FIRST REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL

ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION CP/RES. 822

September 4 – November 4, 2002

In August 2000, at the invitation of the Government of Haiti, the OAS agreed to facilitate a process of negotiation/dialogue among Haitian political parties and other political actors to resolve a post-electoral crisis caused by contested legislative, municipal and local elections in May 2000. The process which continued over almost two years was impeded by violent incidents on July 28, 2001, on December 3, 2001, and again on December 17, 2001 when heavily armed individuals attacked the National Palace in Port-au-Prince followed by attacks on the headquarters of the opposition and the residences of its leadership and others.

On January 16, 2002 the Permanent Council of the OAS approved CP/RES.806 which aimed in paragraph 4 to foster a climate conducive to the resumption of the negotiations to end what by that time had broadened into a political crisis. The Resolution also established a Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti.

The OAS mediating team experienced difficulties in its efforts to encourage a solution to the crisis. Meanwhile the country faced a deterioration in the climate of security and a possible humanitarian disaster. The exigencies of the situation led to a decision, based on those practical considerations, to refer the matter to the Permanent Council. On September 4, 2002 the Council approved CP/RES.822 which encapsulated elements of the Draft Initial Accord [1]^/and gave an opening to the Government of Haiti to establish a more secure and enabling environment to hold credible elections in 2003 and to normalize the country’s relations with the international financial institutions.

Paragraphs 3 to 8 of the Resolution relate to obligations or commitments assumed by the Government of Haiti, regarding inter alia: (a) implementation of the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry into the violent incidents in the country on December 17, 2001 and the recommendations of an Advisory Council on Reparations for victims of the violence; (b) disarmament, (c) implementation of Resolution 806 and (d) establishment, in collaboration with a number of other sectors, of a credible Provisional Electoral Council to organize and manage “free, fair and technically feasible legislative and local elections, on a date in 2003 to be established by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) in which all political parties can participate freely and securely”.

Paragraphs 9 – 16 relate to obligations assumed by the Special Mission, the OAS and the wider international community, including: (a) provision of technical assistance to the Government of Haiti in a range of areas; (b) normalization of economic relations with the international financial institutions and (c) supporting, monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the Resolution.

An essential constituent of the Resolution is the creation of a credible, neutral and independent Provisional Electoral Council. The basis for the focus on that institution lay in the belief that a new one formed in accordance with the formula outlined in the Draft Initial Accord would offer the opportunity to overcome the serious deficiencies which called into question the credibility of the legislative and local elections of 2000.

The extensive consultations on the formation of the CEP since approval of Resolution 822 yielded an emerging coincidence of views on the importance of constituting the institution and a need to take action on a number of key issues relating to security that would facilitate the achievement of this objective. However, as a matter of practice, up to November 4 the Government has focused most of its attention since the adoption of Resolution 822 on the formation of the CEP and the matter of reparations, rather than also on its obligations in relation to other key provisions of the Resolution, such as implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, including in cases where the Commission of Inquiry provided the legal basis or laid some evidential foundation to proceed.

This report provides the status of the implementation of Resolution 822 over the period September 4 – November 4, 2002. The italicized portions quote the paragraphs and provisions of the Resolution. It includes the following annexes:

Annex A: Letter dated October 29 from the Prime Minister to the Special Mission, and the Mission’s October 31 response, regarding the provision of technical assistance to Haiti in all areas of the mandate of the Special Mission.

Annex B: Letter dated November 4 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Haiti to the Head of the Special Mission, transmitting the Report “Implementation of OAS Resolutions CP/RES.806 (1303/02) and CP/RES.822 (1331/02), as of November 4, 2002”

Annex C: Letter dated November 4 to the Head of the Special Mission from the leaders of the Convergence Démocratique, providing their assessment of the implementation of Resolution 822 by the government.

Annex D: Letter dated November 4, requesting a fifteen day extension in the time frame for naming the Provisional Electoral Council, to the President of Haiti from five of the entities which are to name members of that Council in accordance with the Draft Initial Accord (Revision 9 dated June 12, 2002).

