormes.

Se nos informó que en el seno de la Asamblea Nacional se ha avanzado en conformar una Comisión de 25 miembros que se encargaría de investigar los hechos, aunque existen diferencias en cuanto al nombre de la Comisión, al mecanismo de integración y a su composición.

Gobierno y oposición deberían hacer lo que esté a su alcance para afianzar la independencia de los poderes y establecer sus debidos contrapesos. Más allá de la importancia de asegurar la supremacía de la Constitución, es fundamental restablecer la confianza en el estado de derecho y asegurar que todos los estamentos sociales estén dispuestos a acatarla. Así lo dispone el artículo cuarto de la Carta Democrática.

Cualquier acuerdo entre los distintos sectores de la vida venezolana debe pasar, como lo señala la Carta Democrática, por el pleno respeto a la libertad de expresión y por ende de prensa. Debe quedar claro que cualquier queja o deficiencia debe resolverse conforme a la Declaración de Chapultepec. Esta Secretaría expresó públicamente su confianza en que el gobierno del presidente Chávez resolverá de manera satisfactoria las preocupaciones de seguridad e intimidación que alegan los representantes de Medios de Comunicación con los que me reuní.

En el tema de la televisión, es importante acordar un código de conducta que, mas allá de la legislación, asegure la compatibilidad de las transmisiones de interés público con la programación normal.

La comunidad internacional debería prestarle a Venezuela apoyo para asegurar que de nuevo los partidos y las agrupaciones o movimientos políticos sean los principales protagonistas de la vida pública. El vacío que han dejado y que han pretendido llenar otros sectores sociales ha demostrado de manera palmaria sus limitaciones. Aquí cabrían acciones en el marco del artículo quinto de la Carta Democrática.

Quiere esta Misión agradecer la hospitalidad y adecuado apoyo que recibió del Gobierno del Presidente Chávez. Espero haber cumplido con la disposición de nuestro Consejo Permanente al someter este informe a su consideración. La OEA debe estar a disposición del gobierno y el pueblo de Venezuela para que de la trágica experiencia vivida se puedan colegir actitudes y acciones que nos aseguren que estos hechos infaustos y trágicos no se vuelvan a repetir.

Muchas gracias

ANEXO 8

ACUERDO ENTRE LA REPRESENTACIÓN DEL GOBIERNO DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA Y LOS FACTORES POLÍTICOS Y SOCIALES QUE LO APOYAN Y LA COORDINADORA DEMOCRÁTICA Y LAS ORGANIZACIONES POLÍTICAS Y DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL QUE LA CONFORMAN

Caracas, 23 de mayo de 2003

1. Los suscritos miembros de la Mesa de Negociación y Acuerdos, representantes del Gobierno Nacional y de las fuerzas políticas y sociales que lo apoyan, así como de las organizaciones políticas y de la sociedad civil que conforman la Coordinadora Democrática, suscribimos el presente Acuerdo con espíritu de tolerancia para contribuir al fortalecimiento del clima de paz en el país. En ese sentido reiteramos los principios y mecanismos que nos trajeron a esta mesa, que constan en la Síntesis Operativa acordada por las partes desde el momento de su instalación, así como nuestra convicción de encontrar una solución constitucional, pacífica, democrática y electoral.

2. Expresamos nuestra total adhesión y respeto a la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. En su respeto y en el régimen legal que la desarrolla, se basa la prevalencia del Estado de Derecho. La Constitución contempla un conjunto de valores y normas para expresar los principios fundamentales de convivencia social y política, y establece los mecanismos de solución de diferencias. Cualquier cambio para atender las experiencias del proceso político que se ha vivido debe ser hecho dentro de sus normas y de una manera preferentemente consensuada.

3. Somos conscientes de que en el momento histórico que vivimos es necesario ponerse de acuerdo sobre lo fundamental para garantizar una democracia participativa, pluralista, vigorosa y auténticamente representativa, donde continuaremos teniendo espacio para todos y donde la justicia social, la tolerancia, la igualdad de oportunidades, el estado de derecho y la convivencia democrática sean los valores esenciales. Tenemos conciencia de que hay que colocar esos valores más allá de la controversia política y partidista, y que los mismos deben guiar las políticas, especialmente en materias de preponderante interés social.

4. Queremos expresar que estamos convencidos de que Venezuela y el pueblo venezolano continuarán transitando el camino democrático con sentido de hermandad, respeto por las convicciones de cada venezolano y voluntad de reconciliación.

5. Estamos conscientes, que es necesario consolidar en nuestra sociedad el pluralismo contenido en la Constitución, donde la política ejercida por todos los actores de la vida nacional sea coherente con los valores señalados en la misma. Venezuela necesita el concurso de todos para continuar su camino en paz y en democracia, de modo que cada quien exprese sus ideas, asuma sus posiciones y tome decisión entre las distintas opciones que políticamente se le ofrece.