OBLIGATIONS/COMMITMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI

The Resolution outlines with much specificity, a number of fundamental commitments and obligations assumed by the Government of Haiti.

Paragraph 3 To welcome the Government of Haiti’s expressed commitment to implement the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry as well as the recommendations of the Advisory Council on Reparations, as reflected in the Accord signed by the Minister of Justice, Claimants and their Representatives on July 9, 2002, and to call on the Government of Haiti to do so as soon as possible.

The Commission of Inquiry presented its report on June 20, 2002. Discussion of individual elements is provided in the specific sections below.

Reparations: On the basis of the July 9 agreement between the Minister of Justice and the Claimants and their Representatives, reparations have been paid to Mr. Reynold Georges, leader of ALAH, a former coalition partner of MPSN (a constituent of Convergence Démocratique) and were offered to Evans Paul, leader of KID, a coalition partner of Espace de Concertation (another constituent of CD). Partial payment has also been made to Mr. Luc Mésadieu and Pastor Sylvio Dieudonné, leaders of MOCHRENA (a third constituent of CD). The Mission has been advised by the Government, informally, that discussions are ongoing with that party on a number of additional claims. The same government source informed the Mission that negotiations have been completed with Victor Benoit, leader of KONAKOM (a fourth constituent of CD) to settle claims in relation to losses suffered by himself and his party.

The government reports that as of November 4, 34 million gourdes (approximately US$963,719.00[2]^/) have been allocated to satisfy the claims of four of the five political parties and their leaders, all signatory of the July 9 agreement with the Minister of Justice and that US$ 150,000 is available for the French Institute of Haiti.

Disappointingly, however, the matter is not wholly resolved. Negotiations are still ongoing with the OPL which has submitted a claim for all the victims affiliated to it throughout the country. It also appears as of November 4 that matters were not yet fully completed with KONAKOM. Moreover, there appear to be some thirty other individuals who are listed in the Report of the Advisory Council on Reparations and whose cases have not yet received much attention.

The Government has proposed in unspecified terms as of November 4, the creation of a Fund for the victims. To ensure greater transparency and to avoid any charges of manipulation of the process for political advantage, the Special Mission has suggested to the government that a mechanism could be devised to handle the matter neutrally and at arms length, for example by assigning it to a reputable international accounting firm to settle claims on the basis of the recommendations of the Advisory Council on Reparations, within a specified, short, time frame.

Paragraph 4.a To publish within 60 days of receipt of the Commission of Inquiry Report a report by the Minister of Justice on actions taken with respect to persons found to be implicated in the events of December 17, 2001 and subsequent days;

On September 11, 2002 the Government of Haiti published a report characterized as “preliminary” from the Minister of Justice. The report demonstrated that very little had been done to carry out the Government’s obligations. The Special Mission advised the President of Haiti on October 3 that the Report was inadequate. The President emphasized that it was preliminary and that the Government intended to follow up soon. The Mission underlined to the President the importance of action on this front, both in its own right and in view of its relevance for the formation of a credible CEP.

At the beginning of November, the Ministry of Justice published another report (see Annex B) which demonstrated that some further steps have been taken since in Port-au-Prince. Overall, action on this front has been slow and weak, especially outside Port au Prince, and no cases have been concluded.

Paragraph 4.b To strengthen its disarmament policies and programs and, in this regard, invite the active cooperation of the International Community, through the OAS Special Mission, in the development and implementation of a comprehensive disarmament program;

On October 3, 2002 the Special Mission, while recognizing that the primary responsibility on disarmament rested with the government, proposed to the President the creation of a mixed team (Government/Special Mission) to devise a National Plan on Disarmament, and to implement the resulting national disarmament program.

Since then, efforts have been underway to facilitate a dialogue between the Government and other sectors of the Haitian society to deal with this critical issue. A seminar on disarmament was conducted by the Special Mission on October 28-29, 2002 in Port-au-Prince, with the cooperation and assistance of the UNDP, to raise awareness of the effects of the proliferation of arms in Haiti and how the attendant rise in violence contributed to insecurity and lawlessness in the country. The event also provided an opportunity for Haitians to hear lessons learned and experiences from international experts who have managed disarmament programs in other countries such as Brazil, Bosnia, Albania and El Salvador. A number of recommendations emanated from the discussions which will be considered when developing a National Disarmament Plan for Haiti.