6. Expresamos nuestra adhesión a los principios consagrados en la Carta Democrática Interamericana, que declara el derecho de los pueblos a vivir en democracia y la obligación de los gobiernos y todos los ciudadanos de promoverla y defenderla. Todos los sectores, asumiendo lo dispuesto por el Artículo 6º de la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, en relación con la democracia participativa, comparten los valores allí consignados, como aquellos según los cuales al poder no puede accederse sino con sujeción al estado de derecho; la celebración de elecciones libres, justas y transparentes, y la separación e independencia de los poderes públicos; la democracia representativa que se refuerza y enriquece con la participación permanente, ética y responsable de la ciudadanía, en un marco de legalidad; el estricto respeto a los derechos humanos, a los derechos de los trabajadores, a la libertad de expresión, de información y de prensa, a la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación e intolerancia. Ambas partes también reconocen las estrechas relaciones entre la democracia y la lucha contra la pobreza, entre la democracia y el desarrollo, y entre la democracia y la prevalencia de los derechos humanos.

7. Invocamos los principios de la Carta de la Organización de Estados Americanos, OEA, y la Convención Interamericana de Derechos Humanos; el derecho internacional como norma de conducta de los estados en sus relaciones reciprocas; el respecto a la soberanía y a la no-intervención; a la autodeterminación de los pueblos; a la igualdad jurídica de todos los estados; y a la solución pacifica de las controversias.

8. Ratificamos la vigencia y nuestra plena adhesión y compromiso con la “Declaración contra la Violencia por la Paz y la Democracia” suscrita el 18 de febrero de 2003, la cual debe considerarse como parta integrante de este Acuerdo.

9. Coincidimos plenamente en que el monopolio del uso de la fuerza por parte del Estado, a través de la Fuerza Armada Nacional, y policías metropolitanas, estadales y municipales, es una prerrogativa fundamental e indeclinable en la lucha contra la violencia y en la de asegurar la esencia de un Estado democrático. La función de los órganos policiales será dirigida por las autoridades civiles que ejercen su mando conforme lo disponen la Constitución y la Ley, para lo cual se deberá dar cabal cumplimiento a las disposiciones legales y a las decisiones judiciales que regulan las labores de Coordinación de Seguridad Ciudadana. En todo caso, con apego a la Ley, debe racionalizarse la tenencia de armas por parte de los cuerpos de policía, y cualquier otro organismo de seguridad con competencias nacionales, estadales o municipales. Ninguno de estos cuerpos deberá utilizarse como instrumento de represión arbitraria o desproporcionada, así como tampoco para ejecutar acciones que impliquen intolerancia política.

10. Nos comprometemos a adelantar una vigorosa campaña de desarme efectivo de la población civil, basada en la ley aprobada en la Asamblea Nacional, haciendo para ello uso soberano de todos los mecanismos y recursos que en ella se prevén, así como del apoyo técnico de las instituciones internacionales. Las partes seguiremos las conclusiones de la Mesa de Diálogo realizada por la Asamblea Nacional para un diseño concertado sobre el desarme de la Población Civil.

11. Exhortamos a los grupos parlamentarios de opinión representados en la Asamblea Nacional a concluir la Ley para la conformación de la Comisión de la verdad, a fin de que la misma coadyuve en el esclarecimiento de los sucesos de Abril de 2002 y coopere con los órganos judiciales para que se establezcan las debidas responsabilidades y se sancione a los culpables.

12. Las partes, en cumplimiento del objetivo establecido en la Síntesis Operativa para buscar acuerdos con el fin de contribuir a la solución de la crisis del país por la vía electoral, coincidimos en que dicha solución se logra con la aplicación del Artículo 72 de la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, en el que se prevé la eventual celebración de referendos revocatorios del mandato de todos los cargos y magistraturas de elección popular que han arribado a la mitad del período para el cual fueron elegidos (Gobernadores, Alcaldes, Legisladores Regionales y Diputados a la Asamblea Nacional), o arribarán a dicha mitad en el transcurso de este año, como es el caso del Presidente de la República conforme a la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia del 13 de febrero del 2003. Tales referendos, incluyendo los ya solicitados y los que se solicitaren en adelante, serán posibles si son formalmente requeridos por el número exigido de electores y se aprueban por el nuevo Consejo Nacional Electoral, una vez que se establezca que se han cumplido los requisitos constitucionales y legales.

13. Coincidimos en que resulta indispensable contar a la brevedad posible con un árbitro electoral confiable, transparente e imparcial, a ser designado en la forma prevista en la Constitución. En este sentido, se considera muy importante el trabajo que se está adelantando en la Asamblea Nacional. Las dos partes manifestamos su disposición a coadyuvar como factor de entendimiento en todo lo referente a la conformación y operatividad del Árbitro Electoral, sin interferir en el proceso normal que se está llevando a cabo por el Poder Legislativo Nacional.