The November 4 Report of the Government (Annex B) outlines actions taken by the government in its campaigns against illegal arms and against drug trafficking. As receipt of this document coincided with the end of the reporting period, the Mission has not been able to conduct an independent verification of the information reported in the document regarding collection of arms, including the sharp variations in the numbers reported. The report regarding drug matters broadly coincides with information available to the Mission.

Paragraph 4c. To implement, to the fullest extent of its lawful authority, all the Recommendations on Human Rights and the Press set forth in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of December 17, 2001, and all other Recommendations in the Report that are, in whole or in part, directed to it.

The Government has not yet discharged its extensive obligations under this provision.

Meanwhile, the human rights picture over the period has been mixed. On the one hand, a September 19 student demonstration over governance at the State University took place without incident and with appropriate police accompaniment, contrary to earlier attempts. There were several signs of increased government support for the prison system, including the pressing issue of pre-trial detainees.

On the other hand, there were a worrying number of disappearances, so far unexplained by the police, including local leaders in Martissant in September, two members of an opposition political party in October, and a senior police officer from the Palace security detail in late October, among others. There have been several high profile cases of difficulty over exercise of the habeas corpus provision of the constitution, e.g. former president Prosper Avril and Rosemond Jean (spokesman for victims in the ongoing savings and loan cooperatives financial crash), both of whom remained in prison as of November 4 despite protests regarding their detention and legal efforts on their behalf.

Concern over press freedom continued during the reporting period. A leading radio station in Port au Prince, Radio Kiskeya, in late September shut down for several days due to what it called highly credible information that the station would be attacked. There was a large mobilization of support, including visits by government leaders, and the threats did not materialize. Other radio stations were also threatened during that period. At the same time, there has been a debate involving the President of Haiti among others, as to the role and responsibility of journalists. The Special Mission spoke out on several occasions in defence of freedom of speech, as had the OAS Special Rapporteur on September 4 following his August visit to the country.

Paragraph 5a. The restoration of a climate of security;

This commitment has been an essential element of every Resolution on Haiti, expressly or by implication, since August 2000. Nevertheless, the security situation overall has not changed significantly in recent months, including since the approval of Resolution 822. For example, police figures available to the Mission indicate that during the period June through September 2002 total cases handled remained roughly stable (varying between some 480 and 580 per month), assassinations tended to rise (to 38 in September), other assaults and kidnappings declined, but armed robbery was stable.

The problems arise out of: (a) the activities of gangs and of armed groups, officials and individuals, in some cases with political affiliations; (b) an increase in the number of private security agents because of the widespread perception that the government is unable to assure the security and protection of all its citizens; (c) high level of delinquency on account of the socio-economic conditions; (d) impunity due to the weakness of the judicial system; (e) weakness of the Haitian National Police which is attributed to gaps at the leadership and management levels, insufficient and inadequately trained manpower, alleged political manipulation and corruption, and lack of materiel and equipment.

There have been a significant number of serious incidents over the recent months in Port-au-Prince and its suburbs, and in other cities and towns. Tire burnings, local clashes, including deaths and other disruptions, occur often enough to cause understandable concern to ordinary citizens. Major confrontations have occurred in Gonaives, Cité Soleil, and Martissant. Individuals have disappeared or been threatened. The police have not re-arrested Amiot Métayer or most of the others who escaped jail with him on August 2 (see impunity in paragraph 6 below).

Paragraph 5b. The effective prosecution of any person, and dismissal, when appropriate, of any person found to be author of or accomplice in the violence of December 17, 2001, and subsequent days;

As indicated in paragraph 4 (a) above there has not been much action pursuant to this provision. The Port au Prince government prosecutor’s office has sought further information from the investigating judge. The Government’s report of November 4 could lead a reader to think that gaps in the handling of this matter may cause additional delays in the future. Beyond Port-au-Prince there are no activities worthy of mention during this reporting period.