14. Estamos comprometidos con la libertad de expresión, tal como está consagrada en nuestras normas constitucionales y legales; así como en la Convención Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y en la Carta Democrática Interamericana. Las dos partes nos proponemos trabajar con los medios de comunicación públicos y privados, para promover su identificación con los propósitos enunciados en este documento y en la declaración contra la violencia y por la paz y la democracia, particularmente en lo que hace relación a la desactivación de la violencia y a su papel de informar a los ciudadanos sobre las opciones políticas, con un sentido de equidad e imparcialidad, lo cual contribuiría significativamente a crear el clima más apropiado para que se realicen con éxito los procesos electorales y referendos previstos en el Artículo 72 de la Constitución.

15. Asumimos que en la Constitución y en las Leyes de la República se prevén los requisitos y mecanismos idóneos y necesarios para que proceda, por parte de la Autoridad Pública competente, la financiación oportuna de los referendos revocatorios y cualquier otro mecanismo de consulta popular, que deban efectuarse una vez autorizada su procedencia por el órgano público competente. En lo referente el Plan República, éste será activado ante la solicitud de las autoridades electorales, en los mismos términos y condiciones en que habitualmente ha sido ejecutado en procesos electorales anteriores.

16. La OEA, el Centro Carter y las Naciones Unidas, han manifestado su disposición a prestar la asistencia técnica que les sea requerida por las autoridades competentes de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, para la realización de cualquier tipo de consulta electoral, ajustándose cualquier requerimiento al principio de la legalidad contenido en la Constitución de la República. Esta asistencia técnica podría incluir desde las actividades preparatorias o pre-electorales hasta las actividades propias de observación electoral. En lo referente al apoyo directo que se le puede prestar al CNE, es importante resaltar la voluntad de colaboración, tanto con recursos humanos como materiales, que estas tres organizaciones han ofrecido.

17. La fecha en la que deberán realizarse los referendos revocatorios ya solicitados, así como aquellos que puedan llegar a solicitarse, la determinará el CNE, una vez cumplidos los requisitos legales y constitucionales pertinentes, y en forma que resulte diligente y oportuna, conforme a la Ley Orgánica del Sufragio y Participación Política, comprometiéndonos a no proponer ni impulsar modificaciones a dicha norma.

18. Las partes reconocemos el apoyo y la facilitación que han prestado a esta Mesa los representantes de la OEA, particularmente su Secretario General, el Centro Carter y el PNUD, que con la firma de este Acuerdo culmina constructivamente su función. Reconocemos la importancia de la labor de acompañamiento que estas instituciones pueden cumplir en el futuro para la materialización de este Acuerdo y expresamos nuestra voluntad de seguir contando con la colaboración internacional.

19. Finalmente, ambas partes convienen crear el Enlace permanente establecido en el apartado 7) de la Declaración contra la Violencia por la Paz y la Democracia, designando cada una dos representantes, con el fin de abrir canales de comunicación y ejercer acciones dirigidas al cumplimiento efectivo de los contenidos de dicha Declaración y de este acuerdo, manteniendo el contacto con la facilitación internacional cuando lo consideren necesario.

Caracas, 23 de mayo de 2003

PL07004E06

Los Miembros de la Mesa

José Vicente Rangel	Timoteo Zambrano
Roy Chaderton Matos	Alejandro Armas
María Cristina Iglesias	Manuel Cova
Ronald Blanco La Cruz	Américo Martín
Nicolás Maduro	Eduardo Lapi

Los Facilitadores

César Gaviria
(OEA)

Francisco Diez
(Centro Carter)

Antonio Molpeceres
(PNUD)

Los Asesores

Omar Meza Ramírez

Juan Manuel Raffalli

[1]. This proposal was presented to the European Commission, which agreed to contribute €600,000 for its implementation.

[2]. This is composed of experts in facilitation and dialogue promotion, and more specifically, experts in specialized issues on the agenda of the Forum, sponsored by international agencies that are members of the tripartite group (OAS - Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Carter Center and the UNDP).

II. Invitation

III. Design and conduct of the preparatory missions

First Tripartite Mission

Mission of the Secretary General

IV. The domestic context before the establishment of the Forum

ANEXO 4

DECLARACIÓN DE PRINCIPIOS
POR LA PAZ Y LA DEMOCRACIA EN VENEZUELA

DECLARACIÓN DE PRINCIPIOS
POR LA PAZ Y LA DEMOCRACIA EN VENEZUELA

II. Invitation

III. Design and conduct of the preparatory missions

First Tripartite Mission

Mission of the Secretary General

IV. The domestic context before the establishment of the Forum

ANEXO 4

DECLARACIÓN DE PRINCIPIOS POR LA PAZ Y LA DEMOCRACIA EN VENEZUELA

DECLARACIÓN DE PRINCIPIOS POR LA PAZ Y LA DEMOCRACIA EN VENEZUELA

DECLARACIÓN DE PRINCIPIOS
POR LA PAZ Y LA DEMOCRACIA EN VENEZUELA

DECLARACIÓN DE PRINCIPIOS
POR LA PAZ Y LA DEMOCRACIA EN VENEZUELA