Since the adoption of Resolution 822, there is no evidence known to the Mission that there have so far been any actual arrests or prosecution of persons mentioned in the Commission of Inquiry report for having taken part in the violence on December 17, 2001 and subsequent days.

Paragraph 5c. The completion of a thorough inquiry into all politically-motivated crimes;

There has been some action in the Brignol Lindor case: it reached the end of the investigative stage of the proceedings, and ten individuals were charged for commission of the crime. However, Lindor’s representatives have lodged an appeal against the indictment report of the investigating judge. If progress thus far is any indication, it seems that the case is far from being resolved.

The investigating judge, Bernard St-Vil, now in charge of the case of Jean Dominique and Jean Claude Louissaint, has conducted some judicial proceedings since September 4 and, as stated in the Government’s report of November 4, is understood to plan to complete his investigation by the end of 2002. The case thus remains unresolved, two and a half years after the journalist was murdered.[3]^/

Except for the case of Marc André Diogène (a former Fanmi Lavalas Deputy of Gonaive Circonscription) in which there appears to have some activities by the investigative judge, there is no evidence of any concrete action since the adoption of Resolution 822 on almost all the similar cases in this category, such as those on the following non-exhaustive list which the opposition leaders raised with President Aristide in a face-to-face meeting on June 15, 2002 at the residence of the Papal Nuncio:Remy Darant, Mireille Durocher Bertin, Pasteur Antoine Leroy, Jacques Florival, Deputy Jean Hubert Feuillé, Senator Yvon Toussaint, Father Jean Pierre-Louis, Colonel Jean Lamy, Colonel Max Mayard. The list was forwarded to the Ministry of Justice on June 17, 2002.

Paragraph 5d. Prompt reparation for organizations and individuals who suffered damages as a direct result of the violence of December 17, 2001.

This matter has been dealt with under resolutive paragraph 3 above.

Paragraph 6. To urge the Government of Haiti that, with a view to establishing the conditions for elections to be held in 2003, it renew efforts to ensure a climate of security and confidence within the parameters established in operative paragraph 5 of AG/RES. 1841 (XXXII-O/02), bearing in mind the need to strengthen independent police and judicial institutions as part of its renewed efforts to combat impunity as called for in paragraph 6 of AG/RES. 1841 (XXXII-O/02).

Regarding a climate of security, see section 5.a.

Police: Regarding the Police, see also section 5.a. The Special Mission is contributing substantially toward the training of the 14^th Promotion of new recruits, which should add over 800 new officers to the manpower level of the Haitian National Police. However, much more needs to be done to improve the institution to deal with a climate of insecurity which has been aggravated by violence linked in part to gang activity, drug trafficking and politically motivated thuggery and criminality. Some of these problems have surfaced within the past weeks in Martissant, Cité Soleil, Gonaives, Cap-Haitien and other parts of the country.

The weakness of the police has been demonstrated further by its failure to deal with or to at least offer some explanation for the disappearance of a number of persons, a matter which has caused considerable disquiet among the population.

Judiciary: The Minister of Justice resigned on September 25, apparently due to various difficulties. The frequently diagnosed problems of the judiciary remain, despite a promising reform plan prepared by the last Minister of Justice. Those problems include lack of independence of the Judiciary, impunity, limited access to the justice system, inadequate training and lack of resources.

Impunity: The incidence of impunity has been cited as a major deficiency in the administration of justice in Haiti, especially as it relates to a number of high profile, apparently politically motivated killings in recent years (cf. the non-exhaustive list included in paragraph 5 (c) above). The issue has been aggravated by the violent escape of Amiot Metayer from the Gonaives prison in August 2002. The Commission of Inquiry alleged that he was a principal perpetrator of violent activities on December 17, 2001. He appears now to be living quietly but openly in Gonaives, reinforcing the impression of a pattern of weakness by the police compounded by indications of appeasement of high profile criminals.

Paragraph 7a. The formation of an autonomous, independent, credible and neutral CEP no later than two months after adoption of this resolution;

Under the terms of Part IV of the Draft Interim Accord (DIA), which was incorporated by reference into resolution 822, nine Haitian entities were each to propose one candidate to be named to the Council by the President of the Republic.

Apparently two of these entities – the governing party, Fanmi Lavalas, and the judiciary – have sent the President names, which are uncontested within their ranks. The major opposition group, Convergence démocratique, contends as of November 4 that the government has not met its obligations under resolution 822 and, hence, is not presenting a candidate.

The grouping of the other political parties, which are neither Fanmi Lavalas nor Convergence Democratique, but which covers about 60 to 80 political parties, is badly split: one subgroup has sent in a name; another subgroup claims to be the only proper representative but says this is not the time. A third group contests the propriety of the second group, and there may be further division.

The other five entities that have generally worked together in recent weeks comprise three religious groupings – Catholic, Episcopal, and Protestant – the grouping of human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) coordinated by Justice et Paix, and the business community coordinated by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Haiti (CCIH). They first insisted that the government ask the Organization of American States, through the Special Mission, for technical assistance to provide security for elections and for disarmament. The government did so on October 29 and the Special Mission responded positively in the name of the Organization, but the five are seeking additional information and details from the government prior to providing the names, which they state they have selected already. To this end, with the deadline of November 4, 2002 upon them, they proposed in a letter dated November 4, 2002 an extension of the time period for 15 days (see Annex D). As of November 4 further discussions were in prospect.

Paragraph 7b. The establishment by the CEP, within the parameters of Haitian law and no later than 30 days after the formation of the CEP, of a Electoral Guarantees Commission (CGE), which shall be comprised of, inter alia, representatives of a national coordination body formed on the basis of experience of coordinating electoral observation in Haiti and of civil society organizations, and witnessed by representatives of electoral observation mission and the OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti;

Awaits formation of the CEP.

Paragraph 7c. The monitoring by the CEP of the activities of the police in connection with the electoral process.

Awaits formation of the CEP.

Paragraph 8. To further recognize the urgency of forming the CEP, in accordance with the process proposed by the OAS in the Draft Initial Accord (Rev. 9) of June 12, 2002, no later than two months after adoption of this resolution.

This paragraph should be read in conjunction with paragraph 9.

Over the period October 3 to 21, 2002 the Head and Deputy Chief of the Special Mission held meetings with President Aristide (October 3), Representatives of Convergence Démocratique (October 7), Mr. Maurice Lafortune, President of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce (October 10), Pastor Edouard Paultre, Fédération Protestante d’Haiti (October 11, Mgr. Jean Zaché Duracin, Chef des Eglises Anglicanes (October 11) and Maitre Boniface Alexandre, President of the Cour de Cassation (October 14), Father Jean Hanssens of Justice et Paix (human rights organizations) – October 16 and the Other Political Parties (October 21). The purpose of the meetings was to discuss the role of those institutions in the formation of the new CEP, in accordance with the formula agreed upon in the Draft Initial Accord (Rev. 9).

The delegation emphasized to the representatives the importance of putting a credible CEP in place to manage the electoral process. It advised that the principal role in implementation of Resolution 822 was assigned to the government but in relation to the CEP the nine institutions – the churches, FL, CD etc. had a major role to play and that the Special Mission was using its good offices as facilitator to consult and assist as they

pursued their internal processes to play the critical role assigned to them.

The Mission continued to meet with various actors and institutions up to November 4.

OBLIGATIONS OF THE OAS

Paragraph 9. To offer the Government of Haiti, political parties, and civil society the support and technical assistance of the Organization of American States that is required to facilitate the process of forming the CEP and preparing for and holding these elections.

All the institutions designated in the Draft Initial Accord to nominate candidates for the formation of the CEP, with the exception of the Fanmi Lavalas and the judiciary expressed serious concerns about the climate of insecurity in the country and its implications for an electoral campaign.

Those concerns were raised in letters dated October 10, 2002 to the President of Haiti and October 26, 2002 to the Head of the Special Mission respectively from the five institutions cited in paragraph 7 (a).

The institutions indicated that they had selected their candidates for the Electoral Council but before formally presenting them they called on the government to request of the OAS, technical assistance to help implement the provisions of Resolutions 806 and 822. They advised that such request was necessary to have assurances that international assistance would be forthcoming for elections security and on disarmament.

Following discussions begun much earlier between the government and the Special Mission with a view to overcoming the slow rate of progress in the cooperation envisaged when the Special Mission was established in April 2002, by a letter dated October 29, 2002 the Prime Minister officially requested, and in his response of October 31, 2002 the Head of the Special Mission agreed to provide, technical assistance to the government of Haiti in all the areas covered in the Resolutions, i.e. elections including election security, professionalization of the police, disarmament, justice, human rights, and governance. The letters are attached at Annex A to this report. Work is underway to prepare the terms of reference for the technical assistance in each area and to establish joint committees to carry out the work involved.

Paragraph 10. To encourage all Haitian parties to participate in all relevant aspects of those elections and in the electoral process leading up to it.

The Special Mission has repeatedly encouraged all parties concerned, in public and private, to play their full role. It has emphasized that no one is excluded and all must participate in order to ensure a credible process.

In late October the Group of Friends of the OAS Secretary General for Haiti met with President Aristide to stress their concern that the necessary steps be taken pursuant to the government’s obligations under Resolution 822 in order to facilitate the formation of a credible CEP by November 4, thus paving the way for the holding of satisfactory elections in 2003. The President took advantage of the opportunity to underline the importance of resumption of international assistance for Haiti, in order to assist it to meet those undertakings in accordance with Resolution 822.

Paragraph 11. To support normalization of economic cooperation between the Government of Haiti and the international financial institutions and urge those parties to resolve the technical and financial obstacles that preclude such normalization.

Pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 822, discussions have taken place between Haiti and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in particular, which sent a mission to Haiti, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Informal consultations among donors have been scheduled by the World Bank for December 9, 2002 in Washington, D.C.

The Government of Haiti has been critical of the international community for, in its view, not responding more actively or quickly enough to Haiti’s needs. It should be noted that there are serious absorptive capacity problems and donor concerns about the use and application of resources exist and should be met. Resolution 822 urged all concerned to resolve these problems, and it is therefore imperative that the IFIs must work harder with the Government of Haiti to find creative ways to overcome technical obstacles and enable multilateral flows to resume.

On September 30, 2002, the Haitian Delegation to the IMF and World Bank Annual meetings met with the Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean and the Country Director or the Caribbean. At the meeting, the Bank informed the delegation that a resumption of IDA grants and loans will be contingent on the clearance of arrears. The Bank encouraged the government to reach an agreement with the IMF on a Staff Monitored Program. At the government's request, the World Bank agreed to send a mission to Haiti, at a date to be determined, to discuss the government's development priorities, consult the authorities on the Bank's proposed Transitional Support Strategy, and discuss options for the clearance of arrears.

The World Bank has been in discussions with the IMF and IDB to evaluate options for a coordinated and comprehensive plan for the clearance of arrears. The World Bank will be chairing an informal donors meeting in Washington D.C. in early December 2002. During this meeting, donors are expected to discuss developments in Haiti and the feasibility of organizing a Consultative Group meeting for early 2003.

Further to the information provided in CP/doc. 3643/02 corr.1 of 28 August 2002, concerning the Interamerican Development Bank, the Bank has advised that on the basis of Resolution. 822, it has received instructions from its Board to advance on the necessary technical work with the Government of Haiti with a view to reactivate lending. At the time of the preparation of this report, the Bank’s second technical mission to Haiti was being prepared and was scheduled for the third week of November, 2002.

Paragraph 12. To reaffirm the mandates of the Secretary General and the OAS Special Mission in accordance with AG/RES. 1841 (XXXII-O/02), AG/RES. 1831 (XXXI-O/01), and CP/RES.806 (1303/02 corr.1) and to instruct the Sec